WAR AND DEMOCRACY

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Essays on the Causes and Prevention of War

By

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PREFATORY NOTE

A NEW symposium on any subject requires a special defence. The treatment of any topic by a single mind and a single pen is *prima facie* more satisfactory. But our age is one of rapid specialization in the social studies, and it is becoming every day less possible for one man or one specialist to deal adequately with any part or problem of society. That is the sole justification for this book. It consists in a group of papers treating of widely different subjects, but all bearing upon one social problem—the causation and prevention of war. These papers, all of them relevant, could not all have been written by any one of the contributors. This book is, therefore, a primitive experiment in intellectual co-operation.

The authors lay no claim to any unity in the detail of their views. They are individually and not collectively responsible for the articles they have signed. No detailed discussions preceded the composition of the articles. The only unity in them has arisen from the fact that the authors occupy the same general political position. They are democratic Socialists. They are all active members of the Labour Party. All were contributors to an earlier symposium.[1] And they have been surprised to find the extent to which their views, independently stated and derived from separate studies and divergent interests, are, in fact, in harmony. The essays exhibit a spontaneous and interesting consensus of opinion.

The book falls into three rough divisions, although all the papers are self-contained. The first part of the book is psychological. It is written by Dr. Bowlby and Mr. Durbin and it attemps to summarize and analyse the non-historical evidence (ecological, psychological, and anthropological) about the causes of fighting. The second part is historical. Ivor Thomas has surveyed the different causes of international war in the nineteenth century. Douglas Jay discusses the

[1] *New Trends in Socialism*, ed. by G. Catlin, 1935.

relation between nationalism and capitalism during the same period. The third and last part of the book is political. Robert Fraser considers the relation of the use of force to the preservation of peace, while Richard Crossman analyses the choices of foreign policy for a pacific power confronted by the threat of aggressive military dictatorship. George Catlin concludes the book by a review and assessment of the various available policies for the prevention of war in general and under our specific contemporary conditions.

The authors make no claim for comprehensiveness. No question upon which they touch has been fully treated. The historical and other evidence is already so voluminous that a book three times the length of this would be required to survey it. They can only hope that what they have to say, and the simple political conclusions that are implicit in what they say, may stimulate further discussion and help to stir the deep springs of action in our slow-moving and slow-thinking democracy before it is too late.

E. F. M. D.
G. E. G. C.

PART I

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by

E. F. M. DURBIN AND JOHN BOWLBY

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An Examination of the Psychological and Anthropological Evidence

PERSONAL AGGRESSIVENESS AND WAR

I

THE purpose of this article is to examine the bearing of some recent biological and psychological work upon the theories of the cause of war.

The authors hold that war—or organized fighting between large groups of adult human beings—must be regarded as one species of a larger genus, the genus of *fighting*. Fighting is plainly a common, indeed a universal, form of human behaviour. It extends beyond the borders of humanity into the types of mammals most closely related in the evolutionary classification to the common ancestors of man and other apes. War between groups within the nation and between nations are obvious and important examples of this type of behaviour. Since this is so, it must of necessity follow that the simplest and most general causes of war are only to be found in the causes of fighting, just as the simplest and most general causes of falling downstairs are to be found in the causes of falling down.

Such a simple thesis could hardly be expected to contain any important conclusion. Yet if the causes of war are to be found in their simplest form only in phenomena more widely dispersed in space and time than comparatively recent forms of political and economic organization, like the nation State and the capitalist system, it must surely follow that theories tracing the cause of war either to ‘ capitalism ’ or ‘ nationalism ’ can only at the best contain part of the truth. Nevertheless, it is theories of this kind that are fashionable in the current discussions of the cause of war.

We shall revert at length to the bearing of our own views upon these theories. In the meantime, it is our primary task to examine some of the evidence recently collected on the extent and causes of fighting. The procedure that we propose to follow is to summarize and analyse the descriptive work that has been done upon fighting among apes, children, and civilized adults in the Appendix, and to use the conclusions

to be derived from that work in the argument of this article. The empirical evidence that is available is far from complete, but we think that it is more than sufficient to sustain a number of most important conclusions about the effective causes of war.

Fighting, as we have already pointed out, is a form of behaviour widely distributed through history and nature. It occurs in the form of group conflict throughout recorded time. It takes place spasmodically between individuals in civilized countries. It occurs among primitives, among children, and among apes. Whether one looks back through time or downwards to simpler forms of social organization, it is a common practice for individuals or groups to seek to change their environment by force, and for other individuals and groups to meet force with force.

But fighting, or the appeal to force, while universal in distribution, is not continuous in time. The most warlike groups and the most aggressive individuals spend considerable periods in peaceful toleration of, and positive co-operation with, other animals or persons. Most organized communities have enjoyed longer periods of peace than of war. The greater part of human activity—of man-hours—is spent, not in war, but in peaceful co-operation. The scientific problem is, therefore, twofold—why is there peaceful co-operation and why does peaceful co-operation sometimes break down into war? The practical problem—at least, for lovers of peace—is how peaceful co-operation is to be preserved against the universal tendency exhibited in history for it to degenerate into war.

Peaceful Co-operation

What, then, are the simplest causes of peaceful co-operation? Here it is necessary to distinguish between groups with and without 'government'—that is, an apparatus of force constructed with the conscious and explicit purpose of preserving peace within the group. Clearly, the existence of a powerful organization taking action to preserve peace itself constitutes a strong and immediate cause for the appearance of peace.[1] With the consequence of this obvious point we shall

[1] We feel unable to accept Dr. Glover's rather casual rejection of instruments of government and collective security as a means of preserving peace. (See

be concerned at the end of this article. For the moment, however, we are interested in a prior and more fundamental question. What are the causes of peace in a group without government or any effective machinery for the restraint of fighting? Why do animals co-operate in the absence of any agent powerful enough to prevent them from fighting?

Now a survey of the life of mammals in general, and of apes and men in particular,[1] suggests that the causes of peace in the absence of government are, for the extra-familial group,[2] of three main kinds:

1. The obvious, most important, and overwhelming advantage to be derived from peace lies in the division of labour and the possibility of thus achieving purposes desired by the individual but obtainable only by active co-operation with others. This is so plain in the case of adult human society that the point is scarcely worth elaborating. The whole of the difference in the variety of satisfactions open to the individual in isolation and the same person in the active membership of a peaceful society, measures the advantages to be derived from continuous co-operation between adults. The extent of co-operation in any groups other than adult human societies is, of course, much more limited. But groups of children co-operate in simple tasks and in games that require a specialization of function between the individual members of the group. And there is some evidence to suggest that apes exhibit still simpler forms of co-operation and that even mammals who hunt and live in herds develop simple differentiation of function for various common purposes of defence or attack[3].

Co-operation extends enormously the opportunities for life and satisfaction within groups that have developed it. It

Glover, *The Dangers of being Human.*) We feel that he does not appreciate the strength of the will to co-operate expressed in them. We shall consider this point at some length at the end of Part III of this article.

[1] See Appendix *passim*.

[2] We have not concerned ourselves with the reasons for peace within the family, (*a*) because it leads at once to the rather different question of the nature of sexual and familial ties; (*b*) because the family usually exhibits the phenomenon of patriarchal and matriarchal authority.

[3] This last point is not universally conceded by the students of animal behaviour. Apes appear to scratch each other and some herds of herbivores seem to maintain a system of outposts and sentries. But it has been denied that these phenomena can be compared with the purposive co-operation found in human society. The conflict of view could only be resolved by further investigation.

is reasonable to presume that these advantages are also *ca*
of co-operation, since many of the results of co-operat
are of survival value. In any case, few persons would w
to deny that the sovereign advantages of co-operation are
adult human beings one of the main causes of volunt
peace.

2. In the case of apes, there is also evidence that sa
faction is found in the mere presence of others of the sa
species.[1] Whether this satisfaction is exclusively sexual—i
whether the advantage lies in the possibility of varied relati
with the opposite sex—there is not sufficient evidence
determine. In so far as it is sexual, such gregariousness n
easily become a source of conflict within the group. T
we shall see in a moment. But in so far as pleasure is
in the mere presence of other members of the group, th
is a force binding those members together in peace.

The counterpart of the primitive sociability of the apes
children and adult human beings is obvious. Its relations
to sexual promiscuity remains as obscure in human bei
as in apes, but the existence of a pleasure felt in the prese
of human company could scarcely be denied. Sociabilit
therefore an independent cause for the existence and stabi
of society.[2]

3. The reasons for co-operation so far mentioned are
self-regarding advantages. They derive their importa
from the existence of kinds of individual satisfaction that
only be obtained with the aid of others. We do not, howe
suppose that self-regarding ends are the sole causes of peac
co-operation. We think it obvious that in the developm
of the child there is to be traced the emergence of an inte
in others for their own sakes, a gradual but growing recogni
of the rights of others to the kinds of advantage desired
oneself; and finally in the fully developed personal relati
ships of friendship and love, the positive desire for the lo
one's happiness as a good for oneself. From reflection
logic this care for the good of others can make the com
good a personal end. The existence of a general desire
the common good is clearly a force making for peace in a

[1] See Appendix.
[2] We feel it unnecessary to argue the obscure and rather formal contro
as to whether there is a specific 'herd instinct.'

society. But its power will only extend as far as the idea of the common good extends. If the common good is only felt to reach to the limits of a racial, or a geographic, or a social group, there will be no force in this recognition of the common good within the group to prevent the use of force outside and on behalf of it.

All this is very important, but it is also very obvious. It is indeed the common-place of pacifist literature. It is never difficult to find reasons for peaceful co-operation. And with such overwhelming advantages in its favour, the real problem is why peace so frequently degenerates into fighting. It is consequently much more in the study of the actual breakdown of peaceful co-operation among apes and children and grown-up people that recent descriptive work has brought new light. The work that we think to be of greatest interest falls into two parts. There is first the careful work of observation that has been carried out by Doctor Zuckermann on apes, and on children by Dr. Susan Isaacs. This does much to throw into clear perspective the most primitive causes for aggression and fighting in the absence of government. The second clue to the puzzle is to be found, in our opinion, in the mass of descriptive material laid bare by the anthropologist and in the case-papers of patients treated by the therapeutic technique of psycho-analysis. We, therefore, propose to distinguish in our brief survey between the simple causes and forms of aggressive behaviour common to apes and to human beings on the one hand and the more complicated forms exhibited by human beings alone, on the other. For an account of the complications added by the faculties of the adult human mind, we shall offer a brief and necessarily controversial interpretation of the significance of the anthropological and psycho-analytical evidence as to the origins of personal and group aggressiveness.

The Simpler Causes of Fighting

The evidence taken from the observation of the behaviour of apes and children suggests that there are three clearly separable groups of simple causes for the outbreak of fighting and the exhibition of aggressiveness by individuals.

1. One of the most common causes of fighting among

both children and apes was over the *possession* of external objects. The disputed ownership of any desired object—food, clothes, toys, females, and the affection of others—was sufficient ground for an appeal to force. On Monkey Hill disputes over females were responsible for the deaths of thirty out of thirty-three females.[1] Two points are of particular interest to notice about these fights for possession.

In the *first* place they are often carried to such an extreme that they end in the complete destruction of the objects of common desire. Toys are torn to pieces. Females are literally torn limb from limb. So over-riding is the aggression once it has begun that it not only overflows all reasonable boundaries of selfishness but utterly destroys the object for which the struggle began and even the self for whose advantage the struggle was undertaken.

In the *second* place it is observable, at least in children, that the object for whose possession aggression is started may sometimes be desired by one person only, or merely because it is desired by someone else. There were many cases observed by Dr. Isaacs where toys and other objects which had been discarded as useless were violently defended by their owners when they became the object of some other child's desire.[2] The grounds of possessiveness may, therefore, be irrational in the sense that they are derived from inconsistent judgments of value. Whether sensible or irrational, contests over possession are commonly the occasion for the most ruthless use of force among children and apes.

One of the commonest kinds of object arousing possessive desire is the notice, goodwill, affection, and service of other members of the group. Among children one of the commonest causes of quarrelling was 'jealousy'—the desire for the exclusive possession of the interest and affection of someone else, particularly the adults in charge of the children. This form of behaviour is sometimes classified as a separate cause of conflict under the name of 'rivalry' or 'jealousy.' But, in point of fact, it seems to us that it is only one variety of possessiveness. The object of desire is not a material object

[1] See Appendix, p. 57.

[2] This finds an interesting echo in the greater world of politics. Nations will often maintain that certain colonial territories are of no advantage to them, and yet bitterly resist any proposal to hand them over to other countries; or rich people arguing that riches do not bless the rich, angrily resent any suggestion that they should be transferred to the poor.

—that is the only difference. The object is the interest and affection of other persons. What is wanted, however, is the exclusive right to that interest and affection—a property in emotions instead of in things. As subjective emotions and as causes of conflict, jealousy and rivalry are fundamentally similar to the desire for the uninterrupted possession of toys or food. Indeed, very often the persons, property in whom is desired, are the sources of toys and food.

Possessiveness is then in all its forms a common cause of fighting. If we are to look behind the mere facts of behaviour for an explanation of this phenomenon, a teleological cause is not far to seek. The exclusive right to objects of desire is a clear and simple advantage to the possessor of it. It carries with it the certainty and continuity of satisfaction. Where there is only one claimant to a good, frustration and the possibility of loss is reduced to a minimum. It is, therefore, obvious that, if the ends of the self are the only recognized ends, the whole powers of the agent, including the fullest use of his available force, will be used to establish and defend exclusive rights to possession.[1]

2. Another cause of aggression closely allied to possessiveness is the tendency for children and apes greatly to resent the *intrusion of a stranger* into their group. A new child in the class may be laughed at, isolated and disliked, and even set upon and pinched and bullied. A new monkey may be poked and bitten to death. It is interesting to note that it is only strangeness within a similarity of species that is resented. Monkeys do not mind being joined by a goat or a rat. Children do not object when animals are introduced to the group. Indeed, such novelties are often welcomed. But when monkeys meet a new monkey, or children a strange child, aggression often occurs. This suggests strongly that the reason for the aggression is fundamentally possessiveness. The competition of the newcomers is feared. The present members of the group feel that there will be more rivals for the food or the attention of the adults.

[1] This teleological rationalism does not explain the phenomenon of what we have termed irrational possessiveness. Our own explanation of the fact that a child will fight merely to possess objects because they are wanted by others is that the child in question begins to suspect that, just because someone else wants the discarded object he must have been mistaken in supposing that it was worthless. But evidence on this point is not available.

3. Finally, another common source of fighting among children is a failure or *frustration* in their own activity. A child will be prevented either by natural causes such as bad weather, or illness, or by the opposition of some adult, from doing something he wishes to do at a given moment—sail his boat or ride the bicycle. The child may also frustrate itself by failing, through lack of skill or strength, to complete successfully some desired activity. Such a child will then in the ordinary sense become 'naughty.' He will be in a bad or surly temper. And, what is of interest from our point of view, the child will indulge in aggression—attacking and fighting other children or adults. Sometimes the object of aggression will simply be the cause of frustration, a straightforward reaction. The child will kick or hit the nurse who forbids the sailing of his boat. But sometimes—indeed, frequently—the person or thing that suffers the aggression is quite irrelevant and innocent of offence. The angry child will stamp the ground or box the ears of another child when neither the ground nor the child attacked is even remotely connected with the irritation of frustration.

Of course, this kind of behaviour is so common that everyone feels it to be obvious and to constitute no serious scientific problem. That a small boy should pull his sister's hair because it is raining does not appear to the ordinary unreflecting person to be an occasion for solemn scientific enquiry. He is, as we should all say, 'in a bad temper.' Yet it is not, in fact, really obvious either why revenge should be taken on entirely innocent objects since no good to the aggressor can come of it, nor why children being miserable should seek to make others miserable also. It is just a fact of human behaviour that cannot really be deduced from any general principle of reason. But it is, as we shall see, of very great importance for our purpose. It shows how it is possible, at the simplest and most primitive level, for aggression and fighting to spring from an entirely irrelevant and partially hidden cause. Fighting to possess a desired object is straightforward and rational, however disastrous its consequences, compared with fighting that occurs because, in a different and unrelated activity, some frustration has barred the road to pleasure. The importance of this possibility for an understanding of group conflict must already be obvious.

These are the three simplest separate categories of cause we are able to observe in the evidence. One further point, however, remains to be made about the character of the fighting that occurs among apes. It is a marked characteristic of this fighting that once it has broken out anywhere it spreads with great rapidity throughout the group and draws into conflict individuals who had no part in the first quarrel and appear to have no immediate interest whatever in the outcome of the original dispute. Fighting is infectious in the highest degree. Why? It is not easy to find an answer. Whether it is that the apes who are not immediately involved feel that some advantage for themselves can be snatched from the confusion following upon the rupture of social equilibrium, or whether real advantages are involved that escape the observation of the onlooker, is not at present determined. Or it may be that the infectiousness of fighting is irrational in the same way that the irrelevant expression of aggression due to frustration is irrational. Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that fighting spreads without apparent cause or justification—that 'every dog joins a fight,' in other and older words. This excitability and the attraction which fighting may possess for its own sake is likely to be a source of great instability in any society. It is one of the most dangerous parts of our animal inheritance.

So much for the simpler forms of aggression. It is now time to consider the light thrown by anthropological and psycho-analytic evidence upon the behaviour of adult human beings.

The Further Causes of Aggressive Behaviour

So far the material from which we have sought illumination has been derived from the simple behaviour of children and apes. We must now consider more complicated behaviour. There are, as we have already pointed out, at least two relevant studies—anthropology and the case histories recorded by psycho-analysts. The present authors have most unfortunately not been able, through lack of time and assistance, to survey the vast mass of anthropological material in detail, but even such a slight study as they have been able to make suffices to show the very great importance of other causes of fighting among primitive peoples.

Before we begin this task it is necessary to make one preliminary and simple observation about the nature of adult aggression in general. It is of first importance to realise that, as far as aggressiveness and fighting is concerned, there is no noticeable improvement in the *behaviour* of adults compared with that of the most savage animals and children. If anything, it is more ruthless. The recent history of Europe establishes this conclusion with horrible insistence. There is no form of behaviour too ruthless, too brutal, too cruel for adult men and women to use against each other. Torture is becoming normal again; the knuckle-duster and the whip, other more refined instruments of flagellation, and the armoury of mental pain are the common-place instruments of prisons and concentration camps from Japan to Spain. Men and women have been shot down without trial, soaked in petrol and burned to death, beaten to unrecognisable masses of flesh and bone, hanged by the hair and hands until they die, starved and tortured with fear and hope during the 'Reigns of Terror' that have accompanied and succeeded the civil wars in Russia, Italy, Poland, Austria, Germany, and Spain. Cruelty knows no boundary of party or creed. It wears every kind of shirt. And over all of us there hangs, perpetual and menacing, the fear of war. No group of animals could be more aggressive or more ruthless in their aggression than the adult members of the human race.

Are there then no differences between the aggression of more primitive beings and that of adult men? We suggest that there are only two differences. In the *first* place the aggression of adults is normally a group activity. Murder and assault are restricted to a small criminal minority. Adults kill and torture each other only when organised into political parties, or economic classes, or religious denominations, or nation states. A moral distinction is always made between the individual killing for himself and the same individual killing for some real or supposed group interest. In the *second* place, the adult powers of imagination and reason are brought to the service of the aggressive intention. Apes and children when they fight, simply fight. Men and women first construct towering systems of theology and religion, complex analyses of racial character and class structure, or moralities of group life and virility before they kill one another. Thus they fight

for Protestantism or Mohammedanism, for the emancipation of the world proletariat or for the salvation of the Nordic culture, for nation or for king. Men will die like flies for theories and exterminate each other with every instrument of destruction for abstractions.

The differences of *behaviour* are therefore not substantial. The form is the same, the results are the same. Group fighting is even more destructive than individual fighting. A machine-gun or a bomb is no less lethal because its use can be shown to be a necessity of the Class War, or noble because it brings the light of Italian civilization to the Abyssinian peoples. Now it might be argued that there is no continuity of character between the wars of civilized people and fighting of the simpler orders. We cannot, however, see any reason for supposing so. Indeed, the only question of interest appears to us to lie in the matter of causation. Are the causes exactly the same or are they changed in any important way by the greater powers and complexity of the adult human mind?

We are therefore brought back to the question: What are the causes of aggressiveness in adult human beings? We would maintain that anthropology and psycho-analysis suggest a number of ways in which the powers of the human mind change and add to the causes of aggression. There appear to be at least three different mechanisms discernible in the material of these two sciences.

Animism

The first and most obvious of these is the cause of war revealed so very plainly by the study of primitive inter-group conflict. It consists in the universal tendency to attribute all events in the world to the deliberate activity of human or para-human *will*. All happenings, whether natural and inevitable, or human and voluntary, are attributed to the will of some being either human or anthropomorphically divine. If a thunderstorm occurs, or a hurricane visits a village, or a man is killed by a tiger, the evil is attributed either to the magic of a neighbouring tribe or the ill-will of demons and gods. In the same way, good fortune, however natural, is attributed to the deliberate intention of some other being.

This universal tendency in the human mind is termed *animism.*

It is certain that this imaginative tendency on the part of human beings leads to war. It is obvious why it should. If evil is attributed to the direct malice of neighbouring and opposing groups, the only possible protection against further evil lies in the destruction of the source of ill-will. It is, however, of great importance whether the supposed enemy is human or supernatural. If it is spiritual the natural reply will be placatory sacrifices or the harmless ritual of beating or burning or making war upon the evil spirit. The evidence discussed in the Appendix to this article shows many amusing examples of ritual warfare against the spirits undertaken by primitive peoples after some natural disaster. But if the supposed author of evil is not supernatural but human the results are neither harmless nor amusing. If the typhoon is attributed to the magic of neighbouring peoples or of dissident minorities within the tribe, then the destruction of the enemy, root and branch, is the only safe course. Hence after a thunderstorm or an accident the restless fears and hatred of the tribe will find expression in a primitive war against neighbouring tribes or the stamping out of some hapless group of victims within it. Enemies without and traitors within must be exterminated.

We think it difficult to exaggerate the frequency and importance of this cause of fighting inhuman societies of all degrees of civilization. It is a universal tendency among the simpler people of all nations to attribute evil to some person or group of persons. It is present everywhere in party politics. Every evil is loaded upon political opponents. Socialists attribute all disasters, whether economic or political, to 'capitalists' or 'the capitalist class.' Conservatives think it obvious that the last uncontrollable and world-wide depression in trade was due to the 'bad government' of the Socialists in this country. Other movements find different and more peculiar scapegoats in 'the bankers,' or 'the Jews,' or 'the Russians.' In each case what is noticeable and dangerous is that a vast power and a deep malignity is attributed to the inimical group. The supposed malignity is often purely illusory. The attributed power transcends all reality. When the open conflict of party politics is suppressed by an authoritarian regime the tendency

is exaggerated rather than reduced. Some unfortunate minority within the group—' the Jews ' or ' the Kulaks '—become the source of all evil, the scapegoat of all disaster. Or an overwhelming hatred is conceived for another nation. Out of these real terrors and derivative hatreds merciless persecutions and international wars are likely to spring.

We shall go on to show that the sources of aggression among human beings are much more complicated than either the simple causes operating in animals or this common habit of attributing everything to some human agency. Yet it should be obvious that much of the behaviour of large groups can be explained by the categories of cause we have already discussed. Possessiveness, frustration, animism are potent causes of conflict between groups—whether parties, classes or states. After we have discussed the complex history of aggression within the individual we shall have reason to revert to these simpler forms of behaviour. It seems probable that the complex character of the civilized individual undergoes a degeneration or simplification into simpler forms and simpler reactions when he is caught up into and expresses himself through the unity of the group. The behaviour of the group is in an important sense simpler and more direct than the behaviour of the individual. But in the meantime we must consider the light thrown by psycho-analysis upon the history and development of aggressive impulses in the civilized adult.

The Transformation of Aggressive Impulses—Displacement and Projection

What light does psycho-analytic evidence throw upon the problem of adult aggression? It is, of course, impossible to consider at all adequately the mass of material and theory comprised in the work of this school of psychology. Part of it is summarized in the Appendix. All that we can attempt at this point is a brief account of the main conclusions—as they appear to us—of the evidence. It is scarcely necessary to point out that our views are only one interpretation of the data, and although we think our interpretation to be the most accurate, it could only be verified by the kind of practical test that we suggest at the end of this article

We suggest tentatively therefore that the evidence of psycho-analysis justifies the following conclusions :

1. That the *primary* causes of aggression (and of peaceful co-operation) are identical with those of children and apes. The character of the *id*—or complex of instinctive impulses—does not change materially as the individual grows older. The same sources of satisfaction—food, warmth, love, society—are desired and the same sources of conflict—desire for exclusive possession of the sources of satisfaction, or aggression arising from a sense of frustration—are present. But in the life of most children there is a controlling or warping influence present in a varying degree, that of *authority*. The child is denied for various reasons—good or bad—an open and uninterrupted access to the means of its satisfaction. It is denied the breast or bottle, the toy or the company of adults at the time or to the extent that it wishes. The evidence seems overwhelming that such frustration leads to a violent reaction of fear, hatred, and aggression. The child cries or screams or bites or kicks. We are not for the moment concerned with the question whether this frustration is desirable or not. We are simply concerned with its results. The result is 'bad temper' or 'naughtiness'—a resentment of frustration. This original resentment and the aggression to which it leads we would call *simple aggression.*

Further development turns in our view, upon the way in which this simple aggression is treated. The statistically normal method of treatment is, we suggest, further frustration or *punishment.* The child is slapped or beaten or subjected to moral instruction—taught that its behaviour is wrong or wicked. Again we are not concerned with the question of the rightness or wrongness of this procedure, but only with its consequences. We suggest that the result of punishment is to present the child with a radical conflict—either he must control the expression of his simple aggression or suffer the punishment and the loss of love that simple aggression in a regime of discipline necessarily entails.

This conflict in the child is in our view an important source of aggressiveness in the adult. The conflict itself is a conflict between a fundamental tendency to resent frustration and the fear of punishment or, what is just as important, the fear of

the loss of love. To the child the parent[1] is both the source of satisfactions and the source of frustration. To express aggression is to endanger the life of the goose that lays the golden eggs. Not to express simple aggression towards original objects is the task that faces the child. Now one result of the child's attempt to resolve the conflict is called *repression.*[2] Much has been written about the nature and consequences of repression. The hypothesis of the existence and independent functioning of an unconscious mind has been elaborated to explain the analytical evidence, and a whole literature of theory has been built upon this idea. We are not here primarily concerned with psycho-analytic theory and we feel that the main contributions of the evidence to an understanding of the sources of aggressiveness can be explained quite simply. The overwhelming fact established by the evidence is that aggression, however deeply hidden or disguised, does not disappear. It appears later and in other forms. It is not destroyed. It is safe to conclude from the evidence that it cannot be destroyed. Whether we conceive simple aggression stimulated by frustration as a quantity of energy that has to be released somewhere, or whether we imagine that a secret and unconscious character is formed that is aggressive although the superficial character is peaceful, or whether we simply suppose that a certain kind of character is formed, peaceful in certain directions and aggressive in others—is a matter of comparative indifference and mainly of terminology. The fundamental fact is that the punishment of simple aggression results in the appearance of aggression in other forms. The boy, instead of striking his father whom he fears, strikes a smaller boy whom he does not fear. Disguised aggression has made the boy into a bully. The girl who dares not scream at her mother grows up to hate other women. Again a character has been formed by a simple aggressiveness that has been controlled but not destroyed. And in the same way revolutionaries who hate ordered government, nationalists who hate foreign peoples, individuals who hate bankers, Jews, or their political opponents, may be exhibiting characteristics

[1] Throughout this article we use the term 'parent' to refer to the person or persons, whoever it may be, who are responsible for looking after the child—whether they are in fact parents or nurses or aunts or teachers.

[2] The tendency to aggression is not the only thing that may be repressed. Certain other impulses that are punished or condemned by adults or repudiated by the child himself may also be repressed. Much psycho-analytic evidence and theory is concerned with the repression of these other impulses—particularly the sexual impulses.

that have been formed by the suppression of simple aggression in their childhood education.[1] These aggressive aspects of adult character and the aggressiveness to which they lead we call *transformed aggression.* It is the displaced and unrecognized fruit of suppressed simple aggression.

2. The second great contribution of psycho-analytic evidence is to show the kind of transformations that simple aggression undergoes as the adult faculties develop. The fundamental problem of the child, is, as we have seen, a double one : that of self-control and of *ambivalence.* In order to escape punishment the child must prevent its aggressive impulses from appearing—it must control its natural aggression. But this is not the whole of the problem. The parent has become for the child the object of two incompatible emotions—love and hatred. As a source of satisfaction and companionship the parent is greatly beloved. As a source of frustration and punishment the parent is greatly feared and hated. The evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that such a double attitude to one person puts a terrible emotional strain upon the child. In the growth and development of character a number of imaginative and intellectual efforts are made to alleviate or avoid the severity of this internal conflict.

One other aspect of the subjective life must be mentioned before we examine the processes by which internal strain or anxiety is reduced to a minimum—and that is the question of *moral judgment.* We are not at this juncture concerned with the theories of the origin of what the moralist calls the conscience and the psycho-analyst the *super-ego.* It is obvious that persons are deeply influenced in their behaviour and their feeling by what they think they ought to do and ought to be—their 'sense of duty.' We think it also clear from the evidence of psycho-analysis that the content of this moral sense—the total of the things a man feels to be his duty—is made up partly of objective moral judgments and partly of compulsions arising from the teaching and discipline of childhood.[2] The

[1] We are not for a moment suggesting either (*a*) that logical and objective cases cannot be argued in favour of revolutions, wars, and persecutions, or (*b*) that the positive valuation of such things as justice, liberty, and other social values may not reasonably involve a hatred of their opposites We are only suggesting that the repression of simple aggression may result in these forms of hatred. The objective cases of these schools of thought are in every case different in kind from the personal and subjective elements in their supporters' view of them.

[2] And partly of the remnants of the exaggerated and fantastic moral judgments of the child.

moral sense is neither wholly rational nor wholly subjective and irrational. It is partly the one and partly the other. But whatever the origin of the moral sense, there is conclusive evidence that it can become the source of immense burdens of shame and guilt, both to the child and to the adult. Again we think that the available evidence demonstrates beyond question that such guilt in the adult is composed partly of a sensible consciousness of moral failure, partly of an irrational fear of punishment derived from the experiences and wild imagination of childhood and partly of an half-conscious recognition of the dangerous aggressive impulses within himself. All these elements combine to make a considerable burden of guilt—acknowledged or unacknowledged—for most individuals, a burden that rises to intolerable levels for depressed and suicidal subjects.

There is, then, much support in the empirical work of character psychology for the theological doctrine of a 'man divided against himself.' Not only do we both love and hate the same people, but we are divided into an impulsive and appetitive character, only part of which we acknowledge, on the one hand, and a stern and inescapable sense of duty which is often partially unrecognized, on the other. These divisions of our being are at war with each other and are responsible for much of the unhappiness of individual life and are the direct source of the universal phenomenon of *morbid anxiety.*

It is to reduce anxiety and guilt to a minimum and to resolve the conflict of ambivalence that the major psychological mechanisms are developed. These are of two kinds—*displacement* and *projection*: both of them are frequently used for the expression of transformed aggression.

1. *Displacement.* This is perhaps the simplest mechanism of all. Several examples of it have already been cited. It is extremely common in political and social affairs. It consists in the transference of fear or hatred or love from the true historical object to a secondary object. The secondary object may be loved or hated for its own sake, but to the sensible degree of feeling is added an intensity derived from the transference to it of irrelevant passion. The child is thwarted by its father and then bullies a smaller child. The father is reprimanded by his employer of whom he is afraid and then is angry with his son. A girl both loves and feels jealous of

her mother. To deal with this situation she may direct her loving feelings towards her school-mistress and feel free to hate her mother more completely. A boy may hate his father through familial discipline and grow up to hate all authority and government. He would be a revolutionary under any regime. Children who both love and hate their parents grow up to love their own country blindly and uncritically and to hate foreign countries with equal blindness and unreason. They have succeeded in displacing their opposite emotions to different objects.

The tendency to identify the self with the community is so common as to be obvious.[1] The transference of the predominant feelings of childhood from parents to the organs of political life—to the State and the parties in it—is almost universal. Hence the importance of symbolical figureheads and governors, Kings and Fuhrers. Hence the fanaticism and violence of political life. Hence the comparative weakness of reason and moderation in political affairs.

The advantage to the individual of these displacements or transferences of emotion from their historically relevant objects should be obvious. In the *first* place the confusion and strain of the ambivalent relation is often resolved. Instead of both loving and hating the mother it is possible to love the school-mistress and to hate more freely—however secretly—the person who was originally both loved and hated with equal intensity. Instead of both loving and hating the same adults it is possible to love the nation or the Communist Party with pure devotion and hate the Germans or the 'Capitalist Class' with frenzy. In either case the world of emotional objects is redeemed from its original chaos—simplicity and order are restored to it. Action and purposive life is possible again.[2] In the *second* place the displacement is often, indeed usually, towards a safer object. It is safer to kick a smaller boy than to kick

[1] Nor is such an identification by any means wholly unreasonable. After all, the communities in which we are brought up have entered into us and made us what we are. It is natural that we should feel that what happens to them happens also to us more personally than they really do.

[2] When a suitable division of emotion and transference is carried out suddenly the phenomenon of 'conversion' often appears Persons suddenly decide to give all their devotion to the Church or Party, and all their hatred to the 'world' or the Party's enemies. Conflicts suddenly disappear and a frustrated and unhappy individual becomes a confident and happy Christian or Communist or National Socialist. Of course, which of these things he becomes is determined by other forces—including the social and historical environment.

one's father. It is safer for the individual to hate the capitalists than to hate his wife, or to hate the Russians than to hate his employers. Thus fear and anxiety—though not banished—is reduced. Happiness is increased. Of course greater safety is not always reached in any objective sense. To join the Communist Party instead of divorcing one's wife may result in imprisonment and even death. To become a patriot may mean early enlistment and a premature grave, when the alternative was objectively less dangerous. But unless we are to deny the teleological interpretation of human affairs altogether it seems obvious that the internal conflicts of fear and guilt are alleviated by displacement. And there is ample direct evidence to support this view.[1]

From our present point of view the importance of this mechanism can scarcely be exaggerated. Adult aggression, as we have seen, is normally carried out in group activity. Political parties make civil war. Churches make religious war. States make international war. These various kinds of groups can attract absolute loyalty and canalize torrents of hatred and murder—through the mechanism of displacement. Individuals can throw themselves into the life and work of groups because they find a solution to their own conflicts in them. The stores of explosive violence in the human atom are released by and expressed in group organization. The power of the group for aggression is derived partly from the sensible and objective judgments of men, but chiefly in our view, by their power to attract to themselves the displaced hatred and destructiveness of their members. Displacement, though not the ultimate cause, is a direct channel of the ultimate causes of war.

2. *Projection.* A second group of mechanisms that are of the greatest importance in understanding individual and social behaviour are those of projection. It is not so simple a mechanism as that of displacement, but the psycho-analytic evidence demonstrates that it is of frequent occurrence in social life. The mechanism consists in imagining that other

[1] It is also important to realize that the displacement may be temporary. Certain displacements of hatred or love involve further conflict and guilt. Thus the boy who transfers his hatred to his father into bullying may feel after a time, extremely guilty about his cruelty. Members of extreme parties may find themselves involved in blood guilt. Thus displacement, always bringing temporary relief, may lead in vicious circles more and more deeply into conflict towards final breakdown or suicide.

individuals are really like our own unrecognized and unaccepted selves. It is the projection of our own characters upon others.

There are two parts of subjective character that the individual 'projects upon' others in this way—two kinds of unrecognized motives of his own that he imagines are animating other people: first his real but unrecognized impulses, and secondly his unrecognized conscience. In the first case we suppose others to be wicked in the ways that we do not admit ourselves to be wicked; in the second we suppose them to be censorious and restrictive in ways that we do not recognize our own super-ego to criticize and restrain us.

(*a*) *The Projection of Impulse.* Examples of the way in which people project upon others the evil that is really in themselves are not far to seek. There are men and women who imagine that everyone's hand is against them; persons who are mean and parsimonious and who assume that everyone else is seeking to swindle them. Persecution manias or *paranoia* contain, as well as simple animism, an element of this mechanism. In all these cases it seems obvious to us that the individual is either assuming that people will treat him as he wishes to treat them, or that he imagines them to be animated by the motives and impulses that are really his own. The miser attributes to others his own impulse to swindle. The paranoid imagines the object of his fears to be animated by his own wicked and destructive passions.

To the authors, most cases of political persecution seem to be of this kind. We have already seen that much of this behaviour can be explained in terms of the simplest animism—the tendency to blame some human will for all disasters. But the existence of such a tendency does not explain why persecution continues when no disaster is present or threatening. And yet they do continue after all reasonable and unreasonable occasion has passed. Almost all authoritarian regimes treasure a pet object of persecution indefinitely. The National Socialists persecute the Communists and the Jews; the Bolsheviks persecute the Trotskyist and the Kulaks. It is commonly said that regimes 'need a scapegoat.' We suggest that over and above any objective reasons for persecution—the need for an excuse in case of failure or the desire to crush opposition by fear—and explaining the continuation of persecution long after

the objective reasons have lost their force, there is an element of pure projection. The persecuted minorities are made to carry the projected wickedness of the dominant masses. They are truly the scapegoat of the people, not only in the sense that they are hated and despised, but also that they are made literally to bear the 'sins of the people.' We think it important to realize that the National Socialists seriously believe that the Jews are responsible for national degradation—that the Communists seriously believe that the Kulaks threatened the regime—and they believe these things against all evidence because they have successfully projected upon these groups so much of the disruptive elements within themselves. The hated minorities are genuinely thought to be the cause of disruption because they have become the external symbol of internal wickedness.

The advantage of this mechanism is again obvious. It reduces anxiety to force the enemy outside the gate of one's soul. It is better to hate other people for meanness and to bear the fear of their ill-will than to hate oneself for being miserly. To see wickedness in others, though terrifying, is better than to be divided against oneself. It avoids the terrible burden of guilt.

Its importance for the understanding of group aggressiveness is also plain. If it is possible to project upon other groups all the evil within the group, then, as in the case of simple animism, the forces of hatred and fear against the external group will grow more and more intense. If Communists can persuade themselves that all aggressiveness and cruelty is with the Fascists, and Fascists that all treachery and destructiveness is with the Communists, then civil war can be fought with better will and greater ferocity on both sides. If Englishmen owning a quarter of the world can feel that all ruthless imperialism is exhibited by Germany, and Germany with the most powerful army in Europe can feel herself threatened by Russia, then the selfishness of the one group and the aggressiveness of the other can be justified without being reduced. Projection is an admirable mechanism for turning the other man into the aggressor, for making hatred appear as a passion for righteousness, for purifying the hate-tormented soul. By this means all war is made into religious war—a crusade for truth and virtue.

(*b*) *The Projection of Conscience.* Finally, to complete the story, there is the projection of the conscience. In order to escape the pains of self-condemnation, the individual projects upon others the moral judgments and condemnation of his own heart. This leads to a particular form of paranoia or persecution mania—in which persons resent, not only the real, but also purely imaginary moral judgments and legal restraints imposed by the State. It is particularly common among the revolutionary opponents of an existing order. Communists exaggerate enormously the degree and deliberateness of capitalist repression. National Socialists in opposition exaggerated absurdly the oppressions of *das System.* Both parties, all the while, intending to create a far more repressive system themselves. This projection of internal moral censorship, while of great interest in explaining many of the phenomena of political life, is not of central importance in understanding the causes of international war. Displacement and the projection of impulse are the great channels of transformed aggression. The projection of the super-ego is chiefly a cause of revolution and civil war.[1]

We have now completed our survey of the causes of aggression in human beings. We have suggested that there is no substantial difference in behaviour, that adults are just as cruel—or more so—just as aggressive, just as destructive as any group of animals or monkeys. The only difference in our view is one of psychological and intellectual mechanism. The causes of simple aggression—possessiveness, strangeness, frustration—are common to adults and simpler creatures. But a repressive discipline drives the simple aggression underground—to speak in metaphors—and it appears in disguised forms. These transformations are chiefly those of displacement and projection. These mechanisms have as their immediate motive the reduction of anxiety and the resolution of the conflicts of ambivalence and guilt. They result in the typical form of adult aggressiveness—aggressive personal relations of all kinds—but above all in group aggression : party conflict,

[1] The projection of the super-ego is a reason for hating and attacking any form of government If, therefore, the League of Nations or any collective security system became strong there would then arise, if our theory be true, aggressive revolutionary minorities within the collective system. This is an important point made by Dr. Glover. We shall discuss its political significance in the later sections of this part of the article.

civil war, wars of religion, and international war. The group life gives sanction to personal aggressiveness. The mobilization of transformed aggression gives destructive power to groups. Aggression takes on its social form. And to justify it—to explain the group aggression to the outside world and to the group itself in terms that make it morally acceptable to the members of the group—great structures of intellectual reasoning—theories of history and religion and race—are built up. The impulses are rationalized. The hatred is justified. And it is typical of the complexity of human affairs that something in these theories is always true. But most is false, most of it a mere justification of hatred, a sickening and hypocritical defence of cruelty. This is particularly true of the political persecutions of dictatorships. We must now try to apply the conclusions of this evidence to the theory of the causes of war.

The Theory of War

We hold that the evidence summarized above suggests a certain theory of the causes of war. In the absence of government—the organization of force to preserve the peace—we hold that a group of monkeys or children or men can only achieve at the best, an unstable social equilibrium. It may very well be that an appreciation of the advantages of co-operation and an agreement to continue it will preserve the peace for some time. But underneath there is a powerful and 'natural' tendency to resort to force in order to secure the possession of desired objects, or to overcome a sense of frustration, or to resist the encroachment of strangers, or to attack a scapegoat. Fighting and peaceful co-operation are equally 'natural' forms of behaviour, equally fundamental tendencies in human relations. Peaceful co-operation predominates—there is much more peace than war—but the willingness to fight is so widely distributed in space and time that it must be regarded as a basic pattern of human behaviour. The cause of the transition from one to the other is simply when some change in the circumstances of the group alters the balance between the desire for co-operation and the conflicting desire to obtain self-regarding ends by force. New females are introduced into the community of monkeys, food

runs short, rain falls, or a new toy is given to a group of children. The pre-existing balance of desires is disturbed. The advantages to be gained by aggression grow greater. Fighting begins and spreads throughout the group. Social equilibrium is destroyed. Of course we are not arguing that any real advantage is secured by the appeal to force. In the vast majority of cases the parties to a struggle would all be better off had they been able to continue co-operating with each other. All that we wish to insist upon is the universality of the tendency not to think so and the consequent willingness of minorities to fight.

What differences are made to the operation of these primitive forces by the development of more complex societies and cultures? For the moment we are not concerned with the prevention of aggression. To this vital matter we shall return. We are only concerned with the form of its expression. What activities of a developed society influence the form aggression takes? We suggest that there are two such activities—that of education and that of government.

1. The character of parental and familial control we have already discussed. In so far as the emotional education of the child throughout human society involves apetitive frustration, and in so far as intellectual education develops powers of reasoning and imagination, the forms of aggression change. It is rationalized, explained, and justified. It is displaced and projected. Above all, it is expressed in the life and activities of groups. Religious, economic, and political groups—churches, classes, and parties—release for the individual the aggression he dare not express for himself. And the greatest of all these groups—at least in the modern world—is the State. It is by an identification of the self with the State and by the expression of aggression through it, that the individual has in recent times chiefly exhibited his aggressive impulses. Not exclusively so, for religious war and civil war have played an important part, but the great wars and the great loss of life have been in wars between nation states.

2. It is natural that it should be so because the nation State normally succeeds in preventing or controlling all other forms of aggression. The existence of government—with its apparatus of force—enormously increases the penalties of private aggression. Not only does the rationalizing mind and

the conscience of mankind condemn private fighting and killing, but the social will to co-operation creates an instrument of force to control and punish any criminal minority that disturbs the peace. Hence private aggression is not only condemned by the conscience—it is also punished by the law. And so long as the State maintains supreme power, the same thing is true of all kinds of group aggression other than its own. Political and racial parties are prevented from taking the law into their own hands. Tendencies to civil war are successfully repressed.[1] In such circumstances it is natural, in our view, that transformed aggression should be chiefly canalized by, and flow unimpeded through, the State organizations of common endeavour and military adventure. In the service of the State the rationalized and transferred impulses of men find their last remaining and freest outlet.

What then causes the State to embark on war? We offer two conclusions in answer to this question. In the *first* place, as we have already mentioned, the expression of aggression on a group scale appears to restore to it simplicity and directness. In the civilized adult the original and simple causes for fighting are forgotten and overlaid with every kind of excuse and transformation. But when aggression is made respectable by manifestation through the corporate will of the group it resumes much of its amoral simplicity of purpose. Indeed, positive moral obligation becomes attached to it. Nations will fight for simple possession, or through hatred due to animism, or because of national frustration, in a direct and shameless way that would be quite impossible for their individual members. The mutual approval of the members of the group makes conscienceless aggression possible. Hence states will fight for the same reasons as children fight. But not only for those things. In the *second* place states may fight, in our submission, because of the pressure of transformed aggression within their members. The members of the State may be so educated, so frustrated, and so unhappy, that the burden of internal aggression may become intolerable. Such

[1] Of course, the State does not always succeed in preventing group aggression within itself from breaking out. Not only is there occasional rioting, but in recent years democratic Governments, have frequently allowed Party groups to grow up and make revolutions and civil war. Civil war or group aggression within the State means the breakdown of internal sovereignty.

peoples—or the dominant groups within them[1]—may constitute in a real sense aggressive nations. They have reached a point at which war has become a psychological necessity. Ambivalence is so severe, internal conflict so painful, fear and hatred of the scapegoat so intense, that a resolution of the crisis can only be found in war. In such cases war will be fought without adequate objective cause. It will have an objective occasion, some trifling incident or dispute, but the real effective causes will be elsewhere, within the tormented souls of the members of the aggressor nation. Such national neuroses can exhibit any or all of the general psychological mechanisms that we have already examined—animism, displacement, the projection of impulse, or the projection of conscience. Thus nations will exhibit the aggressiveness typical of apes and also the much more complex and obscure aggressiveness typical of humanity. They will fight because they are disciplined, because they are divided against themselves, because they have constructed mythical enemies and conjured terrors out of the darkness, because they are paranoid or sadistic. The balance of impulse between co-operation and force has been shifted against the advantages of peace.

This then is our theory of international war. War occurs because fighting is a fundamental tendency in human things —a form of behaviour called forth by certain simple situations in animals, children, human groups, and whole nations. It is a fundamentally pluralistic theory of international war. If the theory is true, then it follows that nations *can* fight only because they are able to release the explosive stores of transformed aggression, but they *do* fight for any of a large number of reasons. They may fight because of simple acquisitiveness, or simple frustration, or a simple fear of strangers. They may fight because of displaced hatred, or projected hates or fears. There is no single all-embracing cause—no single villain of the piece, no institution nor idea that is wholly to blame. In

[1] We should mention in this context that we are quite aware that there is much more to be said on this subject than we have space to say or the learning to write. Large nations are not simple homogeneous groups. Power in them is divided between many groups and dispersed over a varying proportion of the members of the nation The analysis of the group structure within the nation and of the distribution of power among the sub-groups is a task for sociology and sociologists. We are not competent to perform it We are only concerned with the type of impulse dominating groups with power, whether those groups are the whole or only part of the nation.

this sense the theory stands in marked contrast to almost all accepted theories of the day. To two of these we shall turn in a moment, but before we do so there are one or two further comments to be made in explanation of the theory here defended.

In the *first* place it should be obvious to the reader that in one sense the theory is nothing more than enlightened common sense. It is no overwhelming novelty to show that war is a common form of human behaviour. It resembles the familiar doctrine that 'to fight is only human nature.' The authors wish to emphasize this. They wish to make no claims to great originality. The value of the evidence here gathered together is simply that it shows the grounds upon which, and the form in which, such a common-sense theory can be held. It seeks to describe in greater detail the kinds of situation that call forth the impulses to aggression. It traces the causes of simple aggression in individuals, and follows it through the disguised forms it exhibits in them, into its social manifestations. It shows how and why war is a chronic disease of the social organism. It fills out a simple theory with detail and reason. It throws doubt upon all other theories. That is all.

In the *second* place, it will be as well to say something of the other reasons given by human beings for a willingness to fight in aggressive wars.[1] They fall into two groups. There are first the reasons given by those who defend war as a political institution. It is claimed by such people that war permits and demands the display in a marked degree of certain fundamental human virtues—virility, courage, loyalty, a care for the common good. It has further been suggested to us that this fact, or the belief that this is a fact, is one of the common reasons why individuals are prepared to fight. Now it is obvious that the bare statement that war gives an opportunity for the display of certain personal virtues is true. Moreover, the statement is plainly a most important part of the stock-in-trade of militarist propaganda. But that does not carry us far in assessing the effectiveness of this argument in making people willing to fight. It is a commonplace of moral teaching throughout the history of civilization that these virtues can

[1] We are distinguishing here between aggressive wars and police 'wars'—or the use of force to protect peace and ensure law. See Part III.

be displayed equally well in peaceful competition and peaceful co-operation. It is a platitude to point out that courage, loyalty, and virility are required as much by the arts of peace as by the arts of war. Pioneer navigation on the sea or in the air, dangerous occupations of social value demand courage and comradeship of the highest order. The problem is not why the virtues of strength attract and compel human endeavour, but why the exercise of these virtues in the work of destruction and death make so wide an appeal. The appeal of adventure is intelligible, but why the appeal of killing? We suggest that while the desire for a life of strength and virtue is no doubt a subsidiary cause of the willingness to fight, it is impossible to deny that the peculiar sensitiveness of people to the propaganda of war must be attributed to the existence of an underlying willingness to kill. No other explanation seems to us to account for the ease with which courage and virility can be associated with war.

Then similarly it has been suggested to us that the mere desire for change and movement on the part of most individuals is an independent cause of a willingness to fight. Most people, it is suggested, are discontented with their lot in greater or less degree. They are conscious of frustration, disappointment, and even despair. A war is an opportunity to start again, to see new things and to escape from old chains. There is no question that there is a great deal in this—that many persons are released by war from situations in which they are bored or unhappy. They have, in that sense, a reasonable motive for welcoming war. But is that all that there is to be said? We hardly think so. Does anyone suppose that any kind of general disturbance would be equally welcome? An earthquake that struck half England would stir up enough excitement to release and change the lives of most of its inhabitants. Does anyone really suppose that such a disaster would awaken the passions of exaltation and enthusiasm that are so frequently evoked by war. It seems to us absurd to suppose so. It is not the fact of a general disturbance that excites men, but the kind of disturbance in which hatred and destruction may run and be glorified. It is not the excitement of change, but the excitement of blood that fills the streets with cheering crowds and sends the first—though not the last—regiments into war with trumpets. People are less sensible and more savage than

these rational theories of the willingness to fight seems to suppose.

But in the third place, let us at once make clear, that there is nothing in the least alarmist or defeatist in the theory here advanced. We do not hold, nor think it possible to hold, that because war is a chronic social disease it is necessarily an incurable disease. Not only have we emphasized throughout this article that the forces making for peaceful co-operation have been more powerful in history than the forces making for war, but we have not yet considered the implications of our evidence for the theory of the *cure* of war—the therapeutic as distinct from the causal problem. This we shall attempt to do after we have examined the bearing of this theory upon other theories of the cause of war. All that it is necessary to do at this stage is to repeat and emphasize these three points :

1. Far more of the time and vitality of any nation has been absorbed in past history by the activities of peaceful co-operation than by war. The impulses to peace are therefore more powerful than the impulses to war. Hence the problem —how can they be further strengthened ?

2. The governments of states have been successful in preserving comparative peace within their countries for centuries at a time. Is it not possible then, that the expression of aggression can be permanently prevented or controlled by government ?

3. We have only argued that the social and educational environments of the past have in fact produced certain 'quantities' of aggression. Is it possible that different societies and different educations might produce less ?

II

What is the bearing of the theory here outlined upon other and more popular theories of the cause of war ? It is, as we have seen, itself a simple theory. But it has important consequences for the other theories of war commonly held to-day. We wish to bring out the implications of what we have said for two of the most prevalent contemporary theories—the theory that 'war is due to capitalism,' and the theory that 'war is due to nationalism.'

The Economic Causes of War

In its simplest form it is almost inconceivable that the theory that 'war is due to capitalism' should be true. Capitalism as an historical type of system—its distinctive characteristics of unlimited acquisitiveness, rationalism in technique, and rapid expansion—is not more than three hundred years old. War as a social habit is far older than that. It is therefore difficult to see how the one could have caused the other. Of course it is *conceivable* that by pure accident the fundamental causes of war suffered a violent and complete change in character just when capitalism began. It is not inconceivable that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the purpose and cause of war underwent a complete change—that up to 1600 war had been due to one set of causes, and that after that date the causes became entirely different. It is conceivable, but it is in the highest possible degree improbable. War is a continuously recurring phenomenon throughout recorded history. There is almost no period in which war is not taking place somewhere in the world. It occurs among primitive peoples, in the ancient world, in the 'dark ages,' in the medieval world, and in modern times. It occurs in almost every civilization girdling the world from the Far East, through Europe and Africa to the remote civilizations of Peru.[1] It seems more than improbable that with the beginning of capitalism in Western Europe the causes of war became utterly changed. Yet, unless this happened, it cannot be true in any complete sense that capitalism is the cause of war. An effect cannot precede its cause. Capitalism cannot be the cause of war if the same kind of war occurred before capitalism began.

The same type of theory can, however, be put in more persuasive forms. It may, instead, be contended that war is always due to *class conflict*, or that war is always due to *economic causes*. These phenomena are, unlike capitalism, co-extensive in time with war. Throughout recorded history

[1] It has been shown by Prof. Ginsberg that only thirteen out of three hundred and eleven groups of primitive peoples did not frequently fight, and most of this small number did not meet each other much. The only civilization which may not have been warlike—quoted by pacifists—is that of the Indus. All others make use of war.

societies have exhibited an hierarchical structure and the consequent division of society into class groups.[1] Between these groups conflict is at least possible. In the same way economic activities, the struggle for wealth and conflicts over the division of the social product, are as ancient as society itself. It is therefore possible that war is the consequence of these phenomena and we must examine the bearing of our theory upon the contention that it is. It should at once be obvious that there is no complete contradiction between the second of these views and the theory we advocate. From our point of view the theory that war is due to economic causes—to the struggle for wealth—is not wrong but merely incomplete. We have emphasized ourselves that one of the commonest causes of fighting at the primitive and pre-adult levels is over the right to the uninterrupted enjoyment, or property in, sources of advantage or imagined advantage. Consequently it is perfectly compatible with our theory, indeed implied by it, that wars are frequently fought by groups and by nations to gain possession of territories, markets, or other groups of persons. The shameless and ruthless acquisitiveness of nations merely represents to us the emergence at the group level, of primitive individual behaviour, strengthened and justified by group approval. Economic occasions for war resulting from the a-moral acquisitiveness of groups, we should expect on our theory to be frequent in history, as indeed they are.

The false element in the theory would lie in any suggestion that economic causes are the *sole* cause of war. Holding a pluralist theory about the causes of fighting, we wish to question the doctrine that the acquisitiveness of nations or of groups within the nation is the sole cause of war. The desire to possess sources of advantage is not the only cause of international war. Even at the simplest level of human behaviour the frustration of other ends is shown by the evidence to be a different and separable cause of fighting, while at a higher level the habits of animistic thought, displacement and projection can become the cause of national aggressiveness. Thus it comes about that nations may go to war for other than economic causes. They may, for example, be willing to go to war because

[1] The 'class' structure in a primitive tribe may be extremely simple, and may not be associated with economic privilege. The only superior group may be a meeting of the 'elders'—the older men. They may constitute a power group or political class.

a harsh and restrictive form of education and discipline is common within the nation, or because an economic depression has increased the feeling of frustration and self-hatred in individual life. For these and many other reasons, quite unconnected with rational or irrational acquisitiveness, war-like regimes may come to power or group aggression take place.

One of the most obvious types of these group frustrations is the loss of a war against another people. Defeat will generate hatred and lead to internal civil strife or renewed external aggression, either against the nations responsible for the defeat, or against someone else. Hence the frequency of serial wars and prolonged rivalries between tribes and nations. Of these the tragic and enduring animosities of Europe are a terrible example.

Hence there seems to us no sense in which war is necessarily and always due to economic causes. What, then, is to be made of the other alternative—that it is always due to class conflict—that war between nations is always the by-product of the struggle between classes for mastery within the nation? It is not always clear how exactly it is supposed that the internal struggle precipitates the external war, but presumably the two things may be connected in either or both of the following ways. Either it may be supposed that the passions and hatred engendered in the Class War can easily be deflected into national war—that the Class War stokes up the fires of aggression and the tension thus generated can explode in any direction; or it may be suggested that every international war is a move in the strategy of the Class War—that the exploiting class of one nation uses the instruments of propaganda to arouse the fears and hatred of the exploited class and, having called them up, directs them against an external group.

Now there is obviously a great deal of truth in these doctrines. Just as severe internal familial conflict or repression is likely to make a person aggressive, so will internal class conflict and repression be likely to make a nation aggressive. It is not quite so obvious how the process of deflection is brought about. How can hatred that is already rationalized into class loyalty be deflected into that of national patriotism? It is not, however, inconceivable that this could be done, and it is a

familiar fact that nations in which class conflict is particularly sharp are often war-like—though this is by no means always the case. But the working of the second mechanism—in which external war is used as one move in the strategy of internal conflict—is obvious and not infrequent. Wars have often been fought that were in the interests of the governing group or class within a community and were not in the interests of the great mass of the community. A dictatorship faced by the threat of internal revolution may be able to use the apparatus of propaganda and coercion in its hands to inflame and force a people into war. A ring of armament manufacturers may finance war-like propaganda or use their influence to push foreign policy in the direction of war. All these things are possible and historical examples of them exist.

Yet in our view the theory that class conflict must lead to war or that international war is the by-product of class war seems to us incomplete and inaccurate. In the *first* place there is the question of exclusiveness. Many wars are not fought because the Government is in danger. Very strong governments make war. Many nations in which the internal group conflict is very severe are peaceful in their relations with external peoples.[1] Fighting in all ways similar to war occurs, it is scarcely necessary to repeat, among individuals, children, and apes. In such groups there is no class structure and therefore no class war. The connection between class conflict and war can in no possible way exhaust the causes of war. But *secondly*, the 'class war' theory depends upon the implicit but vital assumption that some force—'propaganda' or 'the Press' or the 'capitalist class'—can inflame the people and make them mad. It is, of course, perfectly reasonable to contend that a strong dictatorial regime can drive an *unwilling* people into war. But in order to explain the fact that democratic nations, whose governments depend upon popular suffrage and are sensitive to public opinion, often wage war, and shamelessly aggressive wars at that, the advocates of the 'class war' theory of international war are forced back upon the view that some interested minority manipulates the organs of propaganda in order to madden and frighten the people into a willingness to fight. It is precisely this underlying assumption of their theory that pure economic or class war

[1] We think Spain to be an obvious example in this category.

theorists fail to explain. Why is it that people can be roused in this way? Even if it were true that in a capitalist system all the methods of propaganda could be mobilized by one sectional group, how is it that the national passions can so easily be roused to fighting? We do not imagine that even the most orthodox exponents of the views we are discussing would wish to deny that war is often popular with the great mass of the people in a nation state, or that governments do not often succeed in increasing their popularity by pursuing an aggressive rather than a pacific policy. We feel the popularity of war and the ease with which the martial spirit of nations can be stirred—the enthusiasm stimulated by the appeal to force—is a basic fact that any complete theory of the cause of war must be able to explain.

We cannot help thinking that those who hold this theory must suppose that common people are fundamentally peaceful and constructive and are only made warlike by the injustices they suffer and the propaganda to which they are submitted. We cannot accept this view. We do not think that the evidence justifies the assumption that the exploited masses are simply the tool of the exploiting classes—that common people are kindly and friendly for the most part, and only bite when they are deceived. We think the truer view to be—as we have already stated—that the majority of human beings are prepared to fight, that fighting is a form of behaviour fundamentally natural to them, in situations and under stimuli the general character of which is revealed by the inspection of the empirical evidence that we have already carried out. While therefore we see part of the truth in the view that nations fight for economic advantages and elements of truth in the view that the injustices and internal conflicts of a capitalist nation state lead to war, we cannot feel that either view contains the whole truth or that they can dispense with the prior analysis of the causes of the willingness to fight.

What, then, are we to make of the doctrine ' that *nationalism*, not capitalism, is the cause of war? "

Nationalism and War

Sometimes this theory appears to be no more than a statement that people now fight in groups that are called nations,

because it is obvious that they fought long before the modern nation state had come into existence. If we are to make more of this theory than a simple historical statement we must suppose that those who hold this view are suggesting that the fundamental loyalties and self-identifications of the individual are now attached to the geographical and political group—the nation—rather than to the social, economic, or ideological groups in which the individual may at the same time find himself placed. For recent times this is plainly true and it is one of the main criticisms of Marx's views considered as a theory of history. The dictum of the Communist Manifesto, written in 1847–8 that 'National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing . . .' and that '. . . working men have no country,' make nonsense now. His assumption that the development of capitalism would make the loyalties felt by persons to their economic and social classes supreme over all other loyalties has been completely falsified. The last war found the great mass of the international (*sic*) proletariat loyal to their particular nation states and not to the international brotherhood of working men. Since the War the intensity of national loyalty has grown rather than lessened. We live in an age of intense nationalism and it is virtually certain therefore that future wars will be fought between groups that are nations. All this is true and important.

But the statement that 'nationalism is the cause of war' cannot be regarded as a theory of the cause of war, but simply as a descriptive or behaviourist generalization. To say that people fight as nations does not explain why they fight at all. It does not explain why group loyalties ever take an aggressive form. As a theory of war it must suppose that it is obvious that a group organization, once it is formed, will fight. It is that prior problem that we have tried to resolve.

In terms of our own theory the true element in the view that 'nationalism leads to war' simply consists in recognizing that the individual tends to identify himself with the predominant group of the age in which he lives. That is to say he treats the events that happen to the group as though they happened to him—as though the body of society were his body. This process of identification—in part sensible and objective and in part imaginative and false—accounts for the

intensity of group life. Without it the world would be a very different place and society a very different thing. But for the moment we are not concerned with the wider implications of this universal practice. We are concerned simply with the fact that many of the advantages and frustrations made an occasion for the use of force are found by the individual in the condition of, or events happening to, the group he sets first in his loyalties, whether it be feudal, national, or class. He transfers to the church or state or party his own loves and hatreds and treats the acquisitive opportunities and frustrations of the group as though they were possibilities or threats for him. Thus it is that in a religious age wars are fought by churches, in the age of organization in geographical and racial nations wars are fought between nations, and in any age in which international and inter-regional class organizations had triumphed, wars would be between classes. War is due to nationalism, not because the nation state is either a peace-making or war-mongering form of organization in itself—there are pacific nations and aggressive nations—but because the triumph of aggressive impulses will always manifest itself in a group form and the great group organization of the age is the nation state.[1] And of course Marx may be right that the age in which we still live will be succeeded by an age in which class organizations and concomitant class war are the dominant phenomena of history.

Now if the theories that war is due to 'capitalism' or 'nation-

[1] The argument and analysis of this section is particularly wide and general. To analyse in full the phenomenon of self-identification by the individual with the group and its implications for the study of politics would take us far beyond the limits of this article—even if the work had yet been done. All that we have attempted is the simplest application to the relations between aggressiveness and nationalism. It may be worth adding two short comments. (1) The phenomenon of identification with the group is far from simple. It does not mean that there is any universal tendency to feel at one with the existing regime. Persons hate the State as well as love it. Revolutionary parties pledged to kill the existing order can win majority support. But revolutionaries as much as patriots find personal significance to them—part reasonable, part exaggerated—in the condition of society. And in general it may be affirmed that the vast majority of human beings feel themselves strongly identified with the fortunes of some group outside themselves. Their own peaceful and aggressive impulses then find expression in group life in the ways that we have already discussed in Part I of the article. (2) The study of the way in which one group organization conquers another and becomes the dominant group of an age is one of the important tasks of history and sociology. We are only concerned with the problem of the aggressive and peaceful behaviour patterns common to all such organizations. We shall mention the problem of whether organizations differ in aggressiveness according to their form before we have finished.

alism' are at best only half-truths, important consequences follow for the consideration of policy. We are not primarily concerned with the prevention of war in this article. That problem is dealt with in the remainder of the book. But it would be impossible to conclude what we have to say without mentioning the most pressing problem of our generation.

We cannot help feeling that if our interpretation of the evidence is correct—and we cannot help hoping that it is not—very little can be expected from some of the measures and policies proposed to-day. We would mention two in particular:

1. We do not see that much can be hoped from the abolition of capitalism or even the triumph of democracy. Neither of these institutional changes will remove or overcome the desire to appeal to force for the acquisition of advantages or the expression of transformed aggression and hatred. Whether such changes can cause or will accompany any diminution of transformed aggression itself we will discuss in a moment. In the meantime it is worth pointing out that democracies have often in fact been very aggressive. England has fought imperial wars of aggression. France, after a democratic revolution, overran Europe. We have, as yet, little experience of the supersession of capitalism, but what we have is not encouraging. Russia has not pursued an aggressive official foreign policy, but she has been exceedingly aggressive, until very recently,[1] against other nations by supporting revolutionary organizations within them. It is therefore not clear to us that a world of democracies, or a world of socialist dictatorships, or even a world of socialist democracies, would be wholly free from war.

2. Nor do we feel that much can be hoped, in the long run, from a weakening of loyalty to the nation group or a diminution of aggressive patriotism. The nation state is only the dominant group of this period. On empirical evidence alone, and assuming the continuity of human history, it is to be expected that this group loyalty will be replaced by another group loyalty just as fierce and just as dangerous to peace. Since religious loyalty gave place to national loyalty and international war appeared instead of religious war, so we should expect that in a new world devoid of nations, some other group

[1] Compare the change of front in the Third International in 1935.

would become the centre of transformed hatred and thus of war. This would seem certain unless something quite different had happened to change human character or unless some new institution had been created. Already it is said that in modern Europe a new kind of thing—an international alliance of nationalist fascisms—is coming to pass, foreshadowing future wars of political religion.

If little can be hoped from democracy or socialism, does that mean that there is no hope? Does the theory, that 'war is due to human nature' hold the field with its gloomy scepticism over the existence or efficiency of any social therapy whatever? We think not. Some psychologists, impressed by the weight of their own evidence, have concluded so. We think that they are mistaken and that a more just appreciation of all the evidence indicates a method of procedure and a moderate hope of success.

III

If war is due to the fundamental aggressiveness of human beings, who tend to fight as individuals and in groups, then there are two solutions and two solutions only—either human beings must be changed or their aggressiveness must be restrained. Neither of these courses appear to us to be impracticable. To say that fighting has been a universal tendency in human behaviour in the past does not imply that it must always remain so in the future. People are what they are not only because of their inherited natures, but also because of the form of environment in which their inherited natures have developed. Hence it may be possible to change the character of adult behaviour by changing the environment in which our unchanged hereditary element develops. And, in a different way, it may be possible to ensure peace long before the slow process of individual change is complete.

Let us repeat at this point a simple fact that we have already twice affirmed. The preponderance of human impulses and inclinations has always been on the side of peaceful co-operation. Not only do the great majority of human beings spend the vast proportion of their time and energies in the constructive arts of peace, but almost always the greater part of

the human race is in favour of preserving peace rather than permitting a resort to war. In both wars of recent history—that of Japan against Manchuria and of Italy against Abyssinia—nine-tenths of the nations of the world were opposed to the outbreak of war and were prepared to do something—though not enough—to preserve the peace. The reason for war is not the spontaneous aggressiveness of all mankind—if it were then indeed there would be little hope—but the ability of aggressive minorities to break the peace and by first taking up the sword to force everyone else to defend themselves in arms. War, like crime, is the result of the existence of anti-social minorities. But if war is due to minorities, cannot the majorities control them? We wish to consider these two possibilities—of cure and of control—in turn.

Education and War

It is our thesis that war is due to the expression in and through group life of the transformed aggressiveness of individuals. We therefore contend that to deal with the symptoms of transformed aggression—such as extreme nationalism, or class hatred—will not solve the problem of war. Aggression will only find another mode of expression. Is it, then, possible to deal with the cause? Is it possible to diminish aggression itself?

The immediate manifestations of transformed aggression is due, in our view, to the repression both by the self and by parental authority of simple aggression. Simple aggression, in its turn, we have argued, is due to the frustration of impulse. It would seem upon this analysis that adult aggressiveness could be diminished either by a reduction in the repression of simple aggression or by a reduction in the extent to which impulse is frustrated. If children could be frustrated less frequently—given more open access to the means of their satisfaction—or if they were punished less severely when they resented frustration; if, in short, they were allowed to express desire and anger more freely it should follow, contrary to common expectation, that they would make more happy, more peaceful, and more social adults. The evidence shows overwhelmingly, as we have already seen, that the suppression of simple aggression does not kill it. It drives it underground and makes it far more horrible and destructive. It is only in the expression

of it that it becomes diminished. It is only within the circumstances of freedom that social habits and a spontaneous desire to co-operate can flourish and abound. 'Spare the rod and spoil the child'—as a quiet and convenient member of the familial group. Spare the rod and make a free, independent, friendly, and generous adult human being.

There are three points to be made in amplification of this suggestion :

1. A certain amount of frustration is inevitable and a certain amount of external repression is almost equally so. A child cannot have all that it wants. In the first place the parents may not be rich enough to supply it even with enough to eat. In the second place some of its desires—though we suspect they would be few except in the first few years of life—are contradictory and dangerous. A baby must be denied the fire that it wishes to reach or the bright but poisonous berry that it wishes to suck. In the third place the satisfaction of some of its desires may make social life impossible or intolerable. The child cannot rampage when its parents are tired or ill. It cannot be taken for a walk when its mother must get the tea. Upon a thousand occasions frustration is inevitable But we suggest that even if frustration is inevitable it should be reduced to a minimum and could be reduced enormously below its present level. The restraint of impulse is so frequently carried out upon principle—as a desirable form of 'discipline.' Parents believe that children ought not to have what they want—that denial of impulse will make a good character. We hold that the opposite of this is the truth.

Nevertheless, some frustration is inevitable. What then can be done to alleviate its ill effects? We suggest that much more can be done by refusing to suppress and punish the natural resentment that frustration calls forth. This we feel to be the essential point. Take the child away from the fire, refuse to take it for a walk, deny it a second piece of cake, but avoid being angry or hurt or disapproving if a scream of rage or a kick on the shins is the immediate consequence of thwarting the child's will to happiness. To permit children to express their *feelings* of aggression whilst preventing *acts* of irremediable destruction is, we suggest, one of the greatest gifts that parents can give to their children.

2. We believe the evidence suggests that such methods of

education will have consequences precisely the opposite of those expected by the parent unaware of the evidence of modern analytical psychology. People greatly under-estimate the rapidity and strength with which the social and affectionate impulses of the free child develop. And yet it is blindness to do so. After all, enormous advantages accrue to the child from co-operation. It is, as we have emphasized *ad nauseam*, the overwhelming impulse of human life. And we suggest that the child, freed from frustration and unsympathetic discipline, will in fact become the very opposite of the popular picture of the 'spoiled child.' Instead of violent and ungovernable anger, inordinate selfishness, and vanity, the child that is not afraid to express its feelings is likely to exhibit affection, independence, sociability, and courage more rapidly and more naturally than a repressed child. Such children, we suggest, become reasonable and sociable at a surprisingly early age. Familial life with them is not a nightmare of disorder, or the false calm of strong discipline, but a moderately peaceful and very lively society of free, equal, and willing co-operation.

3. At the same time we do not wish to over-draw the picture. There are certain inevitable conflicts and sources of disturbance in individual and familial life. Sexual jealousy for one thing is unavoidable. It seems unlikely to us that the strain between father and son, mother and daughter, can be wholly avoided. Nor does the reduction of external repression remove internal conflict. Self-repression—the fear that anger felt towards the source of satisfaction will 'kill the goose that lays the golden eggs'—will still remain. Hence the reduction of repression is not a panacea. It will not produce a familial heaven or a race of perfect adults in a generation. Neurosis and aggressiveness will still be there. Social friction and the threat to peace will not be wholly eliminated. We only suggest that these things will be greatly reduced.

This doctrine is somewhat more speculative than our analysis of the causes of aggressiveness. It is not established by the existing evidence with the same degree of certainty. The number of children educated more freely is still small. No society has embarked upon the experiment of a wide and rapid change in the technique of parental control. No generation has yet grown up that has been influenced by

the spread of these ideas. It is, therefore, too soon to say whether a change in the educational environment can bring about a substantial reduction in the aggressiveness of adults. We personally feel that the evidence gathered from the treatment of children is overwhelmingly on one side. We believe it to be almost certain that if children were actually brought up more freely they would be much happier, much more reasonable, and much more sociable.[1] We think it obvious that social and international relations would greatly benefit if people were happier, more reasonable and more sociable. But this belief is still in the realm of probability rather than fact. It is, of course, a purely empirical question. Will a certain form of education make human adults less aggressive without making them less strong? It is the combination of strength with reasonableness, of power with affection, that we think desirable. We have no faith in, nor desire to educate, a pacifist generation. We believe that the rejection of force, and the passive acceptance of other people's aggression, to be as profoundly neurotic as the manifestation of transformed aggression itself. But with the subject of pacifism we are not concerned. Its logic, though not its psychological origin, is dealt with in the next paper. We only wish to emphasize that what we do not expect is a generation of persons unable or unwilling to protect themselves, who kneel down before the aggressor and fling wide their gates to his attack, to arise from a better form of emotional education, but a generation of men and women who will defend their rights and yet willingly concede equal rights to others, who will accept the judgment of third parties in the resolution of disputes, who will neither bully nor eat humble pie, who will fight, but only in defence of law, who are willing and friendly members of a positive and just society.

Unfortunately this hope is not for us but only for generations that shall come long after us. We have not the time nor opportunity to do these things. It would take generations to affect the course of international relations by emotional education. And, in any case, there is not the remotest possibility of beginning now. Half the nations of the world are in the grip of regimes in which this type of education, so far from

[1] The evidence of the therapeutic value of analysing aggressive children—a process consisting amongst other things of treating them more sympathetically and without punishment—is particularly convincing on this point.

being encouraged, is being destroyed. Even in democratic communities there is no widespread belief in the kind of argument we have been advocating—much less is there any serious attempt to reform familial practice in this direction. Even if there were, the successful execution of a new technique of parental guidance requires a new and less neurotic generation to carry it through. Improvement in the emotional atmosphere that surrounds the representative child can only be brought about slowly and from generation to generation as each group of parents brings to its children a less warped and aggressive personality. It is possible to begin but not to proceed rapidly with this basic social therapy. In the meantime, if this is all the hope there is we shall have perished by half a dozen wars. And each war, by strengthening the fears and hatreds inside national groups, will make the task of better education more difficult. Is there then no hope except for generations centuries hence and parts of the world far removed from Western Europe? We think this to be a false conclusion and we are thus brought to a consideration of the use of force to preserve peace.

Government and Collective Security

Our theory implies among many other important things for the study of society, a theory of the value of government. Just as the greater part of human endeavour is directed to the purposes of peace, so the main activity of government is the organization of peaceful co-operation. Whatever our theory of the state may be, it cannot be denied that most of its labour is devoted to the organization of peaceful activities and defining, without the use of force, the framework of laws and institutions within which individuals and smaller groups can work together in tranquillity. But the State has another and vitally important task. In all modern societies—whether democratic or dictatorial, capitalist or communist—the government and the apparatus of force that it controls seeks to prevent the breakdown of social equilibrium into civil war. One of the worst crimes in any State is treason against it, and the vast and increasing power of the State is built up to crush the various aggressive minorities who propose to resort to force in defiance of the law.

There is no pacifism within the State. If members of the criminal minority resort to force, force will be used against them. If larger groups threaten the peace by rioting, first the police and then the more heavily armed forces at the disposal of the Government will be used against them. The theory and practice of government is the theory and practice of mobilizing an overwhelming force against anyone or any group that will not keep the law in peace. In our view it is therefore not surprising that the area of the strong nation state has been predominantly the area of peace. Of course, this is not always so. Civil war has broken out more than once in the strongest modern states. But almost all wars and all the largest wars have been between nations—that is, in the realm of anarchy outside the rule of law supported by force.

No doubt there exists another great force making for peace within the State—that is, the spontaneous acceptance of law and the moral sanction that law *qua* law therefore possesses. Peace is preserved and the law obeyed in the vast majority of cases without the direct intervention or supervision of the police. Yet force is, nevertheless, present in the background. People may often obey the law because they wish to. But they must obey it whether they wish to or not—or go to prison. And, in fact, there is always a criminal minority who do not obey the law against whom force always is and must be used. There is always a disruptive tendency present in society—a tendency to form aggressive and revolutionary minorities—and, if and when they are allowed to grow without the opposition of force, society draws nearer and nearer to civil war. The recent history of Europe offers many examples of such a development. Moreover, it seems easy to us to exaggerate the strength of the feeling for the moral authority of the law. It seems straining the use of terms to say that the dissident minorities of authoritarian governments 'accept the law.' It seems plainly untrue that peasants admit the moral sanctity of oppressive systems of agrarian law or that the organized proletariat of a capitalist system really *accept* the justice of the present laws of property. It may be that they feel that an unjust law is better than no law at all, but few dictators, at any rate, would willingly divorce themselves from the use of force and expect internal peace to be preserved by the strength of moral sentiment alone.

Although it is well outside the subject of this article and constitutes an altogether larger question, the authors cannot help feeling that the existing evidence largely supports the view that while there is no unbreakable link between peace and justice there is such a connection between peace and force. In their view, peace has often existed in the past, and exists in many places now, where the general condition of society is not accepted as just. It is tolerated because the alternative to it—the appeal to force—has been made a less eligible alternative. We believe that some persons and groups are so aggressive that, in the absence of force to restrain them, they will break the peace and compel everyone else, reluctantly but sensibly, to arm themselves in order to resist force with force and thus escape arbitrary and unscrupulous evil thrust upon them by unjust means. Peace can only triumph with a sword in its hand. Such is the commonplace view of all intelligent supporters of international law.

The application of this view to international affairs and the problem of international war is obvious. Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations was and is, in our view, the only hope for the *peace* of the world. Until law is backed by force there seems to us no hope for law or peace. Law is not justice, but neither is war. Aggressive minorities will make war, but they will not make justice. And while the achievement of justice will greatly aid the establishment of peace, the handing over of the world to the will of the minority of aggressive states will secure neither justice nor peace. Thus, while the struggle for justice and for a system of law that is sufficiently just to be accepted freely by all men is one of the central tasks before this generation, the evidence suggests to the present writers most strongly that the organization of international force for the preservation of international peace and the fulfilment of international law is the most urgent task of all.

Of course, force will not cure the impulses of aggression. Some psychologists, so impressed by this fact and also by the consideration that government is a symbol to most people of their own projected conscience, have concluded that the organization of force is not favourable to peace. We should agree that force is not a therapeutic agent. A policeman will not cure a murderer of the desire to kill. An international

air force will not cure Hitler or Mussolini of the desire to kill. But that, we feel, is not the point. The immediate problem is not to cure the aggressor, but to prevent the aggression, or to see if the aggression takes place it can only lead to one outcome—the vindication of the law. That is the vital point —the problem is to see that the great majority of human beings who are peaceful and the great majority of human activity that is constructive should be protected from the savage and destructive violence of the aggressive minorities. It is only if the lovers of peace and social reconstruction will use force to protect themselves that peace within and without the nation state can be preserved.

Thus, as we see it, there are two ways and only two in which war can be reduced in its frequency and violence—one slow, curative, and peaceful, aimed at the removal of the ultimate causes of war in human character by a new type of emotional education—the other immediate, coercive, and aimed at symptoms, the restraint of the aggressor by force.

Conclusion

This brings us to the end of what we have to say. We have pursued a very restricted theme. It has not been possible to consider the psychological evidence in detail. The vast anthropological material has scarcely been touched. We have not traced out in detail the classification of the historical occasion of wars into our categories of simple and more complex aggressiveness. All this urgently needs doing. Nor have we considered the application of our views to the other problems of social behaviour. We hope at some future date to attempt some of these tasks.

One of our omissions is particularly marked and serious. We have failed to consider the question whether certain types of institution or patterns of society stimulate or alleviate the fundamental tendencies to aggressiveness in children and adults. Does democracy or socialism or a peasant economy—or any other form of society—make in itself, for peace? We have argued explicitly that one kind of institution—the pattern of emotional education current in society—is quite vital in this respect. We are inclined very tentatively to suggest that that is the most important single institution.

Yet certain other simple correlations are probably observ-

able. On the whole and speaking very roughly it would, we suppose, be true to say that democratic peoples, and peoples in the democratic periods of their history, are less aggressive than authoritarian peoples and periods. It may very well be that Socialist democracy would be less aggressive still. But it seems to us that this correlation of democracy and equality on the one hand with peace on the other is less likely to be a correlation of cause and effect as of the parallel effects of a common cause. We are inclined to think, that is to say, that the kind of people who can support the responsibility, freedom, and toleration required by democracy are also likely to be peaceful. They are not peaceful because they are democratic. They are peaceful and democratic because they are the kind of people they are. And the same argument we feel would apply to any correlation between equality and peacefulness. But this whole question of the relation between the emotional character of the individual and the group on the one hand and its social institutions on the other is far too vast a field to consider here. We can only state our belief that the most important and fruitful possibilities in contemporary social studies lie in the further exploration of this field—the borderland between individual psychology and the study of comparative social institutions.

To conclude—we believe that the study of the causal relation between personal aggressiveness and war throws a flood of light upon a universal phenomenon in history—the willingness of groups to fight. We think it reconciles the traditional and pessimistic view that war is due to the unalterable characteristics of 'human nature' with the exaggerated and recently disappointed expectations of the post-war generation in which we grew up. We think the evidence suggests that war is an endemic but not an incurable disease of human society. We think it reveals a long period therapeutic policy. It seems to us to reinforce abundantly the conclusion that a strong organ of collective security is the only possible protection from war. It throws into sharp relief the great tragedy of the present decade—that the democratic and peace-loving nations of Europe seem to have missed through an infirmity of purpose and a love of sovereignty the opportunity to unite themselves in strength for the defence of law and the protection of peace. We have written in the hope that the

analysis of this evidence may help some future generation, who, rising once more from a surfeit of hatred and destruction, may perhaps ask with more sober hope and with more scientific realism—can we prevent this thing from happening again?

E. F. M. D.

APPENDIX

AN EXAMINATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

In this article it has been contended that, since war is a particular example of the widespread animal activity of fighting, a scientific study of fighting should and does throw light upon the origin of war. It is now proposed to describe some of the observations upon which we have built our theory of war. First an attempt will be made to review the evidence at present available regarding individual acts of aggression. An attempt will be made to answer the questions : On what occasions do individuals fight? What about? And to what purpose?

In the second part a few observations regarding group aggression are described. They are deliberately selected with the object of demonstrating that group aggressions are not always explicable in ordinary rational terms and are often only to be understood by reference to the more complicated psychological theories arrived at by a study of individuals. The examples given are too few to do more than illustrate our general contention that the study of individual aggression is indispensable to a proper understanding of group aggression.

It is true that we believe that the motives which produce war in Melanesia and persecution in Germany are extremely widespread and influence profoundly all international relations. We believe indeed that international relations are incomprehensible and inexplicable if these motives are not constantly considered. Nevertheless we are aware that our few examples constitute no proof, and that our belief in the importance of these forces can only be substantiated by more far-reaching and thorough researches than have as yet been attempted.

A. STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL AGGRESSION

(1) The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes

The science of comparative social psychology has made important advances of recent years. It is not long since our

knowledge of animal societies depended entirely upon traveller's tales and the random observations of naturalists. Sometimes these are accurate, but there is usually bias, almost always anthropomorphic. Recent work, however, has done much to correct this tendency and to put the subject upon a more scientific basis.

Zuckermann's study of the social life of mammals, with special reference to monkeys and apes,[1] is a particularly valuable contribution in the wide biological background which it affords for the study of human sociology. Unlike insects, whose societies are sometimes quoted, sub-human primates are nearly related to man and are identical in fundamental physiological processes. Moreover, observation has shown that in certain important respects the social life of monkeys and apes is more like that of man than it is like that of other mammals. For these reasons the authors believe Zuckermann's observations on peace and war amongst baboons are of real value in understanding the problems of peace and war amongst humans.[2]

Before considering the special problem of aggression in apes, it may be as well to discuss the structure of their social life in comparison with that of other mammals.

Zuckermann contends that the forces which influence the congregation of mammals into groups are of two kinds, firstly, an ecological (or geographical) factor and secondly, the nature of their sexual and parental instincts. The ecological factor has been seriously underestimated in the past. It is simply the natural partiality which animals of the same species will have for a certain type of environment. There is an optimum climate and food supply for each given species and each individual of that species will want to live where it can be found. It seems likely that such ecological forces are responsible for the dramatic group migrations of certain birds and animals and for the tendency of grazing animals to move in herds and carnivores to live further apart from each other. Ecological forces in fact explain most of what was formerly put down to the operations of a herd instinct.

But they are of little help in explaining the relations subsisting between individuals within a herd. These can only

[1] Zuckermann, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, London, 1932.

[2] No doubt systematic observations on the social life and aggressive behaviour of the mammals such as dogs, cats, and horses would also be valuable, but, as is described later, their social life differs in important respects from that of man, and furthermore it would be impossible to do the data justice in the space at our disposal.

be understood in psychological and physiological terms. Zuckermann has demonstrated that they depend almost entirely upon the mating and breeding peculiarities of each species.[1] For purposes of sociological analysis he divides mammals into three main groups according to their mating habits.

(1) Mammals who have a mating season and a quiescent (anoestrous) period. In these the social group endures only so long as its members are sexually potent. Some of them like the jaguar spend the anoestrous in solitude. The seals spend it in separate male and female herds. Rabbits on the other hand mix together during the anoestrous period but their social life remains asexual. A few species such as the horse maintain a familial grouping during part of the period, but in none of them is the sexual link maintained until the next mating season.

(2) In the second group are mammals who, whilst having no special season of the year for mating, mate only when the female is on heat. As in the first group the sexual link between male and female is constantly being broken and remade. There is no permanent union between male and female and the family consists only of mother and young. There is no father in the social sense.[2]

(3) Primates (monkeys, apes and humans) are unique inasmuch as the female will mate at any time and both male and female are always sexually active to some extent. Anoestrous periods are unknown. As a result there is a permanent heterosexual interest which holds the sexes together in permanent sexual associations and the family consists not only of mother and young. The male retains possession of his female or females, has frequent intercourse with them all the year round, and consequently is a father socially as well as biologically.

The monkeys and apes therefore have a social life altogether different from that of the lower mammals, but identical in basic structure to that of man. For this reason it is to be expected that the study of the social life of subhuman primates will be of value and relevance for understanding certain problems of human social life. But before examining the fighting which occurs in monkey communities it may be as well to consider in more detail their mode of existence.

[1] 'It is impossible to define animal social relationships other than those of sexual male and female, and nursing female and offspring.' Op. cit.

[2] Apparent 'faithfulness' between male and female in periodically mating animals is probably the combined result of proximity and chance.

As above indicated the primates are distinguished from other mammals in having social ties of a considerable degree of permanency. The family—husband, wives and children—is the unit. The male retains possession of his females because he is in constant need of them and other males are commonly regarded as potential enemies. No other male except the overlord enters into sexual relations with the females of a family group. Since some males have more than one wife, many monkeys and apes are therefore forced to live either temporarily or permanently in celibacy. This is spent in a variety of ways according to the species. Some become the 'lone males' that are occasionally encountered. Others form bachelor clubs and go about in male bands. Still others, like the baboons, join up with a family party, though remaining on strictly platonic terms with the females.

The family groups also vary in their sociability with others. In some species it is rare to meet with more than one or two families together. But in others large troops are formed by the union of numerous family parties and their attendant bachelors

The existence of these larger communities needs explanation. No doubt economic and climatic (ecological) conditions play an important part. Where conditions are bad and food is scarce there will be isolated groups consisting of only one family, where conditions are better bigger groups, each of many families, will gather. The formation of such larger groups may be purely ecological in origin, but there are grounds for believing that psychological forces are also at work. For instance, a sexual interest in the mates of others and the possibility of acquiring more wives is likely to draw bachelors and families together.[1] Whether the advantages of co-operation play a part is uncertain. Naturalists have so tended to exaggerate it in the past that caution is required in examining evidence.[2] But there can be no doubt that co-opera-

[1] 'This constant attraction of the females for the males may also be one explanation of the occurrence of large hordes of monkeys, the females of harems attracting to their vicinity both unattached males and the males of other family parties, even though there is no overt expression of heterosexual interest except within the family.' (Op. cit., p. 214)

[2] 'Many accounts have been published in which reference is made to sentinels placed by baboons during their foraging and pillaging activities. The use of the term 'sentinel' is altogether unjustifiable. There is no evidence of any kind that special members of a troop are placed on its outskirts for the specific purpose of "doing sentry-go," and so far as can be observed, any baboon of a pack who happens to see an approaching human being will bark.' (Op. cit, p. 206.)

On the other hand the fact that species of primates which come closest into contact with man and pillage his farms are those which live in bands of several families, suggests that there may be some primitive co-operation in attack.

tion, if present at all, is very little developed, and of no such vital importance as it has become in human societies. For baboon families split off and rejoin the multifamilial groups indiscriminately with the result that the groups have neither stability nor government.

With this analysis of the social background in the life of apes it is possible to understand the circumstances in which fighting occurs amongst them.

Zuckermann's observations were made principally upon a community of baboons kept in captivity at the London Zoo and checked by observations on groups in other zoos and also in their wild state in South Africa. The unnatural conditions of captivity probably made considerable differences of degree in the behaviour of the animals, but observations of their wild state suggest that it was normal in kind.[1] By far the most frequent origin of a serious fight was over the possession of wives. For weeks or even months the community would live in comparative peace, the family groups remaining together and the residual bachelors either forming mutual attachments or living platonically with a family. But such peaceful social life on occasion broke up into pandemonium, resulting in gruesome and bitter fights in which the whole community was involved. One of the worst was when thirty females were added to the group in an attempt to make the ratio of the sexes more even. The result was disastrous. A fierce fight for their possession broke out and, perhaps due to the restrictive surroundings, within a month no less than half the imported females had been killed. This is Zuckermann's account:

> 'On 27 June 1927, two years after the Hill was founded, the existing population' (consisting of fifty-six animals, only five or six of which were female) 'was . . . augmented by thirty adult females and five immature males. . . . The new arrivals stirred the Hill into great excitement, and all the old males tried to secure females, fifteen of whom were killed in the fights that occurred between the 27 July and the end of August. These fights are definitely sexual in

[1] 'It is also possible that captive conditions modify fighting behaviour. Confined to a small area animals cannot separate from one another as they would in a natural environment. A baboon worsted in a fight is unable to escape from aggressors. An animal not dominant enough to maintain himself and his harem in a large herd cannot succeed in retaining his females by avoiding contact with his fellows, as he might in a wild state.

'These considerations suggest that fights may often be carried much further in captivity than they would be in nature. This, however, adds to their interest. From the point of view of the observer, confinement concentrates a normal response both temporally and spatially.' (Op cit., p. 217)

nature. The males fight for the females, who are usually fatally injured in the mêlée which rages around them.'[1]

It is obvious that this fight was provoked by the unnatural conjunction of numerous unmated males and females. But the fights which followed the death of a husband or the attempted abduction of a wife would presumably occur also in the wild. Fights over the possession of widows were of regular occurrence.

> 'Early in 1927 a young female was killed the day after three males had died. In February 1928 a male, whose body showed the scars of recent fights, died of pneumonia: four days after its death a male was killed, and two days later a second animal died from injuries. On two separate occasions in 1929 a female was killed in less than a week after the death of a male, and in 1930 one female was killed within four days of the death of another. The number of fatal fights that have followed deaths on the Hill is too great to be without significance, and the meaning of the correlation is obvious. The equilibrium of a social group is dependent upon the mutual reactions of all its members. The death of any single individual upsets the state of balance, and fighting commonly breaks out before a new equilibrium is reached.'[2]

Attempts to abduct females were another frequent cause of fights which would presumably also occur in the wild.

> '. . . early in 1929, the population of the Hill was forty-one males, four of which were immature, and nine females, one of which was nursing the young animal that was born in October 1928. These nine females were owned by eight males, there being seven "monogamous" family parties and one that was "bigamous." These relationships were stable. With little exception there was no promiscuity. Five of the nine females lost their lives in fights caused by other males attempting their abduction.'[3]

Such abductions usually start 'as a quarrel between two animals. There is no evidence that it begins as a concerted attack of unmated males upon the harem.'[4]

> 'The normal behaviour of most unmated male baboons suggests their passive indifference to the presence of females

[1] Op. cit., pp. 218 and 219.
[2] Op. cit., pp. 221–222.
[3] Op cit., p. 225.
[4] Op. cit., p. 253.

within the colony. On rare occasions, however, the atmosphere suddenly changes and every male appears to be trying, at the peril of life, to secure a female in an attack upon a harem. The behaviour of one male influences another, and there have been few "sexual fights" on Monkey Hill in which most members of the colony have not been engaged. Though mated animals have never been known to initiate a "sexual fight," almost all of them have been observed participating once such a fight has begun. The "sexual fights" on Monkey Hill have been so serious that they have been responsible for the deaths of thirty female baboons.[1] After each of the serious fights had ended in the death of the female round which it raged, the colony settled down in a state of balance which as subsequent events proved, contained all the seeds of further disruption.'[2]

The tendency for small fights to draw into their ambit large numbers of originally uninterested individuals was shown also in the numerous minor scuffles which occurred. Although no lethal battles took place, except those over the possession of wives, hardly a day passed without a scuffle between the bachelors.

'. . . it is often difficult to understand the causes of their quarrels. Occasionally it is due to a baboon attempting to secure food that is snatched by a more dominant fellow. Sometimes a fight is precipitated by one animal rushing to attack another who has evoked a squeal of terror from an immature animal. Usually, however, fights are begun as a display of dominance, one animal suddenly threatening any other in its vicinity. The aggressive baboon begins to grind its teeth, to 'yawn', to grimace, and stare at the enemy it has chosen, while it makes quick thrusting movements on the rocks with its hand. The response to such behaviour is almost reflex in character. The threatened animal, either alone or together with its neighbours, begins a reciprocal display of dominance. Once two are involved in such a quarrel, it is rare for others not to participate. They rush to the scene, generally joining the animal who is at the

[1] 'Of the thirty-three females that died, thirty lost their lives in fights, in which they were the prizes fought for by the males. . . .' 'It is difficult to believe that so large a proportion of females would be killed in a natural community, even though there can be no doubt that wild female baboons are also exposed to the attacks of their fellows. Thus scars were seen on practically every carcass of an adult female baboon that I obtained in South Africa . . .'

[2] Op cit., p 252.

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[1] Op. cit, pp 218 and 219.
[2] Op cit, pp 221–222.
[3] Op. cit, p 225.
[4] Op. cit, p. 253.

> moment less dominant. Sometimes the disturbance spreads throughout the colony and mated males and their family parties join in the fight. The more aggressive animal seems to be unaffected by the increase in the number of the enemies he has called upon himself, and thus the baboon fight assumes its peculiar character of a single animal defending himself against a group. . . . It is rare for these scuffles to develop into fights in which the animals seriously hurt one another, the aggressive animal usually routing the group he opposes.'[1]

Zuckermann discusses the question of dominance at length, showing how the comparative stability of the group depends upon the recognition on the part of the weaker animals of the superiority of the stronger. When a previously dominant animal is challenged a fight ensues.

> 'Fundamentally, females are also treated as material objects, and are secured by the more dominant animals, the weaker males remaining unmated. In a baboon colony an animal may be dominant so far as females are concerned, whereas his dominance may not be exhibited at feeding times. An overlord may scuffle with bachelors for the possession of some fruit and may be worsted. He does not, however, thus lose caste, nor do such circumstances usually lead to serious fighting. If, on the other hand, adult bachelors were to try to steal his female, the situation would immediately result in serious fighting. If the bachelors are routed in such a fight, the overlord maintains his dominant position within the herd. If, on the other hand, he is dispossessed, he immediately loses caste, to become submissive to those animals whom he formerly dominated.'[2]

The fact that no serious battles occurred over the possession of food is of importance, especially when, as will be seen, this is also found to be true of many primitive human societies. Of course it is not known for certain what happens in wild communities of baboons. The fact that there were no serious fights over food in the London Zoo may only be a tribute to the diet provided in captivity. It is possible that in harder circumstances rivalry for food might constitute as serious a cause of fighting as rivalry over females. Nevertheless what evidence is available points to sexual rivalry as the sole cause of serious fighting amongst baboons.

[1] Op. cit., p. 249. [2] Op. cit , pp. 235–236.

Relevance of this Evidence for Human Society.

Many arguments may be brought to prove that this evidence is not only irrelevant to the topic of war, but actually misleading because baboons differ in many respects from humans. Even if baboons do behave like this, it might be argued, that is no proof that there are any such proclivities in man. No one likes to think that there are in himself such violent propensities; we are all anxious to prove that we are pacific even if others are not. Yet there is evidence to suggest that mankind is not so different from the baboons after all and that men will fight for the possession of wives like any monkey.

In the first place some of the simplest peoples live in societies identical in structure to those of baboons. 'Among the lower gatherers we generally hear of quite small groups, two or three to five or six families in the usual sense of that term making perhaps two "enlarged families" of brothers or possibly cousins with their wives, children, and grandchildren.'[1] Like baboons they have no government or authority and like baboons a frequent source of fighting is over the abduction of women.

Amongst rather more advanced peoples who have attained to some degree of organization sexual rivalry remains a source of conflict. 'Nearly all the native fights in Australia are over women. The abduction of women, rape, elopement, and the refusal to surrender a girl promised in marriage are the commonest causes. In Central Australia intertribal quarrels arise chiefly from wife-stealing, although not infrequently the elopement of a woman with a man of another group is a cause of serious trouble between the two groups.' 'The Greenlanders who have no war, nevertheless occasionally quarrel among themselves, and "women and love are among the most frequent causes of bloodshed." The Chinook Indians were likewise peaceably inclined, but were frequently involved in quarrels resulting it is said, "from the abduction of women more frequently than from other causes."'[2]

English seamen of a century ago were not radically different as the history of Pitcairn's Island Colony shows.[3] In 1790 nine English seamen, mutineers of H.M.S. *Bounty*, landed on Pitcairn's Island together with six men and eleven women

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[2] Davie, *The Evolution of War*, Yale University Press, 1929, p 99.

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whom they had brought with them from Tahiti. They were a friendly group. The Englishmen were fleeing from justice with their native wives whom they had picked up during a stay in Tahiti, whilst the native men accompanied them in a spirit of adventure. Pitcairn's Island was chosen for colonization because it was uninhabited and difficult of access. A successful landing was made, huts built and agriculture begun. Although the Englishmen decided to partition the land equally amongst themselves, making the natives their virtual slaves, no serious dissension arose, and the colony remained peaceful and industrious for the first two years.

The first dispute arose over a woman. One of the Englishmen early lost his wife in an accident, she falling over a cliff whilst collecting eggs. After a while he became dissatisfied with his celibate life and decided to sail off to another island to look for a wife. Since he was a useful artisan, his companions were reluctant to see him go. They consequently approached one of the two married natives and arranged for him to make over his wife to the English widower. The natives were incensed by this treatment, and from having been the friends and later the servants of the Englishmen they became their serious enemies. Their plot to murder the Englishmen was discovered, however, and instead the English murdered two of them.

Another two years elapsed before the natives again became dissatisfied. It is difficult to know precisely what precipitated this quarrel, but apparently cruelty from two of the whites was partly to blame. On this occasion the Tahitian's plot was more successful and five of the nine Englishmen were killed and the remainder driven to the far end of the island. The natives then proceeded to fight amongst themselves for the choice of the dead men's wives. One of them was killed in this fight and another was killed by a native woman in revenge for her dead husband. The Englishmen then attacked and killed the remaining two native men.

Of the fifteen men who had landed only four, all English, thus remained alive after four years. After one had drunk himself to death, a final murder was committed. Another accident bereft one of the three remaining men of his wife. Instead of selecting another from the now surplus supply of women, he insisted with threats that the only woman who would suit him was the wife of one of the others. He became so menacing that the other two decided that in self-defence they had best kill him. They consequently murdered him in his sleep. One of the remaining two men died soon afterwards from natural

causes, leaving a single white man, nine native women, and twenty-five children. Thenceforward peace reigned supreme under a benevolent patriarch, who, afflicted by a sense of sin, became increasingly religious.

Thus within ten years twelve out of fifteen men had been murdered. Two of the fights occurred as a result of successful or attempted abduction. Whether sexual jealousy was operative in beginning the biggest fight is obscure, but once begun rivalry for the possession of wives prolonged it.

Conclusions.

The main conclusions to be drawn from this evidence may be summarized.

(1) The basic biological forces binding individual animals into social groups are ecological and sexual. The particular form of society characteristic of each species depends upon the interplay of these factors which vary for each species. Forces such as vicarious sexual interest and the advantage of co-operation may play subsidiary roles.

(2) The primates are alone amongst mammals in that the sexual tie is not constantly broken and remade. The females become the permanent property of the males who retain possession by force, and the family—husband, wives and children—is the basic social unit.

(3) Many of the primates live in large groups, each consisting of a number of families and bachelors, knit together by loose bonds. There are daily scuffles over food and displays of dominance, but serious fights only occur at intervals of weeks or even months.

(4) The only serious fights known to occur in baboon communities centre round the possession of females. They begin either when there is an unmated female available, through death of a husband or other cause, or else with the attempted abduction of a wife by an unmated male. Such fights frequently end in the death of the prize and sometimes also of some of the males.

(5) Fights usually begin between two males but they always become general, every male in the community attempting to obtain possession of one or more females.

(6) Comparative equilibrium is not restored until all the females have become the permanent and undisputed property of individual males.

(7) The evidence suggests that when man lives in unorganized groups, he tends towards a social life basically similar to that of apes. The main social ties are sexual and familial.

(8) Human groups of this kind are hardly more peaceful than baboon societies. Fighting breaks out sporadically, alternating with peaceful periods.

(9) Although there may be various causes of fighting, it appears that, as in baboons, one of its principal sources is over the possession of wives.

(10) The evidence in fact supports Hobbes' view that without government and in a state of nature, man's life, thanks to his animal passions and rivalries, tends to be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'.

(2) Social Development and Aggression in Children

Further light on the forces influencing human social life is shed by the study of children. Children are usually more direct and more honest in their expression of feeling than adults, with the result that a true estimate of their real motives is easier to obtain. Conclusions regarding adult societies, drawn from the study of children, rest on the observation that many forces present in childhood continue active in adult life.

Several valuable studies of the development of personal relations in children have been carried out. Those based on psycho-analytic technique are considered in the next section. Of the less controversial studies based on direct observation that of Dr. Susan Isaacs is the most comprehensive.[1] Much that follows is derived from her book which describes the work and play of a group of small children in a comparatively unrestricted environment. Once again before considering the incidence of aggression in these children it may be well to discuss the forces making for social unity and peace.

The chief additional factor not found amongst apes which binds children into social groups is co-operation. It seems sometimes to be thought that children would never become either sociable or co-operative if they were not taught to be. This is certainly untrue. Many observations go to show that happy children develop into sociable and co-operative beings as spontaneously as they learn to walk or talk. Nevertheless the development of these abilities takes time and like any other natural function may be interfered with. Isaacs recognizes three phases through which a normal child passes in its progress from selfish solitude to sociable co-operation.

(1) Up to two or three years the small child ignores other children and plays almost entirely by himself or perhaps with

[1] Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children*, Routledge, 1933.

an adult. In this stage of solitary play co-operation is non-existent.

(2) After about three years comes a dawning recognition of the presence of other children, but still no true group is formed. Each child in this phase behaves independently, *making use* of others to further his own ends, but failing utterly to appreciate that others have ends also. It is assumed that the other person will behave exactly as it is wished they should, the possibility of their also having wishes being ignored.

(3) It is not until the age of at least four and often later that a gradual adjustment to the true social situation occurs. Slowly the personalities and independent purposes of others are appreciated. Common ends come to be envisaged and joint action in their attainment undertaken. Moreover it becomes possible for a child to sacrifice his own immediate ends for later advantages. He is willing to become the other fellow's wheelbarrow for a time in order later to enlist another soldier in his army. The principle of 'give and take' develops.

But such temporary abrogation of wishes is extremely difficult for many children. It requires great trust in the goodwill of the others and it is not therefore surprising that the more fearful the child the less co-operative he is. Anything which causes him to believe that the other children are selfish and grasping will naturally make co-operation with them impossible. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in the next section, the human mind has a great capacity for seeing and exaggerating hostility and greed in others. As a result co-operation develops with difficulty and in many people remains precarious.

Two points need to be emphasized therefore in considering the development of co-operation in humans; first that it is a natural process like growth, and will proceed spontaneously in a good environment; and secondly, that it can only develop satisfactorily when conditions are favourable. Anything which leads to distrust and fear of others will interfere with its progress.

But whilst co-operation is undoubtedly natural to children it cannot be said to be their only social activity. Like primitive men who also co-operate in simple ways children fight.

Now no one needs to be told that children fight, yet it is interesting to have detailed observations of the situations which provoke their fights and of the children's motives in 'going to war'. These situations can be described under two heads:

(1) Situations which threaten the loss of possessions or affection.

(2) Situations of failure or anxiety over the accomplishment of a task.

(1) *Situations which threaten the loss of possessions or affection.* There is hardly anything which a child likes of which he does not want exclusive possession and for which he is not prepared, if necessary, to fight. The very small child cannot tolerate either sharing or taking turns for he is unable to trust any one with the objects of his desire. These objects are of many kinds. It is not only his toys and clothes and other little things which he likes; possessiveness may spread also to abstract articles such as nursery rhymes and tunes, and a child may become angry with another for wearing her favourite colour.

> 'Harold and Paul felt a keen sense of property in the nursery rhymes and songs they had heard at home, or in gramophone records of a kind they had there. No one else had the right to sing or hear these things without their permission. All the children felt that anything was "theirs" if they had used it first, or had made it, even with material that itself belonged to all. Duncan and others felt a thing was "theirs" if they had "thought" of it, or "mentioned for it first," and so on.'[1]

Another important observation of Isaacs is that 'neither the pleasure of ownership nor the chagrin of envy bears much relation to the intrinsic value of the things owned or coveted'. It is enough for another child to want a thing for that thing to be valuable, indeed essential. Many instances are described of one child wanting the unused possession of another, only to awaken an immediate desire for the thing in the owner.

> 'While Dan (3.8) was occupied with something else, he saw Harold (5.0) take one of his engine books, which he had left on the shelf, to read. Harold put it down on the table and remarked that he was going to read it "all the morning." Dan immediately said: "*I* want it," and tried to take it from Harold, and screamed and cried. He took it away in the end.'[2]

> 'Lena (3.9) always wants to have any object which another child happens to be enjoying, e.g. the tricycle or engine, and tries to get it forcibly.'[3]

[1] Op. cit., p. 222.
[2] The figures in brackets refer to the children's ages in years and months at the time of the event quoted.
[3] Op. cit, pp 35 and 39.

But perhaps the most important objects of which a child wants possession are the people who afford him pleasure and whom he loves. In this respect children are very like the apes who, as Zuckermann says, treat females fundamentally as material objects. Isaacs notes that aggressive behaviour from the motive of rivalry for the possession of a person was both more frequent and gave rise to more acute tension of feeling than did rivalry over material possessions.

> 'George (4.5), seeing Miss B. sit down to the table with bricks, left his modelling and went at once to sit beside her. Dan (3.8) and Frank (5.3) also went and a squabble ensued as to who should sit next to Miss B. As none of them was willing to give way, Miss B. got up and went back to the modelling table. Dan did not notice this and went on building, but George and Frank saw it at once and left the bricks, and went back to the modelling table to sit one each side of her. When, presently, Dan realized what had happened he came again and cried and screamed to sit beside her.'[1]

Anyone who has looked after children will recognize these instances as absolutely typical of childhood. The intensity of hatred engendered is terrific.

Rivalry is particularly noticeable when a new child enters a group. 'The hostile reaction of a group of young children to new-comers . . . seems to me quite undiscriminating . . . it may be felt and expressed even before the child has actually appeared, on mere hearing that he is to come.' One child expressed this assumption by remarking that people 'don't like you—because they have not seen you before.'[2] The new-comer is called silly, exception is taken to the way he dresses or to the way he walks. Such hostility is clearly the expression of a fear that he will be a rival for toys and for the love and admiration of the grown-ups. The new-comer is felt to be a menace and it is not until he has been in the group for a time that the others become reassured and he is tolerated. It is consequently not surprising that the new-comers themselves adopt an attitude of fear or hostility. 'An attitude of hostility to all the other children seems to be the primary active response of any young child on entering a group.'

A special example of a new-comer arousing intense feelings of jealousy and hostility is when a new baby is born and an

[1] Op. cit., p 50. [2] Op. cit, p. 255.

you that. . . .' A month or two later she punched her mother and was generally tiresome when her mother was feeding the baby and when the time came for the baby's cot to be moved into her room, again became very resentful.[1]

The overwhelming importance of the possession of the mother (or mother substitute) is exemplified again when another adult appears and wants to talk to her. Very small children show undisguised hostility in such a situation, attempting to part the grown-ups, becoming fractious and so on. The constant tendency for little children to become more difficult when two or more grown-ups are present than when with one alone is well known. The child is happy with its nurse and becomes difficult when mother appears or vice versa. This usually leads to the nurse concluding with satisfaction that the mother is bad for the child and the mother feeling that the child prefers her to the nurse.[2]

> 'The degree of Frank's sensitiveness to the presence of adult rivals was most striking. Whenever Dan's father entered the school, for instance, Frank (5 to 6) changed in a moment from active gaiety to sulky destructiveness. Penelope (3 to 4), too, seemed rarely able to be loving both to a man friend and a woman friend at the same time. Nor did Dan (3 to 4), throughout the first year of the school, find himself able to love both Mrs. I. and her assistant at once.'[3]

These rivalries and the hatred springing from them will be further discussed in the next section. For the moment we may conclude that one of the chief sources of hatred and aggression in childhood are situations in which there is deprivation or threatened deprivation. Any frustration of the desire to possess toys or food or the love and approval of others leads to outbursts of anger and aggression. Isaacs remarks that the anger is often quite as intense as if life itself was threatened. The actual threat, of course, is to the sources of

[1] Op. cit., pp. 196–200.

[2] Cf. Isaacs. 'In my notes of recent years, I have gathered a great many instances of the way in which children who are friendly and amenable when with one grown-up only will become fractious and perverse as soon as another enters on the scene. A child may be happy and obedient with either the mother or the father, but disagreeable when both are there. He may contentedly obey the nurse when she has him alone, and be difficult when the mother comes into the nursery. He may be good with either mother or nurse separately, and contrary with the two together. It seems indeed a universal tendency of little children to become more difficult when two or more grown-ups are present than when with one alone.'

[3] Op. cit., p. 237.

what make life worth while—the sources of pleasure and satisfaction. Toys and nursery rhymes give pleasure and must, therefore, be retained at all costs. People are also sources of pleasure, both because they give food and toys and also because they give affection and care. They must, therefore, be kept well-disposed and any rival for their attentions beaten off.

(2) *Situations of anxiety and failure over the accomplishment of a task.* It is not difficult to understand the aggression which springs from motives of possessiveness. Desires for material objects and for affection, and an outbreak of anger when these desires are thwarted by others are such commonplace events as ordinarily to be taken for granted.

The origins of aggression to be discussed under this heading, however, are far less easily appreciated and their importance commonly greatly underestimated. The possession of material objects and of the affection of friends depends as much upon our own activities as upon those of others. Affection may be lost through our own bad behaviour as well as through the competitive behaviour of others. Material objects can be lost or broken by ourselves as well as being stolen. Observation shows that bad-temper in children is just as frequently due to *self-frustration* as it is to the more obvious frustration by others.

> 'Moreover, the element of rivalry in this moody hostility was with certain of the children very clearly bound up with a general sense of their own relative helplessness or ineffectiveness. Cecil was a particularly clear example of this. He was a large but loose-jointed and clumsy child, who could do nothing skilfully. Everything he tried to build fell down, to his own distress and chagrin. He could not even wash his own hands when he first came to school at four years of age, having been trained to no sort of independence at home. It was very noticeable how his aggressiveness became less as his skill and self-confidence grew greater.'[1]

The mother of another child wrote as follows:

> 'She is an only child (3.6), fully developed, of normal and regular habits. The trouble at present is that she takes fits of crying without any obvious reason, accompanied by stamping of feet, and very often disobedience at these times. . . . She was playing in the garden with her doll's pram, while I was cutting the grass—suddenly she started crying—on being questioned as to what was wrong—had she

[1] Op. cit., p. 245

fallen, or had anything frightened her—she refused to answer and continued to cry and scream for about an hour. Sometime later on being questioned as to what was wrong, she told me she could not manage her pram on to the lawn. I tried to explain to her, that if only she had asked I would have helped her—but she evaded my reasoning.'[1]

In both these instances the bad temper clearly resulted from a sense of frustration, but in neither was it another person who was to blame.

If children can get into tempers about such comparatively trivial failures as an inability to build brick castles or push a pram on to the lawn, it is not surprising that an inability to earn the approval and affection of the grown-ups should cause even greater consternation. Thus it comes about that some of the worst outbursts of anger in childhood occur when a child is told that it is naughty or even when it only anticipates disapproval from the grown-ups.

'Benjie (4.1), after lunch, dropped the water-jug accidentally. He looked quickly at Mrs. I., laughed excitedly, then kicked it across the room; he was about to kick it downstairs. Mrs. I. asked him not to do so, but before she could get near he had done so, and broken it. Then he was very defiant, shouting: "I'll hit you in the face; I'll not come to school any more," and so on. This was clearly remorse that took the form of defiance.

'When Benjie spat into the pudding dish, and Mrs. I hastily said: "Now you can't have any pudding," he threw his plate on the floor and broke it. Then he cried very bitterly in anger and defiance.'[2]

In both these cases Benjie became aggressive as a result of doing something which he feared had earned him Mrs. Isaacs' displeasure. Probably in each case he expected punishment and part of his aggression was to combat that, but other evidence suggests that the anger is partly at least directed against himself as the result of *self-dissatisfaction*.

For instance, a boy of fourteen had always suffered from severe outbursts of temper. These had usually been put down to 'naughtiness.' Observation, however, showed that they occurred whenever he made a mistake and failed in some way. One day on his way to school he found he had forgotten his season ticket. He at once flew into a rage with the ticket-

[1] Op. cit., pp. 70–71. [2] Op. cit., p 172.

collector who refused to allow him to pass. On returning home he became abusive to his mother and hit his little brother.

Episodes such as this are frequent in anyone's life. Missing an easy shot, arriving at the station to see the train just going out, upsetting the coffee over one's hostess' gown, breaking a favourite bowl, these are the incidents which put us out of temper with ourselves and in a bad temper with everyone else. What is so particularly mortifying about them is that we have only ourselves to blame and that we cannot legitimately vent our wrath on others. The difficulties of such situations will be discussed at length in the next section and are held by the authors to be of great importance in understanding aggressive behaviour.

In addition to the frustration and anger resulting from the actions either of other people or ourselves, anger may arise from impersonal events. For instance, the picnic we have planned for a hot summer's day may be washed out by a thunderstorm or a motor trip spoiled by a puncture. In neither case is it anyone's fault—the material world is to blame. Without further study it is difficult to estimate the relative importance of such events in causing anger, but there can be no doubt that such happenings make children and grown-ups bad-tempered.

Incidentally, as will be described later, these impersonal frustrations are rarely if ever *felt* as impersonal. Probably because most of the child's early frustrations come from people, children assume that even natural events like rain or cold are the outcome of some personal action. Their anger is consequently diverted against the supposed culprit. This tendency to inculpate and to vent wrath on someone who has had nothing to do with the incident provoking it has been constantly emphasised by psycho-analysts, and appear to us to be of fundamental importance in understanding the origins of war.

Before considering the psycho-analytic evidence regarding hatred and aggression in detail, one further characteristic of aggression in childhood which is easily observed requires special emphasis. This is its violence. Children are notoriously unkind to one another. Of course they are often very kind as well, but we have only to remember the fights and teasing and bullying which go on in any nursery or school, even the best regulated, to realize that children, like baboons, are not natural pacifists. Descriptions such as these from worried mothers remind us how violent and merciless children can be.

'I must write and tell you of my experience with this "jealous hostility." I took your advice and a month ago two little two-year-olds came to live with us as companions for my son of the same age. They looked so sweet together—all red-cheeked, curly-haired, adored only children, but, unfortunately, *they hated each other*. I was in despair. I'd no idea babies could be so horrid to each other. We daren't leave them alone for a moment—such shrieks and yells would come from the nursery. They would pull each other's hair out by the handful—scratch, bite, push each other down—tread on each other. It was heart-breaking. I've seen chickens persecuting a lame fowl—almost pecking it to death. These babies were just little animals. If one fell and cried because of the bump, the other two rushed over to pull his hair and increase the yells. "Pip" loved to bang the others on the head with a brick'

Another writes:

'My other difficulty is about the unkindness of the two elder ones (girl aged 6.6 and boy aged 5.6) to the child of three and a half. They have always resented her existence, I know, though I tried to avoid making them jealous. They are devoted to each other and are quite kind to the baby, but Cecilia's life is really hardly worth living because they are so nasty to her. They tease her constantly by running off with her doll's blankets or knocking over her tea-cups or just by pushing her away (she is learning to tease, too), and also in more subtle ways by making her say foolish things and then jeering at her. She, poor thing, never remembers how she's been caught before, and constantly gets caught again, and she is old enough now to mind considerably.'[1]

Even the desire to kill others is not alien to the childish mind. It was a comparatively normal if aggressive small boy who, on being told by his father that *his* father was dead, earnestly enquired: "Did you kill him and stamp on him?" Such comments are typical of children who are allowed to express their feelings freely.

'Jessica (3.5) accidentally tore a card which had been sent by Miss C. to all the children. Dan (4.9) said he would "get a policeman to put her in prison," and "I'll kill her, because I hate her."'

'Dan (5.0) spoke of the tricycle which Tommy (4.1) had

[1] Op cit., pp. 59–60

lent him. Dan said: "Tommy lent it to me while he was ill—I wish he was dead, then I could have it always!"'[1]

It can therefore be taken as established that bitter hatreds are inseparable from childhood, but this does not mean that they cannot vary enormously in degree. Much can be done by sympathetic and tolerant handling of children, and it is interesting to find that of Mrs. Isaacs' group the more crudely aggressive were those who were whipped at home. Although so far as we know no definite research has been done on this queston, it is the impression of most people who work with children that violence begets violence and that little good and much harm comes from attempts to beat children into pacific behaviour.

Conclusions.

The main facts which have been established by the modern studies of aggression in childhood can now be summarized.

(1) The situations which provoke outbursts of aggression are of two types. Any threat to valued possessions such as toys, food, the affections of others and of course life itself constitutes one type. Within this are numerous acute situations of jealousy and rivalry such as the birth of a new baby into a family or the entry of a new child into a school. In these situations other people, adults or children, cause the frustration and become the objects of hatred. The other type, which is less generally recognized, consists of situations in which the child frustrates himself by his own incapacities or wilfulness. He alone is to blame if he inadvertently knocks over his brick castle or earns disapproval by tiresome behaviour. In such cases the object of hatred is not an external person but the child himself.

(2) Aggression in childhood is conspicuous for its violence. The desire to kill a rival is often freely expressed and sometimes, especially in early childhood, attempted. Numerous cases of children of three to five hitting and hurting their younger brothers or sisters are instanced.

(3) Although all children have violent propensities their violence is of varying degrees and depends upon the way they are treated. It is common experience that the most violent are those who have themselves been subjected to violence. This belief together with much else connected with aggression in childhood lends itself to accurate research which we hope soon to see undertaken.

[1] Op. cit., p 38.

(3) Psycho-Analytic Studies of Aggression

Aggression in apes and children is relatively easily studied by the simple method of observing the animals in a group. This is more difficult to carry out with adult humans and so far as we know has never been attempted. But there does exist a different body of data regarding the aggressive feelings and acts of civilized man which we believe to be extremely relevant to the problem of war. This is the data collected by psycho-analysts in the course of their therapeutic work.[1]

Experience has shown that all patients who suffer from neurotic or psychotic symptoms show abnormalities in the development of their aggressive feelings. Some are bitter, angry people who are constantly complaining that other people are unkind or morally bad, others are quiet and sensitive souls who are afraid to stand up for themselves and will eat any amount of humble pie in order to avoid a row. Hatred in the one case seems to be over-developed and in the other either atrophied or exaggeratedly controlled. And not only are mental sufferers abnormal in these ways, but further work has demonstrated that many of their symptoms are the direct result of their aggressive impulses being either faultily developed or controlled. As a consequence an intensive study of the aggressive propensities of all types of patients has been forced upon psycho-analysts.

This work has very largely extended our knowledge of aggression in man. It has revealed the ubiquity of hatred, its presence where formerly it was unsuspected and its frequent irrationality. People who normally pass for peaceful loving individuals have sometimes been found to be eaten up by jealousy and hatred, whilst those who appear always in a bad temper with friends and relatives have been found to be

[1] Apart from certain speculative theories, such as that of the Death Instinct, psycho-analytic theory has been evolved from a close examination of the feelings, thoughts (including phantasies and dreams) and behaviour of patients in a certain controlled relationship with the physician. The scientific validity of such conclusions is sometimes questioned. Whilst admitting that it is far from a perfect scientific procedure, the authors hold that its results if interpreted cautiously are reliable. Many of the more important observations have been repeated in the less formal setting of the nursery and much of the material quoted here is of such a kind Although the check of controlled experiment is as yet impossible, theories can be tested for their ability to promote accurate prediction. The objection that the material of observation is abnormal carries little weight. Not only have many people who commonly pass for normal been analysed, but in other branches of science breakdowns of the normal are regarded as specially illuminating. The debt of physiology to pathology is enormous, whilst physics nowadays is largely concerned with the examination of phenomena which never occur in Nature outside the laboratory.

prompted by feelings of self-dissatisfaction and self-hatred more often than by any realistic external frustration. Psycho-analysts have consequently been compelled to take a very different view of the hatred and aggression even of normal man from that which is commonly held. Because of the limited space available no attempt has been made to discuss all the relevant issues in this section. Instead we have preferred to concentrate attention on a few of the most important conclusions, giving examples of the evidence upon which they are founded.

One of the earliest and most fundamental of psycho-analytic discoveries was that people could do hostile things without being aware either of feelings of hatred or of the nature of their act. This led to the theory of 'unconscious hatred,'[1] which states that people can be motivated by feelings of hatred of which they are not conscious and actuated by hostile impulses of whose existence they have no knowledge. This notion of people being influenced by motives of which they are unconscious is one which still meets with much theoretical opposition. Yet the empirical evidence is quite unequivocal. For instance a physician was called out urgently to a case and had to wire to postpone the appointment of another patient. This other patient was of the excessively polite type who always found it exceedingly difficult to experience any feelings of antagonism within himself. It was, therefore, completely in character for him to take the postponement in an apparently philosophical mood and agree readily to the later appointment. Yet when he came, on preceding the doctor into his consulting-room, he shut the door in the doctor's face. This man had been aware of no feelings of resentment at the postponement of his appointment and was equally unaware of what he had done. Yet a discussion showed that slamming the door had been no accident—that it was in fact prompted by feelings of resentment which had been repressed. For the postponement had caused him a good deal of inconvenience, and on receiving it he had said to himself: 'I must be careful to write a very polite letter—I must not let any feelings of irritation get expressed in it.'

[1] It is probably more accurate to speak of 'unconscious aggressive impulses.' It is often objected that *feelings* cannot be unconscious and that, since hatred is a feeling, hatred cannot be unconscious. There can be no such terminological objection to the concept of unconscious *impulses* influencing our actions Many of the things we do, breathing or walking for instance, are obviously unconsciously motivated and there is no *a priori* reason to doubt that aggressive impulses can remain unconscious also. Nevertheless the slightly inaccurate term 'unconscious hatred' is expressive and useful.

Freud has collected numerous similar instances in which people's real feelings influence their actions without their being aware of what is happening.[1] He quotes the case of a young man who lost a pencil to which he was much attached, a loss which he regarded as an unfortunate accident. Investigation showed that a few days previously he had received a very critical letter from his brother-in-law and that this brother-in-law had presented him with the pencil. The loss was clearly no accident but an expression of resentment with his critical brother-in-law.

The breaking of crockery by domestics is another instance of purposeful accidents. Plates 'come to pieces in my hands' far more frequently after the maid has been reprimanded than when she has been praised. Indeed it is impossible to criticize some maids without paying for it in breakages.

Examples could easily be multiplied. Misprints and slips of the tongue frequently express the true feelings of hostility which it was intended should be hidden. For instance, in a war correspondent's account of meeting a famous general whose infirmities were pretty well known, a reference to the general was printed as 'this battle-scared veteran.' Next day an apology appeared which read 'the words of course should have been "this bottle-scarred veteran."'[2]

Most grown-ups dislike to feel that they have been prompted in their action by hostile or other repressed impulses and are inclined to call such episodes accidents. In this respect children are perhaps more honest. For them there is the convention of 'by mistake on purpose'. The hostile feelings are there admitted and only partially disowned. As they grow older, however, the 'on purpose' gets omitted and the action is believed to be purely 'by mistake.' In this people may be quite honest. In the case of the man who shut the door in the doctor's face there was no doubt that he was quite unaware of his feelings of anger and revenge for being locked out himself, and quite unaware that the apparent accident had been impelled by a deliberate purpose. Although the significance of the incident was fairly readily recognized when it was pointed out to him, there are of course many people who would completely repudiate any suggestion that they had been influenced by such feelings. There seems, in fact, to be every degree of awareness and unawareness of real motives. We may know our feelings and deliberately act upon them. We may know our feelings and partially repudiate them, yet permit

[1] Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.*
[2] Quoted by Freud, op. cit.

them some expression, or we may repudiate them altogether. In this latter case the result is often that a hostile action is carried out without the person's conscious choice or intention, and sometimes without his even knowing what he has done.

Clearly the existence of these unconscious hostile impulses is important, especially as psycho-analysts have discovered them in greater or less degree in every patient who has been treated.[1] If individuals can be actuated by unconscious hatred in their private lives, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that they may be so motivated in affairs of State. But for the moment we will confine ourselves to the individual and the problem as to why certain impulses are disowned or *repressed.*

Psycho-analysis has been deeply concerned with this problem of repression, for the good reason that the radical cure of neurotics is impossible so long as active impulses remain unconscious. In investigating this problem Freud soon discovered that the repression of impulses was no accidental condition, but the result of the purposeful action of powerful mental forces. Patients refused to admit that they were motivated by jealousy or rage—for some reason they *could* not become aware of such feelings, though they might be obvious to an external observer from their every word and action.

The next question for solution was therefore the nature of the repressing forces It was soon obvious that they were associated with conscience and the sense of shame, that repression in fact was a more drastic form of the common experience of wanting to forget something of which one feels ashamed. But conscience on investigation proves to be no simple thing and psycho-analysts have been forced to postulate a more extensive psychic agency which includes the conscious conscience and other forces as well. This has been termed the super-ego.

It is impossible here to enter in detail into the controversial theory of the origins of the super-ego. It is sufficient to say that all psycho-analysts are agreed that there exists in the mind a combination of forces which are represented in consciousness by conscience and which are responsible for many feelings and impulses being banished from a person's awareness of themselves. Of these repressed impulses the sexual and the aggressive are the most important, although there is no impulse which is not liable to repression. Since, however, we

[1] In this psycho-analysts have been preceded by Eastern mystics who have apparently long recognized the ubiquity of 'latent hatred.' Psycho-analysts are the first to have studied it scientifically, however.

are chiefly concerned here with the repression of aggression these other impulses will not often be referred to.

In the growth of the repressing agency two main forces seem to be operative:

(1) The most obvious is the external pressure which parents and other adults bring to bear upon children through disapproval and punishment. Of course punishments can be of various kinds and it is not always the crudest which are the most cruel and repressive. Thrashings seem to produce hating and rebellious children as often as they make them meek and obedient. On the other hand in skilled hands threats such as 'I'll never love you any more,' or, 'You'll be sent away to a home,' or even a pained nod of the head will curb all but the most defiant of children. (Of course, it is rarely realized that threats of this kind are fully as cruel as the most savage thrashings.)

The effect of these measures will naturally be to make the child attempt to hide its real feelings. If a child is sufficiently often scolded or punished for showing displeasure or resentment, these feelings will be disguised. As time goes on the child may even succeed in hiding them from itself and finally perhaps cease altogether to be aware of their existence. But this process does not necessarily exterminate the impulses which may continue to influence conduct without the person being aware of the fact.

Yet another mode of stamping out hatred in children is to appeal to their pity and love. This is an exploitation of the second major force.

(2) Quite apart from external forces which may be brought to bear on a child to curb his natural impulses is a purely subjective process which is often greatly underestimated. This is the child's feelings of affection for its parents and the inevitable repulsion it has for its own feelings of anger for them. As was emphasized in the last chapter, children are as naturally co-operative and sociable as they are selfish and anti-social. They have spontaneous feelings of love and concern for their relatives as well as feelings of jealousy and hatred for them. This is shown very dramatically when a child after getting into a furious temper with its mother becomes miserable and penitent and extremely solicitous for her welfare.[1] Mothers frequently fail to take these protestations seriously, but experience shows that in the vast majority of cases they are to be taken with the utmost seriousness. For

[1] See case quoted on p. 98.

after being in a temper children feel terrified not only of losing their parents' love, but also lest they should have actually harmed their parents. For they realize, more or less consciously, that when they are in a temper the people whom they love most stand in real danger. An attempt to banish these dangerous hostile feelings not unnaturally follows.

Of course it is always difficult to know to what extent the moral views of children have been influenced by upbringing, but observations have shown that it is not only children who have been brought up in a moralizing atmosphere who develop an abhorrence of the 'naughty,' both in themselves and in others. Like hope, the idea of naughtiness seems to spring eternal in the human breast. Attempts may be made to minimize it by avoiding blaming children, but the very fact that children are inclined to actions which the most tolerant grown-up cannot like inevitably breeds the feeling. For apart from any moral laws or principles, children come to feel as naughty anything which the grown-ups do not like. This is typified by the following incidents.

> 'Alfred (4.2) and Herbert (2.11) were watching the mice, and making them run up and down the stairs in the mouse-box. When they couldn't make them do this, they called them "naughty mice"—"Aren't they naughty mice?" Mrs. I. said: "Are they?" and they replied: "They won't do what we want, so aren't they *naughty?*"'
>
> 'Dan (4.1) was on the river with his father, and defecated in his trousers. He burst into deep sobs of distress, and said: "Oh, what shall I do! oh, Daddy, *Daddy.*" Dan had never been scolded or even slightly reproached for such "accidents" which were very rare.'
>
> 'Dan gave Harold a motor bus. Harold (5.2) put it in the cloakroom, and when his mother came, she said it was not convenient to take it home that day. Harold was very angry at this, and hit his mother several times and said hostile things. She said she was very sorry, but she could not do it. The next day she told Mrs. I. how, all the way home, he kept hitting her and saying hostile things, and how a long time afterwards he asked her: "Do you still love me?" and when she said "Yes," he said: "What, after all that?"'[1]

Hostility, destructiveness, dirtiness, and greed, all strongly developed in children, will almost always be regarded as

[1] Op. cit., pp. 182, 179 and 178.

naughty, although details will be much influenced by the attitude of mother and nurse.

This subjective source of guilt carrying with it a need to repress hostile impulses is more difficult for the majority of people to understand than is the external source. It is consequently worth while dealing with it more fully. Its origin lies in the inclination of human beings to feel both hate and love for the same person. This propensity, known technically as *ambivalence*, is of the greatest importance for the understanding not only of repression but of the whole problem of hate and aggression in man.

Intensive investigation of the motives and feelings of children and adults has revealed a far greater complexity of emotional attitude than is usually recognized. The common man says that he likes X and hates Y and believes this to be true. But careful observation of his moods, thoughts, phantasies and dreams show that his love for X is not so pure as he thought, that feelings of hatred enter in, whilst his outspoken hatred for Y is partly manufactured to avoid envy and may conceal admiration and love. This relationship in which a person alternates between feelings of love and hatred for another is, of course, particularly characteristic of childhood. At one moment a child is happy and affectionate towards his mother, at the next in a towering rage with her for refusing him some trifle. After a short while the incident is forgotten and feelings of love restored. All children pass through such stages, indeed it is taken for granted. What is not so commonly recognized is that similar alternations are extremely frequent also in adults. They are especially noticeable in a patient's personal attitude to the analyst. For instance, a girl of twenty who was being treated wrote a note to her physician one day saying that she was sorry she was unable to come as she had a cold, adding almost effusive thanks for the improvement which treatment had made in her condition. Yet when next she came she was in a very bad temper, saying that she was as bad as she had ever been, that she had had awful thoughts of hurting people and great depression. On investigation it turned out that she had hoped and expected a note from her analyst in reply and that all this bad temper had come on when she realized that she would not get one. She remembered often getting into similar rages with her mother when she was a child and feeling dreadful afterwards for having thought such unkind things about her. It was clear in this case that at the age of twenty she was behaving towards the analyst exactly as she had towards her mother when she was five or less.

Such episodes are absolutely typical. It is true that they are more frequent and more intense the more neurotic the patient, but there are few people who do not exhibit such alternations sometimes. And not only can impulses of love and hate for the same person alternate with one another, but experience has shown that they may actually be operative at one and the same moment and result in thoughts and acts which partake of each.

The attack by MacMahon upon King Edward VIII is a good example. It was clear from the evidence that he was actuated both by a desire to kill the King and also by a desire to protect him. One of his stories was that, having received news that an attempt was to be made upon the King's life, he phoned the police to warn them. Obviously the threat came in fact from himself and it was against himself that he was warning the police. During the procession he seems to have been in a state of great agitation. Finally, when the King came by, his action was a perfect compromise between attacking and protecting him. He attacked the King by throwing his revolver at him. This whilst serious in form was negligible in results and, moreover, had the desirable effect of having the attacker taken into custody.

That this is not a fanciful reconstruction of the episode is shown by the statement of the man who murdered President Doumer of France. He described how he felt impelled to shoot the President on a certain day, but yet did his best to prevent himself doing so. First he got drunk in a café, then gave himself up to a policeman, telling him that he was going to shoot the President and that he had better be arrested first. Unfortunately the policeman had a sense of humour and was indulgent with the drunkard, with the result that the President was assassinated.

In these instances the process of repression is obviously breaking down; the murderous impulses are getting out of control and inadvertently venting themselves upon people different from the originals. (We may surmise that in each case there had been displacement of hatred from the original object, probably the father, on to the titular head of the State.) More commonly the person who suffers from these conflicting impulses is completely ignorant of one of them, usually the hostility, and believes himself actuated only by love.

These psycho-analytic observations of neurotics are amply confirmed by common experience of normal people. The woman who protests undying love for her husband, yet nags him continually and is jealous of his work and men friends, the

man who loves his children, yet beats them unmercifully when they are troublesome or make a noise are well known. And after all it is not surprising that the people who mean most to us should have power to evoke most feelings of anger. For, as observations on children and monkeys demonstrate, aggression is aroused when desires are frustrated. The stronger the desire, therefore, the more likely the frustration and the fiercer the aggression. Many instances can be given of situations where bitter hatred is called forth for a person who is otherwise loved, because he or she frustrates. A man will feel angry with a girl who leaves him for another man. A woman will feel angry with her husband for not earning more money or not providing her with a child.

The ambivalence of childhood has already been commented upon but needs especial emphasis because it is during childhood that passions are at their height and the repressing forces of the super-ego first develop. We have only to watch a group of children playing to witness the rapidity with which friendships dissolve and hatreds appear, enmities are reconciled and alliances formed. But in addition to the obvious occasions when a child is inspired to hatred for the parents or playmates whom it usually loves there are several situations which call for greater description because of the intensity of emotion and conflict generated.

One such is when a mother denies her baby the breast when it wants it. Instead of the affection inseparable from enjoyed satisfaction the baby screams and kicks in a paroxysm of rage and anger. Instead of loving its mother, it hates her. Since this is the first personal relationship which a child knows it is hardly surprising to discover that it often influences later relations very deeply.

Another occasion when love and hatred are mixed is when a child sees its mother with a new baby. Examples have already been given of children who are bitterly jealous of the new baby, a jealousy which engenders great hatred both for the rival and for the traitor mother. Yet the child may usually be most devoted to its mother and at times welcome the new baby as an object of love: 'It is just what I wanted!'

Still another is the jealousy aroused by the sight of the two parents being together. A child may be very fond of his father, yet jealous and resentful when he interrupts his play with his mother. This is obviously a very special case of the rivalry and anger which children feel when any two adults are together.

For instance, an only boy of five was always very upset if

his parents went out alone, leaving him at home with the maid. His jealousy was particularly noticeable on Sunday morning when his parents slept later. He used to knock on his parents' door and want to come in. When he found that they refused him admittance until later, he hit on the dodge of preparing their early-morning tea for them. This gained him admittance. His father who had no knowledge of psychology realized that his son regarded him as a rival for his mother's love.

Moreover this rivalry is not undiscriminating. A sexual motive enters in. Freud has been severely criticized for drawing attention to the sexual preferences of young children, but it is really a matter of common nursery experience. Little boys take more interest in women, little girls in men.

> 'Penelope (3.6) came to tea with Mrs. I. There were several women there, all friendly and sympathetic to children. But Penelope gave all her interest to the one man present, making him play various games with her, caressing him and sitting on his knee, monopolizing his attention all the time and not readily allowing him to take any notice of any one else.'[1]

In view of these observations, it is not surprising to discover that acute feelings of jealousy are constantly aroused in children by the affectionate relation of their two parents. For there is both the jealousy of the two adults being together, which the child feels to be a threat to his possession of either, and also the jealousy of sexual preference. The ambivalent feelings thereby aroused cause great conflict and have been termed the Œdipus complex by Freud. Psycho-analytic literature is full of examples of it.

In each of these instances hatred is aroused for the very person who is also most loved. The child welcomes the new baby, yet hates it for usurping his position. He loves his mother, yet hates her for giving more time and affection to the new-comer than to himself. He loves and admires his father, yet wishes him dead on the occasions when he steals his mother from him. Such ambivalent relationships are quite inseparable from childhood and begin when the infant in arms first screams with rage at his mother for not feeding him on demand.

Now it may be said that much of this is so obvious as to be of no importance. It is true that Freud did not discover the existence of ambivalence any more than Newton was the first to observe apples fall from trees. Freud's claim to fame

[1] Isaacs, op cit., p. 51.

lies in his recognition of the universality of ambivalence in human relations and of the torturing conflicts to which it gives rise. For experience shows that, as a person develops, an ambivalent relationship becomes more and more intolerable. In the first place there is the fear of retaliatory punishment which is seen in children of two or three. But apart from the possibility of punishment, ambivalence obviously interferes with the permanent friendly relation with adults which children so much desire. Moreover, as has already been remarked, it begets remorse ; for no one can get into a rage to the point of desiring to kill someone whom they are fond of without subsequently feeling regret and shame. Promptings from moralizing adults will no doubt increase them, but all the evidence suggests that their birth is spontaneous, arising inevitably from the conflict of ambivalence. The following conversation between two three-year-olds gives an illustration of its beginnings.

> 'Tommy and Martin were in the sand-pit, and talked to each other thus : Martin : "Do you love me ?" "Yes, I love you." Martin : "I love you—I'm not going to hit you again. *Shall* I hit you again ? No, I'm not going to hit you again." Martin repeated this two or three times.'[1]

The conflict is clearly expressed. On the one hand the child does not want to give up the luxury of expressing his aggression. On the other he does not want to interrupt his friendship nor suffer remorse from hurting his friend. It is an awkward dilemma, solved in this case apparently by Martin deciding to control his desire to hit Tommy. Unfortunately the solution is often less philosophically arrived at. A scolding adult demanding peace or the victim being seriously hurt might easily have upset the achievement of voluntary control and resulted in a wholesale repression of the desire to hit.

The difference between conscious control and unconscious repression is no doubt one of degree, but the result is profoundly different. For in the one case the person remains master in his own house, in the other the impulse is banished and control therefore impossible. It is the difference between socializing a dangerous criminal whilst maintaining supervision over him and banishing him to another land where he may, for all we know, continue to plot against us. So long as we retain responsibility for our impulses, as with our criminals, we stand in no danger from them. The problem arises when

[1] Isaacs, op cit., p 277.

impulses are banished and the person succeeds in attaining gnorance of his own wishes. These wishes may then influence hs actions without his realizing it and give rise to the various unconscious hostile acts which have already bnee illustrated.

The formation of the super-ego and the repression of anti-social impulses is, as we have seen, largely the result of the existence of ambivalence. It is in order to avoid the conflicts inseparable from an ambivalent relation that repression is undertaken and anti-social impulses such as aggression and greed stamped down. The result of this simple repression is commonly the non-aggressive, over-polite, over-conscientious type of person, who may none the less be responsible unintentionally for much unkindness. A knowledge of the existence of ambivalent feelings and of the mechanism of repression as a way of dealing with them is obviously of great importance for an understanding of human social relations.

But there are other methods of solving the conflict of ambivalence in addition to repression which are perhaps of even greater social importance. For some of them lead to the expression of violent hatred and aggression upon quite inappropriate people, people who have had nothing whatever to do with the stimulation of such feelings. Psycho-analysts have discovered that anger and aggression are constantly directed away from original objects on to other and often completely irrational ones, and it is because of this that they have approached the problem of war sceptical of rational explanations. For if individuals may hate and fight irrelevant people for irrational ends, may not societies also?

Of these other procedures for solving ambivalence *displacement* is unquestionably the simplest. It solves the emotional conflict which arises when you feel hatred for your friend by the simple expedient of deflecting the hatred and aggressive action to someone else, preferably someone smaller than yourself. Children constantly resort to it.

> 'Speaking to Dan, Mrs. I. called him "darling." Benjie at once said: "Why don't you call *me* that?" Mrs. I. replied: "But I often do." Benjie then said to Cecil: "I don't like you, Cecil. I'll get a gun and shoot you dead."'[1]

These children were both four years old, but Cecil was two months younger. Obviously to threaten Cecil had various advantages. Retaliation would be easier to deal with, remorse

[1] Isaacs, op. cit., p. 48.

would be absent and the friendly relation with Mrs. Isaacs uninterrupted.

A worried mother writes :

> 'My little girl, aged one year ten months, has become very difficult to manage owing, I expect, to jealousy, as she has a little brother of five months. At first she would hit him and start whining whenever I picked him up. I have not taken any notice of these fits, and never asked her to do anything for him, as I realized it only made her more angry. I am pleased to say this has been very effective, as she now asks to tuck him in, and mind him for me. She also offers him her toys, although she does not like parting with them. The real trouble now is that she absolutely refuses to have anything to do with strangers. If anyone says : "Good morning" or speaks to her at all, her reply is nearly always a very definite "No, don't" or "No, won't." She screams if they touch her or try to pick her up.'[1]

In this case it seems that the child has established an affectionate relation to the new baby by means of turning all her dislike on to other 'strangers.'

In older children dislike and criticism engendered by parental frustration is frequently vented upon school teachers. For instance, a child of eleven suffered from insomnia, listlessness and poor school work. On investigation it was found that the mother had always rejected this child and openly preferred her sister who was two years younger. The elder child, however, did not show open hostility to her mother. But after treatment had begun she began to criticize and laugh at her schoolmistress in a way which plainly showed it was an alternative to being antagonistic to her mother.

Displacements of this kind are equally common in adult life. Two instances have already been given of men who attacked the heads of their respective States. In neither case was there reason to suppose that the attackers had any rational grounds for their acts. In both cases there is an overwhelming probability that these men had displaced their hatred from someone nearer them, their father or their employer, for instance, on to the King or President. Actually this phenomenon is so common that it is taken for granted in everyday life. No one is surprised if a man who has been sacked from his job is in a bad temper and rude to his friends, or a girl who has been jilted takes an opportunity to lead on another man and then

[1] Isaacs, op. cit., p. 60.

jilt him. In the political sphere it is also commonly assumed. The idea that dictators undertake foreign adventures in order to deflect the people's resentment from themselves is not a psycho-analytic theory but an assumption of the common man. All that psycho-analysts have done has been to take these ideas seriously and try to understand them more thoroughly.

A good example of the displacement of aggression from its original target on to another was presented in a recent film (*Farewell Again*). It is a simple tale contrived to appeal to the ordinary man. Its assumption of the mechanism of displacement and its assumption that the ordinary cinema-goer will understand and accept it as a normal part of life seem to us eloquent testimony of the pervasiveness of displacement in social affairs.

A regiment is returning home after some years' service overseas. All the men are in high spirits in anticipation of seeing their wives, sweethearts or children again. Then as a bolt from the blue comes a message ordering them back to Palestine where disturbances are supposed to have broken out. The colonel does not seek to minimize the disappointment, but appeals to the men's sense of duty to carry out the order loyally. Most of them try to grin and bear it, but there is a feeling of injustice and much half-suppressed resentment at this sudden frustration of cherished dreams. The discontent grows, but except for one or two professional grumblers it is not directed against the colonel for whom the men have great affection, or even against the War Office. It remains rather aimless dissatisfaction manifesting itself in a variety of trifling ways. The men get on each other's nerves, old-standing feuds break out again, friends become irritable with one another. Finally two of the privates come to blows and a free fight follows throughout the mess. The colonel recognizing the source of the trouble makes another appeal for loyalty and makes every effort possible to ensure that the men will have as good a time as possible during the few hours in which the ship will be docked in England. Peace and discipline are restored.

In this story the men's anger resulting from the authorities' orders is not expressed directly. Partly perhaps from fear of punishment and partly because their sense of duty and loyalty to their colonel forbid it, these men are portrayed as suppressing their anger and avoiding mutiny. Yet their resentment persists and instead of being expressed against the people who were the cause of the frustration it is expressed against men

who have had nothing whatever to do with it. The fight, instead of being between the men and the authorities, is between the men themselves. Their resentment has been displaced.

Although in most people the mechanisms of repression and displacement work tolerably well, fresh difficulties are apt to arise through the mechanism of control becoming hypertrophied. Just as we do not always confine ourselves to passive defence against an external murderer, so a person's conscience does not confine itself to reasonable control of his own murderous impulses. On the principle that attack is the best means of defence, a ruthless campaign is waged against condemned impulses with the object of extirpating them root and branch. When the controlling conscience develops such violent propensities towards the condemned impulses the internal conflict may become so unbearable that it demands relief. But before considering the methods whereby relief is obtained, methods which tend to produce much aggressive behaviour, it may be as well to explain how it is that a child's conscience becomes so violent.

Examples have already been given of the violent way in which children feel and behave towards a rival. The universal severity of their scales of punishment is its moral counterpart.

Their own parents and nurses may have been very tolerant towards their tempers and their greed and other childish vices. Yet they themselves are not satisfied with anything short of the utter extermination of evil. No schoolboy is content until the villain in a story has been hanged or shot, and girls are little more merciful. In schools where the children mete out punishments it is the usual experience of masters that the principal difficulty is in persuading the courts to be lenient.

No doubt children who have been severely treated for naughtiness will be more severe than others who have been tolerantly treated, but it is certain that children spontaneously conceive of punishments far more severe than those which they have either experienced or been threatened with. For instance, Isaacs quotes the case of 'a girl of three and a half years who asked her mother what would happen if she were naughty at school. Her mother said: "Well, what would?" The child, after a pause, said: "I know—God would drown the world."'

Such phantasies are particularly common in neurotic children. While a rather nervous small girl of eight was playing, a cheap china doll fell off the table and was broken. The next time she came she was very afraid and it was not for

a long time that she could be induced to leave her mother and play at all. When finally she did so, she pretended that there was a little girl who had broken her doll and had to be shot. Whereupon the tin soldiers were made to aim at her. When asked if she could be let off, she refused absolutely, saying that the little girl had been naughty in breaking her doll and must be punished. Her mother subsequently said that the child had been very upset on returning home the previous time, had constantly worried about the broken doll and had been extremely reluctant to come again.

The presence of such violent conceptions of punishment in children's minds comes as a shock. Yet it is only to be expected. Children are naturally violent. They do not do things by halves. When they love they do so with great generosity, when they hate they are not satisfied until their enemy is dead. And so with their scale of punishments. Because a child thinks that another should be whipped for being dirty or shot for breaking her doll, we need not assume that he or she has been cruelly treated at home. It is simply the expression of childish violence in the moral sphere.

These examples show moreover that children are ruthless towards evil in themselves as well as in others. The child whose doll was broken was not only afraid of being shot, but clearly felt she deserved it. Self-dissatisfaction over the performance of some mechanical task has already been emphasized (p. 68) as the cause of much ill-temper. Self-dissatisfaction in the moral sphere is no less important a cause. In each case feelings of anger are aroused, which may take the form of self-hatred or deliberate self-punishment with the object of purging the self of all 'bad' impulses. The practice of self-flagellation to overcome and root out evil is out of fashion at present, widely though it was practised in the past. None the less much illness and many accidents prove on investigation to be due to a strong, usually unconscious, urge to punish the self, and suicide usually has this as one of its motives.[1]

Self-love and self-pity are such common conceptions that it is interesting that self-hatred should be so little recognized.

[1] Frequently the bad impulses which self-flagellation is intended to exterminate are dramatized and thought of by the sufferer as due to his having within him a devil or wild animal The self-punishment is then directed against the 'introjected objects' as these products of phantasy are termed. The super-ego may also be personalized, often in the character of a parent. This 'introjected parent' may then be attacked instead of the real external person.

Further discussion of the problems arising from introjection has been omitted because of the desire to present psycho-analytic theory in its simplest possible form.

It is extraordinary how early tendencies to vent dissatisfaction upon the self manifest themselves; the following letter from a mother testifies to its existence in the second year.

> 'My little boy is one year nine months old. He is very healthy and full of life, but if crossed in any way, such as not allowed to go out when any one comes to the door, if his engine turns over, or if checked for doing wrong, he gets down on his knees and bangs his forehead on the floor several times as hard as possible, or against the wall. He must hurt himself as he cries.'[1]

Now it is obvious from these examples that it is a very terrible thing for children to feel dissatisfied with themselves or guilty over anything. The tortures of a medieval Hell are no longer believed in by rational people, but observation shows that such ideas spring afresh in the irrational mind of every child. It is not only the vengeance of an angry and cruel God which is feared; the more immediate punishments of an angry and cruel conscience are equally frightening. As a result of this overwhelming fear of punishment a strong motive arises for turning a blind eye to our own incapacities and moral shortcomings and seeing all that is weak, foolish and evil in others. In our own eyes we then cease to be the enemies of ourselves and of those we love, and see ourselves as the noble champions of all that is good against the follies and malevolence that other men contemplate.

This process of solving the conflict between condemning conscience and condemned impulses by seeing the mote in the other man's eye is known as *projection*.[1] The condemned impulses are projected and viewed as though they originated in someone else's heart. Internal conflict is thereby resolved and instead of self-reproach and suicidal feelings, there are feelings of saving the world from some vicious foe. The conflict goes on, but the enemy is someone else and can be vanquished without exterminating the self.

Innumerable instances could be given both from childhood and adult life.

Sometimes projection is confined to merely blaming another person. For instance:

In close succession a woman loses her mother and younger

[1] Isaacs, op. cit., p. 186.

[2] It is generally believed that the origin of projection lies in an infant including in its feeling of 'self' all pleasant things which do its will, and excluding from its feeling of 'self' all painful things which fail to do what it wants. In the interests of simplicity this theory and also the relation of projection to excretory functions have not been discussed in detail.

brother, both of whom she has had to nurse through long and painful illnesses. She has worked night and day for them, but has always felt her ministrations were insufficient. At the funerals relations talk and laugh, and the full blast of the girl's self-condemnations alight on their heads. *They* are unfeeling, *they* did nothing to help her during the illness, *they* regard the funeral as a joke. They are blameworthy, not she.

At other times more active measures are taken against the alleged malefactors.

The baby of a charwoman gets diphtheria. Someone must be blamed. Her landlord is slovenly and has many times refused to improve the house. He is, therefore, made the scapegoat; the diphtheria is blamed on to the bugs in the house, and the mother gets the sanitary inspector on to the landlord.

A man has a motor accident in which he knocks down an old woman. He immediately begins to feel dissatisfied with the car and exchanges it within the week for a new one. Responsibility for the accident has been placed on the car.

Actual violence is by no means infrequent.

For instance a boy of nine had become very troublesome at school on account of his aggressive behaviour, hitting the other children about for no apparent reason and swearing. Whilst playing with some tin soldiers, he began shooting them with a pop-gun. On being asked who one soldier was, he said: "That's Colin Carver. He's a bad boy." Asked why, he said: "He hits the other boys and uses dirty words."

Another boy of seven also began shooting lead soldiers. On asking whom they represented, he replied: "That's Leslie Mathews. He's a dirty boy. He swears and pinches the other kiddies' things—and he's always smoking." This boy had been a persistent pilferer for several years and had recently taken to using bad language and smoking. Other children would not make friends with him because of his tendency to hit them.

Both of these incidents occurred at their first visit to a psychiatrist, and no suggestions of any kind had been made to them.

In each case we are probably quite safe in concluding that their aggressive behaviour at school was similar to their aggressive behaviour in play. They make the other children into scapegoats and then attack them.

Now this is a very important conclusion. Much aggressive behaviour in children, especially bullying, appears at first sight to be senseless Yet careful investigation goes to show that these apparently senseless assaults have a perfectly logical

origin. The child or person feels terribly guilty about something he has done or wished to do, then finds someone else to blame it on and finally attacks them for it. It is a procedure quite analogous to the bad temper which people get into with others when they themselves have done something stupid. An example has already been given of a boy who, having forgotten his ticket, flew into a rage with his mother and hit his brother. Many others could be given of golfers who, having missed an easy shot, get angry and vent it upon their wives on returning home 'because tea is late'.

The *need* for a scapegoat[1] is always to alleviate intolerable feelings of self-dissatisfaction and guilt It may be remarked, however, that the *choice* is often the result of more realistic factors. The charwoman blames her bad landlord. The man blames the car which actually did the damage. The 'bad' boys blame others who were no doubt also guilty. Such objects of course are always to hand for there are blemishes in everyone. The result is righteous indignation. We can go into tantrums of rage with people whose sins are small and thereby conveniently overlook shortcomings in ourselves which we fear are enormous. Campaigns of righteous indignation are often carried to preposterous lengths. Indeed, it is probably true that of all anger, righteous anger is the most ruthless, the most cruel and consequently the most dangerous.

The result is always an utterly irrational attack upon someone who has in no wise deserved it. But, as has just been emphasised, the irrationality does nothing to mitigate the violence of the assault. It is because of this that psycho-analysts, when considering the most ruthless forms of group fighting—war—have kept their eyes open for manifestations of projection and scapegoat-hunting. As Glover[2] has pointed out, it is extremely probable that motives of this kind play a large part in war. In later sections we shall see that there is plenty of evidence to support such anticipations.

The projection of condemned impulses and feelings upon others is only one of the methods whereby the internal conflict between the condemning conscience and 'bad' impulses can be solved. In this case the conscious self identifies itself with the conscience and sees the 'bad' impulses in others. The alternative is for the conscious self to identify with the

[1] We are using the term 'scapegoat' in this wide sense since it is used so colloquially. Strictly speaking perhaps it should be confined to procedures, such as the Jewish ritual in which personal sin is admitted and then placed upon some other creature to be borne away.

[2] Glover, *War, Sadism, and Pacifism*. Allen & Unwin, 1933.

condemned impulses and to see the condemnation coming from without. This process is known technically as the *projection of the super-ego.* Like the projection of 'bad' impulses it leads to much aggression.

For instance, it was probably a motive in the incident already quoted in which Benjie, having accidentally broken a jug, became defiant and shouted: "I'll hit you in the face; I'll not come to school any more." No punishment had been threatened and experience might have shown him that none was likely, yet like the little girl who was afraid that God would drown the world if she was naughty, Benjie anticipated some serious revenge. As a result, to protect himself from a danger which was almost entirely the product of his imagination, he became aggressive and threatened to attack.

The boy quoted on pp. 69–70 also showed this reaction. One day, whilst helping to clear the table, he smashed a coffee-pot. He thereupon threw some other crockery on the floor, got into a violent temper with his mother, who up till then had no idea what had happened, and began threatening her with a knife. From the boy's point of view this attack was simply self-defence. Unlike Benjie, he had been beaten a good deal so that his fears of punishment were not wholly imaginary. Nevertheless, analysis revealed that his conceptions of punishment were of an altogether fantastic severity, and he had come to expect them from people who in fact wished him nothing but well.

The motive of self-defence in aggressive behaviour requires especial emphasis. Mrs. Isaacs has observed that 'most of the aggressive behaviour of small children has a considerable element of defence about it,' and psycho-analysis has been able to explain it. The projection either of 'bad' impulses or of the punishing super-ego leads in different ways to irrational fears of being attacked and consequently to unnecessary attacks in self-defence.

The tendency to project all one's own 'bad' impulses on to others has the effect of turning friendly people into enemies in the imagination of the projector. A person with strong murderous impulses is apt, through projection, to see every one else as a potential murderer. A person who is inclined to bully will, through projection, see every one else as a bully. It is not he who wants to murder or to bully others; they want to murder or bully him.

The projection of a condemning conscience equally leads to the belief that others are our enemies when in fact they may be friendly. Examples have just been given of children who,

fearing severe punishment, attacked in self-defence. Examples could also be given of adults who, without realizing it, still anticipate punishment and revenge of the same devastating kind as they did when they were children. This may be disputed, yet we need only recall that at one time all intelligent people and even now very large numbers consciously believe that the vilest tortures await them in Hell in punishment for wrong-doing. Again, patients in a melancholia are always afraid of the most terrible punishments such as being thrown to lions or being cut to pieces, fears which can be nothing but products of their own guilty imaginations. With these facts in mind it is less difficult to believe that fears of a fantastic kind may also be present in the minds of ordinary people, despite their consciously disowning them, and account for the remarkable guiltiness with which many people sense criticism and, in self-defence, attack the critic.

In these ways imaginary enemies of an extraordinary malevolence are created. (It is now believed that all the phobias and other terrors of neurotics are to be explained in this way.) The effect of such fears upon social life is, of course, tremendous and almost entirely for ill. The natural rivalry and distrust of children is quite sufficient without any added complications. There is ample real enmity without imaginary enmity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that with the added strain upon friendship imposed by projection, peaceful co-operation quickly breaks down; nor that many fights are undertaken in the genuine though mistaken belief that other people are attacking.

Conclusions.

We may now summarize the contribution which psycho-analysis has made to the understanding of hatred and aggression:

(1) It has drawn attention to the existence of *unconscious aggressive impulses* which influence people's behaviour without their being aware of the fact.

(2) It has emphasized the role which *ambivalence*, the tendency to love and hate the same person, plays in personal relations, and explored the situations which give rise to this paradoxical state of affairs. Frustrations at the breast, jealousy over the birth of a new baby, and also of the affectionate relations between the two parents are amongst its most important sources.

(3) The universal *violence* of children's feelings is stressed, especially as this violence tends to persist unconsciously in adult life.

(4) The desire to consolidate friendships and to abhor ambivalent relations has been found to give rise to various dodges for disguising and disowning unfriendly impulses such as hatred and greed.

(5) Of these, *repression* was the first to be discovered. Unwanted impulses are banished from consciousness although this does not always result in their immobilization.

(6) Another procedure designed to solve the conflict of ambivalence is *displacement.* Here the impulse is permitted expression, but the object is changed. Instead of feeling angry and hurting a friend, we feel angry with and hurt a stranger. The result is an entirely irrational act of aggression.

(7) Feelings of shame and guilt over certain impulses lead to intense self-condemnation and self-hatred and the fear of terrible punishments. Such feelings are often unbearable and demand alleviation. This is found in two ways :

(*a*) *The condemned impulses are projected*, namely, attributed to someone else. These others, the scapegoats, are then seen as wicked people full of murderous and other evil wishes which must be stamped out.

(*b*) Alternatively *the condemning super-ego is projected.* Again the person will feel guiltless, but will view the people upon whom he has projected his super-ego as cruel oppressors.

(8) Projection, either of ' bad ' impulses or of the conscience, has the effect of creating imaginary enemies, people of untold wickedness and malevolence, who are felt to be threatening our friends or ourselves. Much aggression is undertaken in self-defence against these imaginary enemies.

(4) Animism

We have now completed our survey of the situations in which outbursts of aggression occur in the individual. But before discussing the theory of group-aggression to which these and other observations lead us, a further deep-rooted tendency of the human mind to which both anthropology and psycho-analysis have drawn attention needs description. This is the widespread tendency of people to attribute a personal motivation to every event which affects them, whatever its actual origin. Primitive peoples have long been known to hold such views. Frazer's *Golden Bough* is full of examples of the way in which savages attribute misadventures and calamities of all kinds to the deliberate malevolence of some being or other.

And not only does the savage blame the spirits for all the trouble that befalls him ; he attacks them.

'Their constant presence wearies him, their sleepless malignity exasperates him ; he longs with an unspeakable longing to be rid of them altogether, and from time to time, driven to bay, his patience utterly exhausted, he turns fiercely on his persecutors and makes a desperate effort to chase the whole pack of them from the land, to clear the air of their swarming multitudes, that he may breathe more freely and go on his way unmolested, at least for a time. Thus it comes about that the endeavour of primitive people to make a clean sweep of all their troubles generally takes the form of a grand hunting out and expulsion of devils or ghosts. They think that if they can only shake off these their accursed tormentors, they will make a fresh start in life, happy and innocent ; the tales of Eden and the old poetic golden age will come true again.'[1]

Innumerable examples of the manner in which primitives seek to exterminate their supposed persecutors, the demons and spirits who cause sickness, drought, typhoon and all the other disasters man is heir to, are given in the *Golden Bough.*

'Some of the native tribes of Central Queensland believe in a noxious being called Molonga, who prowls unseen and would kill men and violate women if certain ceremonies were not performed. These ceremonies last for five nights and consist of dances, in which only men, fantastically painted and adorned, take part. On the fifth night Molonga himself, personified by a man tricked out with red ochre and feathers and carrying a long feather-tipped spear, rushes forth from the darkness at the spectators and makes as if he would run them through. Great is the excitement, loud are the shrieks and shouts, but after another feigned attack the demon vanishes in the gloom.'[2]

'In the Island of Rook, between New Guinea and New Britain, when any misfortune has happened, all the people run together, scream, curse, howl, and beat the air with sticks to drive away the devil, who is supposed to be the author of the mishap. From the spot where the mishap took place they drive him step by step to the sea, and on reaching the shore they redouble their shouts and blows in order to expel him from the island. He generally retires to the sea or to the Island of Lottin.'[3]

[1] *The Golden Bough,* abridged edition, p. 547.
[2] Op cit , pp 562–3
[3] Op. cit , p. 547.

'When a village has been visited by a series of disasters or a severe epidemic, the inhabitants of Minahassa in Celebes lay the blame upon the devils who are infesting the village and who must be expelled from it. Accordingly, early one morning all the people, men, women, and children, quit their homes, carrying their household goods with them, and take up their quarters in temporary huts which have been erected outside the village. Here they spend several days, offering sacrifices and preparing for the final ceremony. At last the men, some wearing masks, others with their faces blackened, and so on, but all armed with swords, guns, pikes, or brooms, steal cautiously and silently back to the deserted village. Then, at a signal from the priest, they rush furiously up and down the streets and into and under the houses (which are raised on piles above the ground), yelling and striking on walls, doors, and windows, to drive away the devils. Next the priests and the rest of the people come with the holy fire and march nine times round each house and thrice round the ladder that leads up to it, carrying the fire with them. Then they take the fire into the kitchen, where it must burn away, and great and general is the joy.'[1]

This conviction of universal human motivation is usually known as *animism*.[2] It is far less explicit in the civilized person than it is in the savage and therefore less easy to demonstrate. The absurdity of the savage's views on the causes of storms or disease is obvious to westerners, but, since no one likes to admit the absurdities of his own beliefs, it is difficult to convince a European that his also are often animistic. Nevertheless we believe animism to be fully as important in civilized societies as in primitive. It is not so long since everyone in Western Europe believed that all events emanated either from God or the Devil. It is true that such explanations are out of fashion now, but even to-day many religious people still believe that health and prosperity, sickness and disaster are equally dependent on God's will. The law itself enshrines the belief in the words 'Act of God'. But now that science and rationalism have largely discredited the belief in superhuman agencies it might be expected that animism would die altogether. This does not appear to be the case. What

[1] Fraser, op. cit, p 548.

[2] The term 'animism' is sometimes confined to the attribution of souls or minds to inanimate objects. We think it legitimate, however, to extend the term to cover all instances where phenomena believed nowadays to be of non-human origin are attributed to the workings of human or para-human wills. The agents which can be held responsible fall into three classes: (1) spirits, demons, etc; (2) other human beings, (3) the person's own self.

happens is that the tendency to attribute blame to someone continues, but that instead of its being attached to spirits it becomes attached to other groups of men. For instance, in September 1867 'the inhabitants of Calabria (Spain), imagining the cholera to be occasioned by poison, murder whole families on suspicion of scattering it ; eighty persons are cut to pieces and thrown to the swine.'[1] A similar belief, that death is always due to murder, was expressed by a small boy of five. He made a comment about the King being shot and on being questioned remarked : "Well, we've got a new King now. I suppose a soldier must have shot the other one." Many further examples of this, both from primitive and civilized societies, are given in the sections on group aggression.

It seems probable that the tendency to see a human agency at work behind all natural phenomena is initially a simple intellectual error—a false explanation deriving from inadequate knowledge. Psycho-analysis has demonstrated, however, that the intellectual error is reinforced by the strong emotional forces which have already been discussed. The human agencies deemed responsible are not conceived of as either capricious or uninterested. On the contrary their every act is believed to be inspired by personal motives such as love or revenge, a desire to reward or a lust to punish. Thus plentiful crops and fertile women are not simply good fortune. They are the intentional reward for good behaviour. Storms, tempest and earthquake are likewise either malicious revenge or deliberate punishment for evil. This idea is so well known as hardly to need illustration, but it is interesting to hear it expressed apparently spontaneously by a boy of four.

> 'The children were standing at the door, watching a heavy shower of rain. They heard the rustling noise of the rain on the leaves, and when something was said about this, George remarked : "Perhaps it's God saying He will punish us for doing things we shouldn't."'[2]

So far we have only mentioned cases in which the misfortune is attributed to some external being, a spirit or God or the malice of other men. Almost all the anthropological observations are of this kind. Psycho-analytic research has emphasized another aspect. It is frequently found that people hold *themselves* responsible for calamities with which they have in fact had nothing to do. We all know people who like to

[1] Quoted from *Marshall's Ladies' Fashionable Repository* for 1869 in *The Times*, 12 June 1937

[2] Isaacs, op. cit., p. 172.

take the *credit* for everything that happens, whether they are really responsible or not. Such a motive is easily understood. What is not so often recognized is that people are just as apt to take the *blame* for events which they have not really influenced at all. Naturally they do not shout about it so much, indeed they are inclined to deny it to themselves as well as to others, but an enormous amount of evidence has now accumulated to show that people frequently feel responsible for natural misfortunes, often without realizing that they are holding themselves so.[1]

The illness or death of a relative is one of the most frequent sources of such guilt, as the following case-histories illustrate.

A small boy of seven was brought for advice by his mother, because of disobedience, tempers, teasing and hurting two little sisters. On investigation it was found that he had been fairly easy to manage until a sister was born, when he was three years old. He had shown intense jealousy of the new arrival and from that time onwards outbursts of rage would follow any frustration, particularly over food.[2] He would go tense, sometimes threatened to kill the baby, sometimes punched his mother. After these outbursts he became very affectionate and showed great concern for them both. (Similar cases to this abound. A simple situation of frustration and jealousy gives rise to acute anger and aggression towards both the rival new-comer and the traitor mother. This is badly handled and, instead of settling down, becomes a chronic condition. Outbursts of rage and aggression follow any new situation of rivalry and frustration.) But the boy is still genuinely fond of his mother and the outbursts of anger are followed by remorse, thus illustrating that such feelings are born, not of a conventional morality imposed from without, but of simple feelings of affection and a natural desire to be nice to those most loved. Later on his mother fell ill. His remorse then became specially pronounced. He promised again and again that he would never more be naughty and hurt her and, when she was in hospital, made daily pilgrimages to see how she was. On the days when visitors were not allowed

[1] Usually when no conscious feelings of guilt are experienced, the person suffers from a sense of inferiority, a feeling of not being liked, or from depression when misfortunes occur. Psycho-analysts are sometimes ridiculed for talking about an 'unconscious sense of guilt,' but it should be remembered that it is an old religious conception. Although not actually experiencing guilt, these people are very touchy if criticized and often become aggressive.

[2] Food is of double importance to children. Not only are they greedy and like it, but food is part of their earliest relation with their mother. A simple jealousy situation of great intensity results from seeing another child being suckled.

in he would walk around the hospital in the hope of catching a glimpse of her at the window. Naturally he was enormously relieved when she recovered.

This boy's behaviour during his mother's illness, especially his promising gratuitously never to hurt her again, showed plainly that he was blaming himself for her condition. Such self-reproach is in fact unjustified, because, of course, the boy was in no way the cause of his mother's illness. But children have not adult knowledge of cause and effect. All this boy knew was that there had been times when he had punched his mother and wanted to kill her. When she fell ill a guilty conscience led him to conclude that he was the cause of it.

This description was given to me by the mother and was not the result of psycho-analysis, but similar processes are revealed with extraordinary regularity during the analyses of even quite normal adults and children. *Events which happen to be in accordance with aggressive wishes are assumed to have been caused by those wishes.* This erroneous but extremely common conclusion is the result partly of the widespread tendency towards animism which holds that all events are of human or para-human origin, and partly to another fundamental tendency of the human mind, the tendency to equate wish and deed. This latter tendency, known technically as the *omnipotence of thought*, is found in all children and is a characteristic of the obsessional neurotic. These patients are terrified that if they think a thing it will happen, and since their thoughts are usually of a horrifying character, either murderous or obscene, they undergo great torment fighting them. Naturally they are particularly prone to shoulder responsibilities which do not really belong to them. It is from their ranks that the miserable individuals are recruited who, when a murder has been committed, straightway go to the police and confess to having done it.

Dr. Karin Stephen[1] has described a case in which the assumption that an event which is in accordance with aggressive wishes has actually been caused by those wishes is particularly clear, and was at the root of a serious mental breakdown.

Miss M. had suffered all her life from the idea that she was like Cain, the murderer of Abel. She had also a great horror of jealousy and did her utmost to avoid ever feeling jealous of any one. She was unmarried and lived with her mother, being the typical self-sacrificing daughter, continually making her mother presents and taking great care of her health. She spoke in a timid innocent voice, was entirely submissive to

[1] Stephen, *Psycho-Analysis and Medicine.*

everyone and undertook all the housework whilst her younger sister studied and earned prizes. At the age of thirty she had a breakdown, during which she turned against her mother and accused her of having ruined her life.

This was her history as she remembered it during psycho-analysis :

> 'When she was nearly four her mother had another baby and she, as the elder child, was turned out of her cot in the parents' bedroom by its arrival. The day after the new baby was born she was allowed to go in and see her mother, and asked if she might hold the baby, but in a few moments she begged the nurse to take it from her because she felt sure she was going to drop it. Next day the baby died. This did not seem to her a mere coincidence : she appears to have believed that she was in some way responsible. It was undoubtedly true that she had wished the new baby might be removed, and now, when it did, in fact, die, she felt as if the wish had *brought this about*. She got back her cot in her parents' bedroom and remembers feeling glad but guilty at being there again. She said she tried to believe what they told her, that it was the fault of the nurse who had let the baby get a chill, but she knew she had been frightfully jealous, and the idea haunted her that somehow her jealousy had killed it. . . .
>
> 'Four years after the death of this baby her mother had another, which once again turned the elder child out of her cot in her parents' room. She remembers being in the top room with her doll, and first trying to kiss it and be fond of it, then getting angry with it and pushing its eyes in. She was frightened when she had done that, and tried to get the eyes back again, but she could not. Finally she slid the doll to the edge of the bed and succeeded in having it fall out on the floor without *exactly* having pushed it. . . .
>
> 'Later, when she had to wheel out the new baby in the pram, she contrived, in spite of strict warnings to avoid pavements, that the wheels mounted on the curb crookedly, the pram overturned, and the baby fell into the road. This time, fortunately, the baby did not die.
>
> 'She had never connected her terrible feelings of being like Cain and her over-powering dread of jealousy with these episodes.'

This latter case is specially interesting as demonstrating how hatred can develop from feelings of overwhelming guilt over

an incident in which the person had not actually had any hand. The train of events may be schematized thus :

(1) The new baby dies.
(2) Someone must be responsible (animism).
(3) Because she has wished the baby to die the child holds herself responsible (omnipotence of thought).
(4) To assuage the guilt and make amends to the mother the child's conscience demands great self-sacrifice.
(5) Self-sacrifice is so great that life becomes intolerable.
(6) Instead of rebelling against her own severe conscience the girl projects all responsibility for her miserable life on to her mother (projection of super-ego) and accuses her of ruining her life.

It is found in clinical practice that accusations of this kind are often the prelude to physical assaults.

Similar feelings of guilt over a death quite unconnected with the patient were observed after the death of King George. One girl of twenty, with pronounced hatred towards both her parents, was very depressed the following day and said she had had a recurrent self-accusatory thought the previous evening when the King was dying : 'You killed the King.' Dr. Fairbairn reported the case of a youth of eighteen whose symptoms of anxiety turned into panic at each wireless bulletin. During the night following that on which the King died, he dreamt that he had shot a man representing his father. Later in the dream he heard shouts which seemed to come from the person whom he had killed ; but this person now seemed to be his brother (who was six years younger than the patient and died aged six). Similar evidence made it quite clear that he had always felt responsible for his younger brother's death and that these feelings of guilt had been reactivated by the King's death.

Ordinary clinical and also psycho-analytic observations thus explain how it is that people can come to feel guilty over and blame themselves for occurrences with which, in fact, they have had nothing whatever to do. There are few people who do not have some such feelings of guilt connected with their fantasies of destruction. They may remain dormant for long periods but are aroused afresh by actual disasters, such as the death of a relative or a national misfortune.

Now it is when people feel most guilty themselves that they are most apt either to find fault with others (projection of 'bad' impulses), or to interpret every event that is disadvantageous to themselves as being deliberate punishment (projection of super-ego), against which they must protect

themselves. Consequently large numbers of people after they or their friends have suffered adversity become truculent and bellicose. This sequence is well illustrated by the following incident.

> 'Dan (4.8) and Priscilla (6.5) said they would "push Phineas (2.11) to make him cry again." When they were going to him again, Mrs. I. held them back and would not let them go near him, and in trying to run past Mrs. I., Christopher (5.4) bumped his head on the door. The others thought Mrs. I. had done this to him, and were very angry, saying that she was "horrid and beastly," and "we shan't come to tea with you any more." Priscilla said: "Let's be rude to her," and made threatening faces at her. When presently they understood that she had not done it to Christopher, they calmed down and were friendly.'

Here Dan and Priscilla had been actively hostile to a younger child. Mrs. Isaacs interfered and the two children evidently felt guilty. Then an irrelevant accident happens to another child. In their guilty frame of mind Dan and Priscilla fear they are responsible; it is consequently a great relief to them to fix the blame for it upon someone else. In the first place they see hostility in someone else instead of in themselves (projection of 'bad' impulses); in the second place, by fixing it upon Mrs. Isaacs, they can discredit the very person who made them feel guilty.

The tendency to incriminate an external being for natural events is, therefore, seen to be as much due to a need to deny personal guilt, and to find an external scapegoat, as to any intellectual mistake. Were it not for the need to prove their own innocence, they would not be so concerned to prove someone else's guilt. This view is based largely on psycho-analytic evidence, but anthropological observations confirm it.

In Frazer's descriptions of the tribes already quoted, there is no hint that the tribesmen feel any guilt for the disaster, blame for which they pin on the spirits. But there are others who, before expelling the evil agents, confess their sins. The Iroquois, for instance, actually had a general confession of sins as part of the expulsion ceremony, which served, Frazer says, as 'a way of stripping the people of their moral burdens, that these might be collected and cast out.' The scapegoat ceremony of the Jews seems to be a more civilized form of the same process. 'On the Day of Atonement, which was the tenth day of the seventh month, the Jewish high-priest laid

[1] Isaacs, op cit, pp. 262–263.

both his hands on the head of a live goat, confessed over it all the iniquities of the Children of Israel, and, having thereby transferred the sins of the people to the beast, sent it away into the wilderness.'[1]

Frazer has no hesitation in grouping instances such as this where the community sense of guilt is admitted with those (quoted on pp. 95–6) where it appears absent. We are, therefore, probably safe in concluding that where the Jews admitted their own guilt and deliberately and consciously laid it upon another, the more primitive peoples, despite apparent guiltlessness, really do fear counting themselves responsible for disasters and are releived by being able to blame the spirits.

In primitive warfare, the tendency to animism, coupled with a need to find someone else guilty, will be found to play a leading part. Indeed, no understanding of hostile behaviour in humans is possible, in our view, without constant reference to animism and projection. This is discussed at length on pages 117 to 123; meanwhile we may summarize our conclusions.

Conclusions.

(1) Events such as tempest or disease or economic depression, which are the common calamity of all, are always given a personal origin by children and primitive peoples. They thus become the sources of personal hatreds against spirits or humans.

(2) Animism, coupled with a primitive belief in the omnipotence of thought, tends to increase the sense of guilt, through people attributing to themselves calamities for which they are, in fact, in no way responsible. It has already been shown that an over-burdening sense of guilt is liable to lead, through projection, to accusations, and hostile behaviour. Animism, by increasing guilt, therefore stimulates hostile behaviour.

(3) Finally, animism plays into the hands of projection. Every calamity for which *we* are not responsible is an additional proof of the badness of *others*. When rain falls it confirms our belief in an angry punishing spirit or God. When crops fail it proves that the spirits or our neighbours are unpleasant and malevolent people. Animism, whilst on the one hand tending enormously to increase the sense of guilt, at the same time provides an excellent procedure for seeing the blame in others

[1] Frazer, op. cit., pp. 553 and 569.

and proving ourselves innocent. In so doing it vastly exaggerates the mutual fear and distrust in which people live.

B. STUDIES IN GROUP AGGRESSION

(1) War between Primitive Communities

It is the authors' contention that war is simply a particular example of fighting, and that in all probability the origins of fighting amongst groups will be substantially the same as the origins of fighting between individuals. It is now proposed to review the apparent causes of war amongst primitive communities to test out our hypothesis. In the space at our disposal it is impossible for this survey to be more than rough and general. Nor have we had an opportunity to examine the original anthropological descriptions. We are, in consequence, deeply indebted to Professor Davie for his invaluable collection and classification of it. What follows is largely based upon his work.[1]

All authorities who have studied the data seem to be agreed upon the extremely widespread incidence of warfare amongst the simpler peoples. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg examined the records of three hundred and eleven primitive societies, ranging from the lower hunters to those who have developed simple forms of agriculture. Amongst these they found an 'aggregate of two hundred and ninety-eight cases of war or feuds distributed through all the grades, and nine certain and four doubtful cases of "no war." These are mainly confined to the lowest grades, there being four and a half among the lower, three and a half among the higher hunters, and two in the lowest agriculture.'[2]

Davie writes: 'War plays a prominent part in the life of most primitive peoples and is usually a sanguinary affair,' and again, 'The cases where war is unknown or unimportant have been considered in some detail for the reason that they are quite exceptional.' And not only is it very exceptional to find societies where war is almost unknown, but of the warlike tribes there is actually a majority who live in a state of *continual* warfare. 'A survey of the primitive tribes existing to-day shows that those living in a continual state of war greatly outnumber those that are predominantly peaceful.' For example:

[1] Davie, *The Evolution of War*, Yale University Press, 1929.

[2] Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*

'Incessant warfare was the rule among the Eskimos and Indians of Alaska and the islands of the far north-west. The same was true of the Micmac Indians and the Beothucs of Newfoundland, between whom "there reigns so mortal an enmity that they never meet but a bloody conflict ensues." The tribes of Sitka Island are reported to be "perpetually in a state of warfare," while peace was the exception among the Salish tribes of British Columbia.

'The organization and distribution of the Indians of the United States resulted in a continual state of war. Each tribe was practically at war with every other tribe with which it did not have an express treaty of peace. A state of preparedness always existed, even when war was not actually in operation, and defensive works were often erected. War was intensified by the acquisition of firearms and the horse, and by the crowding back of tribe against tribe by the whites.' [1]

Nor is this warfare always of a mild nature.

'The evidence . . . shows that thousands of persons have been slain in single battles among the African natives, that in America and elsewhere entire tribes have been exterminated, and that in certain South Sea Islands accumulated heaps of skull trophies cluster the beaches.'

Summing up Davie writes:

'Primitive tribes in general are more warlike than peaceful, and their warfare is severe and sanguinary more often than it is mild and bloodless. Nomadic races are as a rule more belligerent than agriculturists, and are more often engaged in war; their constant wanderings in search of water and fresh grazing or hunting grounds lead to incessant conflicts with other tribes. As a corollary to this, mountain tribes are almost universally more warlike than those of the plains and valleys. The latter are generally agriculturists, since their land is more fertile, while the environment of the former is more suited to hunting and cattle raising. The conflict of herders and tillers, with the former dominating the latter, is a common phenomenon in culture history. Agricultural civilization, however, does not necessarily conduce to peace. On the contrary, with the growth of population and political control, war becomes more widespread and destructive. Thus the Aztecs of Mexico, the Incas of Peru, the African kingdoms of Dahomey and Benin,

[1] Davie, op. cit.,

and the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, and Persia all stand out as more militaristic than the less civilized tribes about them. Encounters were on a larger scale, and effective conquest now for the first time became feasible.'[1]

Despite this overwhelming evidence, the fact that there are some very simple peoples where war seems to be unknown has given rise to assertions that man is 'essentially' peaceful, and that it is civilization which is to blame for his present undeniable aggressiveness. Ginsberg has dealt at length with this theory.[2]

'Several anthropologists have recently advocated what amounts to a return to the myth of a golden age of innocence and peace on the ground that the simplestp eoples, namely the hunters and food-gatherers, are, it is alleged, gentle and peaceful. I refer to the school of Pater Schmidt in Germany, of Prof. Elliot Smith and Dr. Perry in England, and of Bij in Holland. As an argument in favour of pacifism this is a double-edged weapon; for the believers in warfare may retort that these peoples remained in their primitive condition just because they could not or would not fight, and that war is essential to civilization. This has in fact been urged by Steinmetz. In any event the facts when closely scrutinized do not really justify any belief in the essential peacefulness of primitive man. The antithesis between war and peace is really inapplicable to the simple conditions in which these peoples live. Anything like the organized and aggressive warfare which we find in early history and among the more advanced of the simpler societies can have no place in the life of the simplest societies, for this implies organization, discipline, and differentiation between leaders and led which the people of the lowest culture do not possess. But if these do not have war, neither have they peace. We must think of war not as a genus uniquely opposed to peace, but as a species of violence opposed to social order and security. Scrutiny of the evidence shows that there are singularly few peoples among whom violence, homicidal and other, is unknown. This seems to be true of some of the Semang. The Veddas of recent times do not fight, but formerly they used to kill trespassers and eat their livers (for constancy in revenge). The Kubu do not fight, but the groups avoid each other and hardly ever meet. The Australian

[1] Davie, op. cit., p. 63.

[2] Ginsberg, *A Symposium on the Psychology of Peace and War. British Journal of Medical Psychology*, XII.

tribes have no war in the sense of collective fighting by whole tribes, but there is or was a widespread system of vengeance against members of other groups and retaliation within the group. This is mitigated by the machinery of ordeals and the regulated combat, but this machinery is no doubt inspired and sustained by the serious possibility of feuds and homicide. Murder by magic and the fear of such murders constitute an important factor in Australian life. Fighting between groups on questions of trespass and personal injury is reported for the Andaman Islanders, the Ona, the Botocudo, the Bushmen. Among the Yaghans of Tierra del Fuego there were feuds between banded families, and concerted revenge occurs among the Punans and the Batua Pygmies. In such feuds the groups may not be involved as wholes, and perhaps the term war ought to be confined to such collective fighting. It would seem that war in this sense grows with the consolidation of groups and economic development. Among the simplest peoples we ought to speak rather of feuds, and these unquestionably occur on grounds of abduction of women, or resentments of trespass or personal injury. It must be conceded that these societies are peaceful by comparison with the more advanced of the primitive peoples. But violence and fear of violence are there and fighting occurs, though that is obviously and necessarily on a small scale.'

It seems then that the most primitive peoples are not only not peaceable, but live in a state not far removed from that of baboons. This has already been commented upon. The groups consist of only a few families and are bound together neither by rules nor institutions. Fights and feuds occur, but remain private; the group as a whole does not combine together in an attack. As Ginsberg says, this state cannot be described as either peace or war, any more than a baboon community or a group of children can be said to be at peace or at war. For peace implies an absence of fighting and seems to require rules for its maintenance whilst war demands combined actions of one group against another.

Such primitive communities are rare. The great majority of primitive peoples live in larger groups and these are all characterized by the presence of rules regulating conduct. But whatever groups we study it seems to be taken for granted that members of it should treat fellow-members and strangers completely differently. In fact two codes of conduct appear, one prescribing a man's behaviour towards members of his

own group, another towards strangers. The one is a code of peace, the other usually of war. Within the group, rights, laws, and institutions exist (such as bans on murder and stealing), obviously designed to settle disputes and promote peaceful relations between members. But not only do these rules exclude strangers, often customs exist which prescribe exactly opposite treatment for them.

> 'Against outsiders it is meritorious to kill, plunder, practise blood revenge, and steal women and slaves, but inside the group none of these things can be allowed. . . . The Sioux must kill a man before he can be a brave, and the Dyak before he can marry. Yet, as Tylor has said, "these Sioux among themselves hold manslaughter to be a crime unless in blood revenge; and the Dyaks punish murder. . . . The tribe makes its law, not on an abstract principle that manslaughter is right or wrong, but for its own preservation. . . . Not only is slaying an enemy in open war looked on as righteous but ancient law goes on the doctrine that slaying one's own tribesman and slaying a foreigner are crimes of quite different order."'
>
> 'The Australian has two sets of mores, one for his group-comrades or friends, the other for outsiders or foes. "Between the males of a tribe there always exists a strong feeling of brotherhood, so that, come weal, come woe, a man can always calculate on the aid, in danger, of every member of his tribe," but toward strangers there reigns inveterate hatred, and any means are justified in dealing with them.'
>
> 'Captain Butler says that the Angami of North-East India are, among themselves, usually most truthful and honest; against outsiders, however, they are "bloodthirsty, treacherous, and revengeful to an almost incredible degree."'[1]

In fact the higher savage civilizations are very similar to advanced Western civilizations in these respects. Within the group, members of each are comparatively peaceful and orderly. Towards other groups each shows undisguised suspicion and hostility. Practically the only difference between a European and a primitive in this respect is the variation in the size of the groups within which peace, law and co-operation reign and between which wars are waged.

The history of civilization can be viewed as a series of steps whereby organized social groups have expanded to

[1] Davie, op cit, pp. 18–20

contain more and more people. For civilized men living in nation states whose populations are measured in millions it is difficult to envisage the minute groups in which savages live. In New Guinea the native tribes are so segregated that 'twenty-five different languages are certainly spoken on the three hundred miles of coast extending from Yule Island to China Straits.'[1] This means that each group is on the average confined to twelve miles of coastline. A similar condition of affairs is found in the Naga Hills of India, in East Africa and many other places where the constant state of hostilities between neighbours has resulted in village communities becoming so socially isolated that they hardly understand one another's speech. Yet we have only to remember the small principalities and city-states of Europe or the persistent feuds between small Scottish clans up till comparatively recent times to realize how segregated social life has always tended to be.

This tendency of social groups to be peaceful within and war-like without is of critical interest. It will be remembered that observation on children reveal the large rôle which *displacement* plays in the development of their social life. In order to retain friends and consolidate peaceful relations, hatred for comrades, when aroused, has to be directed on to others. From what is known of the development of adult communities it is difficult not to conclude that displacement of aggression from friends to strangers has also played a major part in their development. The theory which we wish to put forward is that man, having so much of the baboon in his nature, has the greatest difficulty in living in peaceable and co-operative relations with his fellows in a group and that he is enabled to do so far more easily when he diverts his anti-social impulses against other groups. It is easier for him to avoid murdering his relatives and friends or stealing their wives if he has plenty of opportunity to murder other men and steal their wives.

If this theory is correct, internal peace and cohesion in a society is bought at the expense of waging wars on other groups just as the friendship of Benjie with Mrs. Isaacs necessitated hostilities against Cecil. In other words primitive man, by the process of displacement, exchanged a cat and dog existence in which there were numerous private feuds and every man's hand was against every other for a civilised existence in which peace within and war without reigned inseparable like Siamese Twins.

[1] Quoted by Davie, op. cit., p. 15.

Although the historical and comparative evidence all points to displacement having played a critical part in the establishment of social groups, peaceful within and war-like without, there is, so far as we know, no direct evidence to prove it. There can be no such doubt about the rôle of projection however. Just as in Europe, it is invariable for primitive groups to exalt themselves at the expense of foreigners. Anthropologists have termed it 'ethnocentrism.'

> '"Each group," says Sumner, "nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn. Opprobrious epithets are derived from these differences. 'Pig-eater,' 'cow-eater,' 'uncircumcised,' 'jabberers,' are epithets of contempt and abomination."'[1]

Leonard Woolf reports: 'Over and over again have I been told by a villager in the jungle districts of Ceylon that the inhabitants of the neighbouring village, five or six miles away, were "bad people"—yet they were all of the same race, caste, and religion, had probably to some extent inter-married, and to the eye of an outsider were morally indistinguishable."[2]

This tendency to attribute all good qualities to one's own group and all bad qualities to others has even influenced the naming of different tribes. It has been shown that the names which primitive peoples give themselves when examined are mostly found to mean 'men,' implying that 'we alone are men' and that the others are not real men. The name given to a neighbouring tribe may even imply rank abuse.

> 'The term Inuit, applied by the Eskimos to themselves, means "men" or "people". The word Eskimo itself is derived from an Algonquian term meaning "eaters of raw flesh". The Greenland Eskimos think that Europeans have been sent to Greenland to learn virtue and good manners from them. "Their highest form of praise for a European is that he is, or soon will be, as good as a Greenlander."'
>
> 'The Narimyeri of South Australia call themselves "men", and designate all other tribes as "Merkam"—wild or savage. Where a distinction is drawn between tribesmen and aliens, the term applied to the latter is usually one of contempt or of fear. Thus the Kurnai speak of themselves as "men", and give the name of Brajerak, from

[1] Quoted by Davie, op. cit., p. 22.

[2] Woolf, *Quack Quack!*

bra, "man," and *jerak*, "rage," or "anger," to certain of their neighbours. They call the people who live in the Western Port district of Victoria, Thurung or "tiger-snakes", because "they came sneaking about to kill us."'[1]

The Jews of the Old Testament regarded themselves as the Chosen People, their God as the only God, and all other peoples, such as the Philistines and Amalekites, as so much dross.

This attitude towards strangers is further exemplified by the use of the same word for stranger and enemy. Tylor writes: 'The old state of things is well illustrated in the Latin word *hostis*, which, meaning originally stranger, passed quite naturally into the sense of enemy.' The conviction that every stranger is an enemy reminds us also of children's behaviour. It seems probable that in each case there is both fear of possible rivalry coupled with the fear resulting from projecting all that is evil on to him. Whatever the explanation there is no doubt about the resulting behaviour.

'Curr writes of the native Australians: "Strangers invariably look on each other as deadly enemies," and the Australians never neglect "to massacre all strangers who fall into their power." What Von Pfeil says of the Kanaka of Bismarck Archipelago applies also to the Melanesians in general. "Any person," he writes, "from a village removed beyond the small district which the Kanaka looks upon as his home he considers a stranger, and consequently an enemy." Existence is so insecure outside of one's own group that "no Kanaka may, without risk of life, attempt to visit the district of a tribe with which his own is not on distinctly friendly terms."'

'Even among the peaceably inclined Eskimos, "strangers are usually regarded with more or less suspicion, and in ancient times were commonly put to death." The same situation prevailed among the American Indians. Cremony, for example, writes that "an Apache is trained from his earliest infancy to regard all other people as his natural enemies." This is more or less true of the Indians in general, and especially so of the Seri. In South America, many tribes of the Amazon valley are so hostile to all strangers, on whom they wage war, that very little is known about them.'[2]

The ceremonial hospitality extended to strangers by Arab tribes and others is almost certainly to be interpreted as an

[1] Davie, op. cit., pp. 234–235. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

effort to mitigate the initial hostility. An amusing transitional case is seen among the Nigerian natives, where 'guests might be entertained, but would be robbed or enslaved on the road next day.'

These quotations provide us with a general picture of life in primitive communities. What is most striking is the small groups in which primitives live, their friendly behaviour towards group comrades and their hatred of neighbours, coupled with the propensity to see nothing but good in their own group and nothing but evil in others. With this in mind we can fruitfully discuss the occasions which provoke war and the apparent objects of it.

Davie classifies them under four headings—war for land and booty, for the capture of women, for cannibalism, and wars resulting from religious motives such as the obligation of blood revenge and human sacrifices. Of these, wars for land, booty and women can obviously be best understood in terms of acquisitiveness, whilst motives such as the desire for revenge will be found to require theories of animism and projection to explain them.

Acquisitiveness.

Land, women, booty and human flesh appear to be the commonest requirements of primitive man. Davie gives innumerable examples of hunting tribes resisting any trespass on their hunting grounds, herders fighting over the possession of water-holes and grazing grounds, agricultural communities disputing boundaries.

> 'The encroachment of one hunting tribe on the lands of another was a persistent cause of hostilities among the American Indians, who were very jealous of their boundaries. Near the mouth of the Mackenzie River, warfare arising from violation of tribal boundaries was incessant; anyone found hunting out of his own territory was slain. The disputed right of the Flatheads to hunt buffalo at the eastern foot of the Rockies was the cause of long-continued hostility with the Blackfeet. Encroachment on the hunting grounds of other tribes was a cause of war among the Central Californians, the Omahas, and the tribes of the lower Mississipi valley and elsewhere. The wild tribes of the valley of Mexico "attacked all who entered their domain, whether for hunting, collecting fruit, or fighting."
>
> 'In Africa, especially in the south and east, a life-and-

death struggle for the possession of the water-holes and grazing grounds has led to incessant warfare with the extermination of many tribes and the forced migration and dissolution of innumerable others. The more or less civilized herders of to-day are frequently at war for similar reasons, and the historical migrations and invasions of barbaric races into Europe, Asia, and elsewhere belong in the same category. Among the Bedouins, the chief cause of war is jealousy over watering places and pastures, while grazing grounds and the right to use the streams for irrigating purposes are a fertile source of quarrels among the Berbers of Morocco.'[1]

Animals and material goods are frequently fought for. This is especially the case amongst nomads, where property is mostly portable and therefore easily stolen. Some tribes are even stated to make their entire living this way. Many illustrations could be taken from Scottish history of cattle-lifting. The blacks of Africa behave in a similar way.

'Throughout the continent, wherever cattle raising is the chief occupation, cattle lifting is the most frequent *casus belli.*

'Among the Galla and Abyssinians, who wage war for cattle, each warrior receives a certain portion of the booty, the leader getting the lion's share. By far the majority of East African wars are over cattle. The pastoral Vanika make war only to steal cattle while the chief occupation of the Masai is the same. "The Masai do not do, nor will they do any form of work whatsoever beyond tending their cattle and raiding. . . . Their whole life is spent in breeding cattle and stealing it. All fighting comes incidentally. Their greed for cattle is insatiable." They, too, are occasionally raided, however, and warriors, fully armed, guard the cattle day and night.'[2]

The raids of nomads upon agriculturalists for the produce of the soil are yet another variation of primitive battles from motives of acquisitiveness.

'The warlike Matabele of South Africa are a scourge to all the neighbouring agriculturists, as are the Sákalávas of Madagascar, who plunder the fields of the Hovas. Among the Chin Hill tribes of India, there was until quite recently a "raiding season" extending approximately from October to March, after the crops had been gathered and when there

[1] Davie, op cit., pp 78–79. [2] *Ibid*, pp. 84–85.

was no work of great importance to be done in the fields. It was then that the hillmen perpetrated atrocities in the plains, kept the tea-planters of Assam on the alert, and almost annihilated the wretched border subjects of the king of Ava. Similarly the Koiari, who inhabit the mountains of the interior of New Guinea, "go down to the coast occasionally for the purpose of robbing the plantations of the Motu"; and the people of Tatana, near Port Moresby, who have no plantations, live by plundering those who have.'[1]

In the more advanced peoples who have learned the value of labour the desire for slaves is a powerful motive in going to war. 'From time immemorial the Africans have enslaved one another and have been enslaved by other peoples. . . . For centuries European traders and shippers aggravated the condition of slavery already existing in Africa by promoting wars and raids for the sake of human merchandise, and more recently their role has been taken over by the Arabs. Throughout the continent slavery rivals cattle-lifting as the chief cause of war.'[2] War for slaves also existed amongst some of the Naga tribes of India, a few of the Indians of North and South America, in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

The desire for women is another cause of acquisitive wars. The Maoris have a proverb: 'Land and women are the roots of war.' Like most proverbs it is a half-truth. It leaves out of account motives arising from religious and superstitious beliefs which, in some communities, are of vital importance. Yet disputes over land are frequent amongst primitives and as was intimated in a previous section, the desire for females is a frequent source of conflict amongst men as amongst baboons.

In many parts of the world woman capture has been a regular custom and has naturally resulted in as regular warfare. Amongst certain tribes, in fact, it is said to have been the principal cause of war.

'Among the Ba-Huana, women constitute one of the chief causes of war, and the frequent wars of the Ba-Yaka arise principally from charges of adultery. It has been said of the Boloki that "ninety per cent of their quarrels were about women, for every man who had one or more wives bitterly resented any interference with his sole proprietorship in them" Almost all the quarrels of the Nigerian tribes are over women, and the capture of women is one of the

[1] Davie, op cit., pp. 87–88

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.

chief causes of war. Among the Fang, "the chief causes of war are disputes over women and these feuds may last for years. Owing to a bitter feud it is often impossible for the women to work in the gardens or fish on the river, the consequence being a great scarcity of food." This situation is due to the fact that the Fang make no distinction of sex in their fights, shooting down women as well as men. Bennett, who reports the above facts, says that in Foulabifong, where he resided, "a woman palaver (dispute) lasted over ten months, and the three adjoining towns were in a state of famine"—a clear demonstration of the economic importance of women.'[1]

Similar statements are made about tribes in the Pacific Islands and amongst the American Indians.

There can thus be no doubt that the desire to capture women leads to war, but it is a little surprising to find anthropologists differing over the motives which lead to woman capture. Davie argues, in opposition to Letourneau, that the gratification of sex-passion 'is quite secondary to the economic motive.' It may be true that primitive men desire women as workers and slaves, but it is at least open to doubt whether this is his main object in stealing them. Taking into account our knowledge of human nature and of baboon behaviour, we are inclined to adopt the Frenchman's hypothesis. But the question can only be solved satisfactorily by a closer examination of available evidence.

The desire for human flesh is also stated to be a cause of war, but it is difficult to know to what extent it really is so. There can be no doubt that many primitive tribes eat their prisoners and also those slain in battle, but this is different from starting a battle in order to obtain meat for the larder. Davie asserts, however, that cannibalism is 'commonly prompted either by actual want or by a liking for human flesh' and quotes much evidence from Melanesia and from Africa in support of his view. Some of the Congo tribes are said to have regarded human flesh as a special delicacy—'it is very nice and better than any other meat'—and others cured the bodies of the slain as we cure bacon. The Miranhas of South America regarded human flesh as a 'rare, dainty meal.'

But there are other motives for eating your enemy besides hunger and *gourmandise*. One is the aim of destroying the enemy entirely, another that of submitting him to the utmost

[1] Davie, op. cit., p 98

indignity and so gaining revenge.[1] Again primitives hold the view that the man who eats his enemy will acquire his virtues. But it is obvious that these motives are not really *causal* of warfare. You do not want to destroy an enemy until you have got one and the explanation of why neighbours are regarded as enemies is further to seek.

The foregoing evidence demonstrates abundantly that acquisitiveness is often a cause of war. Land, food, women, slaves are desired and war undertaken for their capture. But these requirements are not to be thought of as arising simply from the struggle for existence. Primitives are no more solely concerned with the bare requirements of a livelihood than civilized beings. Their desire for prestige and their competitive valuation of possessions are of great importance. Many possessions are of no real use but are coveted simply as marks of wealth and rank. An instance is the value set upon the intersexual pigs in the New Hebrides. They cannot breed, are not eaten, nor are they used for any other purpose. Yet they are much sought after and their owners deemed worthy of respect. The prestige value of cattle in Africa is also of great importance, altogether apart from food value.

> 'It is said of the Bahima of Africa that "they form warm attachments for the animals; some of them they love like children, pet and talk to them, coax them, and weep over their ailments; should a favourite die their grief is extreme, and cases are not unknown in which men have committed suicide on the loss of a favourite animal." . . . Cattle have a similar hold on the imagination of the Bechuana. Their possession assures social position. A common saying is: "The person who has no cattle is nothing at all of a person." Cattle are not merely the chief wealth of these people; they are even regarded as the clan-gods of their fathers.'[2]

These instances remind us of the way children value anything which other children want, and demonstrate that the desire for land and booty even amongst primitives is by no means explained simply by their need for food.

The psychology of possessiveness is extremely complicated. Biological urges, such as the needs of nutrition and reproduction, undoubtedly play an important part in many of man's

[1] An even greater indignity is to leave the dead man in the oven or to tell a prisoner: 'You are not even worth cooking.' Even to-day in Fiji it is a most appalling threat to exclaim: 'Were it not for the Government, I would eat you.' (Davie.)

[2] Davie, op. cit, p. 83

acquisitive activities. But they rarely play the whole part, and in some they seem hardly to appear at all. In many parts of the world, for instance, men go to war simply for the purpose of capturing victims for human sacrifice; others prey upon their neighbours for no other reason than to obtain their heads. There is no conceivable biological nor economic explanation for such practices. Biology and economics fail also to explain the very numerous wars which result from the widespread tendency for one tribe to make a scapegoat of its neighbour. For an understanding of such wars, which there are grounds for believing are more numerous than any other kind, we must enlist the aid of psychology, particularly the psychology of animism and projection.

Animism and Projection.

The custom of blood-revenge leads to many primitive communities living in a state of perpetual warfare with their neighbours. Revenge for another man's death appears a simple enough motive at first sight. But on examination problems arise. For instance it may be asked why it is that two peoples should keep up age-long vendettas which are manifestly to their mutual disadvantage, and why they cannot come to some arrangement and live together on friendly terms. Again it is not obvious why tribes divide up their neighbours into friends and foes. If a comrade is killed by a member of a friendly tribe an amicable settlement is arranged and no feud results, whereas a similar incident involving an enemy tribe will be followed by ruthless and bitter reprisals. No understanding of such a malignant state of affairs is possible without an appreciation of the deep mistrust with which rival communities view each other, a mistrust which leads to wild accusations of malevolence and does not even require a real incident, such as murder or wife-stealing, to lead to an attack. For the evidence shows that, under the influence of animism, *any* misfortune which a community suffers is immediately attributed to the malevolent hand of another, resulting, of course, in a war of revenge. Wars of revenge because of real damage done must, therefore, be regarded as more justified and intelligible instances of a deep-rooted tendency to punish your neighbour for any harm which you may suffer, whether he be really responsible for it or not.

On pages 95–97 several instances were given of primitive peoples laying the blame for disease and other natural disasters

at the door of the spirits, and then demonstrating against and attacking the malevolent creatures. Exactly similar processes lead to war when, instead of spirits, neighbouring communities are incriminated.

> 'Between tribes or districts which are not normally friendly, warfare becomes a more serious and more deadly matter. Any misfortune which a community may suffer, be it the death of one of its members, injury to the crops through drought or flood, ill-success in fishing or hunting, or any other mishap which by Western Europeans would be regarded as due to natural causes or an "act of God," is as a rule attributed by the Melanesian to the evil machinations of a neighbouring group, and will sooner or later lead to reprisals by means of magic or force of arms.'[1]
>
> 'For instance, the Motu of south-east New Guinea have a superstitious fear of the neighbouring Koitapu, to the magical power of whom they attribute any calamity befalling them. In 1876 they lost much of their sago in a storm at sea, their frail canoes being unable to withstand the rough water and carry the cargo. They charged the Koitapu with bewitching their canoes and killed many of them in revenge. Again, in 1878 after a prolonged drought, for which they held a Koitapu village responsible, they attacked the village and killed all they could. "As the drought had long continued, rain soon followed this murder and confirmed the natives in their superstitious belief." Another instance, illustrative of the mental reactions of primitive man, is furnished by the Quissama of Angola. Should a traveller pass through their country during a prosperous season, they look upon him as a fetish, or possessed of a spirit, but should a dearth occur, he had better escape as quickly as possible, for he is blamed for it and severely handled. In the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides, belief in the evil eye is said to be one of the most frequent causes of war.'[2]

Blood feuds are particular examples of this general tendency. In some cases they may result from an actual murder, but more often the death which has to be avenged was due to natural causes. For it must be remembered that to the primitive mind death is *never* natural. Either it is due to evil spirits or else to the magic and witchcraft of nasty neighbours. Should a man have the misfortune to be eaten by a crocodile whilst bathing, the crocodile is not deemed responsible, but

the man or spirit who by magic caused the crocodile to be hungry. If a man is smitten by disease, it is the enemy who sent the disease who is to blame.

> 'The tribes of Assam, for instance, hold that illness and death are caused by an evil spirit projected by some member of a hostile tribe. The supposed magician or witch is commonly put to death. If he is a member of another tribe, war between the two groups may result.'
>
> 'Belief in witchcraft is a fruitful source of war in Polynesia. It leads to similar results in New Guinea. Not long ago part of the Toaripi tribe left Eavara to settle nearer the coast. Soon after the settlement was formed, a large number of tribesmen developed a bad form of ulcerated legs. It was decided that they were the victims of sorcerers, who were supposed to be members of the faction which had opposed leaving Eavara. A quarrel ensued and developed into a tribal fight. The Kiwai Papuans are frequently incited to war by similar beliefs. About 1890, for example, a party of Sumai natives went to Domori where they were treated hospitably, but shortly after their return home one of the leaders of the party became ill and died. His spirit, it was held, appeared and reported that a certain Domori man was the cause of his death. His tribesmen thereupon attacked Domori and killed several of its inhabitants.'[1]

Numerous similar examples could be quoted from Australia. 'Spencer and Gillen say that under normal conditions in Central Australia, every death means the killing of another individual. If the alleged sorcerer is a member of some other tribe, an avenging party starts out and war ensues.'[2] A similar state of affairs was common amongst the Indians of both North and South America.

No simple psychology of possessiveness or revenge can explain these facts. Moreover, as Wedgewood points out, many even of the more rational incidents which lead to war, such as the stealing of women or disputes over fishing or garden rights, are only 'the necessary sparks which fire the train of hatred and suspicion which ever lies between the two peoples.' This irrational and all-pervasive suspicion, which insists that even natural calamities be attributed to others' evil machinations, the authors regard as of paramount importance in any understanding of war. It is this suspicion which magnifies trivial incidents to gigantic proportions, leads to

[1] Davie, op. cit., p. 116. [2] *Ibid.*

feelings of insecurity and, finally, to outbursts of aggression. Modern Europe demonstrates it quite as plainly as Oceania. We must, therefore, ask what is the cause of such irrational suspicion and hatred.

The role of animism is obvious. Nothing is the result of natural forces ; a human agent is behind everything. But animism does not explain why someone *outside* the group is so regularly incriminated. This, in the authors' submission, is only to be understood as being the result of the projection of condemned impulses on to outsiders ; the group as a whole, probably led by a medicine man, regarding itself as innocent and others as guilty.

It has already been shown that this is a general tendency of groups. They exalt themselves and regard everyone else as 'bad people', capable of any kind of witchcraft. Once begun the tendency to attribute all evil to your neighbour grows like a snowball and leads to constant fear and hatred. Moreover, since the projection is mutual, each group tends to make a scapegoat of the other. It thus appears that the Melanesian habit of 'beating up' a neighbouring island is only a special instance of the very widespread custom of attacking with intent to destroy some scapegoat who is made responsible for every disaster. When spirits are made the scapegoats, a war on the spirits is the result ; when it is another human community, war on that community ensues.

It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the terror lest they themselves are responsible for these disasters is plainly discernible in the beliefs and practices of most primitive tribes. For instance, when a relative dies the savage immediately fears that the dead man's ghost will return to torment him. The universal fear of recently dead ghosts and the precautions which are taken to keep them away seem to us clear indication that the relatives are afraid that they will be held responsible for the death. Frazer[1] has dealt with this subject at length.

> 'The general attitude of primitive man to ghosts, even of his own kinsfolk, is one of fear, and far from attempting to retain them in the dwelling or to facilitate their return, he is at great pains to drive them away, to keep them at a distance, and to bar the house against their unwelcome intrusions. The means to which he resorts for the sake of thus keeping the spirits of the dead at bay are very various, and often display an ingenuity and resourcefulness worthy of a better cause.'

[1] Frazer, *The Fear of the Dead in Primitive Religion.*

'Among the Alfoors of Minahassa in Northern Celebes, when a wife has died before her husband, the widower is led by a woman, with his head muffled, from the house to the place where his marriage was celebrated, there to take a last farewell from his departed spouse. The children and nearest relations follow, lamenting. Arrived at the place, *the woman beseeches the spirit of the dead wife to go away and not to come and trouble the widower and children and make them ashamed.*'

'The Karieng are the aboriginal inhabitants of Siam, who, when the Siamese or Thai invaded the country from the north, retreated to the mountains on the east and west where they still remain. They burn their dead, after which they detach a bone from the skull and hang it on a tree, together with the clothes, ornaments, and weapons of the deceased. After performing dances and pantomimes, accompanied by mournful songs, some of the elders carry away the bone and the belongings of the departed and bury them secretly at the foot of a distant mountain, begging the ghost not to return and torment his family, since everything that he owned has been buried with him.'[1]

The dead man is always conceived of as being in a rage with his erstwhile friends. It is hardly surprising that they, therefore, do their utmost to foist the blame on to someone else and to sacrifice them to appease his wrath. Thus blood-revenge is seen to have much in common with human sacrifice, which is also undertaken to appease an angry spirit and which also frequently leads to war. The differences are that sacrifice is more formalized than revenge and implies an admission of guilt. The god to whom the sacrifice is made is closely connected with the spirits of the tribe's ancestors, but he is usually not a man recently dead. Moreover, sacrifices are made on other occasions besides death, for instance in the event of epidemics or famines.

It is interesting to note that these natural disasters can appear to a people in two guises. In Melanesia they seem commonly to be interpreted as the mischief wrought by *bad* neighbours on a good people. In more advanced civilization they appear as punishments sent by an angry and *righteous* god, sitting in judgment on a sinful people. Although this question needs far fuller analysis than is possible here, it seems to us that these two attitudes can be roughly interpreted as resulting in the first instance from a projection of bad impulses,

[1] Frazer, op cit., pp 33, 170, 172–173 (our italics).

and in the second from a projection of a punishing and retaliatory super-ego.[1]

The projection of bad impulses on to your neighbours has already been seen to lead to 'beating up' expeditions. The projection of a punishing super-ego on to a god also leads to war, but in a rather different way. The epidemic or drought or defeat in battle, whatever it may be, is interpreted as punishment meted out by an angry god on to his sinful people. To stop the punishments the god must be propitiated, and this takes the form of slaughtering criminals or prisoners of war as sacrifices. Westermarck has described it as a 'method of life-insurance'. The many are saved by the sacrifice of a few, the scapegoats. And when there are not enough suitable prisoners to hand, wars are undertaken to collect them. The result is therefore the same. In both cases a neighbour is made to bear the sin. Many instances where human sacrifice has led to aggression and war are quoted by Davie.

For instance,

> 'The Batjwapong of South Africa, whenever there was a drought, would waylay a man and strangle him, hoping thereby to appease the gods and secure rain.'
>
> 'In Benin, terrible human sacrifices were an integral part of the religious ceremonies and rites, especially when an enemy was at the gates. The yearly sacrifices numbered thousands, and to secure the requisite victims the King of Benin would send out his army to raid other villages.'
>
> 'Among the Mayas of Central America, captives, if of noble birth, were sacrificed to the gods, especially at the great feast of victory; prisoners of plebeian blood were offered only in default of victims of higher rank. Raids were also occasionally undertaken with no other object than to obtain victims.'[2]

The annual sacrifices seem to be simply the payment of a regular premium to keep the god sweet. They are the preventive side of religion as against the curative roles of particular sacrifices in situations of emergency.

[1] Although, in the authors' view, the fear that a god is angry is the result of a projection of a severe super-ego on to the Deity, it should be noted that this is not the same thing as saying that the idea of God is nothing but the projection of the super-ego. In our view psycho-analysis has added little to our knowledge of whether a God exists or not. What it has done has been to demonstrate beyond doubt that man's conception of the Deity is heavily distorted by processes of projection.

[2] Davie, op. cit., pp 133–135.

Yet another instance of wars resulting from the fear of the malevolence of neighbours are head-hunting expeditions. Although acquisitiveness run riot plays a large part, the underlying motive appears to be the fear that merely killing your neighbour is insufficient. His spirit remains vengeful and therefore dangerous. Since the soul is believed to reside in the head, by capturing the head you gain possession and therefore power over the soul. If you are nice to the spirit and propitiate it, the plagues, pestilence and murder, over which he has control, can be averted.

> 'A tradition among the Kenyahs of Borneo stated that a frog told them to cut off the heads of their enemies instead of merely the hair, which had formerly been taken to decorate their shields, because "if you were to take away the whole skull you would have everything you required—a good harvest and no sickness, and but very little trouble of any kind." When Furness asked a Kalamantan native why they killed one another for their heads, the latter replied: "The custom is not horrible. It is an ancient custom, a good, beneficent custom, bequeathed to us by our fathers and our fathers' fathers; it brings us blessings, plentiful harvests, and keeps off sickness and pains. Those who were once our enemies, hereby become our guardians, our friends, our benefactors."'[1]

Methods of greasing the palms of the captured spirits vary from feasts in their honour down to the offering of cigarettes. The wars resulting from these beliefs have been numerous and devastating. Davie gives details of tribes which have been completely wiped out by the head-hunting expeditions of neighbours, and of others who live in complete isolation and constant preparedness because of it.

. . . .

The examples quoted demonstrate beyond doubt that psychological processes such as animism and projection play a part in the wars of primitives, and go far to confirm the psycho-analytic theory of war advanced by Glover.[2] Sceptics may be inclined to enquire, however, whether their rôle is of any vital importance, whether they are not merely trimmings to a fundamental economic motive. It is, of course, always easy to pick material to prove any thesis, but we do not feel that the material here presented is particularly speciously selected. Our chief source has been Davie, whose suppositions

[1] Davie, op cit, pp. 138–139.

[2] Glover, *War, Sadism, and Pacifism*.

and conclusions are heavily biassed towards regarding war as the result of the struggle for existence. Again and again he writes of war as arising from the vital biological need of food.[1]

Moreover categorical statements by field anthropologists testify that economic motives, such as the desire for land, are often of minor importance in causing war compared to motives of revenge arising from a belief in animism.

There is Kingsley's statement that 'the belief in witchcraft is the cause of more African deaths than anything else. It has killed and still kills more men and women than the slave-trade.'[2] Simson states that amongst the Laparo Indians in South America the belief that deaths are due to the sorceries of neighbours forms the basis for *most* of their disagreements and quarrels.[3]

Somerville states that in the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides belief in the evil eye is one of the most frequent causes of war.[4]

Curr says of the Australians in general that the belief in sorcery by an alien tribesman as the cause of death is by far the most common and most serious cause of war.[5]

Finally, Lloyd Warner analysed the causes of war in the Murngin tribe.[6]

> 'For the last twenty years, out of some seventy battles that were recorded for this paper in which members of the Murngin factions were killed, fifty were caused by the desire to avenge the killing of a relative, usually a clansman, by members of another clan (blood revenge). (Of these, fifteen were killings that were done deliberately, against the tradition of what is fair cause for a war, because it was felt that their enemies had killed the wrong people when they retaliated for injuries done them.) Ten killings were done to members of a clan stealing a woman, or obtaining a woman who belonged to another clan, by illegal means.

[1] The following statement may be quoted to demonstrate Davie's views :

'But the most fundamental cause of war is hunger or the economic motive, and it ties war up straightway with the competition of life. Groups come violently into conflict in carrying on their struggles for existence ; they fight over hunting and grazing grounds, for food, for watering places, for plunder' (p. 66).

It has already been remarked that Davie regards both cannibalism and the capture of women as springing essentially from an economic motive : 'The most elemental economic motive is the quest for food. On the lowest stages of societal evolution, men themselves are regarded as part of the food supply. Human flesh is animal meat, and cannibalism in such cases is part of the group's self maintenance' (p. 66).

[2] Quoted by Davie, op. cit , p. 116.

[3] Davie, op. cit , p. 117.

[4] Davie, op. cit., p. 115

[5] Davie, op. cit., p. 116.

[6] Lloyd Warner, *Murngin Warfare*. *Oceania*, II.

Five men were killed because they had slain men by black magic. The clans of the men killed by magic slew the men who were supposed to be the magicians. Five men were slain because they looked at a totemic emblem under improper circumstances and by so doing insulted the members of the clan to whom it belonged as well as endangered the latter's spiritual strength.'

It is interesting that in the wars of this tribe economic motives such as the need for food or land played no part during twenty years. But it is by no means our intention to deny the economic origins of some wars. For instance, even in Melanesia where wars are usually the result of a desire to avenge deaths and disasters by punishing neighbours, the acquisition of land has been known to be a cause. 'War undertaken for the purpose of territorial conquests such as are familiar in our own history, and as occur in parts of Africa, are relatively rare in Melanesia, and even the acquisition of land as an incident of war is not common. This is doubtless due to the fact that in most of the islands there is no serious dearth of cultivable land. That such wars do sometimes occur, however, seem certain, for there is evidence that in some of the coastal regions of Aitape district, New Guinea, the desire for a more extensive territory has been the cause of tribal conflicts. Among the Polynesian people of Tikopia there was, several generations ago, a war between the four principal groups in that island, for the acquisition of good garden land which is by no means abundant for the population which it sustains.'[1]

The truth is that primitive tribes are so numerous and their customs so different that it is only after an exceedingly careful and thorough study that anyone would be in a position to generalize about the origins of war in primitive societies as a whole. But the evidence presented by Davie, who certainly has not selected it with an anti-economic bias, makes any predominantly economic theory of warfare untenable. It leaves no doubt that psychological forces such as displacement and projection, resulting from feelings of guilt, and the belief in animism are at least as important as economic motives. Even acquisitiveness is seen on examination to be by no means synonymous with the struggle for existence.

[1] Wedgewood, op cit.

Conclusions.

The evidence presented, we submit, allows for the following conclusions:

(1) Man in his primitive state is fully as warlike as civilized man. In unorganized peoples feuds and quarrels are the rule, whilst organized tribes are usually in a state of constant warfare with their neighbours.

(2) Peace within a tribe seems to be bought at the expense of continual warfare without. This we have explained as being due to the displacement of any hostile feelings which may be aroused against friends on to 'foreigners'.

(3) Apart from this general motive for fighting neighbours, two others can be discerned—possessiveness and the need for a scapegoat.

(4) Possessiveness is not a simple motive and cannot be identified with the struggle for existence. In addition to economic motives such as the desire for land, food, and slaves, wars are waged for the capture of women and of 'useless' booty.

(5) The need to find a scapegoat leads to widespread war. The scapegoat motive has been shown to lie behind the constant mutual suspicion in which many communities live, a suspicion which leads to an outbreak of hostilities and wars of revenge upon the least provocation. When the provocation is purely imaginary, as when crops fail, the scapegoat theme is obvious; when real provocation occurs, for instance over murder or wife-stealing, it is the scapegoat motive which leads to general warfare and prevents a pacific solution. The raids for procuring sacrificial victims are also prompted by the necessity to find a scapegoat, in this case a ceremonial one.

(6) No evaluation of the relative importance of these motives is possible without more thorough investigation.

(2) War between Civilized Communities

It is impossible to deal adequately with the warlike motives of modern States without elaborate historical and sociological research. This we have not attempted, partly because we have little experience in this field and partly because the relevant material is contained in such a vast and scattered literature that the time required to sift it is prohibitive. We have consequently confined ourselves to a discussion of such motives as irrational acquisitiveness and the need to find and expel scapegoats as they appear in modern life. Although we

believe that these forces are usually grossly underestimated, we do not feel that we are in any position to assess their true social influence relative to other factors, as for instance the rational acquisitive or economic motive. It is to be hoped that the research necessary to make such an estimate will soon be undertaken.

Acquisitiveness is no doubt of great importance in impelling modern nations to aggression. This may sometimes have a solid economic motive such, for instance, as the desire for the gold and diamond mines which prompted Great Britain to the South African War. But the interest in possessions is not simply economic any more than the Kaffir's interest in cattle is solely for their food value. For instance, until the recent German claim for colonies, many Englishmen took no interest in their colonial possessions. But immediately someone else wanted them, these people become possessive whilst at the same time maintaining that colonies are of no use to anyone.

The point which, in our view, requires emphasis is that the strength of the possessive feeling with its accompanying potentiality to aggression is, even in civilized peoples, not proportionate to the real economic or political advantages involved. In adults, as with children, possessions are possessions, and will be fought over with a violence only partially dependent on their real value. Of course there is always an attempt to justify covetousness on biological or economic grounds and it is consequently difficult to persuade people that other motives play a part. It would lead us too far into the psychology of possessiveness to deal with this question adequately, but one factor can be touched upon.

It will be remembered that both baboons and children were observed to fight more for the possession of their comrades than of material things. Baboons fight for the possession of females, children for the attention of parents and other grown-ups, primitive man for the possession of wives. Civilized man, on the other hand, rarely proclaims that he is fighting for personal possessions. Usually he maintains that he fights for material economic gain when he fights for possessions at all. But this claim does not always bear close examination. Material property, such as land, jewellery and even food, is often found on investigation to be a substitute for, and to symbolize, a person. The desire for the possession of the person and their affection has been transformed into the desire for the possession of certain inanimate property. Such a process is shown in its crudest form by the fetichist, who will obtain sexual satisfaction from the possession of some article

of clothing. But such symbolization is not confined to the fetichist. There is no one who does not place especial value upon an object because of its personal associations, be it a flower 'worth' twopence or a diamond 'worth' two hundred pounds. The article comes to symbolize the person who gave it and its value becomes the value of their affection.

Sometimes the symbolic value remains of subsidiary importance, but at other times it plays the major part. The latter is occasionally demonstrated by thieves. A friend tells how her mother employed a servant girl who was an orphan and had been brought up in an institution. After a while it was found that articles disappeared and the girl's room was searched. In her drawers were found, in addition to a few articles of female finery, a large collection of photographs of her employer's family. Clearly what the girl most wanted were family relations and the affection which she had never had.

Motives of this type, we believe, underlie much of the irrational attitude of civilized man towards his possessions. Parnell, describing the Irish Nationalist Movement which had for its main objective the rescue of Ireland from the foreign English, remarked : 'You would never have got young men to sacrifice themselves for so unlucky a country as Ireland, only that they pictured her as a woman. That is what makes the risks worth taking.'[1] The idea of a 'motherland' is, of course, a common one, but the implications of the symbolism are not usually recognized. For what it implies and what Parnell implied is that *the combative feelings aroused are appropriate, not to the narrow economic value of the land in question, but to the value of the person whom it is symbolizing* (in this case an idealized mother).

In the evaluation of an object, the 'real' economic value and the personal symbolic value are always intertwined. Both are important, sometimes the one predominating, sometimes the other. An analysis of their inter-relations is an essential preliminary to an understanding of possessiveness, and this we hope to carry further in a later work.

Besides acquisitiveness, in both its rational and irrational aspects, there is another primitive force which in our view plays a major rôle in shaping the relations of modern states to each other. This is the *scapegoat* motive. It has already been shown to play a large part both in individual aggressiveness and also in the wars of the simpler peoples. Here we hope to show that it is exploited no less relentlessly by civilized States.

[1] Haslip, *Parnell*.

An increase of civilization seems to do little to mitigate the the craving for someone upon whom all misfortunes can be blamed. Science has only served to discredit the magical and superhuman agencies held responsible by primitives. We no longer look for the sources of all evil in the spirit world as savages do. A man of culture and science is too enlightened to believe even in witches or the devil. But the need for a scapegoat remains and has to be satisfied, and, since supernatural beings are no longer available, it is members of other races, religions and political creeds who are incriminated. To the Fascist, the Communist or the Jew is at the root of national degradation and economic distress, to the Communist it is the Fascist or the Capitalist who is engineering his slavery. Therefore each persecutes the other with an undying zeal, like members of rival Christian sects in the past.

Sometimes it is difficult to detect the presence of the scapegoat motive. If often lurks behind charges which have an objective basis, or is insinuated so subtly that it beguiles the unwary. But there is at least one nation which makes no mystery of its need for a scapegoat and who proclaims the scapegoat's sins in such fantastic terms that the aid of a psycho-analyst is not required to detect the underlying motive. Indeed the leaders of Nazi Germany have provided in their speeches and writings about Jews and Bolshevists and in their own accounts of numerous pogroms a permanent and ineffaceable record of witch-hunting in twentieth-century Europe.

Ever since the war, the National Socialist movement in Germany has been preaching the wickedness of Jews and the absolute necessity for their expulsion if Germany is ever to regain her old position in the world. The result has been widespread persecution and social violence amounting almost to civil war. More recently the identification of Jews and Bolsheviks has turned this hatred from the internal enemy, the German Jews, to an external enemy, the U.S.S.R. An examination of the Nazi literature inciting the people to fight either Jew or Bolshevik, with the consequences of domestic persecution or fierce international hatred, seems to us to throw much light upon the sources of mass violence.

We shall begin by comparing the Nazi attitude to Jews with primitive man's attitude towards evil spirits and neighbours.

The failure of crops or of hunting and fishing expeditions is put down by the Melanesians to the evil machinations of their neighbours. To the Nazi, economic depression is due to the Jew. Dr. Goebbels 'after declaiming that "they need

not think we shall let the Jews depart unhindered if the crisis becomes serious," went on to say that "the hatred and fury and desperation of the German people would then turn against those who are reachable in the country." '[1]

The natives of Queensland attribute rape to a 'noxious being called Molonga.' The Nazi incriminates the Jew. 'This Jew is forced by his blood to ruin and to decompose all other races. He is driven by his blood and by his inborn abnormal sensuality to ravish non-Jewish women and girls.'[2] 'Moreover, the Jew has in his veins a large element of negro blood ; his frizzy hair, his wolf lips, the colour of his eyeballs, prove this as effectually as the insatiable sexual greed which hesitates at no crime and finds its supremest triumph in the brutal defilement of women of another race. This bestial lust obsesses even a barely mature Jew boy. . . .'[3] Hitler himself says as much in his book : 'The black-haired Jewish youth lies in wait for hours, satanic joy in his face, for the unsuspecting girl, whom he defiles with his blood and thereby robs from her own race. . . . There were and are Jews who brought negroes to the Rhine, always with the same aim and idea in their minds of destroying, through the bastardization that must inevitably result, the white race which they hate—of bringing it down from its high cultural and political level and themselves getting the mastery over it. . . .'[4]

On the Gold Coast of West Africa, epidemics are attributed to evil spirits. Hitler makes the Jews responsible for venereal disease. Jewish doctors in Germany, instead of curing disease, are held by Holtz to inject a 'specifically alien poisonous substance into the German blood.' 'We should have fought and died in vain,' he writes, 'if we were to leave the Jew his greatest domain for robbing and murdering the German people, if we were to leave him medicine.'[5]

No savage in any land can die unless it be by the black magic of his neighbour. No Nazi can die without its being the work of a Jew.

'In Tauroggen, a Memel district, a maid killed her illegitimate child and was arrested. The National Socialist

[1] *The Times.*

[2] Quoted from *Der Stürmer*, October 1931, by E. A. Mowrer in *Germany puts the Clock Back.*

[3] Quoted from *Der Stürmer* in *The Yellow Spot : The Extermination of the Jews in Germany.*

[4] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, German edition, p 357.

[5] Leading article in *German Health from Blood and Soil* (February 1935) by Karl Holtz, editor of *Der Sturmer.* (Quoted in *The Yellow Spot*, p 148.)

official organ in Königsberg, *The Preussische Zeitung*, immediately spread throughout Eastern Prussia the story that this was ritual murder. As a result Jewish shops were destroyed and pilfered in several towns, including Allenstein. A month later the Berliners were told this story as a ritual murder. *The Judenkenner* said :

'"Year out, year in, in every corner of the earth, from country districts and in towns, both old and young disappear. Some of these are snatched away by the Jews so that they may spice the devilish meal of their thirty to forty millions, and enable them secretly and criminally to revel in the idea that, like that of those poor stupid victims, they will one day suck the blood of the whole of mankind when once they have stupefied it sufficiently."'[1]

Jews were responsible also for the World War. 'The Jew . . . gave birth to this hatred and cherished it until the very day when the Tsar was induced to sign the order for mobilization. . . . Tsarism was to be overthrown in order that the Jewry of Russia might snatch equal rights, nay—privileges.'[2] 'The most frightful ritual murder that the world has ever seen was to be perpetrated ; the Aryanry of the world, the flower of mankind, was to be rooted out. This was the will of pan-Jewry, and these were the commands of the Jewish Kahal.'[3]

They have been behind every political death in Germany since the war.

'Herr Hitler, in the course of his oration, said that the nations had to tread painful paths in order to find salvation. The milestones were invariably graves, in which the best of their manhood lay. From the days of the Red November revolution, those who had devoted themselves to the cause of Germany, who had stood for a new and better companionship of the people, and at no time harmed any man, had been menaced by a sinister supra-national power.

'In the severe fighting of the first three months of 1919 German men fell everywhere, shot down by the bullets of their countrymen. They did not die because they had any hatred of those countrymen, but only because of their love of Germany. Behind this madness they saw everywhere

[1] *The Yellow Spot*, p 57.

[2] Hitler's Speech : 'World Jewry and the World Stock Exchanges, the Real Culprits in the World War,' 13 April 1924. (Quoted in *The Yellow Spot*)

[3] Ritual murder number of *Der Stürmer*. (Quoted in *The Yellow Spot*.)

the same power, everywhere the same apparition which led these men and goaded them and finally put the pistol or dagger into their hands. He referred also to the murder of Thule associations in Munich, and said that the originators were again the members of this sinister power which was and is responsible for this fratricide in their nation. *He most solemnly declared that on the path trodden by the National Socialist Movement there lay no single opponent who had been murdered by them, not even an attempted assassination, but an endless row of murdered National Socialists* almost always foully struck down from behind. Behind every murder stood the power responsible for that of Gustloff; *behind the harmless little German incited to the deed stood the hate-filled power of their Jewish enemy; an enemy which they had never sought to harm, but which had tried to subdue and enslave the German people, and which was responsible for all the misfortunes that had haunted Germany through the years.*'[1]

This was a funeral oration for a Nazi who had been assassinated in Switzerland in February 1936. On reading it, it should be borne in mind that it was about eighteen months after 30 June 1934, when hundreds of Nazis were murdered on Hitler's orders by members of their own party.

Primitives are less vocal than Nazis, so that some of the Nazi accusations against the Jews cannot be paralleled. For instance, Hitler proclaims that 'in culture the Jew defiles art, literature, and the theatre, destroys natural sentiments, undermines all ideas of beauty and dignity, of nobility and goodness, and drags humanity down under the spell of his own base mode of life.' . . . 'When the Jew wins political power he casts aside the few wrappings which he still has. The democratic Jew of the people becomes the Jew of blood and tyranny. He tries in a few years to root out the national carriers of intelligence, and by robbing the peoples of their natural intellectual leadership, prepares them for their lot as slaves in permanent subjection.'[2]

Finally a convenient summary of Jewish crimes may be found in the following National Socialist leaflet.[3]

[1] *The Times*, Feb. 1936. (Our italics.)
[2] *Mein Kampf*, German edition, p. 358.
[3] Translation of a leaflet reproduced in *The Basler Nationalzeitung* of 25 September 1935. Reprinted facsimile in *The Yellow Spot*, p. 198.

FELLOW GERMAN,
do you know :
that the *Jew*
ravishes . . . . . your child
defiles . . . . . your wife
defiles . . . . . your sister
defiles . . . . . your sweetheart
murders . . . . . your parents
steals . . . . . your goods
insults . . . . . your honour
ridicules . . . . . your customs
ruins . . . . . your church
corrupts . . . . . your culture
contaminates . . . . your race
that the *Jew*
slanders . . . . . you
cheats . . . . . you
robs . . . . . you
regards . . . . . you as cattle
that *Jewish*
doctors murder you slowly
lawyers never try to get you your rights
provision shops sell you rotten foodstuffs
butchers' shops are filthier than pigsties
FELLOW GERMANS, DEMAND THEREFORE :
etc. etc.

So much for their writings. What of their acts? The persecution of German Jews by National Socialists now belongs to history. Whilst violence and bloodshed were widespread in the early days of the Nazi regime, legal persecution no less vindictive, though perhaps less dramatic, remains the rule. Jews are excluded from all civil rights, from the civil and military services and from many professions. They are not permitted to teach, in some towns they may not even use the trams. The evil spirits have been expelled.

The Germans' own descriptions of some of these expulsions bear a curious resemblance to anthropologists' records of similar rituals in other lands.

For instance : 'When an epidemic is raging on the Gold Coast of West Africa, the people will sometimes turn out, armed with clubs and torches, to drive the evil spirits away. At a given signal the whole population begin with frightful yells to beat in every corner of the houses, then

rush like mad into the streets waving torches and striking frantically in the empty air. The uproar goes on till somebody reports that the cowed and daunted demons have made good their escape by a gate of the town or village; the people stream out after them, pursue them for some distance into the forest, and warn them never to return.'[1]

The Nazi celebrations hardly differ except in the amount of human suffering inflicted.

'On Thursday at 5 p.m. the swastika flag was hoisted on the property of the last Jew to leave Hersbruck. The Hersbruck district is now definitely purged of Jews. With pride and satisfaction the population takes cognisance of this fact, recognizing that this "spring cleaning" is first and foremost due to District Party Leader Comrade Sperber, who has emphasized the Jewish danger at thousands of meetings, until the people realized the truth and the last Jew left the district. . . . We are firmly convinced that other districts will soon follow suit and that the day is not now far off when the whole of Franconia will be rid of Jews, just as one day that day must dawn when throughout the whole of Germany there will no longer be one single Jew.'[2]

These quotations leave no doubt that the persecution of the Jews in Germany is prompted by the same motive as impels the primitive to persecute the spirits or his neighbours. The objects of persecution in each case are held responsible for everything, real and fantastic, about which the people feel guilty. No doubt many other motives come into play in the actual selection of victims for persecution. Personal spite and professional jealousy have played their part. But it is clear that the main form of the campaign is only to be understood in terms of scapegoat psychology. However, this conclusion does not explain why the need for a scapegoat has overwhelmed Germany during the past fifteen years. It is true that most people have the need to a greater or less extent all the time, but experience shows that it usually requires a great disaster to stimulate it to such a pitch that it takes complete possession of a person or a people. What is it then which has recently made Germany have such desperate need of a scapegoat that they have believed and acted upon these insane accusations against Jews? Fortunately there is no mystery about it. Hitler has explained it at length in his book.[3]

[1] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, p. 550.

[2] Reported in the *Fränkische Tageszeitung* on 26 May 1934 and quoted in *The Yellow Spot*, p. 89

[3] Hitler, *My Struggle*. Authorized English translation. Chapters VII, X, XI.

The German collapse of November 1918 came upon Hitler, the front-line soldier, as a crushing blow. Honourable defeat he might have borne, but a defeat brought about by internal disruption made him mad with shame. Describing his feelings upon hearing the news of revolution and capitulation he writes :

> 'Was the Germany of the past worth less than we thought? Had she no obligation owing to her own history? Were we worthy to clothe ourselves in the glory of the past? In what light could this act be presented for justification to future generations?
>
> 'Miserable depraved criminals!
>
> 'The more I tried in that hour to get clear ideas about that tremendous event the more did I blush with burning rage and shame. What was all the pain of my eyes in comparison with this misery?
>
> 'There were horrible days and worse nights to follow. I knew that all was lost. In those nights my hatred arose against the originators of that act.
>
> 'The Emperor William had been the first German Emperor to offer the hand of friendship to the leaders of Marxism, little guessing that scoundrels are without honour. Whilst they held the Imperial hand in theirs, their other hand was already feeling for the dagger.
>
> 'With Jews there is no bargaining—there is merely the hard "either—or."
>
> 'I resolved to become a politician.'

He is immediately overcome by dreadful feelings of unworthiness and guilt,[1] feelings which gradually develop into the conviction that Germany's defeat was a punishment which she had fully deserved.

> 'Germany's military defeat was, alas, not an undeserved catastrophe, but a merited chastisement of eternal retribution. The defeat was more than deserved by us.'
>
> '. . . the military collapse was itself but the consequence of a series of unhealthy manifestations and of those who proposed them ; they had already been infecting the nation in times of peace. The defeat was the first visible catastrophic result of a moral poisoning, a weakening of the will

[1] It is always interesting to speculate on the psychology of dictators, though available evidence confines us to tentative suggestions. There seems reason to believe that Hitler felt intense guilt over his mother's death and that the defeat of Germany in 1918 was regarded by him as a repetition of her death. In his book he describes how, when he learnt of the defeat and the proclamation of the Republic, he wept for the first time since he had stood by the grave of his mother

to self-preservation and of doctrines which had begun many years previously to undermine the foundations of nation and Reich.'

His analysis of the origins of this 'moral poisoning' follows.

> 'If we divide the human race into three categories—founders, maintainers, and destroyers of culture—the Aryan stock alone can be considered as representing the first category.'

The Aryan is the only creative race and all other civilizations have followed from his beneficent rule over other peoples. But unfortunately the Aryan has not always maintained racial purity with the result that civilizations sometimes crumble and have to be built afresh. 'Blood-mixture, and the lowering of the racial level which accompanies it, are the one and only cause why old civilizations disappear. It is not lost wars which ruin mankind, but loss of the powers of resistance, which belong to purity of blood alone.'

This poisoning of the Aryan blood is due to inter-marriage, in Germany's case with the Jew, who is naturally barbarian and can only suck culture from others. 'The exact opposite of the Aryan is the Jew. . . . Thus since the Jew never possessed a culture of his own, the bases of his intellectual activity have always been supplied by others. His intellect has in all periods been developed by contact with surrounding civilizations. Never the opposite.' 'The Jew . . . was ever a parasite in the bodies of other nations. . . . His propagation of himself throughout the world is a typical phenomenon with all parasites! He is always looking for fresh feeding grounds for his race.'

There follows the familiar description of a Jewish plot to gain control of Germany, to 'destroy the elementary principles of all human culture,' and 'to tear down all which may be regarded as the prop of a nation's independence, civilization, and economic autonomy.' This leads to his conclusion.

> 'Thus, if we review all the causes of the German collapse, the final and decisive one is seen to be the failure to realize the racial problem and, more especially, the Jewish menace.
>
> 'The defeats on the field of battle of August 1918 might have been borne with the utmost ease. It was not they which overthrew us; what overthrew us was the force which prepared for those defeats by robbing the nation of all political and moral instinct and strength by schemes which had been under way for many decades; and only these

instincts can fit nations for existence and justify them in existing. By ignoring the question of maintaining the racial basis of our nationality, the old Empire disregarded the one and only law which makes life possible on this earth.

'The loss of racial purity ruins the fortunes of a race for ever; it continues to sink lower and lower in mankind, and its consequences can never be expelled again from body and mind. . . . . .

'That is why, in August 1914, a nation did not rush full of determination into the battle; it was merely the last flicker of a national instinct of self-preservation face to face with the advancing forces of Marxism and pacifism, crippling the body of our nation. But since in those fateful days no one realized the domestic foe, resistance was all in vain, and Providence chose not to reward the victorious sword, but followed the law of eternal retribution.'

The reasoning is typical of its kind. The national calamity, defeat, was sent as a punishment for the sins of the nation. Those sins must therefore be expiated if further disasters are to be avoided. Accordingly Hitler ordained that the Jews should be sacrificed to purge the nation of moral corruption, just as many primitive peoples have ordered the murder of hundreds of thousands of criminals, prisoners of war or slaves, in the belief that this would free them of their sins and make their god less angry.

'At Onitsha, on the Niger, two human beings used to be annually sacrificed to take away the sins of the land. The victims were purchased by public subscription. All persons who, during the past year, had fallen into gross sins, such as incendiarism, theft, adultery, witchcraft, and so forth, were expected to contribute twenty-eight ngugas, or a little over two pounds. The money thus collected was taken into the interior of the country and expended in the purchase of two sickly persons "to be offered as a sacrifice for all these abominable crimes—one for the land and one for the river." A man from a neighbouring town was hired to put them to death. On 27 February 1858 the Rev. J. C. Taylor witnessed the sacrifice of one of these victims. The sufferer was a woman, about nineteen or twenty years of age. They dragged her alive along the ground, face downwards, from the King's house to the river, a distance of two miles, the crowds who accompanied her crying: "Wickedness! Wickedness!" The intention was "to take away the

iniquities of the land. The body was dragged along in a merciless manner, as if the weight of all their wickedness was thus carried away." '[1]

It seems remarkable, almost incredible, that a great modern nation should be swayed and overwhelmed by such primitive motives. But the written word of the Nazis' own prophet leaves no other interpretation possible. Defeat was felt as a punishment for sin. The avenging gods demanded a sacrifice and the Jews were picked as the victims. By this means the Germans were enabled first to admit the guilt they clearly felt and then to free themselves of it. Germany was guilty—yes—guilty of moral corruption and selfishness. But the guilt did not belong to true Aryan Germans, it belonged solely to the Jews and could therefore be remedied by the simple expedient of expelling them.

This idea of defeat and revolution as a national disgrace, the cause of which must be foisted upon someone else, is met again and again in Nazi literature. 'When Jews made their revolution in Germany a new slaughter of human beings began. Whoever resisted the November criminals had to die. Both citizens and peasants.'[2] (In actual fact, of course, the revolution began in the German Navy.) 'The Jew is the cause and beneficiary of our national slavery. He ruined our race, rotted our morals, hollowed out our way of life, and broke our strength.'[3]

But if the defeat of 1918 gave birth to National Socialism, the economic slump of 1931 nurtured it and brought it to power. Without this further calamity, with its corresponding load of guilt which had to be shifted on to other shoulders, it is doubtful whether Germany would ever have reached explosive point. As Goebbels points out, the more serious the crisis became, the more violent grew the hatred and fury of the German people. Despite the fact that no one could legitimately be blamed for the world-wide disaster, the conviction that someone is responsible for everything demanded that the culprit be found and retaliation inflicted. Such an atmosphere naturally favoured an extremist party, one, moreover, which had already fixed the blame for everything upon the Jews. The result was the 1933 election in which Hitler obtained political power with the consequences already described.

[1] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, p 569.
[2] Quoted in the *Yellow Spot* from the Ritual Murder Number of *Der Stürmer*.
[3] Quoted by Mowrer, op cit., 'from an oft-reprinted National Socialist proclamation'

Now it will be seen that the authors' analysis of Hitler's rise to power with the accompanying flood of hatred and bloodshed lays little emphasis on simple economic motives, such for instance as envy of the positions held by Jews in the professions and trade of the country. Economic jealousy may have contributed to the result, but no economic theories can explain the extraordinary charges brought against the Jews, nor explain the similarity of the German pogrom to the witch-hunting of medieval Europe or the persecution of spirits by primitive tribes. In our view the forces which make for rage and violence are the same in all these instances, the belief in animism, the fear of guilt, and the need to find a scapegoat. Simple economic motives are almost as out of place in the explanation of the Jewish persecutions in Germany as they are in explaining the violence with which the natives of the Gold Coast drive off the cholera demons.

But because the persecution of Jews was demonstrably irrational, this does not mean that it was politically useless. On the contrary, the subsequent feelings of relief and emancipation have been very real, as real as the feelings of depression and futility that had been prevalent before. Germany has lost much in the process. Many good citizens and able men have left her shores and the respect of decent citizens in other countries has been forfeited. But she has released herself from a sense of inferiority and guilt and regained self-confidence and that most precious of all beliefs, that she is a good nation capable of adding to civilization, blameless of its destruction. By blackening the Jews, Nazis have been enabled to indulge in comforting fantasies of their own goodness and rightness and to persuade themselves that they are not bad, dangerous people. Goebbels, in one of his self-righteous speeches, announces: 'All we National-Socialists are convinced that we are right, and we cannot bear with any one who maintains that he is right. For either, if he is right, he must be a National Socialist, or, if he is not a National-Socialist, then he is not right.'[1]

This sense of absolute rightness, a certain indication of repudiated feelings of guilt, is often carried by Hitler to the borders of megalomania. Of the 'Jewish doctrine of Marxism' he writes:

> 'It would, therefore, as a principle of the Universe, conduce to an end of all order conceivable to mankind. And as in that great discernible organism nothing but chaos

[1] *The Times*, 6 October 1935.

could result from the application of such a law, so on this earth would ruin be the only result for its inhabitants.

'If the Jew, with the help of his Marxian creed, conquers the nations of this world, his crown will be the funeral wreath of the human race, and the planet will drive through the ether once again empty of mankind as it did millions of years ago.

'Eternal nature takes inexorable revenge on any usurpation of her realm.

'*Thus did I now believe that I must act in the sense of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against the Jews I am doing the Lord's work.*'[1]

Similar views have often been expressed. The following are those of a certain Dr. Schreber, who also wrote an autobiography, which he named *Memoirs of a Neurotic.*

'It was, moreover, perfectly natural that from the human standpoint (which was the one by which at that time I was chiefly governed) I should regard Professor Flechsig or his soul as my only true enemy—and that I should look upon God Almighty as my ally. I merely fancied that He was in great straits as regards Professor Flechsig, and consequently felt myself bound to support Him by every conceivable means, even to the length of sacrificing myself.'[2]

Dr. Schreber's book would have been more aptly named *The Memoirs of a Psychotic*, for he was a patient in an asylum for many years suffering from delusional insanity.

. . . .

The result of attributing a nation's troubles to fellow-citizens is internal dissension, leading, perhaps, to civil war. The result of incriminating another State is international hatred and the danger of international war. The attitude of Nazi Germany towards Bolshevist Russia illustrates this.

Of recent years much of the Nazi hatred hitherto mobilized against the Jews has been diverted against Bolshevism and all the same fantastic charges repeated. Actually the one scapegoat has been transformed into the other by the neat device of identifying the two. This identification was already made in Hitler's book, but it was not fully developed until the Nuremberg Congress of 1936—'The Congress of Honour'—where Jew and Bolshevik became interchangeable terms. Whilst Hitler only referred occasionally to the 'Bolshevik

[1] *My Struggle*, pp 35–36 (Our italics)
[2] Quoted by Freud, *Collected Papers III*, p. 398.

Jews' and the 'Jewish-Bolshevik Soviets,' his Minister for Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, expounded their identity at length.[1]

> 'Bolshevism is a pathological and criminal madness clearly originating from Jewish sources and led by Jews with the object of annihilating European civilization and the attainment of an international Jewish world domination over it. . . .'
>
> 'Jews made the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, but the original revolutionary clique had been practically exterminated and Jewry remained the leading influence. Thus every internal Bolshevik quarrel was more or less a Jewish family affair, just as the latest executions in Moscow were nothing but one gang of Jews shooting another in the pursuit of power. It was wrong to suppose that the Jews were necessarily united. They were only united when they found themselves in a minority threatened by a preponderant national majority. Once in power the old quarrels broke out again.
>
> 'The Bolshevik idea, the unscrupulous destruction of culture and civilization with the fiendish aim of annihilating the people, could only originate in a Jewish brain, however much they might seek to hide the fact in Western Europe. Germany alone in Europe has had the courage to denounce them for the criminals they were. Once upon a time in Germany men were imprisoned for pointing out a Jew as a Jew. The Nazis did it then nevertheless, but the world still refused to allow it. Nevertheless, they believed that as they had been able to convince the German people of this danger, so they would eventually succeed in opening the eyes of the world and showing it Bolshevism in its true colours. And meanwhile they would not weary, through all the fearful crises assailing so many nations, in telling the people again and again of the unholy danger which threatened them and in calling to them: "The Jews are to blame! The Jews are to blame!"
>
> 'In fact, Bolshevism is the foulest tyranny of blood and terror that the world has seen. Jews conceived it and to make their rule impregnable Jews are carrying it out to-day.'

It is difficult to believe that a Cabinet Minister can speak of a neighbouring power in such terms. 'The Bolshevik idea, the unscrupulous destruction of culture and civilization with the fiendish aim of annihilating the people. . . .' That

[1] Speech at Nuremburg, 10 September 1936.

is a phrase which might be expected from a grandiose lunatic suffering from delusions of persecution, but is hardly credible from the mouth of one of the leaders of a great European power. Yet it is no isolated exception. At the same conference Dr. Rosenberg speaks of the ' gangster millions ' of the Soviet which ' spread destruction throughout the world, a bitter challenge to all who still value their culture and civilization', whilst Herr Hess elaborates the villainies of Bolshevism in Spain, concluding : ' What human brains can conceive in the way of cruelty is being given reality. In Spain Bolshevism is displaying itself in its stark infamy. In Spain Bolshevism is giving renewed proof that it is a mockery of civilization,' and Hitler himself proclaims Bolshevism as the universal enemy of Europe.[1]

> ' And we are appalled by the thought that some of the democratic countries may be unable, as they develop, to find a natural and characteristic spiritual form, but may fall a prey to Bolshevism, our hatred of which comes of a natural repulsion for that menacing, aggressive and bestial doctrine.'
>
> (Herr Hitler then continued the now-familiar diatribe against Bolshevism. It had first joined issue with National Socialism by invading Germany with its Marxist theories, just as it now endeavours to threaten them by bringing its military force nearer to their frontiers, since the first plan had failed.)
>
> ' We were successful in attacking, destroying, and blotting out Bolshevism in our internal politics : and now, since we know that these attempts to meddle with our internal affairs still continue, we are obliged to declare Bolshevism the deadly foe in our external affairs, and to recognize the equally great danger which comes from its constant approach. We have fought Bolshevism in Germany as a power which tried to poison and destroy our people : and we will fight it as a world power when it endeavours to bring the Spanish disaster, with new and more violent methods to Germany. And we will not be led aside by the chatter of those weaklings who only believe a danger when they are swallowed up by it.
>
> ' But the object of Bolshevism is not to release the people from their afflictions, but, on the contrary, to extinguish the healthiest, soundest elements, and put in their place all that is most corrupt. I can make no pact with a doctrine whose first act on obtaining power was not to liberate the

[1] Speech at conclusion of Nuremburg Congress, 13 September 1936.

working masses, but to release from the prisons the concentrated anti-social scum of humanity, in order then to release these monsters on a terrified and distracted world.'

The internal enemy has become the external enemy. Instead of a Jewish evil within, which is destroying culture, rotting morals, and undermining the State, Hitler now views a Bolshevik danger coming from Russia, intent on poisoning and annihilating the German people. And just as he threatened to destroy and expel the Jews when his chance came, so does he threaten Bolshevism. It is true that there is no direct hint of invading Russia. Rather does he envisage a defensive war against a rapacious and bestial assault. But the need and desire to annihilate the focus of Bolshevik infection is clear throughout.

'We can therefore afford to observe these subversive attempts on the part of others (i.e. Bolshevists) with a certain calm. Should, however, the Reich ever be threatened by such an attempt the nation would, as one man, remember the National-Socialist watchword, and in a sweeping rush expel those who thought that their task would be more easily achieved by military means than by the doctrinal methods of recent years. In these days of international revolution, let them take note of this: in Germany the German people is going to be master in its own house, and it will not have any Jewish-Bolshevik Soviets.

'I am watching the course of Bolshevik infection of the world to-day just as carefully as I did years ago when I saw this infection in our people and warned them against it. I see the methods of Bolshevik corruption of the peoples and I see their preparations for the great upheaval. It is my ardent desire that it may be given to our movement in Germany to solve in peaceful work the great problems set it. They are tasks to be undertaken in a spirit of high endeavour, and I know that their completion will perpetuate not only my name but above all the name of our movement in Germany.

'But let Bolshevism, which a few months ago we heard was increasing its military strength with the intention of starting a revolution, and, if necessary, *forcing the gates of other countries*,[1] let this Bolshevism realize that before the German Gates there stands a new German army!'

Goebbels also warned Russia:[2]

'The Red East threatened, but the Leader was on guard.

[1] Our italics. Compare German invasion of Austria, March 1938.
[2] Nuremburg, 1936

Germany, as the outpost of European culture, was ready and determined to repel this danger with every means from her frontiers. The Bolshevik pest in Germany had been exterminated, and it would find no further opportunity of raising its head. Should Moscow attempt to revive Communism in Germany they would be met with ruthlessness which would surprise even the Bolshevik rulers. The Party was the guardian of international peace, and the army, as the defender of the country, constituted a shield under which the nation could feel safe.'

Nazi Germany, the all-good, has become the hero defending the fair maid of Europe from the vicious and dangerous dragon of Bolshevism.

This pose as a world saviour is a sure indication that the mechanism of projection is working full-blast. In the eyes of Hitler and Goebbels the Aryan is perfect—he has no sin—and all the evil in the world is due to the presence of Jews and Bolsheviks. Our conclusion that these accusations spring from the need to ease uneasy consciences is confirmed by various passages from their speeches. For instance, by dwelling upon the enormities of Bolshevist political measures (which we do not dispute) Hitler is able to paint National-Socialist methods in colours rather rosier than their records justify.

'National Socialism, therefore, presents a serried front against Bolshevism on racial grounds, and in the interests of the German people and of the German worker. We reject this doctrine also on account of our more humane methods towards our fellow-men. The statement of the speaker at this congress and events in Spain have given the world and our fellow-citizens in Germany an insight into the atrocities of Bolshevik methods of fighting and maxims of government. The German people is too good and too honourable for such hideosities.

'We National-Socialists have also a revolution behind us! That revolution also was made by workers, peasants, and soldiers. It also defeated an enemy and cast him to the ground. But it is a proud thought for us that, when in January 1933 the National-Socialist revolution swept over Germany, not even a window-pane was broken, that we were able to defeat murderous plots, and even the numberless cowardly assassinations of our followers committed by the Communists, with the minimum of defence and no retaliation at all. Not because we were too weak to see blood—we endured the most terrible suffering of human

history as soldiers in the hardest war of all time, at a moment when the leaders of Bolshevism were running round Switzerland as cowardly *émigrés* or making their gain as unnatural profiteers in Germany and in Russia. We led our revolution as we did, and not otherwise, because it is repugnant to us to inflict more suffering on people just because they are our political opponents than is inevitably necessary for the secure defence of our regime. Every civil war brings suffering, but most of all those in which poor working men are incited to run into the face of machine-gun fire, while their Jewish leaders know well how to find a safe way, at the decisive moment, to their carefully invested futures abroad.'

Bolshevik methods of fighting, and maxims of government are full of atrocities. Contrast the German people! They are too good and too honourable for such hideosities! When the Nazis came to power, not a window-pane was broken and there was no retaliation at all! The projection is obvious and it is obvious too in the following specific accusations which, amongst many more general ones, Goebbels levels at Russia.[1]

'We National-Socialists are honest enough to allow our rule of the people to be reaffirmed almost yearly by a general secret ballot. Bolshevism prates of the people, of the land, of peasants, and workmen, but *its real character is nothing but force.*'

. . . .

'It was the achievement of the Soviet Union to have literally reintroduced slavery. About six and a half million men had gone through hell upon earth in the *forced labour camps* of Bolshevik Russia. Hundreds of thousands of corpses strew the Stalin White Sea Canal, built by forced labour under the leadership of Jews in the G.P.U.'

. . . .

'Bolshevism, while claiming to have saved the peasantry from disaster, had, in fact, driven them to hunger and want. *It constantly oppressed them by the system of police espionage.* The summit of this oppression was the law of 7 August 1932, punishing the peasants with death or ten years' imprisonment for every misdemeanour; in the application of this law they even used children to inform against their parents.'

. . . .

1 Speech at Nuremburg, 10 September 1936. (Our italics.)

'*Despite these tremendous armaments Bolshevik propaganda pretended that Moscow is pursuing a policy of peace and has no desire for expansion or aggression.*'

It is typical that Goebbels should indict Bolshevist Russia for the very same practices for which Nazi Germany has become famous.

Finally we may quote rather a curious passage from one of the Führer's speeches[1] which suggests that he has some insight into himself.

'The fact that people cannot see a thing does not mean that it does not exist. For years in Germany I was laughed at as a false prophet. For years my admonitions and predictions were regarded as the visions of a man suffering from mental disease. This was said by those worthy *bourgeois* who had no use for the Bolsheviks in their own business and therefore stoutly refused to believe in the existence of the danger. *Because these dull-witted fellows, owing to their very mentality, naturally had no leanings towards Communism they would not envisage such awful possibilities in others.*'

It seems that only people with an inclination towards Communist atrocities can envisage such awful propensities in others. We are inclined to agree, for clinical work has confirmed over and over again that only people with rapacious and savage impulses are inclined to see them in their neighbours.

These examples make it clear that in at least one Western power the tendency to find a scapegoat to blame and persecute for all the national troubles is no whit less powerful than it is in so-called primitive peoples. Many other examples of a war-like attitude engendered by the scapegoat motive could be given but perhaps none so naked and unashamed.

No doubt it is easier to see the way in which foreigners make scapegoats than it is for us to recognize the same tendency in our own nation. Democracies perhaps make less use of foreign countries and races as their scapegoats than do totalitarian States, for the very reason that in a democracy there is always a rival political faction to blame for all the troubles which beset the country. For instance, many Conservatives are convinced that the Labour administration of 1929–1931 was responsible for the economic crisis, whilst most Socialists would put it down to Capitalists and bankers. Both projection and animism play leading parts in this mutual recrimination. For the man-in-the-street it is just as difficult

[1] Nuremburg, 13 September 1936. (Our italics.)

to believe that economic depression is due to impersonal economic forces over which we have as yet no control as it is for the natives of the Gold Coast to conceive of an epidemic except as the work of a malignant devil. To blame foreigners or any special group of fellow-countrymen as responsible for the slump is just as fanciful as to blame a devil for cholera, and perhaps more dangerous. For little harm comes from the violent expulsion of imaginary spirits or from sending a wretched goat to die in the wilderness as the Jews used to do. When you have expelled the demons you may live in dread of their return, but at least other men remain your friends. But to persecute men is to make dangerous enemies who may revenge themselves on you. Ceremonial demonstrations against an evil spirit held responsible for unemployment would be preferable in very many ways to irresponsible campaigns against this or that political party, race or nation.

The foregoing analysis of some modern manifestations of mass violence has demonstrated that irrational greed and 'righteous' indignation springing from a repudiated sense of guilt play their parts. It is not possible to examine their relations to each other at any length, but it is worth observing that they often, perhaps usually, march hand in hand, the one justifying the other. Sometimes, when the main motive to war is avarice, the projection of evil on to others is undertaken in order to justify the greed. But at other times almost the opposite seems to be true. It would seem probable that *the main driving force in some European wars, as in Melanesian,* is the desire to destroy a scapegoat, and that this is disguised as a necessity for economic expansion. In other words we suggest that economic motives are as often used to justify scapegoat-hunting as is moral condemnation of the enemy to justify greed.

This brings us to the question of what motives actually prompt individuals to take part in a war. They are probably very varied. Displacement of aggression from friends to foreigners and the hope of promotion and success no doubt play a part, but the delight in finding a public scapegoat against whom all our friends are prepared to fight seems to us all-important. Many who fought for England in 1914 must have felt better men because Germany could be painted so black, and they could see themselves as the saviours of all that is good. For psycho-analytic investigation has demonstrated that the scapegoat motive is operative, if not in everyone, at least in the great majority. In some the demand for a scapegoat is constant, in others it remains

dormant, appearing whenever guilt is increased by sad events, others' criticism or a propagandist campaign. It is the latent propensity in each individual towards creating scapegoats which a popular leader works upon. This is illustrated by the course of events in Germany since the War. Very many Germans in 1918–1919 must have felt as Hitler did, burning with shame and humiliation that they should have been defeated. And just as Hitler immediately looked round for a scapegoat to expel, so must thousands of other Germans. Thus the defeat enormously increased the potential demand for a scapegoat, just as in Melanesia it is raised after a storm or a famine. The chief difference between a leader and his followers in this situation is that the leader has a more pressing need to find a scapegoat and an almost abnormal determination to lay the hounds on his tracks. In Germany the Führer made the demand for a scapegoat vocal, he pointed the quarry and incited the pack. But he could not have been successful had not his harangues against the Jews and Marxists met with a response from the hearts of the German people. They too had need of a scapegoat, less vocal, perhaps less violent than their neurotic leader's, but none the less insistent. In our view it is this half-conscious, undirected, popular demand which provides the energy for a political scapegoat campaign, which can be awakened and directed but never manufactured by its leader. Hitler, the prince of propagandists, has a clear understanding of these springs of popular mass action and has never ceased to exploit them.

> 'Men do not die for business, but for ideals.
>
> 'Nothing displayed the Englishman's psychological superiority in readiness of a national ideal better than the reasons he put forward for fighting. Whilst we fought for daily bread, England fought for "freedom"—not her own, but that of the little nations. In Germany they mocked at this effrontery and got angry, proving thereby how thoughtless and stupid Germany's so-called Statecraft had become before the War. We had not the slightest conception of the nature of the forces which could lead men to their death of their own free will and volition.'
>
> . . . .
>
> 'This was realized by the British propaganda with very real genius. In England there were no half statements which might have given rise to doubts.
>
> 'The proof of their brilliant understanding of the primitiveness of sentiment in the mass of the people lay in the

publication of horrors, which suited this condition and both cleverly and ruthlessly prepared the ground for moral solidity at the front even when great defeats came along, and further, in nailing down the German enemy as being the sole cause of the War. . . . . .'[1]

'Men do not die for business, but for ideals,' and the desire to destroy those upon whom they have projected all their own wicked impulses. It is because so few are free of a latent need to see and fight their own bad impulses in others that popular movements incriminating a party, race or nation are able to carry even sensible men off their feet, to instil into them beliefs which in their sane moments they would know are ridiculous and impel them to actions of which in other circumstances they would be ashamed. It is the latent need for a scapegoat in every one of us to which such movements as anti-Semitism or anti-Fascism appeal and which accounts for the self-righteous enthusiasm which carries so many good men away when war is declared. In our view it is only by recognizing and controlling these irrational sources of hatred and greed that society can be purged of war. Since dealing with such problems in the individual is the daily task of the psychotherapist, it seems that he should be able to point the way by which society might hope to handle their mass manifestations. But the application of individual methods to social problems is highly complicated, and we feel that, for the present, diagnosis is all we can attempt. In a later work we hope to suggest a cure.

Conclusions.

In this fragmentary attempt to analyse the causes of hatred and violence in civilized societies, the following tentative conclusions have been suggested :

(1) Working hand in glove with rational acquisitiveness (the economic motive) are the forces of irrational acquisitiveness. The value of land and other property as symbolizing people is stressed and such terms as 'motherland' taken seriously. The aggression aroused in disputes over property is appropriate not merely to the economic value of the property but to the value of the person whom it symbolizes.

(2) The need of a scapegoat is believed to play as large a part in civilized communities as it does in primitive. The causes of the persecution of German Jews are shown to be of a

[1] *My Struggle*. pp, 70 and 83

similar nature to the causes of the expulsion of devils by primitives. The differences lie not so much in origin of hatred as in the victims selected. Exactly the same motives are held to be at the root of certain international hatreds. The hatred of Nazi Germany for Bolshevik Russia is instanced and analysed.

(3) Propaganda is successful only in so far as there is a potential need for a scapegoat in the populace. In leaders this need is more pressing and more vocal, but it is impossible to account for the hatred which can so easily be stimulated in ordinary citizens in certain circumstances without supposing that there is this need latent in everyone.

J. B.

PART II

2. WAR AND ITS CAUSES 1815–1914

by

IVOR THOMAS

WAR AND ITS CAUSES, 1815-1914

WHEN the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher met at La Belle Alliance on the evening of 18 June 1815, it being then 9.15 by the clock, they ushered in a new era of world politics which was to close in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on 28 June 1919. The remnants of the French armies which escaped from the field of Waterloo—those armies which had won so many glorious laurels—were no longer capable of contending for the hegemony of Europe. The age-old rivalry between Great Britain and France was a thing of the past, though the island empire was slow to perceive the fact and though points of friction remained till the end of the century. Thanks to the policy of Great Britain, at once generous and sagacious, France remained a first-class power in Europe, but no longer was she able to redraw with her sword the map of Europe. Henceforth her influence was to be chiefly exerted through the force of ideas, and her conquests were to be the triumphs of her diplomacy.

War, it has been asserted, settles nothing, but this much was decided on the field of Waterloo—that France abjured all aim of world domination and Great Britain had henceforth no challenge to fear from this quarter, either to her own safety or to the integrity of her empire. This was the outstanding result of Waterloo. The century which elapsed between the Vienna and Versailles settlements was marked by the easing of the age-old tension between these two countries. But it was significant also for the entry of new and powerful actors on the world scene. That century saw the growth of national consciousness among the Italian peoples and the consolidation of Italy into a single, strong, coherent kingdom; it saw the restless stirrings of nationality among the Slav nations of the Balkans, championed by the great Slav empire of Russia; in the Far East it saw Japan, after centuries of seclusion, open her doors to white influences and before long revel in the triumphant discovery of her

nationhood; above all, it saw Prussia, waxed strong and mighty, weld Germany with bonds of blood and iron into a powerful, self-conscious nation and make a ruthless bid for that European hegemony and world dominion which France had renounced. There is a correlative side to the rise of Germany, Italy, and Japan to self-conscious, militant nationhood. The same century which saw these countries gaining in coherence and strength saw great and famous empires pass into decay. Spain lost the greater part of her oversea dominions early in the century, all of them before the close; the suns of Austria and Turkey set in the middle of the nineteenth century, but a prolonged twilight lasted until the Great War; it would hardly be correct to say that China fell into dissolution, for she had been sleeping through centuries, but she presented an easy victim for any nation caring to prey upon her, and where the carcass lay the eagles were quickly gathered together.

To these leading features of the years from 1815 to 1914 must be added two others. The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw an astonishing burst of the imperialist spirit in all the Great Powers, most notably in Great Britain, in France, and in Germany, though even the United States was not exempt. The same years saw also a great stirring in the vast Russian Empire. It can hardly be called a rise to self-conscious nationhood in the sense in which we have applied that term to the history of Japan, Italy, and Germany. The more cumbrous a body, the slower it is to acquire momentum. But the stirrings of new life in Russia were unmistakable, nor did they fail to cause apprehension in countries whose territories bordered on her own.

The story of the years between 1815 and 1914 is the story of the rise of nations and the fall of states. War was, in general, the means by which these adjustments took place. By war the grown-up children of decaying Spain shook themselves free from parental tutelage. By war the Christian nations of the Balkans threw off the weakening Turkish yoke. By war Japan gained a footing on the mainland. By war Britain and France sought to curb the growing power of Muscovy. By war in three directions Prussia enlarged her swelling borders and at the head of a powerful German confederation challenged the world to combat. By war, because in the last resort no

other instrument existed for the relaxation of international strains; because it was in the nature of the strong to take and the weak to resist; because few would have questioned the propriety of war as an essential element in the settlement of international disputes; because nations which had accepted the rule of law in their internal affairs still clung to force as the final arbiter between sovereign states, the continuation of policy when diplomacy had failed; because, in sum, international law did not command universal respect, because there was no international court to which disputes had to be submitted, no recognized principles on which such a court could have worked, and no overwhelming backing of force to which such a court, if it existed, could have looked for the execution of its judgments.

There were occasions when the more gifted statesmen, and sometimes Europe as a whole, had glimpses of a better order. The Holy Alliance was fantastic, but even a fantasy may clothe a truth; on more than one occasion the nations of Europe acted in concert; and Mr. Gladstone foresaw 'a tribunal of paramount authority' in the 'general judgment of civilized mankind.' But these were fitful visions. International relations were characterized on the whole by anarchy, by the absence of rule, and in these circumstances it was no more surprising that war should mark international adjustments than that thunder should follow the lightning spark. The physicists tell us that the elemental particles of matter, moving about at random in all directions and with all velocities, will come into collision with each other every so often, not inevitably, but with a probability that is tantamount to certainty. In the same way it is so probable as to be in practice certain that sovereign states, owning no law but their own and pursuing their self-chosen paths, will occasionally collide with each other. Let us not be surprised at what is inevitable, but rather try to understand. In the following pages an attempt will be made to analyse in some degree the causes of those armed clashes between nations in the era 1815-1914 to which we give the name wars.

Decline of Spain

After the exhausting trials of the Napoleonic wars, the great nations were in no mood for further sacrifice of blood and treasure. Europe on the whole had a long peace in the Age of Metternich, and for this peace no small credit is due to that hidebound aristocrat. With all his benighted and illiberal ideas, he saw that Austria and Europe needed peace, and secured it for them. But there was plenty of inflammable material in a question which has more than a passing interest to-day. A revolution in Spain in 1820 brought the Liberals into power, and, incidentally, put that name for the first time into political currency. The three years which followed were a period of complete anarchy. In 1820 Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, suggested joint intervention by the powers of the Grand Alliance to restore order in Spain. The idea then came to naught because Great Britain was in favour of non-intervention, and because Metternich was strongly opposed to the passage of a powerful Russian army through Austria. But in 1822 France raised the question anew at the Congress of Verona and asked for authority to march into Spain, as the instrument of the powers, to end a situation fraught with danger to herself and to Europe as a whole. Great Britain, suspecting that France merely wished to revive the old Bourbon ambitions in the peninsula and in the New World, protested strongly, but a majority of the powers consented; and in 1823 the Duc d'Angoulême crossed the frontier at Irun with his army. It was then that Canning, following the example of the United States, decided to recognize the independence of the Spanish colonies in South America. Thanks largely to the leadership of Simón Bolivar, the Liberator, and to the exploits of the English Admiral Cochrane, they had gained their independence *de facto* when the Spanish monarchy was in the throes of its struggle with Napoleon, and a valuable trade had grown with Great Britain; but this trade was illegitimate by the colonial laws of Spain and was subject to the activities of pirates flying the Spanish flag, from whom there could be no redress at the hands of the Spanish Government. Canning informed the French that the British Government would not tolerate the subjugation of the Spanish colonies by foreign force; and such inclination

as remained in the powers of the Grand Alliance to achieve this end was quelled when President Monroe laid the ban of the United States on European intervention in South America (2 December 1823). The following year Great Britain gave her recognition to Mexico and Colombia, and invited the other colonies to give proof of their stability. Canning informed the House of Commons that he had 'called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old,' and asserted that 'if France had Spain, it should at least be Spain without her colonies.'

But France did not apparently want even the mainland, or was deterred from any ambitions she may have felt in that direction. In the absence of certainty it will be charitable to suppose that she merely wished to see a settled government beyond her southern frontier and to recapture some prestige for the Bourbons. With the co-operation of many Spaniards, and the acquiescence of others, Angoulême drove the Liberal Cortes to Cadiz, where surrender followed a siege. Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne from which he had been twice unseated, and initiated a period of cruel repression. Disgusted with the result of their intervention, the French troops were in due course withdrawn to their own territories.

So ended a situation which might have resulted in a general European war if Europe had not recently passed through such a conflict. It is interesting for its analogy to the present day—an analogy with the difference that France is now advocating non-intervention—but need not detain us longer. There is one sequel to record. Spain had lost her South American empire but remained in possession of Cuba and the Philippines. In the latter years of the century an autonomist movement became powerful in Cuba. Antonio Maura failed to persuade the Cortes or the country of the need for a moderate measure of home rule, and General Weyler was sent to put down disaffection with a firm hand. The United States made repeated protests against the severity of Weyler's methods, and when the cruiser *Maine* was blown up in the port of Havana the demand for intervention became irresistible. The Spanish Government, learning that the American Ambassador had been instructed to present an ultimatum demanding the cessation of hostilities in Cuba, decided to get in first by handing the Ambassador his passports. So much of the old

imperial spirit remained, not without some misgivings in the Cabinet, but Spain had not then even an armada and the struggle was hopeless from the outset. After some decisive naval defeats, Spain sued for peace. She lost the last vestiges of her American empire and, apart from her north African interests, retained only a few islands which were sold in the following years.

There is little in this narrative to perplex the historian. No deep, hidden causes need be sought. The story is one of colonies revolting, as soon as they find a suitable occasion and a gifted leader, against the despotic rule of their ageing mother-country; of France seeking to ensure orderly government on her southern border; and of the United States, caught in the glamour of imperialism, claiming a responsibility for the whole American continent. The narrative is interesting more for what might have happened than for what did take place. Great Britain, it was made plain, would have gone to war to protect her trade with the South American republics, and perhaps also to prevent France adding the Iberian peninsula to her own territories.

Decline of Ottoman Empire

Spain was not the only sick man on the hands of Europe. The Ottoman Empire had entered a state of decline midway through the eighteenth century, but was miraculously preserved from total dissolution for a hundred and fifty years. The danger of disintegration in the Turkish domains, and the consequent threat to world peace, was present to the minds of the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna, and the powers would doubtless have guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish frontiers if Russia and Turkey could have agreed where those frontiers were; but the Sultan would not submit the dispute to the arbitration of Great Britain, France, and Austria, and the return of Napoleon from Elba soon gave the powers something else to think about. In the absence of external guarantees, the Ottoman Empire showed visible signs of dissolution. Serbia had risen in revolt as early as 1804. A local Turkish governor Ali, pasha of Iannina, had established himself on the Adriatic Egypt had secured for itself quasi-

independence under an Albanian adventurer, Mehemet Ali. In 1820 the Greeks saw, in the outbreak of hostilities between the Porte and Ali Pasha, an opportunity for a nationalist revolt long meditated by the revolutionary organization known as the 'friendly society' (φιλικὴ ἑταιρία). Here, again, there is little that need detain us. The causes are patent. A despotic Moslem power, which had exercised a repressive rule over Christian subjects, had fallen into decay. Among those subjects the remembrance of ancient glories and consciousness of their Christian faith had awakened a mingled racial and religious sentiment which could ill tolerate the foreign yoke. Only a suitable opportunity was needed for the signal to arms. The Greeks were threatened with the firmer riveting of their fetters when Mehemet Ali sided with the Porte, but they found good friends in the land of Byron and Canning, and they could always count on Russia, with whom hostility to Turkey had been for long a fixed principle of statecraft. The Treaty of London (6 July 1827), concluded by Canning between England, France, and Russia, contemplated an autonomous Greek state under Turkish suzerainty, and the virtual annihilation of the Egyptian and Turkish fleets at the battle of Navarino (20 October 1827) by the fleets of the allied powers paved the way for complete independence.

Though the Greek War of Independence merely changed a corner of the map of Europe, albeit a corner from which Europe had received an irredeemable debt of light and inspiration, it was not without significance. 'It was here that the first successful blow was administered to the autocratic government of Europe by congress; here that the Ottoman Empire received its most sensible wound; here that the modern spirit of nationalism, afterwards destined to govern Italy and Poland, Bohemia and Ireland, and to bring the Austrian Empire to the ground, won its first romantic and resounding triumph.'[1] It was significant also for the part played by the powers. The Russian claim to be the chief residuary legatee of the Ottoman Empire was made manifest. Her eyes were seen to be set on Constantinople,

[1] H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe*, p. 882. Mr Fisher has perhaps overlooked the part played by autocratic Russia in the liberation of the Greeks, and exaggerated the strength of nationalism among them.

chief see of the Orthodox faith and a menace, in other hands, to her marine connexion with the outside world. British suspicion of Russia was also made evident, particularly after Canning's death, but it was shown that for certain purposes Great Britain was prepared to co-operate with the Russian Empire. It is a matter of debate how far Great Britain was actuated by sympathy with Greek aspirations and how far by a desire to protect her trade in the Ægean and Levant. The former sentiment was prevalent in the country, but the latter probably dominated the Government, whose intervention may most reasonably be attributed to a desire to prevent Russia winning all the moral and political fruits of helping Greece to victory.

The Greek War of Independence, a relatively small thing in itself, revealed political alignments that were likely at some time or other on a convenient pretext to produce a much bigger conflagration. The pretext proved (1853) to be the custody of the holy places in Jerusalem. Certain rights which had been guaranteed to the Latin clergy by the capitulations of 28 May 1740 had fallen into desuetude in the age of the Revolution, and the Orthodox clergy had entrenched themselves deeply. Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, discerned here an opportunity of conciliating clerical opinion in his own country and humiliating the Tsar Nicholas I, who had given only a grudging recognition to his title. The French Ambassador in Constantinople was instructed to demand the restitution of all Roman Catholic rights. Seeking to gain time the Porte suggested a mixed commission of inquiry. France agreed on condition that no documents later than 1740 should be admitted as evidence. This suggestion would have excluded the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774), by which Russia had imposed onerous terms on Turkey after a war lasting five years, and Nicholas intervened with a peremptory intimation that Russia would permit no alteration in the *status quo*. It was clear that the question involved was not the custody of the shrines in Jerusalem but whether France or Russia was to be paramount in the East.

With the help of Great Britain Turkey offered a compromise which would doubtless have settled the trifling religious issue. But neither sovereign desired a settlement. Napoleon III, still nursing a grievance about the slight to his title, was

not averse from war. Nicholas saw an opportunity of clearing the Turk out of Europe for ever. He had spoken of the Turk as a 'Sick Man' to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and had even suggested a partition of the Turkish domains. He thought Aberdeen's Government and the countrymen of Bright and Cobden would not fight to maintain the integrity of Turkey. But he had reckoned without the 'Great Elchi.' It used to be suggested that Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, wilfully involved his country in the war from a conviction that Russia was England's greatest enemy and needed the salutary experience of a diplomatic or military defeat. The question is no longer worth inquiring into closely, save in a purely historical study, as the telegraph has now made ambassadors mainly the mouthpieces of their governments. But Stratford de Redcliffe's published correspondence does not convict him of being the author of the war. Nevertheless his presence in Constantinople, and a presumption that his views were those of his home Government, may have encouraged the Turks to make a stiffer resistance to the Russian demands than would otherwise have been the case.

At any rate when Prince Menschikoff demanded for the Tsar a protectorate over all Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire the Porte, contrary to the advice of Stratford de Redcliffe, declined. The Russian army under Prince Gortchakoff crossed the Pruth, not, it was asserted, to attack Turkey but to obtain guarantees for the enjoyment of rights conferred by existing treaties. One more effort was made to preserve peace. A conference at Vienna proposed a settlement which was acceptable to England, France, and Russia, but it was rejected by the Porte. Turkey declared war on Russia in October 1853. Great Britain informed Russia that no *casus belli* would arise so long as she did not pass the Danube or attack a Black Sea port. The Tsar considered this tantamount to a declaration of war. When on 30 November the Russians sank the Turkish fleet off Sinope, the British and French fleets entered the Black Sea; and on 27 March 1854 the two Governments declared war. So began 'a contest entered into without necessity, conducted without foresight, and deserving to be reckoned from its archaic arrangements

and tragic mismanagements rather among mediaeval than modern campaigns.'[1]

The reasons why France and Russia entered the Crimean War have been explained. But why did England enter? Not for any solicitude whether the shrines of Jerusalem were in the custody of Latin or Greek monks; that question had in any case been settled to everyone's satisfaction before hostilities began. The answer must be sought in the middle-Asian approaches to India. The spread of Russia across the plains of Asia had alarmed England. Would this advance stop before it reached the Indian boundary? It is possible for us to appreciate the Russophobia of Victorian England because we have ourselves seen the superstitious dread of Bolshevism which has paralysed the Tory Party and can still blind its judgment of foreign policy.

To this lively sense that English interests were imperilled were added moral considerations of a powerful nature. Russian autocracy was detested in this country, even by the most extreme members of the Tory Party. The Tsar's merciless suppression of freedom, both in his own country and beyond, disgusted Englishmen of every class. They would not lift a finger to preserve the Russian Empire, and these moral arguments powerfully reinforced their apprehension of the Russian danger. It was the people of England who wanted the Crimean War. The Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, did not seek war; but where William Pitt had been unable to stand firm he was swept off his feet. The Russian advance across the Pruth set the English populace aflame; the attack on the Turkish fleet off Sinope sent them into a frenzy. Aberdeen, a weak and irresolute man, was forced into war against his better judgment. Burke has declared that he knew not how to bring an indictment against a whole people. In the case of England, in the year before the Crimean War, it is difficult to know how to avoid doing so.

Perhaps the Crimean War would not have broken out if Nicholas I had accurately divined the state of European feeling, but he was woefully ignorant of opinion, especially in England and Austria. The former country he thought would have remained neutral, the latter he calculated would give him active assistance. Were not Cobden and Bright

[1] H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (one-volume edition), p. 942.

teaching 'peace at any price' to spellbound British audiences? And had he not just helped Austria to break (1849) the revolt of the Hungarians under Kossuth? Nicholas I did not realize the immense power of moral ideas among the English people, and Austria, in the words of one of her statesmen, 'astonished the world with her ingratitude.' In this breaking of the bonds between Austria and Russia is to be seen the most far-reaching effect of the Crimean War. It paved the way for Italian and German unity, the full consequences of which have not yet been worked out. Some of them will engage our attention before long, but in the meantime we must continue to trace the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, on whose frontiers the Russian ever waited expectant.

In 1875 the iniquities of Turkish oppression produced among the peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina a revolt which quickly spread to Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria. But the Turkish forces crushed the armies of Serbia and Montenegro and proceeded to massacre 12,000 Christians in Bulgaria (May, 1876). The deposition and ugly death of Abd-ul-Aziz introduced confusion into the affairs of Turkey, and the flame of revolt once more flared up in Serbia and Montenegro. The sympathies of Orthodox and Slav Russia had been stirred by the manifestation of national and Christian sentiment in the Balkans, and on 24 April 1877 she declared war on Turkey. After a brief check at Plevna, her armies advanced victoriously to the Shipka Pass. What was won on the field, and ratified by the Treaty of San Stefano, was again largely lost at the Congress of Berlin (1878).[1] Russia consented to that congress because Great Britain had prepared herself for war when the Russians approached Constantinople; and although war did not actually break out, it was made clear that Great Britain would have regarded the occupation of Constantinople as a *casus belli*.

A main reason why war did not break out between Britain and Russia in 1878 as it had done in 1853 is that in the meantime Bismarck had made Prussia a major power in Europe. Gortchakoff was afraid of Bismarck, Disraeli was at least suspicious of him, and they had no desire to make their extremity his opportunity. The Congress of Berlin brought

[1] The main lines of alteration in the San Stefano basis were reached by direct exchanges between Great Britain and Russia before the Congress met.

to light the inherent instabilities of that policy which Bismarck had been pursuing for the last six years. In 1872 the Emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia had met at Berlin and had there agreed to defend the *status quo* in Europe, to follow a common policy in the Balkans and to suppress Socialism. The weakness of the *Dreikaiserbund* was that in the last analysis Austria and Russia had conflicting interests in the Balkans, and that in the last analysis Prussia would support Austria. This was made manifest at the Congress of Berlin, where Austria gave no support to Russia and Bismarck was content with the rôle of 'honest broker.' Russia did not forget, and the way was ready for her closer association with France and that division of Europe into two camps from which the Great War was born.

Decline of China

We shall not pursue the decay of the Ottoman Empire to its final dissolution because that belongs to another and greater story. Let us turn our eyes to the vast empire of the Chinese, which displayed in the nineteenth century little of the martial vigour it had known in some earlier periods of its history. During the reign of the Emperor K'ien-lung (1735–95) a large trade in opium, tea, and silk had developed with the Western nations, chiefly the Portuguese, the British, and the Dutch. The British trade was then a monopoly of the East India Company. The European traders were harassed by vexatious restrictions, being regarded by the Chinese as merely 'foreign devils,' and in particular many Englishmen were subjected to acts of gross injustice. Great Britain was the first state to act in response to the complaints of her traders. Lord Macartney was sent in 1793 to make representations in Peking, but he succeeded only in bringing to light the real cause of subsequent trouble, that China regarded all foreign states as tributaries. The Emperor was the 'son of heaven,' to whom all peoples were subject. Lord Macartney was treated with every outward semblance of courtesy, but the Emperor was unyielding on all essential points. A second mission in 1816 proved equally fruitless, for as Lord Amherst declined to kow-tow before the Emperor (Kia-k'ing), he was not admitted to the presence of the 'son of heaven.'

It was this refusal of China to treat Great Britain as an equal state that ultimately led to war between the two countries, but the occasion was provided by the opium trade. In spite of the technical prohibition of opium smoking and the opium trade, the trade was extensive and was growing. Bribes were taken from the opium traders by the mandarins, even the highest. But there was an economic difficulty. In the eighteenth century Chinese exports exceeded imports, and the balance had been paid to China in silver. By 1830 imports exceeded exports, and silver was being exported. Lin Tze-su, the Chinese imperial commissioner, then suggested *that he could right the balance by stopping the opium trade.* He was sent to Canton, which was the only port open to foreign trade, and without warning issued an edict against opium traders, and imprisoned in the factories all foreigners, including Captain Elliot,[1] the British superintendent of trade. In order to secure their release Elliot, on behalf of the British Government, ordered the merchants to hand over all their opium, and on 3 April 1839 over 20,000 chests were destroyed by the mandarins. The British Government throughout maintained the attitude that China was competent to place any items on a contraband list, and they would do nothing to encourage or help their subjects to break the law of a friendly power. But Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, naturally objected to the violent measures taken by Lin to stop the trade, such as the imprisonment of a whole community, including innocent men, more particularly as the Chinese Government had openly winked at it and made large sums thereby. The merchants' surrender of their opium merely caused Lin to increase his demands, and in 1840 the British Government felt compelled to go to war. They were completely victorious, and Hong Kong was ceded to them; the four ports of Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were declared open to foreign trade.

The opium trade gave the occasion for the first China War, but undoubtedly the real reason is to be sought in the refusal of the Chinese Government to treat with Great Britain as an equal state. This refusal had become more serious in 1833, when the monopoly of the East India Company was abrogated

[1] Later Admiral Sir Charles Elliot.

by Parliament, and for the first time the Foreign Office came into direct relations with the Chinese authorities.

The conclusion of peace in 1842 improved the status of traders, but did not remove the causes of war Commissioner Yeh, who had long treated the British with insolence, in 1856 seized the British lorcha *Arrow* and imprisoned her crew. The Governor of Hong Kong ordered Admiral Seymour to take action, and so began the second China War, which lasted intermittently until 1860. In order to seek reparation for the murder of a missionary,[1] the French joined Great Britain in the campaign. A treaty, signed at Tientsin in 1858 under pressure of an armed force, guaranteed the freedom of Europeans to travel in the interior and to preach Christianity. There followed in the same year a commercial treaty at Shanghai, where no force was used, and in this the import of opium was legalized. The Treaty of Tientsin was finally ratified at Peking in 1860.

At the same time Russia, without becoming involved in war, began to penetrate in her search for the sea into the lower Amur region, and was ceded all the territory between the Ussuri and the sea. Here she founded the port of Vladivostok.

Peace between the British and Chinese was cemented by the loan of Major Gordon, who helped the Chinese Government to crush the rebellion of the Tai-p'ings. These amicable relations with Britain became strained again in 1875 when A. R. Margary, a member of the Chinese consular service, was treacherously murdered, but the British Government contented themselves with exacting guarantees for the future. There followed a revolt of the Central Asian tribes which showed in a powerful light the weakness of the central Government and led Russia to occupy the border province of Kulja, to part of which she clung even when the Central Asian revolt was suppressed.

The uncertain status of Annam, half tributary, half independent, led in 1883-4 to hostilities between China and France. China did not fare badly in the encounters, and came out of the war with an exaggerated sense of her military power. But her pride was rudely humbled in 1894 in a war

[1] There is no need to question the motive France was the great protector of Roman Catholic missions, and Napoleon III in particular liked to think of himself as the champion of the Church.

with Japan. Like the conflict with France over Annam, this war arose out of the uncertain status of Korea, which China chose to regard as independent or as tributary according to her convenience. The events leading up to this war will be related in the section dealing with Japan.

This war was followed by a period of active European encroachment on China, but China did not choose to fight and the powers succeeded by the policy of the 'open door'[1] in avoiding a conflict among themselves. But the gradual dismemberment of their country fostered among many Chinese a spirit of nationalism and led in 1900 to the 'Boxer'[2] rebellion against foreign intervention. This was crushed, not without difficulty, by the concerted action of the powers. But though the Boxer rising was suppressed, the spirit which animated it lived on. China had realized that if she was to continue to exist as a great nation she must adopt Western methods. She was slow to awake from her torpor, but of the reality of her awakening there can be little doubt.

Rise of Japan

The period of European encroachment on China coincided with the astonishing rise of Japan to the status of a first-class power. From the middle of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth Japan shut herself rigorously from all intercourse with the outside world.[3] After many foreign attempts at penetration had been rebuffed, Commodore Perry, who presented himself in Uraga Bay in 1853 with four men of war, secured concessions for American ships. Similar treaties were speedily obtained by Russia, Holland, and Britain. Thereupon Japan, who had so long shut herself off from the Western world, began to model herself on the occidental nations. Her transformation from a feudal nation of Oriental habits to an industrialized state on the occidental model was rapid and formally complete.[4] Every detail was

[1] Proclaimed and adhered to by Great Britain since the 'forties, but modified by Russia in Manchuria and by Germany in Shantung as will be seen below.

[2] The name comes from a literal translation of the Chinese movement, 'the fist of righteous harmony'

[3] The Dutch had a trading station at Nagasaki. But they were kept isolated and were in a very degrading position

[4] 'Formally complete,' because Western forms still conceal an essentially Oriental mind, a firm grasp of this fact is essential for the understanding of contemporary Japan.

copied, and not least the practice of war as an adjunct of policy. For the first eleven centuries of her historical existence till Commodore Perry's visit, Japan was involved in only one foreign war; in the eighty-five years from Perry's expedition to the present day she has engaged in six[1] contests oversea, and of these four fall within our purview.

The first Japanese expedition oversea was to Formosa in 1874. It arose from the maltreatment of the crew of a Riukiuan junk by the inhabitants of northern Formosa. Japan claimed that the Riukiuan islands belonged to her, protested to China, and on getting no satisfaction invaded Formosa. As it happened China did not go to war with her vigorous young neighbour, and in 1880 relinquished her own claims to the Riukiuan islands.

The more important territory of Korea soon took the place of Riukiu. China had long treated Korea in an ambiguous way, as indeed she treated all her frontier territories, regarding them now as under her sovereignty, now as independent states. In 1876 Korea was allowed to sign with Japan a treaty in which she was declared to be 'an independent state enjoying the same rights as Japan.' But China continued to intervene actively in Korean affairs, and this intervention was frequently exercised to the disadvantage of Japan. That country had become sensible of the importance of Korea to her own safety, and was determined to prevent it falling under the domination of any other power. When in 1894 an insurrection broke out in Korea and an appeal was made for Chinese aid, Japan determined on a simultaneous dispatch of troops. An act of hostilities and an open declaration of war soon followed.

Japan's military triumph was complete, and the treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) proclaimed the independence of Korea, ceded to Japan Formosa, the Pescadores, and part of Manchuria, and granted Japan commercial privileges. But Japan was not allowed to enjoy her triumph. Russia, Germany, and France presented in Tokyo a joint note recommending that the territory ceded on the mainland should not be permanently occupied. The recommendation was, of course, a command, and the emperor found it convenient to yield 'to

[1] Apart from the expedition sent in 1900, at the virtual invitation of the European powers and the United States, to suppress the rebellion in Pechili.

the dictates of magnanimity.' But deep resentment had been stirred up against Russia, as the principal author of this humiliation, and more especially against Germany, for whose intervention there seemed no reason. (It was not then known that the Kaiser entertained a dread of the 'yellow peril.') Resentment was changed to disgust a few years later when Russia obtained permission from China to divert her trans-Asian railway through Manchuria, when Germany seized part of the province of Shantung—ostensibly by way of indemnity for the murder of two missionaries though all preparations had been made before the murder was known—and when Russia obtained a lease of the Liaotung peninsula from which she had driven Japan in 1895. As a counter-weight to Russian influence in the north, Great Britain secured from China a lease of Wei-hai-wei.

From that time onwards Japan contemplated the moment when she should draw the sword against her powerful northern neighbour. The identity of their aims made collision inevitable. Japan regarded the independence of Korea as essential to her safety, but Russia also had eyes on it. For a century she had been searching for ice-free outlets to the ocean and had forced her way over the vast Siberian plains until she reached the sea first at Nikolayevsk and then ten degrees farther south at Vladivostok. But Vladivostok did not give access to the Pacific. It lay on the Sea of Japan, which was enclosed by a chain of islands. Control of the Tsushima Channel in the south was essential to Russian plans ; and that Japan was determined to resist. Her intransigence on this point has been compared by a recent writer with the British insistence on the independence of the Low Countries ;[1] but the parallel is rather with the medieval English desire to *own* Calais or Dunkirk.[2]

Japan strengthened her position in 1902 by an alliance with Great Britain, and two years later felt that her military preparations had gone sufficiently far to try conclusions with Russia. Between August 1903 and February 1904 ten draft treaties were discussed and rejected. Japan was convinced that only the arbitrament of arms could settle the issues,

[1] *The Problem of Japan*, by Malcolm D Kennedy, p. 58.

[2] For Japan does not maintain the *independence* of Korea. Mr. W. C Costin points out to me the parallel afforded by the spread of the island republic of Venice in the middle ages to the alpine passes.

and on 5 February 1904 she broke off negotiations. Her success in the war which followed finally convinced the Western nations of the prowess of their Japanese imitator—relatively, at least, to the inefficiency of Russia. The subsequent Treaty of Portsmouth recognized Japan's paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea ; provided for the evacuation of Manchuria by both sides ; transferred to Japan the Russian lease of the Liaotung peninsula ; and ceded to Japan the southern half of the island of Saghalien. By an agreement in 1907 the independence of Korea was reduced to a minimum.

The next war in which Japan found herself involved saw her on the side of Russia. She entered that war when requested to do so by her British ally, but the events leading up to that conflict belong to later pages.

Rise of Italy

Many contributed to the unification of Italy, but none so much as Cavour. He saw clearly that Italy would be liberated only by a war against Austria conducted by Piedmont with the help of France. In two conversations with Cavour in the Vosges during July 1858 Napoleon III agreed to give his help and sketched out a plan for an Italian confederation with the Pope as president, but insisted that Austria must be made to appear the aggressor ; and France would ask only for Savoy and Nice, with a dynastic marriage. Austria obligingly played into the hands of Cavour by an ultimatum demanding that Piedmont should disarm. France leapt to the assistance of gallant little Piedmont threatened by the Austrian bully ; and the war of Italian unity had begun (1859). The Austrians conducted their campaign with a bow-and-arrow mentality, exceeding even the imbecilities of the French Emperor, and before long the Austrians were driven out of Lombardy. At this point Napoleon made private overtures for peace with the Austrians, leaving them in possession of Venetia, but he retained enough sense of decency to waive his right to Nice and Savoy. It should be added that news of the assembly of a Prussian army on the Rhine redeems what would otherwise have been an act of the deepest treachery.

The military support which Piedmont lost in France was more than atoned for by the efflorescence of nationalism all

over Italy. The Italian nation suddenly became conscious of its reality. What had hitherto been only a geographical entity thought of itself as a united people. Duchies and principalities arose against their petty rulers. Thanks to the sympathy of the English Government, and a bargain which Cavour thought it convenient to strike with Napoleon, the unity of the north, save for Venetia, was quickly accomplished. Thanks to the prowess of Garibaldi, the liberation of Sicily and Naples from their rulers followed. After many anxious moments, the unity of north and south had been achieved. In the centre there still remained Rome to be added to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel, and in the north Venetia to be rescued from the Austrians; but the fulfilment of these objects belongs as much to the history of Prussia as of Italy. Hidden more deeply in the future was a great conflict in which Italy, loosely bound to one of the contending parties,[1] gave her services to the other side in return for a higher bid, which could not be redeemed when the time came for payment. That story also will be more appropriately told as part of the history of Germany.

Rise of Germany

Austria, which had been the chief obstacle to Italian unity, also lay athwart the unification of the German peoples. From the Napoleonic era onwards the Austrian Empire moved steadily but ineluctably towards its dissolution. It was this progressive weakening of the Austrian hold, accompanied by the simultaneous outburst of a national consciousness among the Germanic and Italian peoples, which made possible the consolidation of these two nations. Both conditions were necessary. A strong Austria would have crushed national movements at their birth; nor without the manifestation of a powerful national feeling could unity have been extracted even from a weak Austria. In each case, to achieve unity war was necessary.

Austria deliberately frustrated German unity in 1813.

[1] Italy joined the alliance of Germany and Austria in 1882, but in 1902 entered into an agreement with France which virtually nullified her obligations to the Central Powers She entered the Great War in 1915 on the side of France and Britain after the secret Treaty of London, which promised her territorial advantages Great Britain had guaranteed the *status quo* in the Mediterranean by an agreement of 1887, denounced in 1896.

The War of Liberation then roused among Germans a strong national sentiment, which had already been fostered by the literary and philosophical achievements of a band of eminent writers, even though some of them looked to France for their models and despised their countrymen. Opinion was ripe for German unity. In Berlin Hardenberg and Stein were working for it. But Metternich had other ideas, and Austria was then strong enough to enforce her will. His aim was not a powerful and united Germany under the domination of Prussia, but a loose confederation of German states over which Austria would be able to exercise control. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.* Political unity was denied to Germany, but a wise commercial policy followed by Prussia created in the space of a single generation a real economic unity. Maasen had founded in 1818 a *Zollverein* or customs union, which united the scattered Prussian dominions behind a low tariff wall. It proved so attractive that within thirty years almost all the German states had been brought into the system. The work of the *Zollverein*, in giving Prussia the economic leadership of the German peoples, was supplemented on the spiritual side by the teaching of Hegel. The doctrine that the greatness of the state is to be preferred to the happiness of individuals became an axiom in Prussian thought; and few educated Prussians saw any incongruity in believing that the Prussian state was the kingdom of God made manifest.

So it came about that when the fire of revolution blazed all over Europe in 1848, the whole of Germany saw in Prussia its natural leader, as it had done in 1807–13. It was to Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, that the Frankfurt Assembly finally offered the crown of the new German Empire which they contemplated, an empire from which, they decided after many misgivings, Austria should be excluded. But Frederick William was not a prince to receive his crown from a democratic assembly. With a firm dynastic sense, he lent his sword to the German rulers to stamp out the revolutions by which they were faced, but soon found himself on the edge of a collision with Austria, which he averted by a complete diplomatic submission at Olmutz.

Austria was still able to call the tune in Germany, but for how much longer? Prussia had for a generation threatened

her ascendancy. She needed only a leader, a hero who would teach her to be herself and dare the Austrian eagle. That man was present already. Let anyone who believes in the unimportance of the individual in history study the figure of Otto von Bismarck. Undeterred by the slightest scruples, and favoured by the constitution of a giant, he had an unfailing eye for realities and an inflexible will in achieving his aim. War was for him a possible and legitimate instrument of policy. On his own confession, he 'made' three wars. In 1864 he made war on Denmark. He had told Disraeli in 1862 that he intended at the earliest opportunity to make war on Austria, and four years later he carried out his threat. In 1870 he deliberately altered a telegram from his sovereign to ensure war with France when there seemed a danger of peace. The man who would understand the causes of modern wars can hardly fail to include Bismarck among them. Nor do his responsibilities end with the wars which he directly instigated. The game played by William II after his dismissal was the game which he had started; only the gambler was more reckless and the stakes were higher.

A hatred of parliamentarism was essential to Bismarck's philosophy, and at the outset of his administration in 1862, after a tense constitutional struggle, he ensured that the Prussian army was kept free of parliamentary control. If Bismarck had been defeated in this struggle, the subsequent history of Europe might have been very different. As he succeeded, the way was open for that war with Austria which he saw to be the essential prelude to German political unity. To prosecute that war favourably it was desirable to isolate the potential enemy. An insurrection in Russian Poland gave him the opportunity finally to detach from Austria her powerful eastern neighbour. Great Britain, France, and Austria joined in a request to Russia for an amnesty and Polish home rule. Prussia, invited to concur, chose under Bismarck's guidance to sign a military convention with Russia. Bismarck ensured Russian gratitude and could feel safe on his eastern border.

Schleswig-Holstein

The actual occasion for war with Austria arose out of a prior victory of both over Denmark. The annexation of

Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 was an event big with consequences. Its immediate result was to provide Bismarck with his *casus belli* against Austria, and in the future it enabled Germany to build the Kiel Canal and to embark on oceanic adventures which ultimately brought her into conflict with the greatest sea-power in the world. How far Bismarck saw these consequences we may not know, but he was a far-seeing statesman.

The dispute with Denmark concerned the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig. Since 1490 both had been governed by the King of Denmark, but Holstein was within the confines of the German Empire, and, although Schleswig was indisputably Danish, large numbers of Germans had trekked across the frontier. There was a case for incorporating Schleswig in the Danish monarchy and giving Holstein home rule, a sloution proposed by King Frederick VII of Denmark in 1863; there was a case for treating the duchies as indissoluble and creating out of them a new principality in the German Confederation; there was no case at all, legal, historical, or moral, for their seizure by Prussia. Yet that is what ultimately happened.

The first solution was given effect by Christian IX, who succeeded Frederick VII towards the end of 1863. The Holstein Estates thereupon appealed to the Diet, who declared for the second, and a pretender was readily found. But Bismarck had no desire either to see Schleswig in Denmark or a new German principality acting as a check on Prussia. Acting in concert with Austria, he recognized Christian IX in accordance with the Treaty of London, 1852, but at the same time presented an ultimatum demanding the repeal of the constitution by which the duchies had been separated. It was rejected. The Danes thought that England would probably come to their aid. From his place in the House of Commons Lord Palmerston had declared: "We are convinced—I am convinced at least—that, if any violent attempt were made to overthrow the rights and to interfere with the independence of Denmark, those who made the attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend."[1]

'In the result' Lord Palmerston was right, but the fulfilment of his prophecy was delayed till 1914. The Queen,

[1] *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* 3rd series, vol. 172 col. 1252.

with her strong German sympathies, was adamant against intervention, nor was a majority of the Cabinet prepared to back Palmerston. The Danes were overrun by the Prussian and Austrian forces and compelled to cede Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenberg.

It required little foresight to see that the disposal of these territories could be made to give cause for friction between Prussia and Austria. In the summer of 1865 peace was with difficulty preserved. As a compromise it was agreed that Schleswig should be administered by Austria, Holstein by Prussia, with Lauenburg given absolutely to Prussia; and both powers began preparing for the struggle which was now inevitable.

Bismarck could count on the neutrality of Russia, and France played in his hands. Napoleon III did not then see the Prussian menace, but had he felt inclined to intervene on behalf of Austria he disqualified himself for so doing by a foolish and costly adventure in Mexico. That country was torn by a struggle between clerical and anti-clerical forces, and Napoleon was induced by the prospect of gratifying the Roman Catholic Church and the French bourse to nominate Maximilian, brother of Francis Joseph, to the Mexican throne and to support him with the French arms. In the end the Washington Government, having beaten the South in the civil war, were in a position to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, and the French thought it politic to abandon the expedition.

Austro-Prussian War

Chastened by this humiliating experience, Napoleon gave a sympathetic ear when Bismarck visited him at Biarritz (1865), unfolded to him his plans for a war with Austria and the acquisition of the Danish duchies, and suggested territorial benefits for France on condition of her neutrality. It was desirable also to get Italy to engage Austria in the south, and for this Venetia was to be the prize. Finally, to conciliate opinion in his own country, Bismarck drew up a scheme for a German Parliament elected by universal suffrage.

The immediate steps before hostilities may be briefly told. On 21 April 1866 Austria, alarmed by a threatened attack by Garibaldi on Venetia, began to mobilize. Five days later

she sent an ultimatum to Berlin demanding disarmament and an immediate settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question. At this point Napoleon, in response to the pressure of his people, who saw the Prussian menace more clearly than he, attempted to detach Italy from Austria by persuading Austria to cede Venetia. Italy refused to abandon her ally. Napoleon, backed by Great Britain and Russia, thereupon suggested a European congress to reconsider the German and Italian settlement of 1815, but this also came to nothing.[1] On 1 June Austria declared her intention of submitting the question of the duchies to the Diet. Bismarck denounced this as a breach of the convention of Gastein and protested to the Diet. He said that Prussia would recognize the right only of a reformed federal power to settle the Schleswig-Holstein question. On 9 June Prussian troops marched into Holstein. Five days later the Prussian scheme of reform was laid before the Diet, and Austria presented a counter-proposal for a decree of federal execution against Prussia. The Austrian motion was carried by nine votes to six, the Prussian delegate immediately walked out of the Diet, and the following day (15 June) Prussian troops crossed the Saxon frontier on their way to Austria.

The Seven Weeks' War culminated in the overwhelming Prussian victory of Koniggratz (Sadowa). The rapidity of the Prussian movements, their skilful use of railways, and the superiority of their arms, especially the needle-gun, marked a new stage in warfare and made the whole world aware that Prussia had indeed entered the world scene. Venetia was ceded to Italy in accordance with the pre-war agreement, though the Italian arms had been everywhere defeated. But Bismarck resisted the temptation to dismember Austria and create at that moment a unified German State under Prussian leadership. He was content with a North German Confederation alone, rightly believing that the southern German states would voluntarily accede to it in the near future; and Austria resigned to Prussia her rights in the Danish duchies.

Though Bismarck pretended that Austria was the aggressor, there can be no doubt that from first to last it was his war.

[1] Prussia unconditionally accepted the invitation, but Austria refused unless it was beforehand agreed that no invited power should get an increase of territory.

" It must be confessed," he later said to von Treitschke, " that our linen was not always of the cleanest." The truth has been bluntly told by the soldier who commanded the Prussian forces. " The war of 1866," said von Moltke, " did not take place because the existence of Prussia was threatened, or in obedience to public opinion or the will of the people. It was a war which was foreseen long before, which was prepared with deliberation and recognized as necessary by the Cabinet, not in order to obtain territorial aggrandisement, but for power in order to secure the establishment of Prussian hegemony in Germany."

Franco-Prussian War

Bismarck was content not to force German unity, but that was his fixed, ultimate goal, and to attain it a common war of the German states against a common enemy offered the best means. To bring that about Bismarck worked steadily and relentlessly. On the other side of the Rhine in France, where the greatest apprehension had been roused by the sweeping Prussian victory over Austria, there was hardly a responsible politician who did not regard a trial of strength as inevitable. " It is France who has been defeated at Sadowa," exclaimed Thiers. The terrified French diplomatists worked hard, but in a bungling manner, to improve their position. They asked for compensations, such as Bismarck had mentioned, for their neutrality in the Austrian war. Among the requests was one for south German territory. Bismarck saw that the request was published—in a French newspaper—and the Bavarians were immediately inflamed against France. A scheme for the purchase of Luxemburg had to be withdrawn owing to Prussian hostility. The most ambitious claim of all was for Belgium. When war broke out Bismarck had Benedetti's draft treaty published, a circumstance which greatly helped in keeping Britain neutral.

France was in a perilously weak position. Her people had a pathetic faith in the invincibility of their army. She was embroiled in the Roman question. Her emperor, losing such capacity as ever he possessed, had sunk into decrepitude. Now was the time for Bismarck to strike. Yet he was almost deprived of the golden opportunity. The manner in which he caused war to break out has few parallels in history.

"I had the honour of receiving the seals of the Foreign Office last Wednesday (6 July 1870)," said Lord Granville in the House of Lords.[1] "On the previous day I had an unofficial conversation with the able and experienced Under-Secretary, Mr. Hammond, at the Foreign Office, and he told me, it being then three or four o'clock, that, with the exception of the sad and painful subject about to be discussed this evening (the murder of British subjects by Greek brigands), he had never during his long experience known so great a lull in foreign affairs, and that he was not aware of any important question that I should have to deal with."

Alas for the hopes of man! A few hours after this conversation Granville received a telegram with news of a Hohenzollern candidate for the vacant throne of Spain, and the following day Gramont, the French Foreign Minister, rose in the Chamber to declare that French interests were threatened. Queen Isabella had been deposed in 1868 and a republic declared, but the country remained unsettled and a restoration of royalty appeared the only means of introducing order. Twice offered this kingly crown, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen accepted after a first refusal, and his candidature received the sanction of the King of Prussia. The news created an uproar in Paris. It conjured up visions of the empire of Charles V, of a simultaneous attack from the Rhine and the Pyrenees. The explosion was all the greater because the plan had been confidentially discovered in the previous year and its revival, against known French hostility, was attributed to the unscrupulous Bismarck, who had, indeed, placed friends in a Madrid bank to engineer the prince's selection. When Europe trembled with the expectation of war, news came on 11 July that Anthony, Prince of Hohenzollern, had withdrawn his son's candidature. Europe breathed again. The Emperor was satisfied. So was Ollivier, the French Premier. Unfortunately Gramont was not content, and asked for a renunciation by the candidate himself. He even talked of apologies. The deputies in the Chamber lost their heads. There was talk of guarantees. This attitude unnerved the foolish old Emperor. Without the cognizance of Ollivier, he backed Gramont's instructions to Benedetti to meet King

[1] *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd series, vol 203, col 3 (11 July 1870).

William at Ems and obtain from him an assurance that he associated himself with Prince Anthony's withdrawal and would not authorize a renewal of the Hohenzollern candidature.

Quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat. The foolish behaviour of Napoleon and Gramont recalled the danger of war, and in such a manner as to put France in the wrong. Yet the fates seemed to strive for peace against the folly of man. King William received Benedetti at Ems, was firm in his refusal to give guarantees, and would give no further audience to the French Ambassador; but he sent a note saying that he had received an official communication from Prince Leopold renouncing the Spanish throne. He was anxious to avoid war, and in his opinion the matter was over. Benedetti also was anxious for peace, and their relations were thoroughly courteous.

There was one man who had no desire to see peace. Otto von Bismarck was rightly suspected by the French as being at the back of the Hohenzollern candidature. He had striven hard for an alliance by which Spain would open her doors to German trade and, in the event of hostilities, embarrass France in the south. He had urged the Hohenzollerns to accept the offer of the throne, he had urged the Spanish to renew the offer, and had pressed King William to look on it with favour. When, therefore, he heard that 'Father Anthony' had withdrawn the candidature, his disappointment was intense. In his 'Recollections' he described these happenings as the greatest diplomatic humiliation which Prussia had suffered since Olmutz.

It was in this chastened and rebellious mood that Bismarck received from Ems a telegram relating the King's interview with Benedetti.[1] He was dining with von Moltke and von Roon when it arrived. With a glance at the telegram, he saw his way clear. Moltke and Roon assured him that the army was ready. He took his pen and with a few skilful deletions gave a far graver turn to the interview than it really possessed. The soldiers were filled with admiration and suddenly recovered their appetites. "Now it has a different ring," said von Moltke. "It sounded before like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge." "Our God of old," said von Roon, "lives still and will not let us

[1] *v* Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol ii, c 22.

perish in disgrace." The altered telegram was sent to the *North German Gazette*. 'Next morning all Germany was convinced that the King had been insulted by the French Ambassador; in the evening all France was persuaded that the Ambassador had been publicly slighted by the King.'[1]

Paris was a city of confusion that day. "They wish," cried Ollivier as he read the *North German Gazette*, "to force us into war," and they succeeded. A fateful debate took place in the Emperor's Council. At four p.m. the Council decided to call out the reserves. At 6.30 caution prevailed, and an appeal to a European congress was suggested. After dinner the Empress was present. She did not speak, but was known to be an advocate of war. Her presence may have helped the Council to decide at midnight that war should be declared next morning. That day the foolish Parisian mob spent shouting 'À Berlin.' In Berlin they were singing 'Die Wacht am Rhein.'

So it arose that the actual declaration of war came from France. It is undeniable that the Emperor, his consort, and Gramont have a big burden to bear for what happened. But who can doubt where the major responsibility lies? Where but on the shoulders of him who deliberately altered the royal telegram to inflame passions and provoke hostilities?[2] Bismarck planned the Franco-Prussian war as he had planned the Danish and Austrian wars, and his object throughout was the same—to create on the Continent of Europe a powerful, unified German state under the leadership of Prussia. He was completely successful in his ruthless purpose. The 'invincible' French army proved no match for the highly-

[1] Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii, p. 35.

[2] Bismarck's own account, with the amended text, is: In dieser Ueberzeugung machte ich von der mir durch Abeken übermittelten königlichen Ermächtigung Gebrauch, den Inhalt des Telegramms zu veröffentlichen, und reducirte in Gegenwart meiner beiden Tischgäste das Telegramm durch Streichungen, ohne ein Wort hinzuzusetzen oder zu ändern, auf die nachstehende Fassung:

'Nachdem die Nachrichten von der Entsagung des Erbprinzen von Hohenzollern der kaiserlich französischen Regirung von der königlich spanischen amtlich mitgetheilt worden sind, hat der französische Botschafter in Ems an seine Majestät den König noch die Fordrung gestellt, ihn zu autorisiren, dass er nach Paris telegraphire, dass Seine Majestät der König sich für alle Zukunst verpflichte, niemals wieder seine Zustimmung zu geben, wenn die Hohenzollern auf ihre Candidatur wieder zurückkommen sollten. Seine Majestät der König hat es darauf abgelehnt, den französischen Botschafter nochmals zu empfangen, und demselben durch den Adjutanten vom Dienst sagen lassen, dass Seine Majestät dem Botschafter nichts weiter mitzutheilen habe.'

trained Prussian legions; and out of the enhanced national spirit produced by the war against a common enemy the modern German Empire was born at Versailles on 18 January 1871. A few months later (10 May) the Peace of Frankfurt was dictated by the victors to the vanguished. In it Bismarck, forgetting the lesson which he had himself inculcated in the Treaty of Prague, made one serious blunder. Instead of being content with German unity, as he had formerly been content with a North German confederation, he carved two provinces from the bleeding side of France. Alsace, it is true, was essentially German, though Lorraine was as essentially French. To both provinces Germany could make some historical claim. Alsace had been acquired from the Empire by Mazarin,[1] and Lorraine in the reign of Louis XV.[2] But they had been integral portions of French territory for so long that their severance was a blunder and a crime, the more so as the inhabitants were given no method of expressing their feelings, though the deputies from Alsace and Lorraine protested unanimously. The annexation was unwillingly accepted and left a smouldering resentment in France.

New Tendencies in Germany

Bismarck, who had created the German Empire in three wars, was destined to guide its fortunes for nineteen years. They were years of peace, an armed and anxious peace, it is true, but still peace, and in this period the German economy went through a veritable revolution. The thorough system of Prussian education, which had contributed in no small measure to success in the field, was the foundation of equally conspicuous victories in industry. The coal measures of Westphalia were actively developed in conjunction with the iron ore deposits of Lorraine; in chemicals and electricity, two branches of industry which owed their origin to the genius of an English pioneer, Germany leapt into first place among the nations; German shipping penetrated into all parts of the globe. In the first twenty years of the Empire

[1] There were, however, some imperial fiefs in Alsace to the time of the French Revolution.

[2] The Duchy of Lorraine was acquired in the settlement of the war of the Polish succession by the transference of the Duke (the husband of Maria Theresa) to the vacant Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and after the life interest of Louis XV's Polish wife's father had expired. But the French had the three Lorraine bishoprics before this settlement.

German shipping tonnage increased sevenfold. When Jeshurun waxed fat he kicked, and young Germany, rejoicing in its prosperity, gave an attentive ear to the flattering teaching of Heinrich von Treitschke from his chair at Berlin. They were led to see in the rise of Prussia the mysterious workings of Providence and in the hardy, disciplined Prussians the chosen people of God.

Yet prosperity did not bring satisfaction. Denmark, Austria, France had been humbled, but across the North Sea Great Britain still remained free, independent, unconquered, the mistress of a vast empire which had fallen to her not by deliberate conquest but almost by a chapter of accidents. When von Treitschke and his associates looked to the south or south-west they could feel exultant; but when their eyes turned across the North Sea an irritating sense of inferiority seized them and made them give vent to foolish and desperate talk. Why should Great Britain have vast colonial dominions and Germany be confined to the continent of Europe? Why should the prestige of oversea empire be denied to God's chosen vassals? The *pax Germanica* must be extended over barbarian territory; and if this brought conflict with Britain, then let not Germany, conqueror of Denmark, Austria, and France, shrink from the fray!

These dangerous teachings met with an enthusiastic reception, and even the creator of the German Reich could not ignore them. Bismarck had sternly disciplined his mind against colonial adventures. He realized they meant friction with Britain, and, though he was no admirer of the British, whose liberalism he detested, their friendship or neutrality was essential to his plans. But the popular demand for the prestige of colonies was more than he could resist. The pen of Treitschke had proved mightier than the sword of Bismarck. In 1879 he adopted protection as his fiscal policy, and in 1883 he reluctantly gave his blessing to the colonial idea. A colonial group was formed in the Reichstag.

Germany was not the only country which might be brought into collision with Great Britain over colonies. France was, for Bismarck, as for Hitler, the eternal enemy of Germany, and with ultra-Machiavellian cunning he encouraged France to take Tunis, in order that she might be embroiled with Italy, and England to take Egypt, that she might quarrel with France.

To prevent France getting allies in the east, Bismarck engineered in 1873 the *Dreikaiserbund*, or coalition of the Emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia. It nearly came to grief, as already noticed, in 1878, when the Tsar found himself isolated at the Congress of Berlin, and though it survived for some years it lacked reality. For the interests of Austria and Russia were difficult to reconcile, and if a choice had to be made Bismarck, no lover of the Slavs, determined that it should be with Austria. In 1879 he negotiated a secret alliance with Austria directed against Russia, whose principal clause reads: 'Should, contrary to their hope and against their loyal desire, one of the high contracting parties be attacked by Russia, the high contracting parties are bound to come to the assistance, one of the other, with the whole war strength of their empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.'

The treaty was inconsistent with the undertakings of the *Dreikaiserbund*, but that was not likely to deter the man who rewrote the Ems telegram. Bismarck did not want war between Austria and Russia. Yet his policy made it highly probable that at some date Germany would be drawn into a quarrel between the two countries. So long as he was in charge at Berlin he was able to keep Austria under control. In 1885, when Eastern Rumelia joined itself to Bulgaria, the Serbs, fearing the aggrandisement of Bulgaria, took up arms and were defeated. Behind the Serbs stood Austria, behind the Bulgarians was Russia. A general war was imminent, but Bismarck did not think the Balkans worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier, and he kept Austria in check. So war was averted. But who would dare prophesy that Berlin would always be able, or would always desire to restrain Austria? The Dual Alliance of 1879 between Austria and Germany, converted into a Triple Alliance three years later by the adhesion of Italy,[1] must be accounted a momentous stage in the stream of events which led to the Great War. It can only be accounted a blunder in Bismarck's own diplomatic career. There were no sufficiently great compensations for its manifold dangers. That Bismarck himself had misgivings is shown by a secret 'reinsurance' treaty concluded with Russia in 1887.

[1] Italy was mortified by the French occupation of Tunis.

Thus William I went to his grave in peace and full of years. So long had he reigned that the new monarch, Frederick, was already an old man dying of cancer, and in a few months he himself made way for his son, a headstrong young man of thirty-one. No monarch by his personal defects has loosed so many horrors on the world as this impulsive creature, now borne into a mystic exaltation by the stream of his own eloquence, now gibbering with fear at happenings of which he was himself the chief author. Yet in fairness to him it should be said that the first steps on the road to destruction had already been taken by Bismarck. Colonial expansion had received Bismarck's blessing, the alliance with Austria was his own idea. Yet so long as Bismarck was leading, Europe had a guarantee that the worst consequences of these policies would not be realized. But William II declined to follow the promptings of the crafty old Chancellor. "There is only one master in this country, and I am he," the new Kaiser observed. In 1890 the pilot was dropped. Within a few months the new master and his instruments (Caprivi, Marschall, Holstein) committed a cardinal blunder by declining to renew Bismarck's 'reinsurance' treaty with Russia. This may have been due to an honest desire not to follow two policies at once, but it naturally alarmed Russia; and her alarm was greatly increased when the Tsar learnt of the secret treaty between Germany and Austria. Russia began to look in other directions for support, and where more naturally than to France, who had similar reasons for apprehension?

It was impossible for France to ignore the new tone in Germany. The lessons of the Franco-Prussian War had been reinforced by the industrial progress of Germany and by a decline in the birth-rate which threatened to deplete her armed strength. For the despotism of the Tsar there was no sympathy in the free republic of the west. But adversity makes strange bedfellows. France felt the attraction of allying herself with a country of almost inexhaustible man-power which, in time of need, could embarrass Germany on the east. An agreement was outlined in 1891 and in 1894 a secret military convention bound both parties to come to each other's assistance in case of attack by Germany. There was no beating about the bush. The convention stipulated:

'The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men; on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000. These forces shall engage to the full with all speed, in order that Germany may have to fight at the same time on the east and on the west.' Provision was made for consultation of the general staffs. The convention was secret, but the sight of French warships at Kronstadt and Russian men-of-war at Toulon informed the whole world that Europe was divided into two armed and mutually suspicious camps.

British Policy

Britain stood aloof from the Triple Alliance of Germany, Italy, and Austria and from the Dual Alliance of France and Russia. Her policy was isolation,[1] but it was hardly splendid. Between Russia and Britain there was a long-standing hatred, fanned by the Tory Party. France and Britain almost came to war in 1898. The circumstances were absurd, and fortunately were recognized as such by the statesmen on either side. By a series of events, some of which can be considered only as accidents, Great Britain had been forced into deeper and deeper Egyptian commitments. France had deliberately withdrawn from her *condominium* with Great Britain, only to regret it afterwards. In 1898 a French expedition under Major Marchand, which had been trekking across Africa from the west and had been lost for three years, arrived at Fashoda on the Upper Nile and planted the tricolour. Great Britain was hardly likely to relinquish the claims which she had established in that region by the expenditure of much blood and treasure, and Kitchener was instructed to demand Marchand's withdrawal. At once the national honour on either side was felt to be involved. The fleets were mobilized and war was perilously near. Fortunately Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, with his eyes on the Rhine, saw the absurdity of a great war for the sake of some mud-huts on the Upper Nile. Marchand, it was discovered, had enhanced French prestige by his march across the African continent, and peace was preserved.

[1] Though she came for a short time into the Berlin orbit, indirectly, by the Mediterranean agreement of 1887, already mentioned (*supra*, p. 171, n 1).

It was clear that Great Britain could hardly be expected in this atmosphere to join the Franco-Russian alliance. If she was to emerge from her isolation, there was greater hope of an alliance with Germany. There were many Englishmen who urged such a course. The English character, they observed, had a German base. Chief among such advocates was Joseph Chamberlain, who, in a speech at Birmingham in 1899, declared it to be 'the most natural alliance.' The offer, coming from the most important member of the British Cabinet after the Prime Minister, was ignored. The rebuff confirmed British fears that Germany had no desire for close co-operation with Great Britain. Those fears had been awakened by several unpleasant incidents.

Boer War

At the Foreign Office from 1892 to 1895 the young Under-Secretary, Edward Grey, noticed with some bitterness the pressure exercised by Germany on British policy, but this was unknown to the general public. Public indignation against German ambitions was, however, raised to fever-heat by the Kaiser's attempt to embarrass Great Britain in South Africa.

The Cape Colony had been acquired by Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars by conquest, treaty, and purchase. The Dutch inhabitants were not consulted, and among them was a smouldering resentment against British rule. In 1817–19 the Kaffirs returned and laid waste a large part of the area from which they had been expelled, and in 1834 yet another descent by the Kaffirs had to be overcome, not without serious losses. Two years later some 7,000 Boers, impatient of British rule and especially indignant because their Kaffir slaves had been freed, began their great trek out of the colony, beyond the Vaal River. The British Government held that the trekkers could not divest themselves of their allegiance to the Crown, and might be punished for offences against the Kaffirs up to the twenty-fifth degree of south latitude. It is one of the ironies of history that the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act (1836) intended to protect native tribes from white aggression, led insensibly to the extension of British authority over the whole of South Africa.

The details of that extension need not here be given. It must suffice to note that, in the words of Paul Botha, Britain alternately blew hot and cold. For a score of years after the great trek it cannot be doubted that Britain was genuinely anxious to limit her commitments in South Africa. But in the last quarter of the century the imperial spirit became resurgent in England, and the Government embarked on a policy of expansion, not as a political necessity, but as a divinely given mission. The Transvaal was annexed in 1877, and in the same year another attack by the Kaffirs had to be met. Barely was that concluded when Sir Bartle Frere felt it necessary to bring to heel a force of 40,000 trained Zulus under Cetewayo, who were embarrassing the frontiers both of Natal and of the Transvaal.[1] This first Zulu war was successfully brought to an end, but not without serious reverses to the British arms, redeemed by the heroism of Rorke's Drift. Still the British difficulties continued, and Mr. Gladstone, then out of office, but facing the prospect of return, denounced the annexation of the Transvaal. The Boers took this to mean retrocession, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, for a brief space Governor-General, argued against such a course.

"The Transvaal is rich in minerals, gold has already been found in quantities, and there can be little doubt that larger and still more valuable goldfields will sooner or later be discovered. Any such discovery would soon bring a large British population here."

This warning was, of course, not known to the general public, and we have the best evidence for believing that it was 'little considered by English statesmen of either party at this critical time or afterwards, although it proved a vital element in any far-sighted decision.'[2] How little it was considered was shown when Mr. Gladstone took office. To demands for retrocession he argued that the liberty sought by the Boers might be 'most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African

[1] Another view was taken by John William Colenso, Bishop of Natal, who strongly condemned the action of Frere: *v. Life of Bishop Colenso*, by Sir George Cox, vol. ii, pp. 458–9 'Sir Bartle Frere sedulously fanned the flame of irritation, and fed the prejudices which from the first he had conceived against the Zulu king The result was an unjust war, unjustly waged.'

[2] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, bk. viii, c. 3, 2.

Confederation.' This did not satisfy the Boers, who took up arms and inflicted a severe defeat on the British at Majuba Hill. Before this reverse Mr. Gladstone's Government had entered into negotiations with the Boers for retrocession, and, refusing to be deflected by the disaster to their arms (greatly to the harm of their prestige), they restored the Transvaal to its independence.

Friction continued. President Kruger had territorial ambitions and desires for an outlet to the sea which did not make for peace. Then in 1886 came the discovery of the Rand goldfields and the foundation of Johannesburg. British immigrants, known as Uitlanders, flocked into the country, and once there found themselves, to quote the words of Milner, 'in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to her Majesty's Government for redress.' The Uitlanders contributed by far the greater part of the Transvaal State revenues, but they had no share even in local government. To Cecil Rhodes, the Oxford dreamer who had become Prime Minister in the Cape Colony, and his friend, Dr. Jameson, this was intolerable. Between them a plan was devised by which Jameson was to gather a force on the Transvaal border and, if no satisfactory concession could be obtained from Kruger, was to march on Johannesburg, where the Uitlanders would rise. The raid miscarried, but it had important consequences, for it showed that the Boers and the Uitlanders were playing on a world stage. The German consul at Pretoria had dreams of a big German mission in South Africa to be fulfilled by aiding and abetting Kruger against the British. He led the Boers to believe that Germany was prepared to go to extreme measures in support of the Transvaal against Great Britain. That he was not exceeding his instructions appeared to be shown conclusively when President Kruger, having successfully put down the Jameson raiders, received a telegram from the Kaiser congratulating him on having done so 'without appealing to the help of friendly powers.'

The indignation in Great Britain was intense. Here seemed open proof that Germany was flagrantly provoking hostility to the British Empire. It was an act hardly calculated to win the friendship of Great Britain or to promote the peace of the world.

Were the grievances of the Uitlanders merely a pretext for the annexation of the country? The answer is best given in a letter by Milner.

'*Sir A. Milner to Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson.*[1]

'8 May 1899.

'(Very Confidential.)

'Telegrams from the S. of S. though very brief leave me no doubt that the Government is in earnest this time. I don't think they are going to reply to the petition[2] by an ultimatum to the Transvaal, but I think they are going to send a dispatch so strong that it will practically necessitate their intervention, if Kruger does not grant large reforms. If he does, the Uitlanders must take them and work them *bona fide*. I have impressed this strongly upon them. Perhaps it would be best if Kruger hardened his heart and the smash came. But I don't think we ought to aim at that. Personally I am playing quite openly and wholeheartedly for radical reform.'

The British Government felt the appeal of the Uitlanders and the advice of Milner were not such as they could ignore. Troops were sent to South Africa in the case of need, but the attitude of the Boers became even more truculent, and they sent an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of British reinforcements, whether in South Africa or on the high seas. Great Britain would not accept those terms and the Boers declared war on 11 October 1899.

So came about a war which taxed the resources of the British Empire to the utmost. It was unpopular with a vocal minority at home, and abroad it was almost universally regarded as an attempt by a mighty empire to annex a weak and courageous nation. In Germany, which had so steadily supported the Boers, anti-British feeling ran high. The difficulties of the British army were noted as a sign of decadence in the island race. But the Kaiser was compelled also to reflect that at sea there was no power which could challenge British superiority. Reflections of this kind probably brought to nothing a suggestion by the Tsar—a curious person to

[1] *The Milner Papers (South Africa)*, edited by Cecil Headlam, pp. 358–9.
[2] A petition had been sent to the Queen by 21,000 Uitlanders.

mount the high moral horse—for a continental league against Britain.

Rise of German Navy

The lesson was not lost on the Kaiser. For some years a young naval officer, von Tirpitz, had been pressing the construction of a high sea fleet. William II assented, and a series of navy bills initiated a disastrous race in naval armaments with Great Britain.[1] The Kaiser's favourite playthings as a boy had been toy ships, and he treated the navy as his toy. Any suggestion that his naval programmes were excessive he took as a personal insult. Any proposal from London for a halt he jubilantly took as a sign of British weakness. At the beginning of the century the two-power standard was an axiom of British policy—that is, the maintenance of a fleet at least as strong as any two fleets within striking distance. The Kaiser did not believe that Great Britain could stand the financial strain of maintaining this standard against his competition. The strain was certainly great, and became greater through the short-sighted adoption of the dreadnought policy in 1905. It was believed that the possession of a new type of capital ship immensely superior to all other ships afloat would increase Britain's superiority. It does not seem to have been sufficiently realized that other countries would desire this type of ship, that its possession would therefore put other capital ships in the British Navy out of date, and that a new race in arms would begin with all countries on scratch. The dreadnought policy therefore lost for Great Britain the superiority which she had previously enjoyed.

To get his navy bills passed the Kaiser found it necessary to foment hatred of Britain in his own country. This outburst of anti-British feeling did not go unnoticed across the North Sea (or, as the Kaiser liked to think of it, the German Ocean) and there was an almost miraculous result. Great Britain and France, who had been on the verge of war in 1898, settled all their colonial differences in 1904 and initiated an Entente Cordiale. No longer could they go on bickering. A reckless adventurer on the throne of the Hohenzollerns

[1] For a full study of this subject *v. Great Britain and the German Navy*, by E L Woodward.

threatened both of them. Great Britain, who had already in 1902 signed an alliance with Japan, had emerged from her isolation.

Anglo-French Entente Cordiale

The agreement between Britain and France was not an alliance. Its great advantage was that it terminated colonial rivalries which had persisted for a generation and as recently as 1898 had brought the two countries to the brink of war. The essence of the agreement was that in return for a free hand in Egypt, Great Britain abandoned all idea of intervention in Morocco and recognised the special interests of France in that country. The chief articles were :

> 'Art. 2. The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms, which it may require. They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for the purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, convention, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade, etc.'
>
> 'Art. 9. The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.'

No one could blame Lord Lansdowne for taking the opportunity to remove what had long been sources of friction between the two countries. But unfortunately things had already come to such a pass in Europe that it was not possible to cultivate the friendship of France without incurring the hostility of Germany.

Moroccan Crisis, 1905–6

This was soon shown by a disturbing incident which brought Europe to the verge of war. It was not only the things

Germany did, but the manner in which she did them, that made men put their hands to their swords. After acquiescing for a year in the Moroccan settlement, Germany chose the moment when France's ally was engaged in the war with Japan to complain that she was being ignored. If she had made her complaints through the diplomatic channels they would doubtless have received attention. But when the Kaiser demonstrated his intention to protect 'German interests' in Morocco—then virtually non-existent—by a spectacular disembarkation in person at Tangier and by a declaration that he had come to enforce the sovereignty of the Sultan, the world naturally took alarm. The Sultan rejected a scheme of reforms put forward by France, and, at the instigation of Germany, issued invitations to the powers to a conference. The French Foreign Minister, Delcassé, held that there was no occasion for a conference, but von Bülow used threatening language and Delcassé was forced to give up his long tenure of office at the Quai D'Orsay. The French Government thereupon agreed to a conference, which met at Algeciras on 16 January 1906. In accordance with the 1904 agreement, then tested for the first time, Great Britain strongly supported France, while Austria made 'a brilliant second' to Germany. Russia was lukewarm. The influence of the United States was successfully used to bring about an agreement, but unfortunately the American President made it clear that his country would take no steps to enforce that agreement, which was embodied in the instrument known as the Act of Algeciras. By it Germany acknowledged the privileged position of France, and the commercial equality of all nations was recognized.

Grey at the Foreign Office

The months between the Kaiser's landing at Tangier and the conference at Algeciras had seen in England the fall of the Conservative Government and the return of the Liberals to power. Sir Edward Grey, who took charge of the Foreign Office, had beforehand warned the country and the world, in his speech in the city on 21 October 1905, not to expect a change in British foreign policy. To the policy which he then adumbrated he adhered faithfully in his long and anxious years in the Foreign Office.

'There are three cardinal features at the present moment of British policy, not one of which does the Liberal Party wish to see changed. The first is the growing friendship and good feeling between ourselves and the United States, a matter of common ground and common congratulation to all parties in this country. Another feature is the alliance between Great Britain and Japan. . . . Another cardinal point in our foreign policy has been our French agreement. . . . But you may fairly ask: Is there no room for improvement in some other respects? . . . We are perfectly ready to enter into new friendships bearing in mind that you can never make a new friendship which is worth having by backing out of an old one. . . . Those who are anxious for further advances, I think, have in their minds especially Russia and Germany. . . . If Russia accepts, cordially and wholeheartedly, our intention to preserve the peaceable possession of our existing Asiatic possessions, then I am quite sure that in this country no Government will make it its business to thwart or obstruct Russia's policy in Europe. . . . I am sure of this that if there is a desire for the improvement of our relations with Germany—I do not mean in the relations of the British and German Governments, because so far as I know those are quite correct, but an improvement between the Press and public opinion of the two countries—if there be a desire for that in Germany, it will meet with no obstacle in this country provided it be clearly understood that nothing we do in our relations with Germany is in any way to impair our existing good relations with France.'[1]

The new Foreign Secretary had barely taken office when he was asked to answer a question that would have taxed the skill of the most experienced British servant. France in the previous few months had been given good cause for alarm. She did not then, it is true, know that Count Schlieffen, German chief of staff, had proposed that Germany should take advantage of Russia's difficulties in the east to force a war on France, a war in which a sudden blow would be given through Belgian territory. But she did know that her trusted Foreign Secretary had been forced to retire, and that she

[1] *Grey of Fallodon*, by G. M. Trevelyan, pp. 90–92.

had been unwillingly forced to a conference. In these circumstances the French Ambassador in London, M. Cambon, presented himself at the Foreign Office on 10 January 1906 and asked whether, in the event of an attack by Germany on France arising out of the Moroccan difficulty, France could rely on the armed support of England.

Grey had himself been impressed by the aggressive diplomacy of Germany in the previous months. The forced resignation of Delcassé had sunk deeply into his mind, and from the point of view of England there was an even more disturbing circumstance. In the summer of 1905 the Kaiser had entertained the Tsar in his yacht at Björkö and had there persuaded him to sign a treaty which would have put an end to the Franco–Russian Alliance or converted it into a pan-European alliance (including Germany) against Britain and Japan. It mattered not that the treaty was never ratified. The Tsar, as soon as he returned to his advisers, saw the folly that he had committed, while the Kaiser was threatened with von Bülow's resignation for putting into the treaty some words that would have nullified the scheming Chancellor's purposes. But the Kaiser had revealed his hand only too clearly, and no British Foreign Secretary could ignore it.

Cambon's question could not be evaded. Grey wrote the following account of the interview.[1]

'I said I could not answer this question: I could not even consult the Prime Minister or the Cabinet during the elections. I was sure that there would be a strong sentiment and sympathy on the part of the English public; more than that I could not say, and all I could promise was diplomatic support now. M. Cambon said he did not believe that there would be war, if the German Emperor knew that we should fight to help France.

'I said that I thought the German Emperor probably did expect this, but that it was one thing to let it be supposed in Germany that we should join in a war;[2] it was a different thing to take an engagement to France to do it; it would

[1] *Grey of Fallodon*, by G. M. Trevelyan, p. 129.

[2] Grey had, in fact, given a strong intimation to the German Ambassador, Metternich, a week before.

be a very grave mistake to make a promise of that kind till one was absolutely certain it would be fulfilled.

'M. Cambon mentioned the word neutrality, and I said at once that neutrality—benevolent neutrality, if there was such a thing—I would promise, but that was all.

'Our great desire was to see the Morocco conference have an issue favourable to the Anglo-French Entente, but a pacific issue; if that failed, I could not say what England would do; much might depend upon the manner in which war broke out.

'M. Cambon said he would again ask me after the elections were over.'

So much for the question of formal engagement to France. Grey knew that he could not give such a formal engagement because he could not be sure of the backing of the Cabinet and Parliament; he also realized that such a formal engagement was undesirable because it might lead France to adopt a bellicose attitude towards Germany; and to this line of policy he steadfastly adhered. But towards the end of the same interview he told M. Cambon that he had no objection to conversations between military experts to provide for the contingency of a war between Germany and France in which England would take the French side.

Conversations of this nature were, in fact, already proceeding in an unofficial way through the mediation of Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of *The Times*. What Grey did was to put these conversations on an official footing. He can hardly be blamed for doing so. The contingency presupposed was a very real one, and if England found herself fighting by the side of France it would be folly to have done done so unpreparedly. The conversations in no way committed the politicians of the two countries to a course of action. The one mistake that was made was not to communicate the fact of these talks to the Cabinet. Grey told the Prime Minister (Campbell-Bannerman), the War Minister (Haldane), and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Asquith). But neither Campbell-Bannerman nor Grey thought it necessary to inform the whole Cabinet. Later Grey admitted this to have been a mistake. As it happened, the whole Cabinet were informed in 1912, after questions had been

asked, and it was then put in writing that the conversations did not 'restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force.'

Military conversations proceeded from 1906 to 1914 and were supplemented in 1912 by certain naval arrangements which had an even more serious aspect. Metternich had striven in vain to persuade his Government that naval limitation was essential to good relations with Britain. His dispatches merely sent the Kaiser into a rage and in course of time led to his own removal. In the winter of 1908–9 the Cabinet became aware that Germany was going ahead at an alarming rate with the preliminary work of naval building. They dared not remain indifferent, and after much internal argument determined on a vastly increased naval programme. But they dreaded the results of this armament race and strove hard to get an abatement. Sir Charles Hardinge at Cronborg on 11 August 1908 raised the question of naval limitation. The Kaiser told him flatly that he would prefer to go to war. Mr. Churchill proposed a naval holiday, or a year's respite from shipbuilding. It was characterized in Berlin as 'mere humbug.' Lord Haldane, during his mission to Berlin in 1912, was told that Germany would slow down her rate of shipbuilding only on a promise of neutrality if France were attacked. It was futile to ignore the German menace, and in 1912 Great Britain altered the disposition of her fleet by stationing a great portion of it in the North Sea. It meant a withdrawal from her dominant position in the Mediterranean, but the step was inevitable. At the same time France, realizing that her fleet would be useless in an encounter with the German vessels, concentrated her forces in the Mediterranean. There was no pre-arrangement in these changes. They were dictated by the logic of events. But they arose naturally out of the spirit of the Entente, or rather from the underlying circumstances which had forced the Entente into existence.

Anglo-Russian Agreement

Thus had the colonial agreement of 1904 been virtually transformed into a defensive alliance. A momentous trans-

formation had also taken place in the relations between Britain and her other old rival, Russia. Grey had hinted at the possibility of a reconciliation in 1905. It was effected in 1907. The superficial arguments for Russian agreement were the same as for the Entente Cordiale. It removed sources of friction containing in themselves the potentiality of war, in this case the interests of the two countries in Persia. Russian and British spheres of influence in that country were carefully defined. But without doubt the underlying reason for the *rapprochement* was the fear roused by German armaments and German policy. It was cemented in the spring of 1914 by naval conversations between the two countries on fleet movements in the Baltic in the contingency of war. The conversations were, as Grey admitted later, a farce, for in the event of war with Germany the British fleet would be unable to get into the Baltic and the Russian fleet would be unable to get out. Grey assented to these conversations because, on his visits to Paris with King George in April 1914, he was earnestly asked to do so by the French Foreign Minister so as to give the Russians an assurance that they were not being cold-shouldered.

Yet the conversations were a mistake, for they gave the German Government some ground to claim that they were being encircled.[1] How little truth there is in this allegation is easily seen. The French and Russian agreements arose primarily out of colonial questions, and if they were subtly transformed into closer understandings that was merely because the defiant attitude and powerful arms of Germany compelled her neighbours to be on their guard. The charge of encirclement is usually made against Sir Edward Grey. But Grey was so far from desiring to encircle Germany that he welcomed her expansion in the Near East, and, indeed, in Africa. He gave strong support to Germany's Baghdad railway treaty with Turkey, and in the event of Portugal desiring to sell her colonies—a contingency by no means unlikely in the financial condition of that country at the time—he was prepared to see an equitable division between Germany and Britain. Negotiations to this end, opened in 1907 and resumed in 1912–14, led to an agreement which

[1] The German Government were informed of them by an officer in the Russian Embassy in London.

was initialled when war broke out, but had not been signed pending the consent of all parties concerned.

In the light of these facts it is hardly possible to accuse Grey of seeking the encirclement of Germany. His aims were more correctly estimated by Prince Lichnowsky, who had succeeded Metternich as German Ambassador in London. Lichnowsky wrote, with reference to the Baghdad railway and the Portuguese colonies :

> 'Sir Edward Grey intended to demonstrate his goodwill towards us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole, as England hoped to divert the German development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the Ocean and to Africa.'

Grey, as he himself stated and as his biographer has made clear, had two aims which he consistently pursued during his whole charge of the Foreign Office. The first was to preserve peace ; the second was to ensure that, if peace could not be preserved, Great Britain should enter the ensuing conflict in the strongest possible position. Those who charge him with the encirclement of Germany concentrate on this second aim to the exclusion of the prior objective. They note how he strove to cultivate the friendship of the United States, Japan, France and Russia, but neglect his unsparing efforts to conciliate Germany herself. The charge would have substance only if Grey's two aims were, in fact, incompatible ; if the second could be pursued only at the expense of the first. But who will say that ? Grey's aims were perfectly consistent and no prudent statesman could have done otherwise. The margin of safety proved perilously narrow in 1914–18 ; and if Grey had neglected to pursue his second objective, the very people who accused him of the encirclement of Germany would doubtless be the first to charge him with failing to protect the country against the German menace.

Grey's accommodating attitude failed to preserve peace, or rather failed to preserve it for more than eight years. At intervals from 1906 to 1914 the peace of Europe was ominously threatened in Morocco and the Balkans, and finally broke down over the murder of the heir-apparent to the Austrian throne.

Moroccan Crisis, 1911

The Act of Algeciras did not remove Morocco from the theatre of international disturbances. The latent dangers were shown by a trifling incident in September 1908, when six deserters from the Foreign Legion (three of whom were Germans) were given a safe-conduct by the German Consul but arrested by a French patrol. Germany instantly demanded an expression of regret from France even before the facts were established. The Hague tribunal before whom the facts were in due course brought substantially vindicated France.

More serious trouble arose out of Morocco in 1911, when Germany's precipitate action once more brought Europe to the edge of war. There had been conditions of anarchy in Morocco for the previous twelve months, and in April 1911 the French Government decided on a march to Fez on the ground that the Sultan was unable to defend himself or the European residents against rebellious tribes. Berlin let it be known that she would regard this march as reopening the whole Moroccan question. To this no exception could be taken. But in a high-handed way which characterized so many of their actions during that decade, the German Government followed verbal warnings by the dispatch of the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir 'to lend help in case of need to their subjects and protégés as well as to the considerable German interests in that territory.' The news was received with indignation even greater in London than in Paris. Germany was suspected of intending to seize a naval base in Morocco. It was further believed that Germany was planning to make a settlement of the Moroccan question with France and Spain to the exclusion of Great Britain. It was known that Germany was making demands for huge territorial concessions in the Congo basin. The tension was eased by a speech made at the Mansion House on 21 July by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the approval of the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Lloyd George declared :[1]

> 'I am bound to say this, that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place

[1] *v War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. 1, page 26.

and her prestige amongst the great powers of the world. . . . I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international goodwill except questions of the greatest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievements, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.'

The warning was bitterly resented in Germany, but it achieved its purpose. That such a warning should have been uttered, not by a Liberal imperialist, but by the leader of the British Radicals, showed Germany that Britain meant business. She moderated her tone, came to the conference table, and was finally satisfied with a small slice of the Congo basin. It was a material advantage, but the original German demands had been so great as to give the appearance of a diplomatic defeat.

Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

But Morocco was not to be the occasion of the world war. Already, before the Agadir crisis, the danger point had shifted to the Balkans. The key to the situation is the growing influence of Hungary in Austro-Hungarian affairs. After her defeat by Prussia, Austria had admitted Hungary to equal partnership by the constitution of 1867 which created the Dual Monarchy. Thereafter Hungarian influence in the counsels of the Dual Monarchy tended to increase, and that influence was disastrous. The problem of the subject Slavs continued to grow in importance. It is possible that the creation of a Triple Monarchy, under which Germans, Magyars, and Slavs would have stood on equal terms, might have been the best solution for the problems of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[1] The Slavs, who ultimately brought the empire to the ground, would thereby have been conciliated,

[1] I am indebted to Mr. W C Costin for this suggestion.

and a counterpoise to the baneful Hungarian influence would have been created. But this course was not taken: the history of the period is the history of Austrian failure either to check the growing pretensions of the Hungarians or to win the Slavs into loyal allegiance.

The map of the Balkans had been rearranged by the powers assembled at Berlin in 1878, and though it was far from ideal, it was not essentially disturbed for thirty years. An item in the settlement was that the Dual Monarchy should administer under Turkish suzerainty the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose populations were predominantly Serbian. But Austria-Hungary grew weary of the task of administering territory over which she would not claim sovereignty. Her Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, meeting in a Bohemian country house, plotted that Austria-Hungary should seize the two provinces and Russia should get an opening to the Mediterranean. But in this case there was not honour even among thieves. Austria-Hungary prematurely seized the provinces in October 1908 and so achieved her own object while nipping the Russian plan in the bud. Isvolsky was furious and ready for war, but he was not the only danger. Serbia[1] was equally indignant at finding her kinsmen, whom she had hoped to rescue from Turkish domination, brought under the rule of another alien master. Germany had not known of the Austro-Hungarian design until it was an accomplished fact, but she stood firmly by the side of her ally. Austria was Germany's gateway to the east, an essential link in the chain of German domination from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf, and could not be deserted. The Kaiser told the Tsar on 23 March 1909 that if he were to go to war with the Dual Monarchy he would have to reckon with Germany as well. The threat was sufficient, and next year in a speech at Vienna the Kaiser boasted of having stood by Austria 'in shining armour.' There were others who had talked more dangerously. Moltke, German chief of staff, and Conrad von Hotzendorf, his Austrian counterpart, had urged that the Bosnian crisis afforded a good opportunity once and for all to settle accounts with Russia and France.

[1] It is significant that in 1885 the Dual Monarchy had been pro-Serb and Russia anti-Serb; the change is to be attributed to the growing influence of Hungary in the framing of Austro-Hungarian policy.

BALKAN WARS

The Dual Monarchy had succeeded in this adventure, but at the expense of increasing the nationalist feeling in Serbia which was to be its final undoing. Balkan nationalism had also been kindled by events in Turkey. The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 for a while persuaded outsiders that the old empire had become rejuvenated, and that the Ottoman despotism would make way for a regime of liberty and democracy. It was a pathetically mistaken belief. Whereas Abdul Hamid had scourged the Balkans with whips, the Young Turks chastised them with scorpions. The Christian Balkan states composed their differences and formed a military league. Their opportunity came in 1911 when Italy, anxious not to be left out in the general scramble for African territory, declared war on Turkey and sent an army into Libya and her fleet to the Dodecanese. The Balkan league, taking advantage of Turkish pre-occupation in Libya, raised an army of 600,000 men in 1912 and routed their opponents at every point.

The Dual Monarchy viewed the success of Serbia with alarm and was determined to rob her of the fruits of victory. The danger of a further and bigger conflict led Grey to suggest a conference of ambassadors in London. To this Germany and France agreed. The ambassadors met under Grey's chairmanship in 1912 and 1913 and succeeded in keeping the peace. It was not easy. Austria-Hungary was determined that Serbia and Montenegro should not have access to the sea, Russia was determined that they should get such access. The ambassadors substantially granted the Austro-Hungarian case by making Albania an independent state and so blocking the path to the sea. It was hardly a case of encirclement of the Central Powers ! Before the ambassadors parted, in August 1913, they had to witness the mortifying spectacle of a war among the Balkan states themselves, who had fallen out over a division of the spoils. Bulgaria was the aggressor, but she was defeated by Serbia, Greece, and Rumania ; and Turkey not unnaturally took the opportunity to recover part of Thrace.

This success revived Turkish military prestige, and was followed by the appointment of a German general, Liman von Sanders, to a post in the Turkish armies. Russia asked France

and England to resist this appointment. France would have done so, but Grey refused to see in the appointment a *casus belli*. He even went so far as to give recognition, and even encouragement, to German penetration in Asia Minor by agreements in 1913 with Turkey and Germany, the essence of the agreements being that Britain would not oppose the Baghdad railway system and Germany would not oppose British control of the mouths of Mesopotamian rivers.

Great War 1914–18

So it came about that for the first six months of 1914 the international air in Europe was clearer than it had been for many years past. Yet disaster fell from the clear sky in that year. On 28 June the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife were assassinated at Serajevo by a Bosnian fanatic. A storm of indignation burst throughout Austria-Hungary, where the assassination was widely believed to have been the work of the 'Black Hand' society that had dispatched King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903. It was strongly maintained that the Serbian Government themselves were implicated in the dastardly murder. Count Berchtold, the Austrian Chancellor, judged that the moment was opportune for making a final reckoning with Serbia. The Emperor Francis Joseph personally appealed to the Kaiser, and on 5 July was promised full and unconditional support. The German Chancellor gave the Austrian Ambassador a similar *carte blanche*. William II warned his military and naval officers of the dangers, and thereupon light-heartedly went off (6 July) on his annual cruise. Fortified with the German assurance, the Austro-Hungarian Government sent to Serbia on 23 July an ultimatum that moved Grey to say he 'had never seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character.' It included a demand for the presence of agents of the Dual Monarchy on Serbian soil to help suppress propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and it required an answer within forty-eight hours. It was not believed that Serbia would accept the ultimatum. The object of the Austro-Hungarian counsels had been to frame demands so strong that war would be inevitable. Nevertheless Serbia accepted seven out of the ten points, and went a fair way to accepting the other three, but Berchtold persuaded Francis

Joseph to sign on 30 July 1914 a declaration of war against Serbia.

Grey had desperately striven first to secure an extension of the time limit to Serbia, and then to get the question settled by such a conference of ambassadors as had handled the previous Balkan dispute. On 28 July the German Government rejected all idea of a conference, declaring that 'Austria's quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do.' This rejection of a conference, combined with the *carte blanche* previously given to the Dual Monarchy, and the Kaiser's later rejection (30 July) of a personal appeal from the Tsar that the Serbian conflict should be remitted to The Hague court, places a heavy responsibility on Germany for the origin of the Great War. For though Russia could have disowned Serbia, and so have localized the conflict, it was hardly to be expected that she would stand by while a Slav race was being subjugated; and had she done so, her impotence before the Central Powers would have been as complete as if she had suffered a military defeat.

This complete German support for Austrian intransigence made a general war inevitable. At the last moment, it is true, the Kaiser would have withdrawn from the horrors which he had done so much to provoke, but the nations were then caught in the toils of a destiny from which escape was impossible. He advised Austria-Hungary to be content with holding Belgrade as a pledge. But when Belgrade was bombarded by Austrian guns, the Tsar, on 30 July, ordered mobilization. On 31 July Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding the cessation of her mobilization, and on 1 August she declared war on Russia. (The Dual Monarchy and Russia, it is worth remembering, were at peace for another five days.) The German declaration of war on Russia automatically brought in France on the side of her ally, and from that moment all other issues were dwarfed by the Franco-German hostilities. England was still an uncertain quantity. Germany made desperate efforts to get an assurance of neutrality. These efforts were rejected by Grey with indignation. But still the Cabinet were unwilling to give an assurance of armed help to France. One supreme act of stupidity by Germany enabled Britain to make up her mind. Grey sought

from France and Germany a pledge that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected. From France he obtained that pledge, but the German Government would not give it. The military plans involved an invasion of France through Belgium, and the machine could not be stopped. Opinion in Britain hardened in the twinkling of an eye. The German military plans ran counter to one of the fundamental principles that had guided British policy for centuries, the principle that control of the Low Country ports must remain in friendly hands. It was instinctively felt that British safety was at stake or would, at least, be gravely jeopardized. Not to support France at that hour, it was felt, would mean that Great Britain would be left without a friend in the world, and Germany would be in such a strong position that she could overwhelm England at any time she chose. Moreover, there was a tremendous wave of sympathy for a little country overrun by a mighty power. Great Britain on 4 August 1914 entered the War on the side of France and, not for the first time in history, saved herself and civilization.

Nothing is more puzzling to some foreign observers, nor more characteristic of British policy over the centuries, than the British failure to reach a decision until action was imperative. If Grey had plainly told Germany that in the event of a war with France she would have to engage Britain as well, so a common argument runs, there would have been no war. This is far from certain. In the first place Grey could not have given such an assurance because the Cabinet was seriously divided right up to 3 August 1914; and even if the Cabinet had agreed there would have been a revolt in the Liberal and Labour Parties in Parliament. But it may fairly be argued that the Cabinet, at least, ought to have been better prepared for such contingencies as eventually had to be faced in 1914. The responsibility for their refusal to face unpleasant possibilities rests largely with the Prime Minister, but mainly with the members themselves, for the sky was dark with warnings, needing no special prescience to interpret. Yet even if Grey could have had the solid backing of the Cabinet, it would have been unwise, as he saw, to give to France such a promise of unconditional support, for it might have encouraged her into rash courses of action.

On the other hand, Germany had received ample warnings

that Great Britain might not be able to stand aside if France were attacked. In his first weeks at the Foreign Office Grey had given such an intimation to Metternich, duly transmitted by him to Berlin. And in 1912 King George V had given a similar warning to the Kaiser, as is now known from an important letter published by Professor Trevelyan.[1]

The fact is that Germany thought it a matter of indifference whether Britain was involved in the coming war or not. She counted on being able to capture Paris and overwhelm France in a few weeks. The presence of a small British expeditionary force, it was expected, would increase the casualties but not substantially affect the German plans. Moreover, the Germans thought that the British Government, already embarrassed by the Suffragette campaign, would be paralysed by the Irish Home Rule issue; and the Curragh mutiny certainly encouraged the belief that Britain was incapable of action.

Retrospect

The picture is complete. Its meaning remains to be traced. We have followed the successive crises which from 1815 to 1914 led to the armed clash of men. In the pattern before us can we discern the causes of wars, or even, greatly daring, the cause of war?

The word 'cause' is not used unambiguously. Aristotle, whose discussion of this subject is still of value, distinguished four kinds of causes—the formal, the material, the efficient, and the final. In the case of war the formal cause is difficult to distinguish. The material cause of war is the men and weapons without which it could not be waged. The efficient cause is that which actually sets the war in operation, which we may identify at choice with the declaration of war or, a little more remotely, with the *casus belli*. But these are not what we mean when we speak of the cause of war, even though war could not be waged if the armed forces did not exist and if a *casus belli* were not provided. As for the *casus belli*, it was Aristotle himself who said that wars may arise out of small occasions but seldom from small causes. What we are concerned with is Aristotle's final cause, the end for which war is fought. We seek not the superficial reasons for war, but

[1] *Grey of Fallodon*, p. 230.

the deep underlying causes which compelled or induced statesmen to resort to force.

In the period which we have surveyed we have seen once-mighty states grow feeble and weak nations become powerful. Hands that had ruled vast empires became unfitted for the task, while young nations sought to extend their influence beyond their own narrow borders. Though there are many points where we might with some propriety and metaphysical justification place the cause of war, surely there is more reason for placing it here than anywhere else? Some nations grow weak others wax stronger, and war takes place because no peaceful means can be found for making the necessary readjustment in their relationships.

Such, at least, was the view of the century with which we have been dealing. It was accepted that the territorial division of the world needed adjustment from time to time according to the changing capacities of nations, and if that adjustment could be effected only by war, then war was regarded as a perfectly correct instrument of policy. This philosophy was expressed with a bluntness that astonished the world by the late Earl of Birkenhead in his rectorial address to Glasgow University on 7 November 1923.

> 'We are told that the object to be aimed at is the abolition of war. Everybody recognizes that war is both cruel and hateful. But is it even conceivable that it can ever be abolished? Is the ownership of the world to be stereotyped by perpetual tenure in the hands of those who possess its different territories to-day? If it is, very strange and undesirable consequences will one day follow. For nations wax and wane, so that a power competent in one age to govern an empire, perhaps remote, in the general interest of the world, will in another abuse a dominion for which it no longer possesses the necessary degree of vigour. The history of Spain supplies familiar illustrations. . . .
>
> 'No one, indeed, who has studied the history of the world has ever defended the view that the supreme interest of evolutionary humanity can support a definitive delimitation of the surface of the world. But if such a final distribution is unpracticable, and even undesirable, by what agency are modifications to be made? Voluntary cessions

of territory have not been frequent in the past; and there seems little reason to suppose that they will become more fashionable in the future. For many thousands of years the emergence of a new and martial nation has been gradually marked by violent readjustments of national boundaries. It may, of course, be the case that human nature has so completely altered that some new method is discoverable. I confess, however, that none has up to the present occurred to my own mind.'

With some of Lord Birkenhead's premises there can be complete agreement. 'Nations wax and wane.' The causes why they wax and wane may be material or they may belong to the region of the mind. Nations may wax and wane because some scientific discovery gives great importance to their mineral wealth. There can be little doubt that the existence of vast coal measures in Britain greatly contributed to the rise of Britain, as their relative absence contributed to the decline of Spain. The oilfields of the United States have enormously increased her influence in the modern world. But I cannot help feeling that, great as is the material factor in the rise and decline of nations, the spiritual factor is even more important. The decline of Spain was due primarily to a hardening of her arteries and a tightening of her aristocratic hide. The rise of Italy, Germany, and Japan to virile nationhood is to be attributed less to material possessions than to a new-discovered mental vigour. Indeed, both Italy and Japan are singularly deficient in material possessions. In the growth of nations, statesmen, orators, thinkers, teachers, writers, poets, musicians, men of science, athletes, all have their part to play. The rise of Germany to her dominating position is the work not only of Bismarck, though his work can never be underrated, but of Hegel, Fichte, Gauss, Herz, Treitschke, Wagner, Mommsen, Harnack, Wilamowitz von Möllendorff, Einstein, and an unrivalled band of scholars. To these men, whose achievements dazzled the world, no less than to the statecraft of Bismarck and the sword of Moltke, must the rise of modern Germany be credited. And this movement of the spirit, which bloweth where it listeth, cannot be foreseen and cannot be kept within narrow bounds.

'Is the ownership of the world to be stereotyped by perpetual

tenure in the hands of those who possess its different territories to-day?' I should answer: 'No.' It is certainly not to the advantage of 'evolutionary humanity' as a whole that all the advantages which might be wrung from a territory shall be denied to it because the rulers of that territory have become too effete to exploit them, and too short-sighted to permit others to do the work. It is also unreasonable to expect nations which have cheerfully borne the rule of some imperial master in his prime to continue to do so when he has become a weak and grasping tyrant. Adjustment in the territorial divisions of the world there must certainly be from time to time.

But need we follow Lord Birkenhead to the conclusion that war is an inescapable necessity in the evolution of humanity? Most emphatically not. It was such a necessity in the period we have been considering, because there was no recognized alternative means of securing adjustment. There was the Concert of Europe, but what could be done through it depended entirely on the readiness of the powers to co-operate. There was the court at The Hague, but nations were under no obligation to submit their disputes to it. There had been cases of arbitration arranged between the nations themselves, notably the *Alabama* case between Great Britain and the United States, but their success depended wholly on the goodwill of the parties in submitting the dispute and carrying out the award.

To the leading statesmen in both the Old and the New Worlds it was clear that many wars could have been averted had there been in existence permanent machinery by which adjustments between nations could be made. So much we may deduce from the fact that they put a League of Nations in the forefront of their peace terms. And the real scandal of Lord Birkenhead's address lies in the statement that no new method of securing adjustments between nations without recourse to war 'has up to the present occurred to my own mind.' For the League of Nations was in existence, and it had not occurred to his mind that here was a possible way of avoiding war! If a distinguished Conservative statesman thought so little of the League, is it surprising that this instrument has not fulfilled its potentialities? There was nothing wrong with the League Covenant. What was wrong was the failure to apply it. I refer not only to the failure to apply

'sanctions' in restraint of the aggressor. A merely negative attitude of that kind could not in the long run prevent war. The greatest failure was the refusal to make any application of Article XIX of the Covenant, providing that 'the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.'

The League Covenant was a thoroughly realistic document. It recognized that the territorial settlements become unsatisfactory with the passage of years, and provided machinery by which such adjustments could be made while preserving the sovereign rights of the member-states. It is not my business in this essay to study the failure of the nations to make use of this new instrument; I mention the League only because its creation bears witness to the fact that war in the century I have been considering was a recognized method, when diplomacy had failed, of making adjustments in conditions which had grown out of date. The League may be looked on as an improved piece of diplomatic machinery, a permanent concert.

Much is heard on platforms of the economic origin of war and of the 'necessary connexion' between 'capitalism, imperialism, war, and Fascism.' I would not be sorry if I could show that capitalism contained the seeds of war, but the facts are that race, nationalism, prestige, are far more important to an understanding of the causes of war. Economic factors and imperialist ambitions have certainly caused wars in the period under review,[1] but not the chief wars.

Trade was admittedly a dominant factor in the British and French wars in China, and the British wars in Burma and South Africa; it was a factor in the French expedition to Mexico. But we should gravely err in laying these wars solely at the door of the traders and the mercenary governments behind them. The fault lies just as much on the other side. If the Chinese had treated the British and French traders with reasonable consideration, it is highly probable that they would not have had to face war; Japan, be it noted, was not involved in war with any trading nation. If the Transvaal

[1] In the eighteenth century I am prepared to concede that they were major causes of war.

had given the Uitlanders the ordinary rights of citizenship, then she might have been an independent state to this day. There are few who will assert that an undeveloped country has the right to exclude all foreign traders, or to subject them once admitted to harassing and humiliating restrictions; and there will be equally few to deny that, in the conditions of the nineteenth century, a country had the duty of protecting its nationals from maltreatment by a foreign power. At any rate, it is not conducive to the interests of humanity at large that the undeveloped regions of the world should continue for ever in that state.

There are no other wars in the nineteenth century that can be attributed directly to reasons of trade. Imperialism was linked up with the trade conflicts, notably in the Boer War. It is impossible not to notice the surging of the imperial spirit in Great Britain about the time of the Boer War. A pride in ruling the 'lesser breeds without the law' had been diligently cultivated by Joseph Chamberlain and his archpriest Kipling. The opportunity afforded by the ill-treatment of British traders of adding the Transvaal to the British domains was welcomed for purely imperialist reasons by the mass of the people.

It is a quality of an empire to be always searching for its natural frontiers, behind which it can feel secure from attack. This quest for natural frontiers misguidedly led Great Britain into the Afghan War of 1878. It also sent Russia over the Siberian plains until she came into conflict with Japan, whose ambitions on the mainland coincided with her own.

Yet though imperialism bred war, it is astonishing that never once in their policy of colonial expansion did the Great Powers come to war with one another. The danger of collision was almost infinite. Yet the partition of Africa and the economic penetration of China were effected without Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, or Italy coming to blows.

The wars which can be laid to the doors of trade and imperialism were relatively minor conflicts. Neither trade nor imperialism will explain the big conflicts of the century—the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the Great War. Let us give one more brief glance at them in the light of what has been said. If a League of Nations had existed, could it have prevented these wars?

It is tempting to say that a League could have prevented the

Crimean War, for it was an admitted blunder. But certain doubts which arise make it well-nigh impossible to give a direct answer. A League could certainly have settled the trifling points about the holy places which were at issue; but those points were settled through the ordinary diplomatic channels. On the British side the war really sprang from a deep suspicion of Russia. When we see how easily in the Great War Britain offered to Russia that Constantinople from which she had striven for a century to divert her, we may wonder how well founded that suspicion was. But of its depth in the nineteenth century, especially when the Tories were in office, there can be no doubt, and if this suspicion had not given rise to war in 1854 it would have done so at a not much later date. Could a League have assuaged these mutual fears of Great Britain and Russia? It is very difficult to give an answer.

In the circumstances of 1870 no League of Nations could have prevented the Franco-Prussian War unless it had the backing of overwhelming force. Bismarck was then determined to have the war, for the sake of effecting the unification of Germany. Consultation would have been useless. Only superior force would have availed. On the other hand, it would not have been the function of a League at that time, any more than now, merely to preserve the *status quo*. It may well be maintained that a League at that time would have had the duty of giving international sanction to the unification of Germany, a step which would have removed the need felt by Bismarck for the war. But would France have been a consenting party to such action? Would she have willingly given her *fiat* to the unification of Germany? The France of Napoleon III would almost certainly have done no such thing but would have left the League, as Japan and Germany have done.

A League of Nations might have stopped the Great War from breaking out in August 1914. None of the Great Powers wanted it when it came. Germany, it is true, had declined a conference of ambassadors, but had there been sitting a permanent body to which Serbia could have appealed the dispute might have been adjusted or localized.

On the other hand, the Kaiser and his military advisers were bent on a war at some time for the hegemony of Europe. The war might have been prevented in August 1914, but no

purely consultative League could have prevented a big European war at some time or other. The constant rattling of the German sabre had set all Europe's teeth on edge. The nations were caught in the grip of fear, and fear breeds war.

The Treaty of Versailles, in the famous war-guilt clauses, attempted to fasten responsibility for the Great War on the shoulders of Germany alone. The clauses are:

> 'Art. 227. The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. . . .
>
> 'Art. 231. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.'

These clauses may readily be admitted to do an injustice to Germany. For though Germany bears a heavy responsibility for the Great War, a still heavier share belongs to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The responsibility would seem to lie primarily on the Dual Monarchy for going to war with Serbia, secondarily with Germany for failing to restrain her ally, and more remotely with Russia, who by sacrificing Serbia and her own diplomatic position (a hard requirement) could have localized the conflict. The fact that Britain and the United States were dragged into the war is the responsibility of Germany, and of Germany alone.

It is significant that the three countries among which blame for the Great War must be apportioned had military despotisms for their systems of government. Democracy is certainly one of the greatest safeguards of peace and, conversely, autocracy may be reckoned among the causes of war. Bismarck saw clearly at the outset of his career that he would not be able to carry out his plans if he had to get parliamentary sanction each time. The existence of a free parliament imposes many salutary checks on the pursuance of an aggressive policy. Unfortunately there were no such checks in Austria, Germany, and Russia, where the caprice of a ruler or minister could

plunge the whole nation into the misery of war—not that the populations of these countries showed any aversion from war when it came in 1914.

On the other hand, democracy is no guarantee of peace. In earlier pages it has been pointed out how popular clamour caused the Crimean War against the desire of a weak British Government. It is also worth noting that the democracies of 1918–19 made a much worse peace than the aristocracies of 1815, and thereby possibly sowed the seeds of future war.

The fact is that no machinery in itself will preserve the peace. If nations are prepared to go to all lengths in pursuance of their policy, then there will be war. If all the great nations of the world want peace, then there will be peace. But the fact that there is no machinery of international conciliation which will automatically ensure peace is no reason for not having the most efficient machinery possible. The argument for the League is, not that it provides an automatic guarantee against war, but that it is the most efficient piece of diplomatic machinery yet devised for the prevention and settlement of international disputes.

But no reliance can be placed on machinery alone for the settlement of international disputes. The success of the League depends on the existence in a sufficient number of states-members of a deep attachment to peace and a firm resolution to co-operate in all measures necessary for the preservation of peace. If this spirit is lacking, no machinery, however efficient, can avail. To cultivate that spirit is the first duty of statesmen.

The balance of power, with the system of alliances it demands, and the growth of armaments have been censured as causes of war, but it should be obvious that they are symptoms rather than causes. Nations enter into alliances with the object of strengthening themselves for a conflict regarded as inevitable or highly probable. Alliances can be regarded as causes of war only if they lead one of the allied parties, conscious of his increased strength, to adopt a truculent and bellicose attitude. Fear of such a contingency made Grey reject proposals to convert the agreements with France and Russia into alliances. In a similar way increased armaments must be regarded as an outward and visible sign of a deteriorating international situation, and not as in themselves causes of war. It has sometimes been argued that armament manufacturers stir

up strife for the benefit of their trade, but the evidence that politicians have been guided by the advice of arms manufacturers rather than by their own judgment is slender.[1] The responsibility for policy cannot be taken away from the politicians. Nevertheless there is a truth behind the assertion that alliances and armaments are causes of war. The truth is that alliances greatly enlarge the area of conflict, and the growth of armaments vastly increases its destructiveness.[2] The rival European groupings are responsible for the fact that the war of 1914 could not be localized in the Balkans, and the growth of armaments in the preceding twenty years is responsible for the destructiveness of that war. In that sense, but that sense only, they may be looked on as causes of the Great War. But it is clear that they themselves have prior causes, in which we must seek the ultimate explanation of that conflict.

As I read the history of the years 1815–1914, war is not something which inevitably arises in the evolution of human society. It is a contingency, highly probable owing to the existence of separate sovereign states, but avoidable with diplomatic skill and national forbearance. Let us not abandon ourselves to a blank pessimism. War can be avoided if statesmen will apply themselves with earnestness and sincerity to the task.

The lessons from the period we have surveyed are fivefold: (1) The evolution of nations calls for territorial adjustments; (2) in the century 1815–1914 such adjustments were effected by diplomacy so far as possible, but where diplomacy had failed they were carried out by force; (3) a purely consultative international authority could have effected many of the adjustments without recourse to war; (4) but the greatest wars could only have been prevented if that body had been endowed with sufficient military force to deter all aggressors; (5) mere deterrence of the aggressor not being sufficient, the international authority would have had to take positive steps to bring about those adjustments which war was designed to effect.

[1] The stock case is that of a Mr. Mullner, who is alleged to have had a big hand in the increased British naval programme of 1908–9. But the evidence is overwhelming that the Asquith government were moved solely by their own knowledge of German constructional plans.

[2] This is true notwithstanding the fact that new methods of attack always produce new methods of defence.

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Apart from my obligations to these works, I wish to acknowledge much valuable criticism from Mr. W. C. Costin, Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford.

I. T.

3. NATIONALISM AND CAPITALISM

by

D. P. T. JAY

NATIONALISM AND CAPITALISM

THE history of the immediate origins of nineteenth-century wars, as Mr. Ivor Thomas has pointed out in the previous chapter, does not support the view that trade in the narrow sense was the main cause of war. National and personal rivalries seem in fact to have been a more important immediate cause. In reply to this, however, it may be argued that the cause of war in capitalist society is fundamentally economic, but that it is to be found in the economic struggle between classes within each country rather than in trade jealousies between countries. This internal struggle, it may be argued, produces political tensions within a modern industrial state, as well as national economic tensions outside it.

That there is some truth in this general contention, few will deny. But it is much harder to say exactly what truth. It is argued in this essay that the most publicized Marxist theory of the connection between capitalism and war is faulty in many important respects, above all in its neglect of the fact of nationalism. An objective examination of nineteenth-century history and philosophy, as well as of current politics, seems to indicate that nationalism is the specific link between capitalism and war which Marxists have felt to exist but have seldom distinctly appreciated.

I do not think it is true to say that capitalism makes war inevitable for economic reasons. But I do think it is true that the capitalist class struggle tends to produce nationalism, and that nationalism creates political conditions in which lasting peace is impossible.

It is particularly desirable in a discussion of this kind to avoid question-begging phrases or unreal abstractions. But it is also essential to realize that there are common factors, common beliefs, and common motives operating at various times, in various countries, and in various groups of men. These are real things, often of dominating importance in the

shaping of events. The belief that man was born free, or that Italy was a 'nation,' have been facts of dominating practical importance at different times in the history of the last hundred and fifty years. If we are really to understand, therefore, the forces that have been and are at work, we must take account of these seemingly abstract and general things. But we must define them as clearly as possible, particularly nationalism, and inquire into them a little more deeply than is sometimes customary.

A rudimentary attempt is made, therefore, in this essay, to analyse the simple realities of liberalism, nationalism, and patriotism, and the relation between them and capitalism and war, in the last hundred and fifty years. If we mean something by these words, we had better know what it is. But before doing this, it is necessary to examine the orthodox theory that capitalism is the cause of war, and see what can be inferred from the theoretical and historical weaknesses of this theory.

1. Economic Imperialism

War, according to this theory, is the inevitable product of economic tensions within capitalist society which cannot in the end be resolved in any other way. The relation, that is to say, between capitalism and war is essentially an economic one, and no amount of political effort can break it. The relation is supposed to be of the following kind :

Production in a capitalist country is organized by entrepreneurs whose actions are determined by a search for profit. Profit means in effect the margin between the proceeds of selling their products and the 'cost' payments which are incurred in the course of producing them. These cost payments consist of wages, salaries, rent, interest, expenditure on materials and a few smaller items. The incomes of the whole community apart from the profit-earners are in fact derived from these cost payments. The profit-earners, however, in their search for profits are perpetually trying to increase the proceeds of selling their goods and to diminish the sums paid in costs. They are, therefore, trying to diminish the incomes of all the other sections of the community other than themselves. Since, however, it is the other sections of the community which can

alone buy their goods, the more those incomes are reduced the less easily can those goods be sold. As wages and other cost payments are reduced in the continuous search for profits, the purchasing power which might be expended on the goods produced is itself reduced.

There therefore tends to be, according to this theory, a chronic or at least spasmodic deficiency of purchasing power, and a consequent fall in profits in the internal market of the capitalist country. Two main attempts are supposed to be made by the profit-earners to overcome this difficulty: they attempt to maintain the amount of profits by increasing the total of capital, and they search for foreign markets in which to sell the goods which can no longer be sold at home. This leads to an attempt to monopolize markets and accordingly to obtain political control by force over undeveloped parts of the world. For these parts of the world can be used both for the investment of new capital and for the absorption of exports. But as the capitalist countries all attempt, under the same economic compulsion, to do this at once, they gradually find that the undeveloped spaces of the earth are limited; they compete for the same areas; and in the end they fight. Or to use the accepted jargon, the search for colonial markets leads to 'economic imperialism' and so to war. It may be, of course, that the immediate cause of a war is not a quarrel over a particular colony; but the inherent rivalry born of the 'colonial struggle' makes war inevitable in the end.

Now the logically crucial point in this theory is often overlooked by its own most sincere and dogmatic advocates. It is an essential part of the theory that the capitalist class struggle *must* in the end lead to war, and that any other solution of the economic problems of capitalism is impossible. For if there is a mere tendency for colonial rivalries to lead to conflicts and sometimes to war, as Mr. Ivor Thomas has suggested, then the Liberals are right who say that this tendency can and should be resisted by all reasonable and peaceful countries. Moreover, unless war arising out of colonial rivalries is the absolutely necessary and inevitable consequence of the class struggle, war cannot be said to be due to capitalism. If capitalism merely created a bias in that direction, which was enforced by natural jealousy and bellicosity, then it would

not be necessary, or effective, to abolish capitalism in order to abolish war.[1]

It is an essential part of this Marxist thesis, therefore, not merely that capitalist countries find colonies economically advantageous, but that they cannot survive without them. Either the theory means this or else it does not prove any of the things it purports to prove. It should be admitted at once that colonies are normally considered economically beneficial to industrial countries, and that in many cases they actually are so, or at any rate to particularly favoured groups in those countries. It is also plainly true that particular capitalist interests struggle for monopolistic advantages in particular areas, and that the struggle for these advantages can and does involve the major capitalist countries in war. The South African War can be assumed without much doubt to have been partly caused by the greed of a few British adventurers for gold and diamonds. But even here it is noteworthy that Holland most signally refused to regard the 'market' of South Africa as necessary to her economic existence.

However, the essential part of the theory that requires examination is the contention that a capitalist country cannot survive economically without the possession of colonies to which to export its 'surplus' products. And this contention is plainly contradicted both by empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning. In the first place the argument rests on a demonstrable fallacy. In the second place many industrial countries can, and do, flourish without the possession of 'colonial markets.'

The fundamental fallacy springs from a curious misconception of what is meant by a 'market.' A 'market' under capitalism does not mean a human being who wants something; it means a human being who has money he wishes to spend on it. It is money, not men, that constitutes a capitalist market. If, for instance, the British manufacturers of bicycles are in trouble because they cannot sell them, the remedy is not to find penniless black men in Africa, but to print notes and put them into the hands of those in England who want bicycles and have not the money to buy them. Since markets consist

[1] See the argument of the first essay.

of money; and since bank-notes or bank deposits can be created by governments at will, there is not the slightest fundamental difficulty about creating them.

This may sound highly paradoxical to those who are accustomed to talking about the 'search for markets,' as though one could only find such things amid African forests. Is it not obvious, these theorists will say, that capitalists do search for markets—as at Ottawa for instance—and that this is the source of much of the political trouble in the world? Of course it is true that particular producers of particular commodities search for markets in new parts of the world when the demand for their particular commodity is satisfied at home. It is also true that in a deflationary period—when, that is to say, faulty monetary policy in the industrial countries has temporarily allowed total money demand to fall too low—all producers together may be forced to search for 'markets' abroad. To some extent Ottawa was an example of this.

It is not true, however, that the situation *can* only be cured in this way. The situation can be cured, and normally is cured, by an expansion of the monetary supply and a consequent revival of 'markets' within the industrial country. This is sometimes alleged to be impossible on the ground that internal demand cannot be revived just because this would involve giving higher wages to the masses and so raising costs. In the first place, however, it might be done by giving more money to the profit-earners; and in the second place it could be done by giving wages to the unemployed in the form of bank loans passing through the hands of the entrepreneurs or the State. This does not raise costs; and it is in fact what happens in the normal capitalist revival.

The nature of the capitalist crisis, as painted by believers in 'economic imperialism,' is an incredible travesty of the facts. Here are profit-earners, we are told, unable to sell their goods for fundamental economic reasons owing to the lack of markets at home. Yet if this were the trouble, the politically all-powerful profit-earners would merely have to print notes or create bank deposits and place it in their own hands and buy the unused goods. To say that the capitalists could do this, but are in fact too stupid, is entirely to destroy the logical foundation of the theory. For, as has been pointed out, the theory must maintain that the capitalists *cannot* do

anything else but search for colonial markets. If the only trouble is that they are stupid about monetary policy, then the solution is to educate them in that subject.

And in fact they are being quite rapidly educated. For the actual method—and this is the essential point—by which capitalist countries do revive themselves after depression nowadays, is not by finding export markets, but by expanding their own internal monetary demand. That this happened in all the major industrial countries during the recent Great Depression, is surely not in doubt. For a time certain countries involved themselves in a ridiculous deflationary crisis, caused by an internal lack of money, simply because there was a conflict between the bankers who always favour monetary contraction, and the industrialists who naturally favour expansion. After two or three years, however, of this situation the industrialists normally win, since the deflationary situation comes to be universally regarded as intolerable. The real way in which a deflationary crisis tends to create war—as is argued later in this chapter—is not that foreign markets are demanded, but that in the extreme reactionary atmosphere of a Fascist State the only method of putting money in peoples' hands which is politically acceptable to the ruling clique is rearmament or war. In the Fascist, as opposed to the democratic capitalist countries, deflation does, for this political reason, tend to promote war.

Every one of the great capitalist countries extricated themselves from the Great Depression of 1929–32 by expanding internal demand—by peaceful or militarist methods—and not by finding new export markets. The most crushing refutation of the theory of economic imperialism is the fact that the United States, the greatest of all capitalist countries, when faced by the greatest of all depressions, not merely did not achieve revival by finding new export markets, but did not even look for them. Revival in the United States was produced by internal monetary expansion. In the usual way, after three years of senseless deflation dictated by the bankers and poor Mr. Hoover, Mr. Roosevelt came to power with a mandate from the whole people to expand internal purchasing power and so end the depression. 'Markets' were discovered by the simple process of printing dollars and putting them—by relief works of innumerable kinds—into the hands of those

who had none. And nobody has suggested a search for export markets as a remedy for the American slump of 1937.

In Great Britain revival also came not as the result of a discovery of export markets, but of internal monetary expansion made possible by the abandonment of the gold standard, and of the consequent cheap money policy forced on the Bank of England by the Treasury with the backing of industrialist opinion. The Ottawa agreements not merely failed to expand British exports until after internal revival, based on building activity had begun; in themselves they failed to increase exports at all, but merely diverted them from foreign to British countries. In Germany again it was internal expansion and not increasing exports that revived demand: and the fact that internal expansion was only *politically* possible if justified by rearmament was precisely due to that *political* interaction between capitalism and nationalism which it is proposed to analyse later in this essay. In Japan again it was not the invasion of Manchuria that cured the acute 1931 depression, but the devaluation of the yen in December of that year. The total value of the subsequent exports to Manchuria was trivial in comparison with the increase in the yen value of all other exports automatically resulting from devaluation. It was devaluation which increased the yen incomes, and therefore the profits, of the exporting manufacturers of Japan. Finally the Scandinavian industrial countries achieved recovery by monetary expansion following the depreciation of the pound, and France, Holland, and Switzerland by devaluation of their own currencies five years later.

These latter countries point the moral even more effectively. France and Holland for instance, which had enormous colonial empires, were nevertheless acutely depressed from 1933 to 1936. Why? Because their colonial 'markets' were entirely unable to offset the deflation of purchasing power in their own countries. Meanwhile Sweden which had no colonies, was flourishing because the Swedes had put money into the hands of their own people. Swedish policy in particular refutes the idea that internal revival is impossible because money cannot be put into the hands of the masses. Even if this were true, as has been pointed out, the crisis could be solved by creating money and giving it to the rich to spend. But in fact the progressive governments of Sweden, Denmark,

and Norway, as well as Mr. Roosevelt, actually started the revival by creating money and putting it into the hands of the unemployed workers through public works schemes.

To economists, the final theoretical absurdity of the view that capitalist depression can only be cured by finding export markets, lies in its complete misconception of the monetary mechanism of foreign trade. For when the British exporter sells goods he is paid with a sterling bank deposit in a bank somewhere in Great Britain. If the goods are sold to African natives, those natives must get hold of the bank deposit in London either by borrowing it or selling goods in London. But if the problem is simply to enable the British manufacturer to sell his goods in exchange for this bank deposit, it can of course be solved by his selling to whoever holds the bank deposit already. Or else the necessary deposit can be created and spent by the Government or by whoever the Government choses to lend it to. The creation of an export surplus and the resulting 'lending abroad' which is often put forward as the method by which capitalist crises were solved in the past, merely means that bank deposits in England were lent by Englishmen to Argentina or Australia. But as far as the production crisis was concerned, just as easy a solution would have been for the Englishman to spend the deposit directly.

It is consequently impossible to argue for any theoretical reason that capitalist depression can only be cured by discovering colonial markets. And the most cursory glance at the contemporary world shows that this must be so. For many important industrial countries do not possess colonies at all; and those that do only send a small fraction of their exports to them. Sweden and Switzerland have been prosperous industrial countries for a very long period without any colonies at all. The United States has practically no colonies at all; and though various financial groups have from time to time suborned the Government into using military force against small Central American states, it cannot be maintained that the United States has ever been dependent upon trade with either the colonies or the states coerced in this way. Total United States' exports to her colonies have never approached near to 0.1 per cent of her total national output. It is surely an odd theory which makes the dependence of industrial countries on exports to colonies the crucial point

of capitalist development, when the greatest industrial country has never exported to colonies as much as one-thousandth part of its national production. Even Great Britain, the greatest colonial power, sends less than 10 per cent of her exports, and less than 1 per cent of her total output to her colonies.[1] Similarly, the proportion of the industrial countries' imports of raw materials arriving from their own colonies, investments located in their colonies, and emigrants going to their colonies, has always been trivial.

The theory then that capitalist countries must fight for colonial markets in order to solve their internal economic problems is contradicted both by theory and fact. It is impossible to maintain, on these grounds, that capitalism must produce war.

This is not for a moment to deny that capitalist countries do attempt to monopolise colonies, do exploit colonies, and do fight one another for colonies. At times certain groups interested in particular colonial trades have been able to persuade Governments to involve their country in war. But this is much more the consequence of normal human greed than of capitalist society—except in so far as capitalist society tends to produce certain sorts of Governments. In general, however, in the light of the facts, 'economic imperialism' must be regarded as one among many sources of jealousy and ambition which are liable to produce war in the present age as in most others. The argument that capitalism *must* produce war for an inherent economic reason cannot be sustained.

It does not follow, however, that existing capitalist society does not tend to destroy the conditions in which peace can be established. For though, as is argued in other Essays contained in this book, the natural pugnacity and aggressiveness of the human species, and the inextinguishable rivalries of human beings and groups, are a potential cause of war in any society whatsoever, it may be that they are far more likely actually to cause war in one kind of society rather than another. For pugnacity, jealousy, and greed prevail among the individual citizens of civilized states. Yet a political

[1] Those who are interested in the exact statistics should consult the pamphlet, *The Demand for Colonial Territory and Equality of Opportunity*, issued by the Labour Party.

organisation has been devised in those States which normally prevents these indestructible vices from generating forcible conflicts. All sane men are agreed that the world can only find permanent peace when States themselves submit to a similar organization. One of the reasons why they will not is, of course, again, the existence of pugnacity and greed. But the principal additional obstacle, in the conditions of to-day, seems to be the political circumstances and passions which arise out of the struggle between the wage-earning and the property-owning classes.

In short, since the full development of society into these classes began, the ancient creed and cry of nationalism have been discovered by the property-owning class to be the most effective method of resisting the valid claims of the wage-earning class; the use of this cry has created, contrary to the wishes of most of the property-owners themselves, an anarchy of independent, aggressive, heavily-armed sovereign states; and this anarchy has made permanent peace precarious or impossible.

2. Liberalism and Nationalism

These are bare assertions which have to be sustained by the evidence of history. The first evidence for them is the plain and all-important fact that in the contemporary world the property-owning parties are everywhere the nationalist parties, and the working-class parties are everywhere the pacific parties. Why? It is curious how few people ask themselves this question. For perhaps the dominating reality in contemporary world politics is the fact that in every country —including Russia[1]—the conservative parties are nationalist and the socialist parties are internationalist. And it is certainly not obvious why this should be so.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the alignment was precisely opposite. The liberals were the nationalists. It seemed the most natural thing in the world that those who were fighting for political and personal freedom, whether in Italy, Germany, Austria, or anywhere else, should also be fighting for 'national' rights. In the great struggle of 1815–1848 the liberals were the advocates of the idea of

[1] Stalin, it almost seems, must be regarded as a reactionary, who disgraces the name of Communism.

nationality, and Metternich and the reactionaries were its enemies. Indeed, the reactionaries explicity believed in an international order. There was to be a system, whether Concert of Europe or Holy Alliance, which was to preserve international unity and 'legitimate' tyranny in face of the separatism of the liberals.

Yet by the end of the century the reactionaries had become nationalist and the liberals internationalist. To-day it is a commonplace to regard them as such. The Metternich idea of an international order, based on the 'legitimate' claims of the old eighteenth-century dynasties, finally vanished in the years immediately after 1848. Canning, the liberal, had begun to kill it in the 'twenties with his 'every nation for itself, and God for us all.' After 1860 it was the socialists and liberals who took the idea over and presented it in a new form. In 1864 the 'First International' was formed, and by the end of the century the first rudimentary efforts were made by liberal idealists to found international institutions at Geneva and The Hague. It was from this tradition that President Wilson derived his central ideas. And so, whereas the 'sublime mysticism and nonsense' of an international political order was urged on the world in 1814 by an ultra-reactionary Tsar, the same 'nonsense' was urged on the world in 1919 by a Liberal President of the United States.

How did this come about? Partly, of course, for the reason traditionally given: that the 'nations' seeking to be free happened to be ruled by other nations. But an equally important reason, often overlooked, was, it seems, this: Liberalism, which must have in the average man's mind a psychological rather than a rational basis, invariably degenerates into nationalism, and the propagandist value of nationalism is therefore so great that the capitalist parties always adopt it for political purposes. 'Liberalism' proper is taken in this essay to mean the conviction that the thoughts, feelings, life, and happiness of every human being, and not of a privileged few, are of ultimate value and, therefore, an end in themselves. It is as a human being, and not as himself or as a landowner or an Englishman or a Christian that a man has a right to life and happiness and other men have a duty to enable him to live and be happy. The recognition

of this truth is, after all, the rational basis of all liberalism, socialism, and communism—of all the ideas now popularly known as 'Left-wing.' For the really essential common element in all these ideas is the conviction that equality, freedom, and justice are of greater value than the Spartan virtues of courage, discipline, and strength.

If one remembers for how many centuries almost the entire human race was still held in the grip of extreme ignorance and superstition, one need not perhaps be surprised how slow has been the emergence of the idea that every man has a right to life and happiness. Inevitably the power of privileges and possession have always been opposed to it, since privilege and possession mean little more than the exploitation of one man by another. It is not, therefore, strange that the liberal idea, though always valid, became most effective in an age when a new economic class, for the moment opposed to privilege, was pushing its way to power. Economic change probably explains why liberalism obtained a hold on the European world at the end of the eighteenth century and not before, though it does not in the least affect the validity of the fundamental liberal conviction. Kant thought that every man ought to be treated as an end in himself, and Rousseau that they were 'born free.' Both were right. But no doubt they would have never got a hearing if the beginning of the Industrial Revolution had not thrown up a commercial middle-class economically in conflict with the privileged feudal aristocracy.

The idea of every man as a rational being, with full social and intellectual rights, naturally produced the demand for political equality and freedom, universal education, freedom before the law, freedom of the Press, and all the principles of nineteenth-century democracy. But as the idea descended from the minds of the philosophers to the speakers on the platform and the ears of the people, it suffered, gradually, insensibly, a quite inevitable corruption. 'Every man is born free.' He has 'inalienable, indestructible rights.' 'Liberty, equality, fraternity.' To the mob of Paris and the peasants of France it no doubt meant first of all the possession of bread and land. But it also rapidly propagated the idea that the State was something in which all men had rights and, therefore, obligations and loyalties. As Napoleon's

wars spread the revolutionary propaganda in Italy, Germany, and beyond, these natural psychological consequences evidently followed. There was to be a democracy, a constitution, a Parliament. Whereas the allegiance of men's minds had previously been to a despot, presumed to be elected by God, and therefore to all Christendom, it was now to a 'constitution' and therefore to a single State.

The idea of an allegiance to a unity larger than the individual self is clearly a rational inference from the central idea of human equality. One man's right to freedom and happiness implies the obligation to fulfil the laws which guarantee the same right to other men. The sense of allegiance and altruism in face of a community larger than oneself is, therefore, a mark of civilization which may fairly be called 'patriotism.' This is an essential inference from the idea of equality and freedom.

In the mind of the plain man, patriotism in this sense is a powerful but confused emotion. But the consciousness of allegiance to a unit larger than the self, which is so extremely potent a force with the mass of mankind, seems inevitably bound in the practical world to take the form of the worship of one unit in opposition and antagonism to another. It may be a family, a football team, a religion, or—ultimately and fatally—a 'nation.' But the pride and the altruism seem only to become really concrete and potent in the ordinary man's mind when the unit comes to be conceived in opposition to something outside.[1] So, ironically, tragically, nationalism is inevitably born out of patriotism in the unreflecting mind, although the very conviction of human equality, which is the only valid root of patriotism, itself shows nationalism to be irrational and absurd.

Nationalism we may therefore define as the belief that one political unit, to the exclusion of all others, is the true source of obligation and true object of all loyalty. Nationalism, accordingly, is not merely different from patriotism. It is flatly in contradiction with it. Both beliefs cannot be rationally held by the same person at the same time. To speak, therefore, of 'extreme' or 'excessive' or 'perverted' nationalism as if true nationalism were valuable and just another form of patriotism, is nonsense. Nationalism is not a thing which

[1] See the argument of Essay II.

is good in moderation. It is wholly, certainly, and unconditionally bad.

Most of those who use the words patriotism and nationalism do so, of course, in a casual way and do not mean them in exactly the senses defined here. To define them exactly, however, is not pedantry; it is really the only way to clear our minds about two crucially important realities.

If this is a valid account of the psychological relation between liberalism, patriotism, and nationalism, we need not be surprised that in the age of the French Revolution liberalism and nationalism were virtually the same thing. For it is a fact of experience, which few will now deny, that the idea of patriotism is ever tending to become, in the plain man's mind, the idea of nationalism; and this latter idea, though wholly false, is so psychologically powerful that, once aroused, it seems hardly able to be overcome by any other force, least of all an appeal to reason. If the nationalist appeal is once made, the odds on it winning are large; and to suppose that any amount of 'education' or 'science' will defeat it seems to be one of the flimsiest delusions that any intellectual has ever swallowed. Since this is a plain, if bitter, fact of experience, one need not perhaps inquire why it is a fact. But the principal reason appears to be that 'nationalism' supplies exactly that combination of altruism and self-interest which every human being craves as a motive and justification of action. To pursue one's own naked self-interest seems a little shameful. But to ensure the triumph of one's team over one's opponent's is noble as well as gratifying. And if in the name of patriotism one can conquer one's enemies, acquire wealth and power, and indulge all the cruelty and violence one pleases, human nature is indeed content. "If we did for ourselves what we do for our country," said Cavour, "what scoundrels we should be."

To analyse then the psychological roots of nationalism is not irrelevant. For, though the persons and groups who exploit the appeal to nationalism in the modern world are, for the most part, themselves impelled by their own economic self-interest or lust for power, the success of their propaganda ultimately depends on what happens in the ordinary man's mind. No doubt Hitler was paid by the steel magnates to beguile the masses by talking nonsense about 'Germany'

and the Aryan race. But what was actually happening in the minds of the masses all the time they were listening to the nonsense? And why was that particular nonsense more successful than any other? These are the questions which tend to be ignored by those who harp on the purely economic interpretation. What were the actual emotions of the deluded young men who listened to the bands playing 'Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles' and watched the purple spotlights playing on Herr Hitler's face?

Surely it was just that combination of group egoism with altruistic aspiration from which the terrific strength of modern nationalism springs. For nationalism is at once simple, in that it groups crude emotions round a simple symbol, and subtle, in that it blends altruism and egoism in just the proportions necessary to seduce the ordinary man. The altruistic element is all-important: for it is just this which makes nationalism dangerous and irresistible. A man will not sacrifice his life for money. But he will for 'Germany,' just because he is convinced he is doing something noble. The passionate delight which Bruno and Vittorio Mussolini have confessed to feeling, as they watched their incendiary bombs falling on the unarmed Abyssinians, must, of course, be attributed to inherited bestiality. But, in the case of the ordinary decent young Italian, one must look for another reason. If these young Italians had understood that they were simply robbing ignorant natives of their land and their lives, they would hardly have risked their own. But convince them that they are doing it for 'glory,' for 'honour,' for 'Italy,' and they are capable of almost any degree of heroism or barbarity. How many human beings would drop bombs on defenceless women and children if they had not first been persuaded that they were doing something sublime? The young German airmen who were captured after bombing Guernica explained—doubtless in all good faith—that they were 'rescuing Europe from Bolshevism.' That is why the appeal to nationalism is the wickedest of all crimes against the human race.

For it harnesses the altruistic motives of simple men in the pursuit of murder and destruction, and uses them to further the interest of some privileged minority or to placate the vulgar pride of a dictator. In the minds of the simple

men who are fighting for England or France or Germany or whatever it may be, the word 'England' or 'Germany' calls up the picture of most things they have ever desired or loved. For the mass of them can never have known home, friends, beauty, or happiness in any country but their own. That is what 'England' means to them, as 'Germany' does to the Germans. No wonder they are prepared to fight for it with extreme endurance and heroism—and to fight one another. To realize this, and to remember the realistic details of modern war, is to know how unbearable a tragedy it is and how terrible is the responsibility of those who make it inevitable. If you saw a man dying from poison gas, Wilfred Owen wrote :

> My friend you would not tell with such high zest
> To children ardent for some desperate glory
> The old lie 'dulce et decorum est
> Pro patria mori.'

There have always been 'children ardent for some desperate glory' since the beginning of history. It is not suggested here that either patriotism or nationalism in its simplest form first appeared in the nineteenth century. Patriotism, or loyalty to a community larger than the individual, has clearly been a reality in all ages and the theme of most heroic literature. So has nationalism—in the simple form of an exaggerated love of that with which one is familiar. And this love is clearly a profoundly important psychological fact in the case of the great mass of mankind. The common man knows and loves his own cottage, town, and friends. These he knows for certain ; so he loves them. The others, though 'fair and wise,' he consigns to 'cold oblivion.' He does not know them ; so he cannot love them. This is irrational. But it is real and therefore powerful. It is the feeling of the hackneyed, sentimental, yet moving lines :

> Breathes there a man with soul so dead
> Who never to himself hath said :
> 'This is my own my native land.'

That, too, is a sentiment which, though strong in modern nationalism, is itself as old as humanity.

What is new in the fully-developed, rigorous, dogmatic

nationalism of to-day is the specific doctrine that the political unit to which a man belongs is the source of all value and obligation, the only absolute end, the proper object of all loyalty and love; and that nothing outside it has any claim for respect, tolerance, or even pity. "Germany," Dr. Goebbels has said in so many words, "is the source of all value." This is a doctrine which Rome would hardly have applied to the barbarians, or Christendom to the heathen. It has been left to Herr Hitler and Dr. Goebbels to apply it to the Jews, the Czechs, the French, the English—to all who are not Germans. The religion of nationalism, the doctrine that Germany, Italy, Spain, France, or England is the source of all values and the only object of allegiance whatever—and this is the explicit first principle of Nazi doctrine—is a creation of the last hundred years. It is the final degradation of nationalism (not its *reductio ad absurdum*; for the doctrine was always absurd). It is indeed as hateful a debasement of the human spirit as any that can be imagined. There must have been many savages in the prehistoric age who spared their defeated enemies out of simple humanity and so achieved a higher level in the scale of civilisation than it has been granted to Herr Hitler to attain.

But how did this horror come among us? And how, above all, did the humane and liberal doctrine of the equality of man become so unkindly mutilated? Those who trace Nazi nationalism back to the 'absolutest State' doctrines of Hegel and Fichte seem only very partially right. No doubt these serve as a convenient intellectual peg for the despotic nationalism of the Nazis. But the real roots of modern nationalism seem to be much more surely discernible in the psychological consequences of the liberal propaganda of the French Revolution era. It has been suggested here that the degradation of the pure liberalism of Rousseau, Godwin, and Shelley began at the very moment when the French Revolution had to fight for itself with arms in the practical world and not merely with the weapon of philosophy. At the battle of Valmy in 1794, when the Revolutionary Government took the field against its enemies, the Army was exhorted to fight in the name not merely of the brotherhood of man, but also of 'France' and of 'glory.' For to win a battle the masses had to be aroused, and only the seemingly concrete

symbol of 'France' could arouse them. Napoleon, though he professed to the end to be fighting for freedom against privilege, was identified in the minds of his countrymen with the glory and aggrandizement of France.

For perhaps the greatest of all the absurdities of nationalism is the fact that the actual unit to which all the heroic emotions get attached is usually purely fortuitous. We feel the uprush of loyalty and pride—and we look round for an object. What is it that determines that object? It is certainly not its worthiness to be made the object of these emotions. It is not even necessarily its nature as bound to ourselves by race, or language, or geography, or history, or religion. For it may be any one of these things, and the one may cancel out the others.

Not merely, therefore, is there no rational basis of nationalism. There is not even, so to speak, any historical basis either. In France the nationalist emotion has attached itself to a unit largely of language; in Great Britain of geography; in Italy of language and geography mixed; in the Slav countries of race; in post-war Austria of neither language, race, religion, geography, nor history. In Germany, where the madness is strongest of all, the unit depended on none of these things—not even race or language. It was a Customs Union. The actual unit to which the fanatical and insane nationalism of modern Germany has become attached, excluding Austria as it originally did, was simply the chance collection of States included in the pre-Bismarck *Zollverein*.

In India again a sentiment of nationalism has arisen, which, in face of racial, religious, historical, and linguistic strife, can only attach itself to geography. And this nationalism wishes to include Burma, while the Burmese have a nationalism of their own and wish to be excluded. More paradoxical still is the land of mad, mystical, fervent nationalism—Ireland. The Southern Irish are passionately attached to the nationalist unit of their dreams. But it happens to include Northern Ireland; and the nationalist fervour of the Northern Irish has unfortunately got attached to a different unit. In Palestine, most absurd of all, the nationalism of both Arabs and Jews demand the exclusive possession of the same portion of the earth's surface.

3. Bismarck

It is a waste of words, however, to demonstrate that nationalism, as opposed to patriotism, is absurd. To suggest that its propaganda value has become immeasurable, is far more important. In the first half of the nineteenth century the doctrine of nationalism was not consciously and ruthlessly exploited for political ends. It was partly aroused in Italy and Germany, as has often been pointed out, by Napoleon's tyrannical methods ; and it was thus allied, as we have seen, with liberalism during the period of the 'national movements' in those two countries and elsewhere. It is fair to say that what enabled these movements to succeed in the first half of the century—when the reactionaries were the internationalists—was the emergence of the commercial middle-class created by the industrial revolution. That middle-class was gradually winning the battle everywhere against the landowning aristocracy—in France, in England, in Germany, and even in Italy. In England it was finally and set up a politically liberal and pacific, though economically ill-balanced State. In France it won temporarily with the Louis Philippe revolution of 1830, and finally with the Republic of 1871. In most of Europe it nearly won in 1848 ; and in Germany it was on the verge of what seemed certain victory when Bismarck came to power in 1862.

A considered examination of the relevant circumstances of the time and the principal events that have succeeded suggests the definite conclusion that, had Bismarck not succeeded in creating the nationalist movement in Germany, the subsequent nationalist wars, including that of 1914, and all the consequences following from it, would never have occurred. Further, it suggests that if Bismarck had not had the extraordinary genius to divine the power of the nationalist appeal, the liberal cause would have won in Prussia, and we might, for a time, at any rate, have had a democratic Germany and a peaceful Europe. For if there had been a democratic, capitalist Germany, like Switzerland or Sweden, there would probably have been a peaceful Europe. Nationalism apart, there is nothing, as has already been argued, in a middle-class, liberal, capitalist democracy that makes war inevitable.

The capitalist democracies of England, France, the United States, Holland, Switzerland, and Scandinavia live at peace with one another. The capitalists, as such—apart from the armament manufacturers and a few doctrinaire maniacs—do not normally want war. Their crime is that they appeal to political propaganda, and that makes peace in the end impossible.

This was what the German Liberals allowed to happen.

In 1862 in Prussia the Hohenzollern monarchy and the feudal landowning classes had virtually given up the struggle. Already, in 1848, the liberal middle-classes had almost won. Since then there had been a protracted conflict between the King and the Liberals centring on the question whether Parliament would refuse to vote money for the Army, and whether, if not, the King would in fact dissolve it. In 1862 the King, whose conscience but not his heart was in the struggle, was inclined to give way for good. He had actually written out his abdication—such was the thinness of the thread on which Europe's future hung. Prussia was on the very verge of having a liberal democracy; and all Germany, probably including Austria, on the verge of being united in a democratic federation. Only the economic interests of the landowners stood in the way. As a last throw, not expected to succeed, Bismarck, himself the son of an East Prussian landowner, was appointed Chancellor in 1862.

If Bismarck had merely resisted the Liberals by the time-honoured methods of repression and obscurantism, he would doubtless, like Metternich, have failed. On the other hand, to give way was not in his nature. He succeeded—by refusing the Liberals' demands with one hand and giving them nationalist glory with the other. Wars were engineered, glory was won, and the demand for freedom and reform was simply pushed out of men's minds. In 1864 Denmark was defeated, in 1866 Austria, and in 1870 France. Germany was united under Prussia in an Empire not Liberal, but despotic, militarist, and—unlike that of Metternich—nationalist. The Liberals—like Sir John Simon in a later and more ludicrous fashion—became 'National Liberals'; and the cause was lost not merely in Germany but in Europe.

Thus, by deliberately exploiting the all-powerful emotion of nationalism, Bismarck was able to save the privileges of

the Prussian landowners and the Hohenzollerns. He did it at the cost of creating a nationalist Europe, an armed camp that could but clash in the end. But he and his propertied supporters no more cared for this than did their direct descendants in January 1933. To argue thus, some will say, is to put too much emphasis on Bismarck, since in the end the reactionaries, forced by the general and apparently final triumph of liberalism in Europe by 1860, would have discovered the nationalist appeal even if he had not. Though they might have discovered it, however, it is not certain that they would have done so in time to create so madly militarist a State in Germany as to make peace in Europe hardly possible and the continued existence of Western civilization no more than a hope. For it was beyond question the existence of a militarist Germany between 1870 and 1914, and from 1933 till to-day, that has forced the other more or less peaceable countries into the appalling dilemma of either fighting or giving up their freedom. Thanks to Bismarck, we cannot have both freedom and peace.

This is an interpretation of the crucial events of 1862–1870 in Germany, which I think most historians would be prepared to accept. Mr. H. A. L. Fisher's considered opinion is as follows :[1]

> 'The crushing victory in the Austrian war (of 1866) enabled Bismarck to defy with impunity counsels founded on the success of insular Liberalism, and to engrave deep upon the constitutional life of Germany the principle that, although a Parliament may vote new taxes and discuss laws, three things lie outside it and beyond it. Neither may it prescribe the army, nor frame policy, nor, as in England, make or unmake Governments. . . . Bismarck's triumph was complete and enduring. His success is blazoned across the history of the world. He led Germany into the path of long-range policies of aggrandizement based upon long-range military and naval programmes. The State was power. War, as Clausewitz taught, was the continuation of policy. End and instrument acted and interacted. As policies became more ambitious, armaments became larger ; as armaments grew, policies expanded. The conversion

[1] *A History of Europe*, vol. iii, pp. 966–7.

of Europe into an armed camp was the inevitable consequence of the defeat of Prussian Liberalism in 1862.'

Not only did Bismarck's appeal to nationalism turn Europe into an armed camp. It taught the reactionaries in every other country to make the same appeal. And as soon as they learnt how to do it, the first successful counter-attack was made on the industrial Liberal movement that had been steadily gaining ground ever since 1789.

4. Disraeli and Hitler

In Great Britain, where the Liberals had been almost continually in power from 1832 to Palmerston's death in 1865, Disraeli learnt Bismarck's lesson. It is customary in contemporary histories of England to explain how great a statesmen Disraeli showed himself in revivifying the Conservative Party by making an 'Imperialist' appeal. What he actually did was to copy Bismarck, only in a more gentlemanly way, and so to enable the forces of property and reaction once again to defend their privileges more successfully by debasing the idea of patriotism and Liberalism in the people's mind down to the level of sordid, theatrical nationalism, and so kindling the flames that made 1914 in the end inevitable.

The Queen became the 'Empress of India'; the Union Jack began to appear on Tory platforms; and all the cheap nationalistic cant which buys votes and is paid for in human lives began to infect English politics. That was the great statesmanlike decision with which Disraeli revivified, as we are often told, the historic Conservative Party of England. For with Disraeli a new element was introduced into the development of nationalism which has been all too familiar since; the calculating political genius, who knows as well as the Liberal intellectual that nationalism is nonsense, but sees nevertheless its extreme political value and exploits it to the utmost. Does anybody suppose that Disraeli—who was a cynic and a Jew—believed the British to be the chosen race, and the British landowning aristocracy to be the salt of the earth? No more than he believed his own protestations to Queen Victoria that Albert, the Prince Consort, was the

best, the greatest, the wisest, and the most godlike of men that ever lived.

So the political leaders of the capitalist parties ever since have been either cynics who did not believe their own nationalist propaganda or maniacs who did. The industrial and financial magnates, who have stood behind the capitalist parties, have been mostly economic Liberals believing in free trade and peace, and hating economic nationalism and war. It is just because 'international finance' *is* international that Fascists dislike it so much. The City of London in 1914, as has often been pointed out in supposed refutation of Marxism, was overwhelmingly opposed to war; and Stock Exchange prices still fall to-day when war appears over the horizon of probability. Yet these same financial and political leaders, in order to defeat the working-class parties, never shrink from exploiting the nationalist appeal, which eventually makes war inevitable. For their own narrow, selfish, political ends, they raise up a monster which gets beyond their control and in the end comes near to destroying them.

For Dr. Schacht, it need hardly be said, no more believes in the Aryan race than Mr. Montagu Norman believes in Imperial Preference. Both believe—or did—in free trade, free foreign lending, and the international gold standard that is supposed to make both possible. Mr. Norman, for all his faults and intrigues, at least stood in the post-war years for an international economic system. Yet Mr. Norman in 1931, and Dr. Schacht in 1933, both took leading parts in destroying the political movements in their own countries which could alone have made an international economic or political system possible. Why? Because only the Socialists were the true internationalists; and in order to destroy the class enemy Socialism, our financiers and industrialists are willing to evoke the passions and hire the maniacs that in private they deride, but in the last resort cannot control. In every crucial political struggle since 1918 in every country the reactionaries have been driven to attack the working-class parties by resorting to nationalistic propaganda; for nothing else had any hope of winning. In this country in 1919 it was 'Hang the Kaiser,' and in 1924 the 'Red Letter.' In the United States the Wall Street interests, unable to put forward any atom of a rational case against Mr. Roosevelt,

maintained—through the mouth of poor Mr. Hoover—that they were 'defending the American system.' General Franco, invading his own country and massacring his own people, in the interests of the most worthless and reactionary of privileged cliques in Europe, with the help of foreign money, and in defiance of a democratically-elected Government, calls himself —grim and ironic jest—a 'nationalist,' and says that he is fighting 'for Spain!' What else could he say? In a very true and accurate sense 'patriotism' (and Dr. Johnson meant nationalism) *is* 'the last refuge of a scoundrel.' When there is absolutely nothing else to say that will fool anyone, when there is not even a pretended thread of justice in one's cause, when even the name of liberty cannot cover the multitude of one's crimes, one can always call oneself a 'nationalist' and say one is fighting for one's country. In the whole range of political mendacity there is no other refuge whatever for such criminals as General Franco.

The Nazi revolution itself is, of course, the classic example of the manner in which the propertied interests prefer to resist Socialism—at any cost to their own country and the world—by calling in cynics or fanatics who are sufficient experts at the nationalist game to be able to fool the people. Dr. Schacht, Herr Hugenberg, the East Prussian landowners, the generals, and the steel magnates, were unable of themselves to prevent the masses seeing the justice of their own cause and voting for a Social-Democratic Germany and a peaceful Europe. Von Papen's Government, which succeeded Bruning's in the summer of 1932, was a failure; it had no mass supporters. Von Schleicher then tried to govern through the autumn of 1932 with the combined support of the army and the trade unions. Such a policy might have saved Germany till the economic crisis had moderated, and so have saved Europe. But von Schleicher made one mistake which cost him his life and Germany and Europe their hope of peace. He attempted to ensure the support of the trade unions by putting a stop to the outrageous scandal of the loans made to the East Prussian landowners. These feudal monopolists, maintained by fabulously-high bread taxes at the expense of the impoverished workers and unemployed, had also been granted huge 'loans' by previous Governments. These loans, the landowners now proposed, should be written

off and never re-paid. Von Schleicher intimated that the landowners had had enough doles already and that it was time the scandal stopped.

From that moment all was lost. Von Papen, disgruntled at his supersession by Schleicher, saw that he could remove him in his turn by getting the landowners—the descendants of Bismarck and his colleagues—to play on the aged Hindenburg's feudal prejudices. In order to offer to the President the plausible possibility of an untried alternative Government, von Papen made a bargain with Hitler that if the intrigue succeeded the Nazis should share in the Government. Hitler was to be Chancellor, and Papen Vice-Chancellor. Other Conservative non-Nazis, such as the industrialist Hugenberg, Blomberg, Dr. Schacht, etc., were to be in the Cabinet. Von Papen, Dr. Schacht, Herr Hugenberg, and the landowners hoped thus to destroy the trade unions and the Communists with the help of the well-known propagandist powers of Herr Hitler and Dr. Goebbels. But they themselves, they thought, and not the monster they had called up, would be the real masters of Germany !

Here we see, in the most crucial case since Bismarck's access to power, the whole drama of the capitalists' appeal for nationalism enacted in one crucial month. The landowners and industrialists and bankers hated Hitler and his Nazi nonsense. They knew well enough that such a maniac would enslave Germany and probably inflame Europe. But what did that matter as long as they would not have to repay their loans and if the Socialists and the trade unions were destroyed ? There was no doubt whatever about the answer. The bargain was struck. Hindenburg, who could in no other way have been induced to dismiss Schleicher, was moved by the whisperings of his fellow landowners that the holy soil of Prussia was being attacked. Schleicher was dismissed, and the new Cabinet came to power with the infatuated monster and the cynical intriguers locked together in a desperate embrace. The landowners never paid back their loans ; the industrialists saw the trade unions destroyed in two months ; and the chance of preserving the peace of Europe was lost probably for ever. Indeed, the Prussian landowners will have written off their loans cheap if they cost no more than another 5,000,000 lives.

For the monster won and the miserable capitalists were in their own turn fooled. They had not counted on Dr. Goebbels and General Goering showing quite such a degree of criminal daring as to set the Reichstag on fire, announce a Communist plot, and win a Government majority at the election which left Hugenberg and Papen powerless to stand up against the extremist tide. The constitution went, the terror began, and in a few months Hugenberg and Papen had gone as well. Only Dr. Schacht lived on for a time, a prisoner in his own ship, forced to steer a course he hated because he dare not do anything else, and because nobody else had the cunning to steer such a ship at all. After four years, disillusioned, derided, the now unwanted pilot was permitted to leave the ship in the autumn of 1937. And four months later even Blomberg and von Fritch were thrown overboard as well.

The whole course of events illustrates the fact that, in order to destroy the working-class movement finally, the German capitalists had to discover a genuine maniac as well as the ingenious cynics who abounded. In Hitler they found the supreme, perhaps the only example of his kind, the shrewd and ruthless politician who at the same time really believes the nationalist legend itself, in its most sweeping, insane, intoxicating, apocalyptic form. Without the rooted mania that was in him, no hypnotic eyes or rasping voice, or uniforms, or banners, or spotlights could have driven half a nation out of its wits. But, given the precious madness, and given the Treaty of Versailles, which supplied the perfect peg for nationalist propaganda, and—far more important—the Great Depression which had reduced the German workers' real income by half in three years, Herr Hitler was able not merely to destroy the working-class movement, but even to enchain the all-too-clever capitalists themselves, and lead them unwillingly down his own mad path.

5. Propaganda

The second great step, after Bismarck's, in the technique of nationalism, was the discovery of modern propaganda. This is a fact of extraordinary importance in the modern world which no previous age appears to have quite foreseen.

It seems to rest on two foundations: first the decision to teach the masses to read; and, secondly, the realization that what usually convinces mankind is not the truth, but what they want to hear. By teaching the masses to read, the Liberals of the nineteenth century, who believed that the spread of 'education' and 'science' would result, made modern propaganda possible. The first of the great propagandist geniuses was, by common consent, Lord Northcliffe, who knew the mind of the common man—as few of our intellectuals and not many of our politicians do even now—and realized that to tell him what he wanted to hear was the easiest way to popularity and power. Second came Mr. Lloyd George, hardly less skilled than Northcliffe himself, and his ally in the war propaganda of 1914–19—then the most expert and successful yet achieved. Third comes Hitler himself, who tells us in *Mein Kampf* how the Northcliffe–Lloyd George war propaganda made an indelible impression on his mind, and gave him a lifelong contempt for the intellectuals who think you will convince the people by telling them the truth. And fourth comes Dr. Goebbels, the acknowledged leader of his profession, whom no writer the world over can honestly forbear to cheer. Joseph Goebbels, grandson of a Jewess, the savagely-ambitious boy who saw his poems and plays rejected by Jewish editors and never forgot it—that same Goebbels has built up a magnificent apparatus of mendacity which none of the great criminals of former ages could ever have conceived. The Greek sophists were supposed to be able to make the worse appear the better cause. Dr. Goebbels can make black appear white, night day, famine plenty, war happiness, and death life. "It is a scientific truth," Dr. Goebbels has said on one occasion, "that Christ was not a Jew." To say that, to say it again, to shout it into the microphone at 10,000 people, and be believed—surely that is the privilege of genius.

Propaganda and nationalism go hand in hand. To-day we can hardly think of one without the other. Without modern propaganda nationalism could never have become the dominating religion of the modern world; and without nationalism propaganda could hardly have found a worthy theme. Together they thrive and multiply.

6. Democratic Reactionaries

During the last 100 years political reaction has meant, in effect, the resistance of propertied interests to the cause of economic justice and equality. Reaction, therefore, plus violence, plus nationalism, plus propaganda, is what we call Fascism. For running through the propaganda of both the violent and the democratic reactionaries is the appeal to nationalism designed to divert attention from the struggle for economic justice. This is as true of the English, French, and American Conservative Parties as of the German and Italian Fascists. In the Fascist countries war, or at least the threat of war, becomes necessary in the end because internal poverty and terrorism eventually grow unendurable. In 1935 in Italy Mussolini had to divert attention from an internal unemployment problem which had become unbearably acute. The number of unemployed had grown from 150,000 in 1923 to 1,250,000 in 1935. Like Bismarck, Mussolini must have a campaign—if possible, a victory—but at least a campaign, and the quicker and easier the better. It was not to find 'markets,' but to solve the unemployment problem by the only manner politically possible, and to win glory, that Mussolini slaughtered the Abyssinians. And the English propertied classes supported him, as they have supported General Franco, because class feeling was stronger with them than either the desire for peace or even their sense of their own national interests. Here we learn how completely the reactionaries themselves normally disbelieve in their own nationalistic propaganda.

The Abyssinian war illustrates the one important respect in which we must qualify the argument advanced earlier on the economic solution of the capitalist crisis. In a deflationary situation, it was pointed out, there is no economic reason why a solution should not be found by putting money into people's hands through public works of various kinds. That is what the capitalist democracies do. In a Fascist country, however, where the Government by its nature will never consent to any form of expenditure calculated to raise the standard of living of the people, and where the other obvious solution, currency devaluation, may be banned by rentier and banking interests, the only *politically* admissable form

of public works are, in fact, rearmament or war. This is the real danger. Germany solved the last deflationary crisis by rearmament, and Italy by war. When the next deflationary crisis gathers in Germany, the menace to Europe will become acute.

Moreover, though the democratic reactionaries, as opposed to the Fascists, do not deliberately engineer or probably even desire war, the threat or possibility of war is politically advantageous to them. The more the possibility of European war looms over the horizon, the better it is, for instance, politically, for the British Conservative Party. There was a ghastly illustration of this in the spring of 1935. At the beginning of March the Government's reputation was very low, by-elections were being lost, and gilt-edged securities were falling because the City began to fear a Labour Government. On 15 March 1935 Herr Hitler introduced conscription, and an atmosphere of war began to spread throughout Europe. Immediately the British Government's failure in social policy began to be forgotten; 'national unity' and strength began to be desired; and from 1 April onwards gilt-edged prices began steadily to rise. Bankers and industrialists began to tell one another that the 'political situation had much improved.' Can one be surprised if the Cabinet and the City were grateful to Herr Hitler for introducing conscription, and fearful lest peace might break out once again? Our democratic reactionaries do not want war. But they want the possibility, the feeling of war. And by trying to have one, they eventually give us the other. Similarly our Fascist dictators must periodically commit some aggression against a weaker country, because by thus stirring the nationalist passions of their own people they can smother the discontent which must otherwise destroy an anti-social despotism before long. There is no other way to smother it. That is why it is pure delusion to suppose that you can get peace by mollifying the Fascist regimes. You can only get peace by destroying them.

Nationalism, therefore, which is not a perversion but a contradiction of the Liberal idea and of what validity there is in the sentiment of patriotism, has become the propagandist weapon by which the propertied minority delude the mass of the people into fighting against their own just cause. With

this weapon—like the tear-gas of the American strike-breakers—the forces of property and reaction have fought back with ever greater and greater success since the middle of the nineteenth century. They have succeeded—as they intended—in defeating in country after country the cause of economic justice and equality; and they have succeeded—where they did not intend because they did not care—in destroying the hope of an international system of law and order and thereby rendering the world liable to a war more unimaginably horrible than any we have known yet. It may be that even in a democratic socialist world, where nationalist propaganda was renounced, ordinary human bellicosity and jealousy would in the end have created war. But there was at least a hope and a chance that, with an international system of law and justice, peace might have been preserved. That hope and chance have been destroyed by the action of the propertied minority in appealing to nationalism and violence. For the sake of a narrow class-interest, the German capitalists have given us Hitler. For the sake of the same narrow class-interest the British National Government has allowed the League of Nations to be destroyed. So the common people everywhere, it seems, will again be forced into the dilemma of having to give up either their freedom or their lives. If, in fact, a new war has to be fought, if all the unthinkable suffering and degradation are to be forced on us again, if further millions of innocent lives have to be lost, the responsibility will rest on those who have not scrupled to appeal to the poison of nationalism and the weapon of violence in defence of the economic privileges that only an unjust system has given them. Theirs will be the ultimate responsibility; theirs almost alone.

PART III

4. PACIFISM AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

by
ROBERT B. FRASER

PACIFISM AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

THIS article is not concerned with pacifism as a faith to be judged by the nobility of its ideals, but as a policy to be judged by its probable results on the future of mankind.

It is as a faith that pacifism is usually stated. Thus : Force is evil. War is the application of force. Therefore, it is wrong to take part in war, whatever the circumstances. This argument rests on a categorical imperative It flows forward from an article of faith. 'Force is evil.' 'Killing is wrong.' It does not work back from a consideration of results to an assessment of value. It does not say : If you use force, this and that will happen. This and that are evil. Therefore, force is evil. It says : Force is evil. Therefore you must not use it. The weakness of such a method of statement is that it contains nothing to convince a reasonable mind that its acceptance will reduce the aggregate use of force, and thus mitigate the evil which it condemns. In a second way, pacifism will sometimes be accepted without an examination of results. Men naturally feel that the next war will make necessary very terrible things, the gassing of enemy women and children, for example, and also a preparedness to have one's own women and children gassed. They do not wish to accept any responsibility for such horrors. Therefore they seek to absolve themselves from all responsibility by saying : I will take no part in war or war preparations. I, at least, by that clean stroke, render myself obviously innocent of any part in such crime. The result of this declaration is not examined. A man who made it could not be assured of its logic without first examining whether fewer women and children might not be killed if he were prepared to fight. But such examination is not necessary, feels the pacifist. 'Killing is wrong.'

All such pacifism is an emotional formula, not necessarily

wrong, but not to be accepted without an examination of the consequences of so doing. Lately a more scientific pacifism has developed which discards opposition to force as such and all categorical imperatives and *a priori* judgments of moral value in favour of the practical argument that force cannot be used in the existing international situation without doing more harm than good. It would be right to accept pacifism if this could be established, or if reasons cannot be given for believing it to be untrue.

What, then, since pacifism must be judged accordingly, seem to be the most likely results of its adoption?

In estimating the likely results of the adoption of pacifism by the United Kingdom, it is necessary to consider two possible sets of circumstances. We must consider what would happen if all other countries adopted pacifism simultaneously, and what would happen if no nation, or only some non-Fascist nations, followed the example. If every country was simultaneously converted to pacifism, the age of wars would be over. That is self-evident. If, moreover, other countries adopted pacifism first, then it would clearly be right for Britain to do so, as its defence services would be a waste of money, and their continued existence might frighten other countries into abandoning their pacifism. Again, if the adoption of pacifism by Britain would lead others to emulate its policy, then clearly Britain would gain, and also benefit mankind, by setting such an example.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence for regarding the universal adoption of pacifism as possible. No nation in history has ever adopted complete pacifism as its policy, nor even faintly approached doing so. No nation has ever given the smallest indication of placing peace before defence, which is the preference accepted in the decision not to resort to war in any circumstances. The horrors of war, to which the pacifists point as overwhelming reasons for refusing to fight, have not made the nations less determined to defend themselves. The level of armaments, higher now than ever before, is the external reflection of the judgment of each nation that there are worse things than war. There have been four considerable wars, including one civil war, since the Great War ended. In England during the Great War there were about 16,000 male pacifists, or one in a thousand of the adult

male population. In France there were fewer. In the year 1937 pacifism is classed as a heresy in three Great European Powers, and the Governments punish those who advocate it. Nor, in all history, has any nation adopted pacifism as even an internal policy. All countries, even the most humane and kindly and peace-loving, maintain police forces. These police forces continually employ force to maintain the law, and the force is overwhelmingly and ruthlessly employed if necessary. Pacifism does not offer us hope of its world-wide acceptance, and it does not seem that we need further consider that as among the possible advantages.

It is not, however, utterly inconceivable that some of the non-Fascist countries might become pacifist. If they refused to fight under any circumstances, they would be saved the horror of war, but they would not escape some very disagreeable sufferings.

It is necessary to consider with some care what might be expected as a result of the adoption of pacifism by the British, and perhaps other democratic Governments. The country, of course, would then be defenceless against aggression. Would foreign nations which have anything to gain, emotionally or materially, from subordinating Britain take advantage of this defencelessness or not? It seems to be the common assumption of the great majority of pacifists that they would not. They build considerably on the results of an appeal to the higher self of the dictators. The evidence usually produced is that relatively moderately-armed Scandinavian countries are also moderately secure. These countries are, of course, far from defenceless, and there is no considerable body of opinion in Scandinavia that they should render themselves entirely defenceless. On the contrary, the Scandinavian countries are re-arming, under Left Wing Governments and with full popular support. They are also discussing the possibility of military co-operation against aggression. The relative security of the Scandinavian countries really arises from their good fortune in possessing nothing much in property which anyone covets, nor the 'Great Power' prestige which anyone wishes to destroy. It does not come from their relative defencelessness at all.

The results of defencelessness, that is, vary according to the economic and international position of the defenceless

group. It may not particularly matter to the natives of some small island in the South Seas, which no one envies or covets, that they possess no anti-aircraft guns. But it is a very different matter, say, for Soviet Russia, to have none. Indeed, the verdict of history, and an observing judgment of the present, is that defencelessness is extremely dangerous, and leads to national or racial subjugation by nations which are in a self-assertive and pugnacious mood. The natives, for example, who found themselves in the way of self-assertive and pugnacious British Imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century were not saved from subjugation by their defencelessness. They were conquered and their lands were taken. Similarly, the Jews in Germany and elsewhere have not been saved by non-resistance and defencelessness. They have been brutally persecuted and subjugated. China was relatively defenceless when self-assertive and pugnacious Japanese Imperialism invaded and seized Manchukuo in 1931 and 1932, and then took up the process of conquest again in 1937. The Abyssinians have been subjugated and their land taken, though they, too, were relatively defenceless. It may be said that China and Abyssinia made a mistake in offering resistance. Had they not done so, they would be safe. This is absurd. China and Abyssinia were not armed to anything like the point where they brought trouble on themselves by provocation, or as a result of competitive armaments. They were not invaded because the invader said: 'You threaten me and my rights by your armaments, and therefore I shall conquer you.' They were attacked because they possessed certain things which the invader wanted for himself, and which he has now taken. Mussolini's heart and higher self were not, as the pacifists predicted, touched at all by the pathetic helplessness of the men, women, and children of Abyssinia. If they had not defended themselves, they would have been subjugated earlier. But if China in 1931 or 1937 had possessed an air force capable of reducing Tokyo to ruins, it seems very probable that Japan would not be eating away the integrity of China to-day. If Haile Selassie had possessed 500 fighting aircraft and supplies of poison gas in August 1935, he would still be Emperor of Abyssinia. Mussolini could get territory much more valuable than Abyssinia in the British Empire. He selected

Abyssinia precisely because she was defenceless. He left Britain alone, precisely because she was not.

In other words, when the spirit of self-assertion and domination is in control of any nation, defencelessness does not save other nations from conquest and invasion. If, let us say, France were the only other nation in the world, Britain could afford to be defenceless, and yet enjoy security. For France is not aggressive, acquisitive, assertive, just as Scandinavia is none of those things. But Germany, Italy, and Japan are aggressive. And it is those nations who make the cost of defencelessness so high. Perhaps the position of Czecho-Slovakia is the clearest case in point. If that country now disarmed, and announced that it would not fight under any circumstances, its subjugation by Germany would be inevitable. It is, of course, possible to believe the reverse. The German Jews did. But it is not possible for those who comprehend the Nazi state of mind and the spirit of the Third Reich.

The reason why pacifism has not proved a protection against Fascism is because Fascists do not share the pacifist belief that violence is wrong. They will, therefore, secure what they believe to be good, by violence if necessary, unless they feel that a resort to violence will bring upon Fascism itself the dangers of military defeat, or such heavy losses as to outweigh likely gains. This absence of belief in the badness of force is seen in the internal history of the once-democratic countries which Fascism now rules. In a democratic country the parliamentary parties act under a self-imposed rule not to resort to violence in the settlement of political disputes. It is this agreement which is the working basis of all democratic systems. Governments are content to try to get their own way, not by suppressing the opposition, but by defeating it in open and peaceful elections. They give the opposition a position of constitutional importance, listen to its criticism, do not attempt any intolerable outrage upon its feelings, and compromise with it. Oppositions do not seek to overthrow Governments, but admit and observe their right to govern, as long as they leave their opponents in a position of equality in the successive electoral contests for power. Toleration and compromise and abstention from violence are the rules of the democratic system. But they are all

specifically rejected by Fascism. Fascism does much more than defeat its opponents. It destroys a whole system. It does more than form a Government. It destroys the means whereby that Government can be peacefully defeated. Pacifists must fairly note that the opponents of Fascism are not suppressed because they make a show of violence. They, for their part, desire to maintain the democratic peace. They believe in its virtues. They wish to practise free discussion and free elections, and to maintain the process of peaceful change. But their willingness to abide by the rules, to respect their opponents' rights, to forsake violence, does not save them. It exposes them only to the more crushing oppression. This is not theory. It has happened.

Now if the assumptions of pacifism are correct, it should not have happened. The Catholics, Liberals, Jews, and Socialists in Germany did not prepare to defend their rights by force. They did not reply to force by force. They adopted the pacifist policy of non-resistance. According to pacifists, this should have rendered Hitler's position impossible. His own heart should have been softened. The Brownshirts and Blackshirts should have been touched and moved, and gradually they should have begun to feel ashamed of themselves and desisted from persecution. Domestic and international public opinion would play its part in making the dictator's position morally untenable. This psychological process would be started by the power of the moral example set by the non-resisters. Democracy would be re-introduced. Or, better still, Hitler should never have resorted to violence at all, since none was threatened against him. Unfortunately, the theory of pacifism did not work. To avoid persecution it is not enough to be a physical non-resister. It is necessary to be a spiritual and moral and intellectual non-resister as well. In other words, it is necessary to be a slave. The German non-resisters have discovered this truth, if their English comrades have not.

If it is true that defencelessness does not ensure immunity from conquest, let us make an estimate of the result of the adoption of pacifism by the non-Fascist countries.

It seems inevitable that Fascism would overrun the world. An early consequence would be the destruction of the British Empire, the seizure of British colonies, and the invasion and

conquest of all the Dominions except perhaps Canada, where the values of peace and democracy might be saved by the military power of the United States. It also seems inevitable that Britain itself would be invaded and conquered by Germany, or Italy, or both. France would be humbled and Czechoslovakia destroyed, and all the small nations would live on Fascist sufferance. After Britain, the outstanding victim marked out for doom would be the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. would not be allowed to exist for very long in a world at the mercy of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Her territories would be violated from east to west, and a pro-Fascist dictatorship established. Socialism in the small countries, like Sweden, would be exterminated. Indeed, socialism and democracy and pacifism would be exterminated throughout the world for perhaps 200 years. These results appear the probable outcome, within a few years, of the policy urged upon the nation by Mr. Lansbury and Mr. Huxley. They seem equivalent to the destruction of all the moral and spiritual achievements of civilization. The only alternative form which Fascist aggression might take would be internal Fascist revolutions in the democratic countries. For in every country converted to pacifism there would be a Fascist minority which would remain unconverted. This Fascist minority would do what Mussolini did in Italy, Hitler did in Germany, and Franco tries to do in Spain. Power would be seized, democracy overthrown, and its resurrection made impossible. Pacifism would bind the now converted democratic parties not to resist the Fascist rebellion. 'Killing is wrong.' (The action of the Spanish democrats in resisting Franco and Fascism in Spain will be regarded by pacifists as immoral.)

If these are generally recognized as the likely results of pacifism, then there is not the slenderest hope that France, Britain, the Dominions, Russia, or the United States will adopt pacifism. Their peoples would be well-nigh unanimous in preferring war to such an alternative. If these countries do not adopt pacifism, none will.

If it be asked whether pacifists themselves do not consider such a prospect appalling, the answer seems to be that in general they do not consider it at all. They are, in the first place, not concerned with results of actions, but with their

'inherent values.' It is 'wrong to kill.' War is killing, therefore war is wrong, and pacifism is right. They do not class actions as good or bad according to a careful calculation of whether their net result will be good or bad. Acts are good or bad 'in themselves,' irrespective of consequences.

The second reason why pacifists take the probable consequences of pacifism so lightly is that they are shielded from recognizing them by the refusal of their fellow-citizens to adopt pacifism. It is emotionally much easier to be a pacifist in the United States, beneath the shelter of the Navy and Air Force, of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and remote from the theatre of possible wars, than in Czechoslovakia or France, beneath the menace of Hitler's armed might. In the first case, it does not appear that there is any urgent reason against being a pacifist. In the second there does. Pacifist movements are, as a matter of fact, powerful in direct proportion to the relative security of the countries in which they flourish : strong in the United States, weak in France ; and also in direct proportion to the relative security of the time : strong in peace-time, weak in war-time. This is partly because anti-pacifism becomes contagious in war, but also because war forces pacifists to face the price that will be exacted for their persistence in pacifism. Pacifists rightly claim with pride that their faith was tried in the fire of persecution during the war. The trial that was never applied was to force them to submit to the German tyranny that would have been the result of English pacifism. They were protected against the consequences of their faith in action by the refusal of the majority to share it. The majority stubbornly persisted in defending English democracy and English civilization which pacifism would have lost.

Given that the result of pacifism is the spread of Fascism throughout the world, is pacifism still a good policy? Only if the alternative policies are likely to produce results at least as frightful.

The alternative to the pacifist ideal is the ideal of world government. Both are based on a desire for justice. Pacifism, however, classifies not only injustice, but also force as evil. World government implies a use of force, but force used according to certain principles which the advocates of world government regard as beneficent.

It would be an error to believe that mankind has had no success in preventing anarchy or the settlement of disputes by violence. Over vast areas of the world man has been successful in creating peaceful societies in which war does not occur, and from which all danger of war is now eliminated. These areas are the well-organized nations. A nation is an *organized* society; and its organization for keeping peace between its various sections is the most important of all its organizations, the one without which all the others would be destroyed. For a nation must be regarded as an area reclaimed from the anarchy of violence between individuals and war between factions, and prevented from slipping back into the wilderness by the persistent observance of the principles of an organized society. These peaceful areas stand in the sharpest contrast to the world as a whole, and the kind of order that prevails in them approximates to the ideal of pacifism. Since this is so considerable an achievement, it will repay us if we ask how it has been done. Just why is it that we fear war between Germany and England, but no longer between Sussex and Wessex, which used to be in a state of chronic warfare? What is this beneficent principle which has so reduced the possible points of an outbreak of war?

The problem of creating a peaceful community is the problem of making it unnecessary and impossible for people to fight. If it is to be unnecessary for them to fight, then they must be offered some alternative defence of their rights than their own strength. If a man is offered no way of defending his rights than by arming himself, then he will arm, for he will consider his rights worth defending. If, on the other hand, he is left free to enforce on others his own conception of his rights, he will do so. Violence will prevail whenever there is no impartial 'third-party' definition of rights, and where the authority which hands down the definition cannot defend it.

If there were no defence of my home, my wife and child, save what I provided, then I would not remain individually defenceless. I would arm myself and fortify my home. I do not do these things because the defence of my home is provided for me in another way—collectively by the organized community—and I know that this defence is more formidable

than any I can provide. It is also so formidable that I know I cannot, by arming, obtain more for myself than I can by accepting the verdict by the law. Anarchy is that condition in which each man defines and defends his own rights. In order to defend his rights, as he sees them, against his possible opponent's conception of them, he must try to be stronger than his opponent. Similarly, his opponent must struggle to be stronger. But everyone cannot be the strongest. And the supremacy of the stronger is a denial of right to the weaker. Equality of rights is obtainable only when the definition of rights is impartial, and society so organizes itself that the impartial definition cannot be overthrown, is the one which is and must be accepted. This is the principle on which every existing nation is organized, and to which it owes its durability. Its external form is the law courts and the police force—the definers of right and the defenders of impartially defined right. And when we speak of the 'collapse' of civilization, it is the collapse of these principles that we have in mind.

This process has resulted in reducing the use of force to a minimum inside national areas. Force is still used, of course, as the existence of the police testifies. But it is not often used. And when it is used, it is used to defend the law and not to defy it. Force is used less often and with better consequences than in an unorganized society. Justice rules. These conditions are very nearly those which pacifism desires.

The crucial point to grasp is they could never have been achieved if pacifist principles had been followed. It was not the abandonment of force which created organized society, but the transference of force, in Sir Norman Angell's phrase, 'from the litigants to the law.'[1] Civil disarmament was made possible because the law was empowered to defend what private arms had previously attempted to guard. If authority had not been armed to defend itself it would never have stood. Civilization is the child of the marriage of law and force. Peace is thus seen to be no accident, or natural outcome of men's increasing goodness. Peace is a consequence of ordered society. War is a symptom of society without organiza-

[1] In all this section of the argument I write deeply under the influence of Sir Norman Angell's work.

tion; without an organization for preventing war, without the institutions of peace.

In other words, the very counsel which pacifists give is certain to destroy peace, not create it. In disbanding the police, the gangster is enthroned. Pacifists thus have no right to the peaceful benefits of ordered society. They have no right to the protection of the police, for the authority of the police rests on force, and pacifists disapprove of force. They should therefore implore the State to remove the protection of the police from their persons, homes, wives, and children, on the ground that force is evil, and they do not approve it. Not merely so, but they should also urge others to forgo the protection of the police. It is possible that they believe, of course, that the authority of the State does not rest on force. The fact is against them. It is precisely as a central and preponderant powerful authority has grown up, that civil war, duelling and gangsterdom have been suppressed.

After generations of ordered society, force is still necessary to secure peaceful respect for the law. Indeed, in some American cities, the police force is still unable to suppress gangsters, and in no country is crime eliminated. Nor is it merely the criminal elements that threaten peace. The Fascist–Communist tension in London in 1936 would certainly have led to widespread rioting had it not been for the police force. In the end, it might have led, if the democratic parties had practised pacifism, to the destruction of democracy and a Fascist or Communist Government. In Spain the authority of the State did not prevent a rebellion. And I have vivid memories of what happened in the city of Melbourne during a police strike a dozen years ago. Within a few days of the withdrawal of the authority of the police, rioting was taking place on the main streets, and shop windows were broken and rifled by the score, despite the enrolling of amateur policemen. The city might have been chaos in a fortnight if authority had not been restored. Justice and liberty, the result of generations of effort, would have been destroyed; as it was nothing but force saved them. If force is so little used, it is because its potential reserves are so well organized and so overwhelming.

The practical alternative in national life is not, therefore, between no force and force, but between lawless force and

lawful force; between force used to defy the law and force used to support it; between anarchy and society. Nor is it merely a choice between qualities of force. It is also a choice between quantities of force. For it is the record of history that individual, 'each-man-for-himself' force means chronic, large-scale violence and persecution, a world given over to brute strength, while lawful and beneficently-organized force creates a society of peace and liberty and justice, in which the quantity of force actually used contracts in direct proportion to the organization of order. This is to say, pacifism is a false theory. It is incorrect to believe that violence can be eliminated by the advocacy of pacifism, and by a refusal to employ force. On the contrary, pacifism hands over a community to the mercy of its violent elements, who are no longer under any restraint.

The question remains, is it practicable to apply to the world the same principles of social organization which have proved peace-keeping whenever they have been applied to areas more limited than the world?

The Covenant of the League of Nations represents such an attempt. Its principles are the principles on which all peaceful societies rest. The only difference is that they are meant to be world-wide, not just nation-wide. The Covenant provides for individual judgment to be superseded by third-party judgment and for individual defence to be replaced by collective defence. It erects a world law and supports it with force. But force, say the pacifists, is evil. Sanctions are force. Therefore sanctions are evil, and we are against them. Pacifists should, however, note that wherever just force has been used, it has brought peace. There is no area in the world where it has failed when effectively applied. Where it has failed, as in China, Spain, or in a minor degree Chicago, it has not been because there was too much, but because there was not enough force in the hands of the law relative to the force in the hands of the lawbreakers. Conversely, they must note that where these principles of social organization are not observed, in 'backward' and 'uncivilized' parts of the world now, and in the world considered as a whole now, there is war or the constant danger of it. This suggests that war and peace are not so much the result of the national badness or goodness of men, but of bad and good social organization.

Peace is a product of organization. War is a symptom of lack of organization. In the world the first step has been taken. Institutions have been created capable of declaring the law, of giving third-party judgment. In the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia, the facts were referred to third-party judgment, just as a dispute between the County Councils of Kent and Sussex would be referred to third-party judgment.

The unfulfilled principle was the absence of the means of enforcing the law. It may be said that the real difference was that Italy and Abyssinia were patriotic sovereign states, with armies, and all the paraphernalia of patriotism. They were psychologically warlike, whereas Kent and Sussex are not. This overlooks the fact that sovereign states are warlike just because there is no world organization which can remove the fear of aggression, because of which every nation is in a state of preparedness for war. As long as each nation is compelled to arm in order to have some means of defending its rights, then other nations will be driven by fear to arm also. The atmosphere becomes dangerous. Individual defence, springing from the fear of aggression, contributes to the war tendencies. Some nations, it is true, are warlike because they like it. They are animated by a will to power and conquest, by a zest to dominate, by Chauvinism. But the great majority are in the arms race against their will. It is fear of aggression which drives them into armaments, which themselves create a 'war psychology.' Therefore it is only by somehow removing the fear of aggression that peace and disarmament can be secured. The only way to remove the fear of aggression is to guarantee nations against it. And the only way to do that is to organize collective defence for all nations. Once that is achieved, peace follows. Equality of rights is organized. Peace breakers are restrained. Once it is clear that the law is too strong to be resisted, war will cease. It will be impossible to gain from it. If Mussolini had known that the nations of the world would have treated the attack upon Abyssinia precisely as they would treat an attack upon themselves, there would have been no war in 1935. As it was, the League acted more in accordance with the principles of pacifism than of an ordered society, with the result that there was war, and Abyssinia was conquered.

Two separate arguments are used by pacifists against the applicability of the laws of ordered nations to world affairs. First, it is said that it is impossible to 'keep peace by making war.' This attractive little phrase is a terrible deceiver. In our national affairs, this is precisely what is done, and with great success. We keep peace by making war on all criminal and law-breaking elements. When a law-breaker is tracked down, we inflict such punishment as is necessary to restore the law. If the law-breaker violently resists the authorities, we kill if necessary. By 'making war' we enjoy peace and security. But we do this only because we 'make war' according to certain rules. The only 'war' we permit is that waged by the law in defence of the security of the law-abiding. It is certainly impossible to keep peace by allowing any nation to make war in order to establish its rights, as it sees them, at the expense of others. It is possible to keep peace by offering equality of rights and defence to all nations, and by making it clear that the force of all—the war-making force of all—will be used to maintain the supremacy of law. The second argument is that domestic law punishes only the guilty, whereas international law would result in the killing of innocent women and children for the crime committed by their leaders. This is true. It is also true that any war, whether in defence or defiance of law, will kill the innocent. The humane course is therefore to adopt the kind of international organization which has the best chance of preventing war altogether, or of reducing its scope, duration, and frequency, so that as few innocent people are killed as possible. It is better that 100,000 women and children should be killed in defence of right than that 1,000,000 should be killed in a challenge to right. If we reject military sanctions on the ground that they will kill the guiltless, then in practice we perpetuate an international anarchy in which a much larger number of the guiltless will perish.

It is no answer for the pacifist to say that world government is the merest theorizing. We are in the realm of the theory of government as soon as we consider man's behaviour and methods of controlling it, and it is the first important step to be sure we have the right theory. The first point on which we need a decision is whether pacifism is a sound or false theory of government. Reasons have been given for believing

it to be a false and impractical theory of government. There is no single practical success of government without force to which the advocates of pacifism can point, whereas the advocates of beneficent force can point to scores of areas in the world where it is maintaining free, just, and orderly societies. They can also point to historical processes such as the unification of the warring provinces of England, Italy, and Germany as evidence of the peace-keeping qualities of beneficently organized force. The falsity of pacifism as a theory of government springs originally from a false psychology. It over-estimates man's tender emotions, and under-estimates his self-assertiveness and pugnacity.

If, however, the pacifist argues that a theory is not worth having if it will not work in time to prevent war, then he raises the question of whether the theory of pacifism or of world government is most likely to be accepted by an organized nation. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that it is Utopian to expect the conversion of any large nation to pacifism. Britain offers the pacifist the most favourable conditions in Europe. He is given freedom of speech and association, and he works upon a people which feels relatively secure from invasion or even defeat, and which still tends to think of war as a foreign adventure which can be declined without sacrifice. Even so, the number of pacifists during the Great War was as low as 16,000. The Peace Pledge Union early in 1938 had over 120,000 members who have signed the pledge: 'We renounce war and never again will we support or sanction another.' The number is not large, and past experience of pacifist movements suggests it might be incorrect to assume that all the signatories would refuse to fight under all circumstances. The terms of the pledge seem to carry the implication that war is a foreign excursion from which we should steer clear. How many would have signed a pledge on these terms: 'We refuse under any circumstances to defend our country against a Fascist invasion.' Yet this must follow from the Peace Pledge if it is truly pacifist.

On the other hand there has been a steady growth of support for the conception of world government. The Labour, Liberal, and Conservative Parties all reject pacifism outright. In varying degrees they are in favour of taking some tentative steps towards world government. The progress of the concep-

tion was roughly measured in 1934 in the National Peace Ballot. The last question and the replies to it, were :

Do you consider that if a nation insists on attacking another one the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by	Yes	No	Doubtful	Pacifists	Abstention
(*a*) Economic and non-military measures	10,096,626	639,195	27,369	14,169	862,707
(*b*) If necessary, military measures	6,833,803	2,366,184	41,058	17,536	2,381,485

Thus, among 11,640,066 people, pacifism was the faith of only 17,536, or one in every 660. The remaining 659 out of every 660 were in favour of the use of force under certain circumstances, and nearly 7,000,000—well over half—gave their approval to military sanctions, i.e. the defence of the supremacy of the law by force if need be. It is certainly true that since 1934 there has been a growth of pacifism, as the progress of the Peace Pledge Union proves, and a corresponding decline in popular faith in the practicability of collective security. But the comparison is too overwhelming to need labouring.

Moreover, if the theory of beneficently organized force is correct, if it is true that the condition of peace is the transference of force 'from the litigants to the law,' then education and propaganda will convert more and more people to accept it. The creation of successful national governments based on the principles of law backed by force are a standing example of what can be achieved, and a model for world government, to which the League of Nations supporter can point as evidence that he is on the right track. But the pacifist can point to no single successful example of a pacifist community. Indeed, he is in the unhappy position of owing his own domestic security to the operation of principles which he denounces as evil.

The psychological obstacle to pacifism is the preference of every nation for defence rather than peace. That is, if it cannot defend itself except by fighting, then it will prefer to fight. The requirement of any peace system is therefore that it will make both defence and peace possible at the same time. This is the object of the collective system, whereas pacifism offers peace only at the price of defencelessness in a world of prowling aggressors.

In conclusion, note that the force of such arguments has not been lost upon distinguished war-time pacifists. The situation which the pre-war pacifist confronted was profoundly different from that which now exists. The forces making for world government are now incomparably stronger. Before the war, it could be impressively argued that world government was an utterly Utopian conception, and that the advocacy of pacifism did really offer the best hope of escaping from war. Even so, as we have seen, so few accepted the argument that when the war came, pacifism had not the smallest effect in delaying, averting, or shortening it. Reasons have been given for believing that the position is now reversed. Pacifism is farther from our reach than is world government.

In another way the problem has changed. Before 1914, war was regarded as natural and even as a good thing by large sections of opinion. The results achieved by the pacifist movement in preaching the superior advantages of peace and the injustice and futility of war are of great value, and that work needs continuing. It is being continued, both by pacifists and by the great mass of non-pacifist supporters of the principles of the League. But in this field victory is really achieved. Desire for peace and hatred of war are ruling passions in the democracies, and even the dictators praise peace. The problem now is not to get war condemned, but to get it averted. The problem now is to reduce the use of force in international relations and to make it the servant of law when it is used.

In the declarations of the war-time pacifist organizations and leaders,[1] it was the 'sanctity of human life' which was taken as the ample basis of pacifism. At the first conference of the No Conscription Fellowship in November 1915 this basis of membership was adopted. 'The No Conscription Fellowship is an organization of men . . . who will refuse from conscientious motives to bear arms, because they consider human life to be sacred, and cannot therefore assume the responsibility of inflicting death.' In his chairman's address to the Conference, Mr. Clifford Allen, now Lord Allen, moved a resolution in which it was stated that conscription 'must destroy the sanctity of human life.'

In recent declarations of leading pacifists, the emphasis is

[1] Quoted in Robert and Barbara Donington's *The Citizen Faces War*, a book to which I am generally in debt.

changed. 'The pacifist,' says Mr. Fenner Brockway, 'must not be judged by the purity of his principles, but by the degree to which he lessens by his contribution to life the amount of violence and bloodshed in the world.' (Reported in the *War Resister*, September 1934.) In his book, *Britain's Political Future*, Lord Allen of Hurtwood says that the loss of some hundreds of lives in the applying of forceful police sanctions, and the loss of some millions in an anarchic world war, are not the same in principle. 'Let us cease to speak of pacifism only in terms of abstaining from force, and come to think of it as much or more in terms of cultivating reason. . . . It is not by appealing to men to refrain from evil that we shall most quickly make them good and peaceable, but by the building of institutions through which they may develop the habits of goodness and peace.'

The change in attitude is very marked. It seems due to two things: first, the uneven but gradual approach of world government towards the practicable; and second, a moral and intellectual development inside the older pacifist movement which has led some of its leaders to judge the validity of spiritual principles according to the effect their acceptance has upon the future happiness of the world.

5. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND DICTATORSHIP

by

R. H. S. CROSSMAN

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND DICTATORSHIP

WHAT should be the attitude of a Labour Government to the National Socialist regime in Germany? To ask this question is to demand a complete survey of foreign policy; for the German problem overshadows all others, and a solution of it is involved in the solution of every major question of world politics. In brief, on Anglo-German relations depends the issue of peace—or war.

In this matter the years 1914–18 have made no fundamental difference. Since March 1933 Europe has reverted to a pre-war situation. The French attempt to replace the balance of power by the League of Nations and French Hegemony has failed. The British attempt to restore 'normal' international relations, while ensuring that German military power should not menace peace, has failed also. We have returned to a system of uneasy alliances, and it is for a world of this sort that Labour foreign policy must be shaped.

History, however, never repeats itself. Its spiral coil has ascended until it hovers uneasily over the era of the years immediately preceding the war, and yet we are not in the same, but in an analogous situation; and while we note the analogy, we must note the differences as well. Let us list them as briefly as possible.

1. The League of Nations and the New Nationalism

In the transition period from 1918 to 1935 an attempt was made to construct a new machinery of international negotiation. The Wilsonian philosophy which inspired the creators of the League, inspired also those paragraphs of the Peace Treaties under which Central and South Eastern Europe were refashioned. Not only the League of Nations, but also the Treaty of Versailles was based on the principle of national self-determination, and the prophets of world-peace were also worshippers at the shrine of nationalism. Throughout the

world they deliberately unleashed the furies of long-oppressed minorities and gave them a moral justification in international law which they had hitherto lacked. In the new conclave of the nations of the world, each should count for one: the lamb should lie down beside the lion, and the lion should be equal to the lamb. With the old diplomacy the old recognition of the difference between major and minor powers should be annulled. Just as Tom Paine heralded the national assembly as the true expression of the interests of each individual, so the new League Council should express the interests of individual nations, and abolish once for all the supremacy of ancient privilege and power.

True the prophets of the League recognized not only the rights but the duties of nations; true they sought to lead them into the ways of peace, by curbing their oppression of minorities and softening with fair words their colonial conquests. There was, and there is a noble ideal of international conduct implicit in the Covenant, but outside Scandinavia and Great Britain scant attention was paid to it. In the rest of the world the League was the guarantor of certain national rights, those rights which were brought into being by the Versailles settlement. And it was so regarded not only by the Versailles but also by the conquered powers—and up till 1934 by Russia as well. If France held that the League was the sheet-anchor of her policy, Germany and Hungary fully agreed: for them the League was indeed the guarantor of national rights, but unfortunately not of their own particular rights! Even Stresemann regarded collaboration with it as a concession extorted willy-nilly by Germany's desperate situation.

Thus the existence of the League of Nations produced the most diverse effects on the public opinions of the different countries of the world. What was by some intended as a curb on nationalism or even as a step towards the abolition of national sovereignty, became in fact an irritant of nationalism; and, because the code of international law was closely linked to the Covenant, the new nationalism was either self-righteously law-abiding or categorically opposed to international law. Those who stood to gain by the strengthening of the League became pious adherents of international morality, while German Nationalists and Russian Communists, soon to be joined by the Fascists in Italy, denounced it as a mockery and

a deceit. The outlaws discovered a new morality in disobeying Law; standing by the principle of national rights, they denounced the instrument for the preservation of national rights; and because all international law seemed to be bound up with it, they came to denounce all international law as well.

Here, then, is our first point of difference between our present situation and that immediately preceding the war. We have now in the League of Nations an instrument of international pacification; but we have also a world divided into the partisans and the opponents of that instrument. With this new division, any semblance of an international code of good faith, universally felt to be in some degree binding, has vanished. Before the war, if we were all highwaymen, we were all gentlemen, too: now the gentlemen-highwaymen are menaced by competitors who righteously denounce the hypocrisy of a thieves' code of honour.

If this fact is neglected by many Conservatives, it is not always appreciated by Socialist writers. The former find it difficult to realize that Fascists feel no compunction in breaking the old rules of the game: the latter, by describing the pre-war system as an international anarchy or as organized hypocrisy, blur the difference between a Bismarck and a Hitler. For it is precisely the impossibility of prediction which makes our present predicament, in contrast with the pre-war period, really and truly an international anarchy. Where one side makes a virtue of breaking rules, the game has degenerated into a riot, or rather into the gradual spoliation of the gentlemen-highwaymen by the highwaymen. Pre-war treaties may not always have been kept: they were never broken *on principle*. But this is our present situation, and it is the result of the League's failure to become a universal machine for the enforcement of international law. Fascism is the organized opposition to international organization, and as such it has succeeded in demolishing that framework of international dependability which still existed in the pre-war epoch. That non-intervention, a violation of normal relations with a friendly government, has been not merely accepted, but glorified by France and Great Britain, indicates how successful has been the Fascist attack on the structure of the society of nations.

2. Economic Nationalism

Parallel with this break-up of international law goes the break-up of international trade. Before 1914 it was possible to trace a progressive movement of international economic unification. Despite tariff policies, the world was becoming an economic unity. This process was replaced during the war by an unparalled system of international economic control on the part of the allies. The resources of many empires were pooled in the stress of military exigencies, and it was proved that international economic planning is a possibility in time of war. The year 1918, however, brought a return to conservative sanity, and international planning was only retained in the efforts to extract reparations from Germany. Apart from this exception, the world tried to return to normal (i.e. pre-war) conditions and from 1925–29 it seemed almost as though this objective had been achieved. These years saw the League at the zenith of its powers, and trade almost on a pre-war scale. But the coming of the slump closed this brief St. Martin's summer, and, in 1930 began the bleak winter of economic nationalism in which we now live. And here, too, we must note a division of the world into two camps. The one, headed by Great Britain, reluctantly and self-commiseratingly bows to the *fait accompli*, still sighing for the golden age before the war; the other, glorifying in the death of an effete system, ushers in with new philosophies and new economic theories a new age of self-sufficiency and exclusive military imperialism. Just as our diplomats have been flabbergasted by Fascist diplomatic methods, so our industrialists and merchants stand horrified at the unseemly commercial methods of their Fascist rivals.

The significance of the new economic nationalism has not been fully appreciated in this country. Germany's penetration of Central and South Eastern Europe, and her claim for colonies, Japan's conquest of China, and Italy's attempted conquest of Spain are still considered by many to be attempts at old-fashioned imperialism: and for this reason hopes are still fostered that if we remain on friendly terms with these countries, we can yet share some of the spoils, or even provide the needy victors with the credits necessary for their exploitation. But the new imperialism is a *closed* imperialism of

bankrupt countries which, because they cannot obtain credit, reject the credit system *in toto*. They seek a self-sufficiency which can be obtained only by monopoly control; and they seek it because they could not obtain economic stability under the post-war system of international finance. Once they have made a virtue of their defects, once they have unbalanced their budgets beyond repair, there is—*pace* Dr. Schacht—no way of returning to the fold. Without bankruptcy, neither Germany nor Italy nor Japan can become partners in the restoration of a pre-war system of commerce. But no dictator can afford to be discharged from his bankruptcy by French or British or American commissioners. They must live—or die—by economic nationalism, and until they die no sane British capitalist would sleep easy in his bed.

3. The Conflict of Ideologies

And yet the British capitalist fears above all else the end of the present regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan. This is the third fact which we must notice as distinguishing the pre-war epoch from our own. I doubt if, before the war, British or French big business would have shed many tears over the Tsar's fall, or the arrival of a democratic regime in Germany. Yet Kaiserism and Tsarism were far less inimical to their interests than modern Fascism. We have here a factor of inestimable importance, the emergence of an ideology potent enough to blind men to their patent interests. The belief that Fascism was the bulwark against Bolshevism enabled the Fascist to attain power in his own country; now it provides him with foreign victims who, while their safes are rifled, thank the burglar for his protection.

This paradoxical situation is rendered possible by the existence of the U.S.S.R. But it is not the part which the U.S.S.R. *really* plays in world politics, but the part which Communists and Fascists alike pretend that she plays, which is here significant. Since 1934 the U.S.S.R. has been an orderly member of the League fraternity. Since 1926 there has been no chance in any country of a revolution organized by Communists under the orders of the Third International. Russian Communism has become an article for Russian consumption, Russia a nation-state serving in its foreign policy

its own national interests. Where the ideology of Communism conflicts with Russian interests, small concessions may be made, as in Spain, or none at all, as in China where Russia has given less help even than France or Britain. At least Mr. Baldwin had to expel Sir Samuel Hoare—for a time—when British democracy tried to take the League seriously. Stalin need not even do that, since Trotskyism is a label which can easily be attached to anyone who takes International Communism too seriously.

All that survives indeed of world-revolution is the name of its organization. The actual policy of Communists throughout the world is defence of democracy and the League, and a ceaseless propaganda for a united front for this conservative object. Meanwhile a Fascist International has been formed for the express purpose of combating Communism. Unlike its shadow opponent, this International is militant in the extreme. Its agents are to be found in every democratic country, its money is behind many conservative papers, its voice can be heard on most wave-lengths and in most languages. The crusade against Bolshevism and Internationalism is the finest international organization which the world has seen. It is a revolutionary organization with the single-minded purpose of hypnotizing its opponents before it robs them; and the fear of Communism is the bright light which is flashed before the eyes of the wealthy patient, who fortunately does not know the eminent respectability of Bolshevist policy.

4. The Confused State of British Public Opinion

The last new factor which we must notice is the character of British public opinion. Before 1914 there had been difference in detail between the foreign policies of Conservative and Liberal Governments: there had grown up, since the Boer War, even deeper differences between sections of the Liberal Party. But there had been agreement on one major point: that British interests and imperial interests were the concern of British statesmen, and that these interests must be defended, if need be, by force of arms. This agreement had enabled foreign policy to be lifted out of the arena of party politics and controlled by full-time experts. The nation assumed, whether rightly or wrongly, that, given these premises, the job had better be done quietly and confidentially.

The Great War of 1914–18 was the first war which demanded of all the major countries of the world an effort on a truly national scale. Not professional armies, not even conscript armies, but whole peoples were engaged, and blockades and air-raids brought the war into the very homes of the working-classes. In this sense, it was a democratic war, just as the Treaty of Versailles was a democratic peace. Lloyd George got a popular mandate in 1918 both for his vindictive reparations policy and for the attempt to grant to the oppressed minorities of Central Europe national self-determination. That the peoples were misinformed is immaterial: they believed that, through their elected representatives and the new open diplomacy, the bad old system of confidential negotiation was to be replaced by the democratic machinery of the League.

Thus from 1918 on, foreign policy became an element in party warfare. There grew up a Conservative and a Progressive foreign policy, and with the fissure and gradual decay of the Liberal Party, these two foreign policies became associated with the Conservatism and Labour. Crudely speaking, the Conservative Party tried to operate according to the pre-war traditions within the changed circumstances, the Labour Party to impose the new League methods upon the Foreign Office traditionalists. The actual differences in results may have been small, but the psychological difference was enormous both inside and outside the country. Labour statesmen felt themselves at home in Geneva, strangers in the Foreign Office: Conservatives, on the other hand, were always trying to introduce a little Vansittart 'common sense' into the vulgar speech-making of Geneva. As a result the chief successes in foreign policy were scored by Labour Ministers who made up for their inexperience by their simple belief that a new world order must at all costs be established. Such idealism had its effect even on the French who preferred it to the stiff-necked insincerity of the Tories.

But below the surface of party warfare, another far profounder change was taking place. Public opinion was roughly divided into three groups: (1) 'never again' isolationists on the American model, who fought shy of all 'foreign entanglements' and so condemned the League as involving the country in new obligations abroad; (2) 'never again' pacifists who

believed quite simply that war was wicked and that unilateral disarmament was the one way to peace; and (3) League of Nations enthusiasts who saw in the new machinery of the League the one instrument for the prevention of war. When the war fever died down the prevalent British mood was a *peace mood,* and all three groups were exclusively concerned with the avoidance of war. This mood was perhaps peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon countries, and, had it not been for the activities of the L.N.U., the British version would have been hardly distinguishable from the American. Both were rooted in an ethical revulsion from violence, combined with a judgment, more acceptable to the prosperous victors than to the impoverished conquered, that no war was really worth while. This judgment was epitomized every Armistice Day in the slogan: 'It must not happen again.'

This mood of pacifism was capitalized, after 1925 with ever-growing success, by the propaganda of the L.N.U. The L.N.U. was the most successful organization of its kind since the Anti-Corn-Law League. By the devoted work of thousands of idealists it created a public opinion favourable to the full operation of the Covenant, and the whole-hearted co-operation of Britain in the organization of peace. Hundreds of thousands of people in this country began to believe that a new era had dawned, that war could be banished and even that war had been banished. The positive needs of Europe, according to this new gospel, were three in number: disarmament, fair play for Germany, and an International Police Force. The third of these remained a distant vision; but from 1926 on the first two became the foreign policy of most progressively minded people irrespective of party. War, they believed, could be abolished by realizing these two aims. It is easy in retrospect to jeer at the blind optimism of this policy, but such easy ridicule shows a lack of historical thinking. Given favourable economic conditions, given a Stresemann with better health, it might possibly have succeeded. At least it was the one policy which we could have forced upon France if our statesmen had given it whole-hearted support. But this support was not forthcoming, and Philip Snowden's performance at the Hague in the summer of 1929 showed how easily even a Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer could succumb to the temptation of scoring easy victories which played into

the hands of the German Nationalists. Already by 1932 it was clear that the policy had failed, and that as the Nazi electoral successes grew, so France's resistance to disarmament would also grow.

At this point the peculiar problems of democracy manifested themselves. Progressives in this country had learnt to contrast the pre-war 'international anarchy' with the new dispensation. They had come to believe that none but reactionaries could talk about armaments or suggest that power politics still existed. The League for them was invested with a religious glamour: dreaming of an ideal they had come to identify that ideal with facts which were by no means ideal. Their foreign policy was concerned with the operation of an international order which had never existed even before 1929, and which after 1930 could not possibly exist, at least for the next ten years. Whereas war could be exorcised up till 1929 by simply asserting 'it shall not happen again,' after 1930 it could not, because there were now potential warmongers about who refused to murmur this exorcism in unison with the virtuous victors of Versailles. If it takes two quarrellers to make a quarrel, it takes two pacifists to make a peace. Whereas treaty-revision and disarmament were sound policy while German democracy was strong, they were madness when the tide of German Nationalism was rising. The Emergency Decrees of Brüning were the death blow not only of German democracy but also of the plans of progressive internationalists throughout the world. Unfortunately the S.P.D. in Germany and the progressives in England refused to recognize what had happened.

In 1931 Sir John Simon succeeded to Mr. Arthur Henderson as the first Foreign Minister of the National Government. This government in spite of its Conservative policy, relied on the votes of millions of non-Conservative voters, most of them supporters of the L.N.U. In this situation the L.N.U. was able to divert the Government from furthering imperialist interests, but could not force it to adopt a whole-hearted League policy. Thus, the Government, while doing nothing to strengthen the League in Europe or the Far East, also did nothing to protect British interests there: and, unable to resist the pacifist feeling in the country, shirked the problem of rearmament which, since the advent of Hitler in 1933, had

become increasingly urgent. It pursued neither its own natural policy—rearmament combined with an Italian understanding—nor the L.N.U. policy of enforcing the authority of the League at all costs. It could not do the first without sacrificing Abyssinia and losing the elections of 1935. It could not do the second without unseating Mussolini. Disliking both, it decided to do neither, and to sit tight. Once it had won the General Election of 1935, the National Government could quietly jettison the policy which had given it victory.

Thus the country was allowed to drift into a mood of pacifism in which any energetic foreign policy was condemned as war-mongering: and meanwhile the League was dying because the National Government refused to take energetic action. Conservative patronage killed a league in which Conservatives never believed. And when they had killed it, they were able to denounce the folly of its supporters!

Meanwhile the Labour Party had also been seduced into a mood of optimistic self-deception. Nurtured on the pure gospel of 'League Action' it had evolved a foreign policy which had relevance only to a situation where the League was functioning efficiently and where there were no potential aggressors strong enough to challenge it. In the Fulham by-election and in the Peace Ballot, the Party made easy capital out of a dangerous mixture of pacifism and L.N.U. propaganda. The Peace Ballot was conducted in 1934 when German rearmament was already under way, Japan had seized Manchuria, and Italy was preparing to invade Abyssinia. By now rearmament by France and Great Britain was the one measure which would have made the threat of sanctions a reality. Faced by two countries prepared for the sake of the League's authority to rearm and then rearm again, Mussolini might possibly have believed that those two countries would bring the League into action, and might possibly have climbed down. But Labour was in no mood to preach rearmament for League action when it could repeat such easy slogans as 'Disarmament and the League of Nations' and win votes by repeating them. And so, instead of being the first to advocate rearmament in the name of sanctions, we were forced to accept it from the National Government when it was already too late to save the League, or to prevent aggression in China or in Abyssinia or in Spain.

British public opinion is still in 1938 dispirited and confused : it is still unable to realize that an entirely new situation has arisen in which the hopes and policies of the post-war period have no relevance. Pacifism whether of the 'no entanglements' or of the 'disarmament and the League' type imply in our present European situation a blank refusal to have a foreign policy at all. To add rearmament to either is to render it not a whit less meaningless. A 'no entanglements' policy was at least defensible when no unsatisfied power was strong enough to challenge us : it meant simply leaving the control of affairs to France. 'Disarmament and the League' was defensible while the German democracy might still be strengthened by reasonable concessions and while the League still enjoyed some respect. But simply to modify these two policies now by the magic word 'rearmament' is to confess that the new situation has not been understood. Yet public opinion in this country seems unable at present to do more than this. It accepts the need of armaments, but refuses to consider for what objects and in what contingencies they should be used. Echoing its government, it dubs anyone who has a policy a warmonger and a fanatic.

The Position of Germany in World Politics

Bearing in mind the differences we have noted, let us examine as briefly as possible the balance of power in the winter of 1937–38. How little precision is possible ! In 1914 it could be stated with fair probability which way the majority of countries would go : now any such statement would be a wild guess. We are back in 1898.

We can, however, affirm that there are three major aggressor countries and four major 'satisfied' powers, Great Britain, France, Russia, and the U.S.A. Germany, Italy, and Japan are all economically unsound, militarily proficient, and open opponents not only of the League of Nations, but of the recognized code of international law. They all dream of building exclusive economic empires, and at present they are collaborating far more effectually than the four satisfied powers. If you want an example of collective security in actual working operation you must turn to the anti-Communist League, which, without a Covenant, is in fact providing

a system of mutual insurance for aggressors. Any one of them can stifle opposition to its schemes by the unspoken threat that sanctions (say against Italy) will mean war (say against Germany). And so all three can continue fearless upon their aggressive way.

Besides these seven major powers, there is a host of smaller countries whose attitude will be determined almost exclusively by the march of events. Not even Czechoslovakia or Sweden can be reckoned an indubitable opponent of the Fascists, while countries like Poland and Jugoslavia are open in their willingness to give their support to the highest bidder. Furthermore, the party conflicts in these countries is largely determined by the relative influence exerted in them by the major powers. Roumania and Brazil are only two instances of this phenomenon.

In this struggle the position of Germany is central and decisive. Geographically, she is situated in a position where, by absorbing Austria, she can render the Franco-Soviet Pact a mere formula, and extend her economic influence throughout the Balkans. Economically, she is well adapted for an exchange of goods with the producers of raw materials in South-Eastern Europe, though her mineral and rubber deficiencies will compel her to keep up her trade connections elsewhere. Militarily, she is now powerful enough to prevent any satisfied power from declaring war upon another state. Though she cannot perhaps risk war herself, she can gain her ends by playing on the risk of war, and by her anti-Commintern propaganda.

But what are the Nazi objectives? To this question no simple answer can be given. If it could, how much easier our diplomacy would be! But National Socialist foreign policy is essentially opportunist: *it strikes wherever it observes weakness*; it prepares plans for many emergencies, is not afraid of inconsistency, and is prepared to scrap a half-won victory, if it observes an easier triumph to be won elsewhere. It is no use discussing whether colonies or territorial advance in Europe is Hitler's real intention. Both are real intentions, and only circumstances can decide which at any moment he will prefer. For the sake of a western pact, he might be prepared to surrender temporarily his colonial claims. Equally, an understanding with Stalin might enable him to throw his whole pressure against the colonial powers. Only three

factors limit the range of his opportunism: (1) his Pan-Germanism which draws him irresistibly towards countries with German minorities; (2) his need for raw materials and for markets for the products of the heavy industries; and (3) the financial insolvency of his country which forces him to seek markets in countries weak enough to become the monopoly of German enterprise. The only alternative is a devaluation which would terrify a nation with the German experience of inflation.

The final dismissal of Dr. Schacht shows that Germany, under the Nazi regime, will never return to the international credit system. Her economic empire must be a currency empire too: Nazi Germany cannot afford to accept loans from abroad except on her own terms, or to surrender *autarchie* without bankrupting vested interests too powerful to be gainsaid. It is not a question of whether Germany is willing to co-operate in the lowering of the tariff barriers; she *cannot* do so, because she is held tight within the system of military self-sufficiency which she had imposed upon herself. Hitler has burnt his bridges and must intensify his economic nationalism—or go under. He may be willing to surrender this or that particular field of exploitation, but some field of exclusive exploitation must be found, and kept. Hence the hectic activity with which Nazi propaganda is pushed into every country of the world in search for weak points where advance may somehow be made.

There are some who believe that the Nazi economic system must break down. This belief is based not on observation but on hope. Nazi expansion may be thwarted, but there is almost no limit to the lowering of the standard of living which a totalitarian regime can impose on the masses. A failure to find markets, or to obtain necessary raw materials will mean simply the deterioration of the worker's lot, and an intensification of nationalist propaganda designed to push the blame upon the satisfied powers. Opposition comes no doubt from German industrialists and financiers, but that opposition is sterilized by the fact that they have no alternative to offer which does not involve the destruction of the Nazi Party; and to destroy the Nazi Party is to prepare the way for a Socialist revolution. Revolution can only come from below, and in existing circumstances, it is infinitely less likely than

war. Thus, if we simply advocate resistance to German expansion, there can only be one result, a result which no reponsible politician can desire. If on the other hand we press for concessions to Germany's just demands, the concessions will be appreciated, but not their justice.

For we must be perfectly clear that the nationalist temper of a Hitler cannot conceive of justice in its relations to a non-German world. Justice for him is that which strengthens Germany, injustice the reverse. There is no dishonesty or diabolical cleverness in this. It is simply the characteristic of the fanatic, be he religious, economic, or political. De Valera is not a dishonest man, but he regards Great Britain as an obstacle to Irish freedom, and in order to accomplish Irish freedom, he is willing in his relations with this country to take every advantage of every occasion. That moral principles can play a part in the relations between Ireland and Great Britain, is an idea which is meaningless to him because he assumes the morality is all on his side. It so happens that in the domestic problems of Ireland, De Valera is a high-minded and religious democrat, but this does not influence his policy with regard to Great Britain or to Ulster. Here his nationalism is paramount and destroys all conceptions of 'fair play.' In this respect Hitler resembles De Valera. In internal German affairs he has a morality (however distasteful we may find it); in foreign policy, however, every principle is subjugated to the one overwhelming passion of Pan-German expansion, and it is this passion which he has successfully injected into the veins of the Nazi State. De Valera wants an independent Ireland, and nothing will turn him from his purpose. Hitler wants a Pan-German State, and, whatever his protestations, that will be his aim until he dies. We shall not go far wrong in deciding to frame our policy towards Germany on the assumption that we have here the problem of Ireland magnified to a world scale.

For this reason we must reckon with limitless tergiversations in German policy. No ally, not Italy nor Japan, can be so loyal that Hitler will not betray him for the sake of Germany, as he betrayed Röhm in 1934. No enemy is so detested that he may not be wooed, and won, to save Germany—not even Stalin. The peculiar instability of the present balance of power is due to this fact that the three aggressor nations are

all of them inspired with a single-minded ambition which makes any combination immediately insecure if it is not immediately useful to the parties concerned. What is more, Fascist opportunism permits of an equal and opposite opportunism on the part of its present opponents; as they grasp this fact, so they will increase the international instability.

The Anti-Fascist Front

In such a world it seems obvious to many that the antidote to the Fascist International is an anti-Fascist Front, built round the alliance of England, France, and Russia, and depending on America for whatever assistance may be forthcoming from that quarter. This policy is popular with phrase-makers and ideologues, but its simplicity in formulation hides the difficulties in its accomplishment. Let us observe these difficulties one by one.

(i) The Collective Security of an anti-Fascist Front, even if it is called a League of Nations, will only be effective if its participants are all prepared to take overwhelming and immediate risks of war. The Dictators *are* prepared to take these risks—and are therefore successful. But will the democratic powers, where public opinion can overturn governments, take similar risks? It is no use propounding a policy which the temper of your people and the very free institutions you are defending make impossible. It is also no use continuing to propound a policy which *would* have been effective if it had been realized before 1933. We can blame the National Government for the break-down of the League; but we must also remember that the League really has broken down, and that League policies have thereby been rendered futile. Perhaps England, France, and Russia have preponderating armaments: perhaps we can be confident that we should win the next war, if it was forced upon us. But this belief is not sufficient to justify a policy which may precipitate that war. Whether we like it or not, the people of this country are not prepared to back a foreign policy as bellicose and as risky as that of Germany. But unless the anti-Fascist Front *was* all these things, it would not win; and, unless it did win decisively, it would not be worth making.

(ii) Geographically, such a front presents considerable

difficulties. No one knows even now the effectiveness of the Franco-Soviet Pact, particularly since the Austrian catastrophe ; no one knows how Poland would react (certainly she will never enter into close combination with Russia) ; and no one can predict with certainty that France would help Prague, in the case of German interference. It is no good totting up all the small countries scattered over the globe which would support such a front. Pooled security is not achieved by such arm-chair arithmetic, but by military and naval plans worked out in advance by the General Staffs of Great Powers. Such plans could be prepared by France and Great Britain, and conceivably Russia and Czechoslovakia could be induced to co-operate, but this would mean that once and for all we were committed to preparations for the next war. Do the protagonists of the anti-Fascist Front really face this conclusion? If so they should be recruiting for the Air Force and the Navy, for the next war will not wait upon the arrival of a Labour Government.

(iii) There is one other awkward problem. An anti-Fascist Front would consolidate the alliance of the Fascist powers. It would force them in self-defence to co-operate more closely than ever before. This result could only be excused, if we were completely certain that the anti-Fascist Front would defeat its enemies. You cannot afford to strengthen your opponents, unless you are overwhelmingly superior in strength. But the anti-Fascists are not so overwhelmingly superior : if they were to win a war, it would at least be a close struggle, on whose result no one would wager highly. We have here the lessons of sanctions to study. Ineffective sanctions made Mussolini a popular hero : they created an enthusiasm for Fascism, which Fascism itself could not create. I believe that an anti-Fascist Front would have an even greater effect in consolidating opinion in Fascist countries behind the Dictators.

(iv) The advocates of the anti-Fascist Front are only too frequently 'anti-war.' 'Against War and Fascism' is their slogan, and their hatred of Hitler is only equalled by their hatred of rearmament. They advocate both an alliance of Britain, France, and Russia, and opposition to rearmament under the National Government. Such arguments are not even specious, and they are employed only to capitalize the prevailing emotions in this country in a campaign against the

Government, *regardless of the foreign repercussions of that campaign.* Moreover they fail to do even this. For the British people have a shrewd political sense: it will never give power to politicians who refuse while in opposition to face the responsibilities of government. Though it respects pacifists whose pacifism is based on profound moral convictions, it has no time for pacifists who are belligerent and opportunist and shrill. If the country is to have an anti-war policy (i.e. at all costs to avoid the risk of war) then there is no reason to turn out the National Government which is sacrificing every imperial and democratic interest for this very object.

For these reasons, the idea of an anti-Fascist Front must be abandoned, and with it all those interpretations of collective security which mean at bottom an old-fashioned alliance under modern ideological colours. They are Utopian, and they are pernicious, too; for they provide a new simplification to replace the old simplifications of 'Disarmament and Peace' at a time when we need not a fighting creed but a real understanding of the complex movements of international affairs.

The World Economic Conference and Colonial Concessions

Another simple panacea can be dismissed quite briefly. It is urged that a World Conference should be called, and that the economic grievances of the aggressor powers should be firmly and wisely removed. This solution issues from minds which cannot grasp the novel features of our modern world. It treats Hitler as though he were a sensible English businessman who simply wants a square deal, and will shake hands across a green-baize table as soon as he gets it. It neglects the facts of German *autarchie* and German nationalism which we described, and it forgets that the primary need of nation states to-day is not 'prosperity' but military security. Germany is steadfastly sacrificing the first to obtain the second, and so are Russia and France and (to a lesser degree) England. It is not prosperity, but raw materials for armaments, and food supplies for the contingency of war which are being sought, and no World Economic Conference can amicably transfer these military requirements from one state to another, at a time of unequalled international tension.

In the second place, conferences are only successful where a considerable agreement has been reached by preliminary discussion and where either there is a fundamental agreement of purpose, or one side can dictate to the other. None of those conditions is present to-day. The Fascists are aware that they have the Versailles powers on the run, and that the peoples who were victorious in the Great War will only fight to save their own skins. They have, therefore, everything to gain by delaying a settlement; for the longer they wait, the more minor burglaries they can carry out in the interval. For this reason the World Economic Conference would be another Non-Intervention Committee on a still larger scale. Taken desperately seriously by France and Great Britain, it would afford to their opponents an opportunity for such polite jesting and effrontery as they have indulged in on previous occasions.

These arguments apply also to the suggestion that peace can be maintained if only Great Britain takes the lead in returning to Germany some of her stolen colonies. Not one of the fundamental causes of dispute would be seriously modified by any colonial concessions which are within the bounds of practical politics. Nor would Germany, stirred by British magnanimity, become forthwith a law-abiding nation; nor would she lose her inferiority complex if she possesses such a thing! It is not disputed that colonies are advantageous or that Germany was unjustly deprived of them. But colonial concessions cannot be considered by themselves, nor can the colonial question be argued 'on principle' as *The Times* would have us do. In dealing with extreme nationalists, discussions of principle inevitably become either propaganda or a method of rationalizing policies whose real motives are very different. The Nazis understand the position, and to deal with them successfully we must understand it too.

Some Positive Suggestions for the Solution of the German Problem

It is high time that we turned from analysis and criticism to something more constructive. But the foregoing pages have not been valueless, if they have indicated certain general

principles upon which Labour policy should be constructed. These principles can be summarized as follows.

1. The one hope of anything like permanent peace lies in the disappearance of the dictatorships of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the introduction of real democracy into Russia, and the development of social democracy in England, France, and the U.S.A. Only where the will of rational individuals can oppose and check the policies of governments, can peace be assured.

2. Foreign policy, however, to-day cannot be based upon such a hope of permanent peace. We cannot make it our immediate objective to overthrow Fascism in other countries, nor can we work upon the hypothesis that it will be overthrown in the near future by internal forces. We must take the world as we find it, accept the existence of Fascism, and try to maintain democracy in such a world. To proclaim without qualification that our objective is peace is therefore incorrect, since this implies that we will sacrifice anything to avoid war. Our objective as Social Democrats must be the maintenance and strengthening of Social Democracy first in this country and secondly throughout the world; and if, in order to do this, we must risk war, then the Labour Party must face this risk honestly and with determination. For if we are not prepared to take risks, there is no hope of a peaceful settlement of the German problem or of any other problem.

3. Granted that our primary objective is the maintenance of Social Democracy in this country, we must be clear that no international machinery now exists by which this may be secured. There is no one to do the job for us, and it will be our task, when we gain power, to guide our democracy through an international anarchy where we must rely first and foremost on our own strength and secondarily on our friendship with France. This is the foundation of collective security upon which we can build: the superstructure has crumbled away.

4. But we must also remember that the strength of Social Democracies in other countries is a vital factor in our own security. Though we reject the formation of an anti-Fascist front, we realize the supreme importance of maintaining freedom in all countries where it still endures, and we recognize that a true community of interest can only exist between the free citizens of free nations. We are not going actively to under-

mine Fascism in Germany or Italy—at any rate not as a government—but we are going actively to support democracy in Spain and in Central Europe; and we must state in quite precise language that Great Britain, the mother of democracy, regards it as a violation of British interest, if Fascist states take steps either openly or covertly to destroy the constitutional governments of democratic powers. British interests, because we are an imperial people with world-wide obligations, coincide with the interests of world democracy. Just as we work for the establishment of free institutions throughout the Empire, so we proudly admit our interest in the growth of free institutions in countries outside our control.

5. Because we recognize that interest and duty alike demand our support of freedom in this country, in the Empire, and elsewhere, we are prepared to equip this country with all the armaments which she needs. We recognize that a powerful Britain willing to take sides in the struggle between freedom and autocracy is the only thing which can check Fascist aggression and prevent a war. For a free people, willing to face the risk of war, is a factor which no dictator can disregard. Unlike his subjects, we face it of our own free will and in spite of our natural pacifism; and already it has been demonstrated once in European history that democratic countries endure the strain, when it comes, better than their autocratic rivals.

6. To preserve our own free institutions and, as a guarantee of them, to support freedom beyond our shores, does not however imply that we can pledge ourselves in advance to any precise measures of assistance to countries invaded by aggressor powers. We will not make such pledges, because we cannot foresee precisely the circumstances of any particular act of aggression. While the League is impotent, it is futile for a Labour Government lightly to undertake precise unilateral obligations long before the emergency arises. We stand for the restoration of the League, but we do not stand for putting much reliance on sanctions before the League is restored. It is useless to invoke the League where she cannot act, and it is wicked to pose as sanctionists where we know that sanctions will never be enforced or that, if they are enforced, they will be enforced ineffectively. We should therefore make it clear that we are not prepared at present to press for the

use of sanctions by a League unable to impose them, but that we shall do everything in our power to make the League once again strong enough to play its part in the preservation of peace. If it is argued that such a policy implies the surrender of the only instrument which we possess for the preservation of peace, we should reply: 'In fact the Covenant of the League is now invoked chiefly as a method of pushing the responsibility off on to other people; to call for League action is often a way of avoiding taking an awkward initiative. The British Labour Movement is no longer prepared to accept such procrastination. Where it sees freedom in jeopardy it holds itself free to take all measures it can, in collaboration with all who will, to protect the innocent from the aggressor. To revive the League we must revive first of all the spirit of the League and this can only be done by leaving ourselves a free hand in the choice of the methods to be used in the assistance of our friends abroad.'

It is with these six guiding principles in mind that we must approach the German problem. We assume that the League is not likely in the near future to take action against an aggressor: we admit further that in the world to-day there is no collective security, and yet we refuse absolutely to stand by and watch the steady self-aggrandizement of Fascist powers. What, then, shall we say to the National Socialists, and how shall we face them?

The first thing which Labour must do is to prove its capacity in domestic issues. The foreign policy of social democracy draws its strength and vitality from its successes within its own country. Before we tackle the German problem we must prove to ourselves and to the world that free institutions are not merely a peculiar characteristic of British nationalism, but that they are the instrument by which, and by which alone, social justice can be achieved. Previous Labour Governments have excelled in foreign affairs and done little at home. To-day after six years of National Government, the most urgent task of a Labour Government, even in the furtherance of its foreign policy, is to prove that by democratic methods great social changes can be carried through. To face the Nazis on equal terms, we need to be the leaders of a peaceful revolution.

If this could be achieved, the fundamental weakness of British foreign policy would be removed. For the Government could act, and could take risks, knowing that it had the people behind it. One reason for the impotence of the National Government is that it fears to do anything which will lose it the next election. In spite of its overwhelming majority, it knows that one mistake only is needed to cast it out of power. The apathy of all, the pacifism of a growing section of our people make energetic speeches by British statesmen too obviously empty words. A government which is tolerated can risk nothing. But a Labour Government successful in home affairs would inspire very different feelings in the Nazi regime. They would fear it because it was the expression of the people's needs ; and they would know that, if it gave a lead, the people would follow. Such a government, and only such a government, could snap its fingers at Hitler without a risk of war.

The influence of internal affairs on foreign politics cannot be overestimated. They determine more than any other single factor what can and what cannot be done. The best foreign policy in the world will be totally impossible for a Labour Government, or any other government without confidence in itself and without the confidence of the people. That confidence can only be achieved by a party which has proved not only that it can rule, but that it can improve the people's lot.

Given this confidence, we must first proceed to counter Fascist propaganda in all its forms. Democracy must, to put it crudely, learn to advertise itself. We should not hesitate to broadcast in German to the people of Germany our version of the news, our belief in free institutions, and our theory of government. Whether this causes irritation or no, it must be done ; for no settlement with Germany will be secure until the Nazis have been made to understand that our belief in democracy is as passionate and better grounded than their own philosophy. Reluctance to offend their susceptibilities, or a refined display of cultured good manners neither impresses them nor inclines them to peace. They do not appreciate aristocratic gentility except as an outmoded joke ; they can only understand straight language and they can only respect people as tough as themselves. Mr. Ernest Bevin may not be as kind or as smooth-mannered as Lord Halifax, but his

style of negotiations is better suited to impress the Nazis, than the charming courtesy of a Christian peer.

The advance of democracy in this country and outspoken propaganda abroad are the two prerequisites of a proper handling of the German problem. They alone will create an atmosphere in which business can be done. Until British statesmen learn to express in simple and popular language their pride in their own country, their loathing of tyranny, and their determination to ensure a just peace, they will not produce a situation in which Hitler can be brought to reason. But granted that we could learn this lesson, the third step would be the speedy development of the economic collaboration between the British Empire, France, the Baltic countries, and, if possible, Russia. I have argued already that normal economic relations with Germany are impossible for some time to come. It is vital to show that democratic countries, which refuse to practise extreme economic nationalism, can offer each other mutual advantages of considerable value. There is no question here of an exclusive economic League. We shall exclude no one; the Fascists by their economic policy will simply exclude themselves.

The fourth step is an international conference on the African colonial question. Here there *is* a possibility of collaboration with Germany, but only if Germany is prepared to share in a new experiment in colonial administration. Labour cannot take part in any barter of colonial peoples, but it can and should be ready to work a scheme for the international control of a central African area, cut out of the colonial territories of several powers. Such an area could be developed with capital provided in fixed proportions by the several powers concerned and this capital should be administered not by private capitalists, but by a special investment board. This proposal should not only satisfy German prestige since other states, beside herself, would have sacrificed colonial territory. It would also shift the colonial question on to its proper plane and would substitute for the old imperialism a new conception of European responsibility to the African peoples. Even if Germany refused to participate, as she well might, the experiment would demonstrate the readiness of the democracies to put their theories into practice, and, in case of war, would strengthen the loyalty of the colonial peoples.

It is difficult to express the difference which these preliminary measures would make to the German situation. A British Government which openly stated its sympathy with Republican Spain and enforced non-intervention by threats of active support, a B.B.C. which proudly and self-confidently preached and practised democracy, and informed the German nation in its own language of the true facts, a British people proving in practice that by the use of parliamentary institutions social justice can be peacefully achieved—these would be factors sufficient to change the whole trend of Nazi diplomacy. They would not precipitate war ; on the contrary, they would create a situation in which negotiations for a real settlement could be begun. And if the economic collaboration of the four 'satisfied powers' achieved any success, Germany would be compelled by force of circumstance to meet our own demands. For we should have taken the initiative in foreign affairs, and unless we have the initiative we cannot expect any but dictated terms.

This situation, moreover, is the only situation in which the League could be revived, or the colonial question settled along the lines which I have suggested. A respect for law and a desire for a just and lasting peace can only be reawakened in the world by the energetic revival of democracy in this country. Our foreign policy begins at home.

But, it may be argued, to restore democracy in England, and to stimulate economic co-operation among the satisfied powers is to provoke an inevitable resistance by the Fascist powers. If this is true, and I dispute it, then we must choose between democracy and peace, and my mind at least is made up. But it is *not* true. The measures I suggest will not positively harm Germany ; they will merely render more difficult her further expansion, and so for the first time bring her to the point where she must choose between a settlement and war. To produce a situation in which the Nazis are compelled to think seriously of coming to terms with the Versailles powers is, of course, to risk war—but it is also the only chance of making a permanent peace. Until you have stood up to the Nazis you cannot negotiate with them on equal terms. That such an admission of failure on their part might cause their downfall is not a fact which need upset us too deeply.

For, though Germany is well situated for gaining successes by threat of war, she is not so well situated for fighting a war. She can win in Europe, provided it does not come to serious fighting; and for this reason she will do everything in her power to avoid it. The firmer England and France stand, the less risks will she take in Central Europe. The closer the economic co-operation between England, France, Russia, and America, the more willing she will be to make the best of her present frontiers. And it is only when she is afraid to attack that concessions can honourably be made.

What form should these concessions take? In the first place, they should be consequent on the revival of the League and explicitly accorded under the Covenant. In the second place, the Covenant and the colonial question should be entirely divorced from the Versailles Treaty. In the third place, concessions to Germany should be part of a general settlement of outstanding European problems. The German problem must never be isolated from the European problem, or the general colonial problem.

But any likelihood of a general settlement is remote. We must plan for an unsettled world, and in such a world, where there is no collective security, there is no honourable settlement with Germany to be made. It is false optimism to believe that in the immediate future we can envisage an end to the power politics of international instability. Any British Government, whatever its colour, must at the moment rely on Franco-British co-operation, and little else. Any Labour Government in the immediate future must avoid Utopian dreams either of an anti-Fascist Front or of a settlement with Germany, and expect a long period of uncertainty and insecurity, in which it cannot do all it would like for the defence of democracy in Europe. It is as useless to pledge ourselves to defend Austria and Czechoslovakia, or to use military sanctions in Spain, as it is to summon the League to do so. We cannot now say what we should do in an emergency when the balance of power shifts from day to day. The difference between our policy and that of the Government is not that the one is rigid and doctrinaire while the other is opportunist. Both must be opportunist, but we should seize every opportunity to strengthen democracy in Europe, while they seek desperately to make gentlemen's agreements with our enemies at the cost

of our friends. Better the confidence in Europe that a Labour Government, not bound by any new pledges and guarantees, will do all it can on every occasion to anticipate and prevent aggression, than the spinning of empty pacts and repetitions of formulas.

In brief, we refuse to predict to our short-term policy towards Germany, because we cannot accurately predict the situation in which that policy will be made. To our long-term policy we remain steadfastly true, and we only admit of a settlement with Germany within the framework of a revitalized League. Till then we state explicitly to this country, to the world at large, and to Germany in particular that we recognize that Great Britain, France, and the U.S A. are linked together by their common interest in the enlargement of freedom throughout the world, and that we are determined to strengthen the ties that bind us in every way, not by pacts and political promises, but by common economic endeavour and by a common belief in social justice and world peace.

6. PACIFISM, MARXISM, AND PEACE

by
GEORGE CATLIN

PACIFISM, MARXISM, AND PEACE

I

SPEAKING in August, 1935, the Bishop of Durham said: 'Justice is a higher concern than peace.' It is one aspect—although not perhaps the most important—of the English tradition, as Mr. Fraser has shown, to give to political problems a moral and religious coloration. It is, therefore, relevant to begin a discussion of peace by examining the attitude of the churches and the churchmen. That attitude is often refreshingly unexpected. In a brief pamphlet on *Abyssinia*, of 1936, Dr. Hensley Henson continued, in a denunciation of Papal complacency over the Italian campaign, 'Peace divorced from righteousness is the sorriest cant that can pollute Christian lips.' This is not an isolated opinion. The Archbishop of Canterbury has said, in confirmation, 'The use of force, of the sword, by the State is the ministry of God for the protection of the people.' Mr. Aldous Huxley suggests to me the gloss: 'The use of poison gas is the ministry of God.' . . . I am not, however, sure that the knot of one of the most complicated problems of morals can be cut by the edge even of an indignant wit. I suggest that, when Mr. Middleton Murry says that 'Socialism and the Church both sanctify the coming war: they are in league with Death,' he is—shall we say?—too sweeping; too Hogarthesque. How peace and justice rank in the hierarchy of moral value is one of the most instant problems of our contemporary world.

The Catholic Church has given to this issue prolonged consideration through the centuries. It early departed from its primitive pacifism, as it departed from its primitive and quite un-Marxian Communism. Even at the beginning it rather indicated a better way than set up a moral imperative—as the words of John the Baptist to Herod's soldiers and the relations of Peter with the centurion of Caesarea show. Just, however, as this Communism lasted on in the economy

of the monastic communities, so abstention from arms remained a command for those who followed the religious life. A monk of St. Basil who served as a soldier had to undergo a prolonged penance before he was readmitted to good standing in his Order. Centuries later Richard I regarded it as an adequate rebuttal to a Papal rebuke for his war-making and breach of treaties to send to Pope Celestine III the coat of armour of the captured Bishop of Beauvais with the words: 'Does the Holy Father recognize his son's coat?' It was doubtless this anti-militarism in example which had those pacifist consequences for the Christianized Roman Empire which Gibbon, with some exaggeration and more venom, deplores. Briefly, according to this point of view, the Christians were traitors, although unenterprising ones. The Church, however, maintained no such unified attitude as Gibbon suggests, even before its new espousals with Constantine. Thereafter, and even on into the days of chivalry and the approved Crusades, without placing the life of the soldier-patriot in the highest plane, it sought, in its catholicism, to consecrate the military mode of living and to affirm uncompromisingly its potential moral value.

The ultimate and authoritative doctrine of the Catholic Church—*quod fuit promulgatum contra manichaeos* ('promulgated against the Manichees')—began to crystallize early and received adequately clear expression in the writings of St. Augustine, from whom it was taken over by the father of Canon Law, Gratian. In St. Thomas Aquinas peace becomes a state of mind, possible for one acting under lawful and moral authority, rather than a matter of mundane conduct, whether or not in the profession of arms. There can be a just war. In St. Thomas' great work we turn up *Quaestio* xl: *utrum bellare sit semper peccatum.* 'A war for the defence of the commonwealth, and for the common good, waged for these motives and by lawful authority is no sin; but otherwise is not permissible.' (*Summ. Theol.*, II, ii, 40, i.) Aquinas will even permit just warfare to priests in extreme necessity —*in necessitatis articulo.* He follows Augustine in justifying the work of a soldier on the analogy of a magistrate, sheriff, or policeman—'just as princes lawfully defend the State with the sword against domestic breakers of the peace when they punish wrongdoers.'

This analogy seems well founded. Its repudiation is usually marked by a lack of historical sense. We must compare an international police to-day with the sheriff at the beginning of his history—we must compare equivalent historical phases. It is true that to-day a policeman presumably arrests the individual wrongdoer, whereas an international air force could be called on to bomb a capital. A policeman, however, also arrests those who abet a wrongdoer. In the Middle Ages the policeman's historical predecessor, the sheriff, with his *posse*, would have proceeded against an entire village guilty of such abetting. 'Our lord the King'—in England, if not always under the feudal law of France—would have proceeded, not only against a baron who violated the King's peace, but against all those, his men, who supported him in despite of the peace and in treason against the lord King. It can reasonably be held that all those who, from lack of courage or other reasons, support, even passively, a government guilty of breaking international law are themselves, individually, breakers of that law, and should be *in misericordia*—guilty and subject to punishment. What may, however, well outrage us is the excess of that punishment, even if we admit that no crime is greater than this—of war—against all civilization, at which they connive. At present men, moreover, do not regard war—at least, when waged by their enemies—as a punishment imposed 'for the common good and that alone,' but as a vengeance undertaken for reasons of national sovereign policy and aggrandizement.

Cardinal Cajetan, at the close of the fifteenth century, recapitulates the position of Aquinas. 'He who wages a just war acts as a judge proceeding against a criminal.' A generation later the great international lawyer and Dominican, Francesco Vittoria, concludes the discussion by reiterating, with quotations from Aquinas and Antonino of Florence, the three conditions of a 'just war,' such as alone is permissible. These are (*a*) that it be declared by public authority; (*b*) that it be for a just cause, i.e. because the enemy's action violated the law of nations; and (*c*) that it be waged with right intention, i.e. to re-establish this law. For the rest, Vittoria adds, with delightful humour, 'War cannot be just on both sides at the same time, except in a case of invincible ignorance.' Immanuel Kant carries this argument

an important stage forward when he declares that there can be no 'just war,' properly so called, without an impartial tribunal competent to decide what is just—i.e. in effect, since the breakdown of the Papacy, there have been no wars established to be just. Men have merely called their own interests just, being judge and party to their own case.

The Catholic Church had limited the right of a Christian man to take part in war to the waging of *bellum justum*—' a just war.' Protestants had no longer at their disposal the Catholic expedient for deciding what was a just war; they repudiated the international arbitration of the Pope *ratione peccati*, together with that dispensing power by which subjects were released from obligation to princes who sought to use war, as a matter ' beyond good and evil,' merely as an instrument of their realm's policy. From this embarrassment arises a prevarication in the XXXIX Articles, themselves an appendix to an Act of Parliament, which rises little higher than vulgar fraud. The English version, which alone was likely to be marked, learned, and digested by common folk, declares: ' it is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate, to wear weapons and serve in the wars.' The learned draughtsmen, lawyers, and divines, subjects of the tricky Tudors, were not unaware that, implicitly, they here ran contrary to the entire tradition of the Canon Law and the better opinion of the Fathers. Thus in the Latin text, they safeguard themselves by writing, '*justa bella*.' It is a trivial extenuation to state that the Latin, in case of conflict, was admitted to be the preferred text in these basic issues of faith and morals.

It is presumably such ambiguities that have led the late Secretary for War, Captain Duff Cooper, with vague memories of the faults of the Manichees, to suggest the trial of Canon Sheppard for heresy—a demand precedent to his denunciation of the Bishop of Birmingham on the oddly confused, but typically Protestant, ground that Bishops should find other and ' higher ' occupations in their churches than preaching about imperialism. Mr. Duff Cooper has forgotten that *every* province of conduct is subject to the admonition of an overseer in faith and morals. (I do not wish to argue here whether Bishop Barnes is not the Sir Stafford Cripps of the Anglican Church.) This irritated Erastianism of Mr. Duff

Cooper, which divides between the things of Cæsar and those of God apparently in the ratio of six to one—six days for the politician and one for the priest—called forth a well-directed rebuke from the Bishop of Southwell. This was followed, in September, by a statement by the Bishop of Chelmsford. Dr. Wilson wrote:

> 'A certain noted politician a while ago, in his best magisterial manner and with the most pompous superiority, rebuked a well-known leader of the Church for criticising his policy. No impartial judge would have regarded that noted politician as in any way the intellectual equal of the ecclesiastic.'

This interchange, however, of military invective and episcopal regrets does little to solve the radical issue: when should men fight?

It is clear that the waging of a just war, whether or not contrary to the mind of Christ (St. Matthew v, 39; xxvi, 52), Paul (which is not the same thing: Romans xii, 19; xiii, 4), Peter (Acts x, 2), and John the Baptist (St. Luke iii, 14), cannot honestly be said to be condemned by the Christian Church, although it may be by especial societies such as the Quakers. The opposite is historically untenable. It does not indeed follow that Christ, as distinct from the Church, if we choose to interpret his fairly clear words as those of a Communistic pacifist, may not have counselled passive resistance only—while the apparently opposite instance of the driving out of the money-changers can perhaps scarcely be cited with great confidence on behalf of wars in favour of national markets or of a capitalist *status quo*. I should personally hesitate to dogmatize about the mind of Christ. It does not, of course, follow that, on psychological (as distinct from religious) grounds, total non-resistance may not be the most intelligent and beneficial course, or that, in our present civilization, any war may not be inexpedient. These are different issues.

Of those issues the first—absolute pacifism as a technique of passive-resistance—has been upheld by Mr. Aldous Huxley and Mr. Middleton Murry. Mr. George Lansbury apart, this notion of a technique of non-violence has been maintained (not without practical success) by Mr. Gandhi—'a science

of pacifism, as I believe there is.' This thesis has already been discussed, in this volume, by Messrs. Durbin and Bowlby, and by Mr. Robert Fraser. It is significant to note that Mr. Gandhi apparently maintains the interesting and intelligible position that, although some men have a vocation to move the world by their entire repudiation on principle of violence, the mass of men, who have not learned what non-violence involves in sacrifice, are not entitled in its name to avoid their bread-and-butter civil duties. Pacifism must not be organized cowardice or absenteeism. Mr. Gandhi wrote, in *Young India* (1925) :

> 'I do not believe in the use of arms . . . it is contrary to the religion of Ahimsa which I profess. . . . I do not believe in retaliation, but I did not hesitate to tell the villagers of Bettiah four years ago that they who know nothing of Ahimsa were guilty of cowardice in failing to defend the honour of their womenfolk and their property by force of arms. And I have not hesitated . . . to tell the Hindus that if they do not believe in out-and-out Ahimsa and cannot practise it, they will be guilty of a crime against their religion and humanity if they fail to defend by force of arms the honour of their women against any kidnapper who chooses to take away their women. . . . Generally there are two kinds of fear in men's minds : fear of death and fear of loss of material possessions. A man of prayer and self-purification will shed the fear of death and embrace death as a boon companion, and will regard all earthly possessions as fleeting and of no account. . . . No power on earth can subdue a man who has shed these two fears.'

These are the words of a great saint who (unlike many of the men of violence) happens to be one of the most successful of living statesmen, who has practised the challenging and profoundly true principle expressed by de Ligt in the words, 'the more violence, the less revolution.' Incidentally, the distinction here between the 'inner' and the 'outer' teaching throws the most illuminating light I have found yet upon the true interpretation of the Gospels.

The second issue—empiric or conditional pacifism—has been raised (and here there is a genuine continuity in religious thought) by neo-Thomists in Belgium and Holland, and by

certain Catholic groups in this country. They find in Barthélemy de Ligt their most representative writer.[1] Although war to defend the 'vital interest' of a community may be just, is any war, they ask, really for the vital good of a country—'*pro bono communi*'—under present conditions of warfare? The same argument, although on different, non-religious grounds, has been put with singular brilliance and vigour by Mr. Bertrand Russell in his *Which Way to Peace?*

II

If the scholastic argument were applicable, in contemporary politics, with its assumption of a law of nations, an impartial, universal international arbiter and the justice of force used to maintain and execute that law, one might see no ground for disagreement with the conclusion recently reached by Mr. Winston Churchill, in his speech before the New Commonwealth Society, of 25 November 1936. Mr. Churchill then said that the New Commonwealth Society

> 'differed from other peace societies . . . in the fact that the members of it advocated the use of force against an aggressor in support of law. They considered it utterly futile to have a League of Nations or an International Court unless, behind them, there was an armed organized force capable of procuring respect for their decisions. They believed the world would one day proclaim a structure of this kind not only right but necessary, if any elevated form of human civilization was to be achieved, and even if such civilization as had developed was to be preserved and not cast down once again into the barbarism of the Dark Ages. There was nothing easier than to mock at a plan for an international force to carry out the decisions of a European, or, if possible, a world council. There was nothing easier than to marshal and magnify obvious difficulties that stood in the way, but no one could dispute the achievement of such an ideal, and its acceptance simultaneously by many countries, would be the greatest blessing that could come to mankind.'

This apparition of a Churchill to the rescue of ideals maintained by the dashed but still hopeful supporters of a sovereign

[1] Cf. *Conquest without Violence* (Routledge), 1937.

League, in alliance with Mr. Litvinov, was unexpected, but by no means empty.

The issue between an 'empiric pacifist', such as Lord Russell, and Mr. Churchill—always an advocate of intervention, even in Russia—can be stated briefly thus: if international force is used, on the supposition not of absolute moral values but of expediency, as an instrument of the League, will that, *at present*, operate as the instrument of a world federation concerned for the equitable treatment of all its citizens? Or will it be merely a noble name for, at best, an assemblage of soldiers and statesmen concerned to maintain the *status quo* and to have, as political Shylocks, their full pound of flesh; and, at the worst, for a congress of vindictive national banditti? Mr. Frank Simmonds, in one of the most provocative books ever written on the peace issue, *The Price of Peace*, maintained the pessimistic thesis, since nations would neither impair their sovereignty nor surrender their possessions. Ignoring the lesson of the late war (or, as he would have asserted, learning from it all too well), he therefore advocated for his country, the United States, a policy of political detachment and economic self-sufficiency. It is important to inquire whether Simmonds is right in his belief that countries will, in bald fact, not yield their full sovereignty. It is important to ask if Russell is right in his assertion that (howsoever 'a League War' or 'a War for Justice and Civilization' be substituted as names for that once called 'a war to end war' or 'a war to make the world safe for democracy') all inducements to fight a new just war are but new gestures of the old harlotry. *Are* the Christian Church arguments on 'the just war' in fact applicable?

Is 'the indivisibility of peace' merely a euphemism for 'the indivisibility of war;' and 'collective security' a synonym for 'collective menace?' Is not the best way of maintaining peace to maintain it—unadorned by oratory and unembroidered by diplomatic finesse? To maintain actual peace by detachment?—or (if we ourselves or the Commonwealth is attacked) by passive resistance as, for example, Denmark might have no option but to do?

First, let us consider whether a nation, attacked, may reasonably be expected in practice to be a nation of pacific

resisters. Detachment, let us note, or neutrality, when unattacked, and passive resistance when attacked are not at all the same thing. The former is Lord Beaverbrook's thesis; the second (pacifism, let us note but *not* passivism—pacific resistance; not passive obedience) is Lord Russell's. I am not confident that Lord Beaverbrook has not got the better case. Russell has a razor-like incisiveness in cutting into fragments the League which Mr. Noel Brailsford has already flayed; but he seems to me weak when he reaches his conclusions. Is the Empire, even the Commonwealth, cheerfully to be thrown away (not even handed over to international administration) as a whole burnt-offering for peace? Is it to be devoured by the Have-not Powers such as Germany, and the Never-had Powers such as Poland? 'Light lie the dust on the grave of English pride.'

Let us suppose all this. Let us suppose that it would not matter if German troops occupied part of England or demilitarized it as the Allied Powers occupied or demilitarized the Rhineland—that it would not matter if pacifists were put in concentration camps or refused freedom of discussion to spread their views, since after all the early Christians did not have freedom of discussion and still won the world.

The comment is obvious. It is difficult to see that Britain *ought* to be called upon to surrender her dependencies for the benefit of some closed economy of another nation. So long as Germany chooses to appeal to the sword she must be reminded that she lost by the sword. It is highly improbable that Britain *would* surrender these colonies on summons, whatever might be done by negotiation. Lord Russell's own supposition is precisely that there may be aggression, not discussion; and it is, to say the least, unlikely that, along this course, there would not be war, instead of peace. It is, of course, possible to argue that there will not be aggression because nations will be frightened, or morally deterred, from appropriating such trade and such lands as they require of other States by the complete lack of armaments of these nations. It seems improbable to me. The entire argument is, indeed, either a corollary to that pure and individual pacifism which has already been discussed, which says with Luther, 'I can no other'; or an ill-judged deduction from the sound observation that armaments races may lead to a

war mood and, ultimately, to war. If Britain is directly attacked, as a practical matter, no pacifist movement yet on the horizon is likely to prevent this country from being at war.

Let us, however, take a *second* step. Let us put aside the question of attack against our own shores. Let us assume for the sake of argument that (whether or not it is indifferent that a state is armed or unarmed) we may keep to neutrality if we wish—that we have the choice. The subsequent question then arises: Is it moral or prudent to maintain detachment when other nations are attacked? It will be noted that the schoolmen merely maintained that a just war was permissible —*est licitum*. Is abstention from a just war permissible or moral? Or abstention from a League war for international justice? The judicious archbishops, it will be noted, in their reply to Canon Sheppard, apparently maintained that such abstention—even personal—was not 'contrary to the mind of Christ.'

Here (however odd the statement may sound) Lords Beaverbrook and Russell stand together, along with Mr. Lansbury—and against Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Pollitt. It is these strange practical alliances which cause the greatest perplexity in the 'peace and war issue' to plain minds, and confound those who think in terms of simple 'ideologies.' The conclusion of the first group is: it is not worth while to fight *any* war of principle. There must be no bombing crusades for international well-being. However these public men disagree, they agree on this. (Lord Beaverbrook would, of course, except, as permissible crusades, wars 'for King and Country.')

Lord Russell supplements this conclusion against 'crusades for justice,' and in favour of 'collective neutrality,' by an exceedingly able argument to show why League wars should *not* be fought, in many points using the same evidence as that utilized by Mr. Noel Brailsford in his *Towards a New League*. Of the halcyon decade after the peace and the establishment of the Weimar Republic, Mr. Brailsford concludes: 'This chapter of history would have been in no essential different if the League had never existed. . . . The League originated nothing and it controlled nothing.' At the present, when Germany, Italy, and Japan are outside the League and their

plans deeply affect the sovereign interest of others of the Great Six, the League organization clearly will not be overlooked by this residue, even as a propaganda force. Some years ago Professor Lasswell, of Chicago, remarked to the writer that 'the last Great War was fought in defence of democracy; the next Greater War will be fought on behalf of the League.' Hitherto *all* wars have been, for those who entered them, 'just wars of defence.' Now all wars by League members, it may be argued, will be represented as 'just League wars.' The judgment that Russell reaches is:

> 'The League becomes part of a new technique of imperialism [or of a *bloc*], and of a new propaganda which, once more, turns idealists into war-mongers. So long as we retain separate sovereign States and our present economic system, so long will imperialism remain; and if there is a powerful sentiment in favour of the League the cleverest imperialists will find ways of enlisting this sentiment in their support. Thus what are nominally League wars, but really wars for the national interests of some dominant group in the League, will receive the support of those who hate war. The only effect of the League, in such a case, will be to mislead the pacifists and stultify their efforts. . . . A persuasive tongue is one of the chief requisites for achieving political power.'

In so far as Lord Russell's argument is a general one, applying to an indefinite future, it seems to prove far too much. He himself adds: 'It is true that, if respect for international law were sufficiently strong, peace would result in the long run; but it would result in consequence of a series of wars from which pacifists would shrink.'

Enforcement of international law *might* result in a series of wars. It is an admitted danger, and not one likely to be minimized by anyone who consults the history of the establishment of the domestic law and civil peace within the various countries of Europe, with their baronial wars, or the history of the Holy Alliance. But to say that such respect *will* result in a series of wars is a very grave and, I suggest, unwarrantable conclusion. Lord Russell appears to share the sardonic pessimism of Frank Simmonds, with his belief that sovereign States (which means the peoples constituting these States

and the makers of their public opinion) will never surrender any tittle of their sovereignty, except after defeat in war. The history of Mr. Simmonds' own country, the United States, does not bear that out. It is impossible to improve human nature unless one has a certain initial confidence in the nature of humanity, if not of politicians.

Lord Russell is right, however, that the whole inertia of humanity is on the side of war—on the side, that is, of following those traditional policies of unabated sovereignty, vigorously expounded, for example, by Treitschke, which on Treitschke's own admission issue in war. Money is the root of all peace, in the sense that if men had enough wealth, individually and distributively, they would not fight—or, more exactly, *one* great cause of fighting would be removed. But sovereignty is the root of all war. It is the very palladium of Mars, a jealous god. There is then a strong political case for balancing the excess of militarism natural to humanity, as it emerges from the primeval forest and progresses to civilization, by an obdurate and un-arguing pacifism. It is the intransigent 'hundred-per-centers,' the Telemachi, John Browns, Emily Davisons who get things done—whether it be the abolition of the gladiatorial show, or of slavery, or of the 'subjection of women.' It is difficult to have too much respect for these heroes. It is they who move the men of practical judgment, the Abraham Lincolns, into action. It does not follow that either position, national militarism, or absolute pacifism (for the whole nation here and now) is satisfactory. *Strict defensive action apart, we need Governments that can be relied upon, if they fight, only to do so to set up a super-state that shall be the final negation, not of cultural autonomies, but of local sovereignties. This, however, is certainly not the present Versailles-Treaty-enforcing situation.*

It is significant that Lord Russell's own argument for pacifism is explicitly stated to be a political one of expediency, and not one of moral principle. 'I am not a believer in the doctrine of non-resistance; I do not desire the abolition of the police; I do not hold that war is always and everywhere a crime. If an international Government existed, and were possessed of the only legally-permitted armed forces, I should be prepared to support it in suppressing rebellions, since I should regard this as the only means of making peace secure. The evil of war is quantitative, and a small war for a great

end may do more good than harm. My belief in absolute pacifism is limited to the present time.'

The case between pacifism and militarism, i.e. the belief that force has, does, and alone will decide the issues between States (frequently regarded as themselves super-personalities, eternal and unchanging, struck off by the direct intervention of the Creator), is an issue of principle. The issue between pacifism and international order is one of expediency and of the pace of progress. Such pacifists as Lord Russell are alive to the dangers of political deception and of a new disillusionment after a new hell-bath of war, and are more sceptical of man's ready acceptance of an international order than are the enthusiasts of the League of Nations Union. They need more guarantees that the war will, indeed—this time—end war, before the war is hopefully begun by 'collectively *enforcing*' peace. The issue is not incapable of adjustment. Lord Russell would fight in a war were he convinced it were indeed just. The League of Nations Union would not fight in a war were it convinced that it were unjust. These views are conceivably not irreconcilable.

A *third*, more substantial argument, indicated by Russell, reinforces the second. Behind the imposing façades of the Palace of the League at Geneva and the Palace of Peace at The Hague, Great Powers and their satellites manœuvre and counter-manœuvre in formations that appear suspiciously comparable to those of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. It is well to reflect whether the issue of such a policy may be to find ourselves half a league backwards. There are, indeed, two major differences from 1914. The new collective security, unlike the old Entente, is an association on principle open to all nations, just as the anti-Communist Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan is theoretically open to all. And, in the stead of Tsarist Russia, stands Marxist Russia. We have then, Russell argues, the Powers of Europe in the process of being grouped round Nazi Germany, which often talks as if it believes in war as a moral regeneration, and Marxist Russia, where it is orthodox to hold the theory that capitalism inevitably leads to war—two confronting *blocs*. Is there a case for substituting for enmity, founded on self-conscious righteousness, the obvious diplomatic alternative—the exploration of terms of agreement between the leading enemies?

Lord Russell is justified in supposing that, talk we never so sweetly about 'collective security' and 'the indivisibility of peace,' the prospect is not one that encourages the belief that peace will persist, or that we shall not soon be discovering the full meaning of collective insecurity and the indivisibility of war. Whether there be, or be not, 'just wars' on principle, it is the reinforced lesson of history that not all wars are such that are, thanks to propaganda, quite inevitably so called. To these objections of what we may call 'empirical pacifism' we shall return. Let us first clear up an alternative line of argument.

III

Is the statement justified that, under capitalism, war is inevitable? If so, pacifism is pious futility—but all attempts to 'preserve the peace' by an aggregation of nations, partly capitalist, around the palladins of Geneva, are pretentious folly. They only have meaning if what is euphemistically called 'the preservation of the peace' means the waging of a successful, but inevitable, war to end war, which will result in the destruction of the entire capitalist system—and also in the benefit of Russia which, for strategic reasons of air attack, is the least vulnerable of the countries involved.

The argument takes two forms. Of these the first is that war must come owing to the foreign, imperialist ventures of capitalism. It has been discussed, in a preceding article, by Mr. Jay. Is it, we may ask, in fact so orthodox for a Marxist to hold that capitalism inevitably leads, through imperialism, to war? The customary form that this argument usually assumes is that capitalists, as Mr. John Strachey urges, making smaller returns on capital invested in their home countries, are inevitably driven by the law of profit-making to invest, using aggressive monopolies as their agencies, in undeveloped and colonial countries. Equally inevitably this leads to the fight for land, imperialism, colonial rivalry and war, all as a matter of straight logic—political syllogism.

In *The Coming Struggle for Power* Mr. Strachey writes:

> 'Capitalism has for many years been in what is called its imperialism phase. It will be our task to show that this is its ultimate phase, and that its only future will consist in the working out of the last possibilities of imperialism. . . .

When capitalism has taken on its last and most monstrous form, when commercial competition has evolved into inter-imperial war, at this very moment the conflict between the two classes of society, the workers and the capitalists, is reaching its final stage. . . . It may be that the reader, while finding the last chapter a sufficiently life-like picture of what is actually happening in the world to-day, will consider the *inevitability* [italics Mr. Strachey's] of these events has not been established,' etc.

Mr. Strachey proceeds to allay the fears of the reader, and to demonstrate inevitability.

I shall not pause to examine here how far Italy's appetite for Abyssinia or the present German demand for colonies is an economic one, looking to profitable fields of investment. One might, I think, venture to challenge that assertion, even were the term 'economic' so far widened as to include, not only 'inevitable' fields for investment, but outlets for population from Milan to Eritrea. Let us rather turn to the classical exposition of the theme in Lenin's *Imperialism*, following Hobson's investigations, and in Bukharin's *Imperialism and World Economy*.

Lenin provides the classical definition for this school of Imperialism :

> 'We have seen that imperialism is, in its economic essence, monopolistic capitalism. Its historic place is determined by this fact, for monopoly born out of free competition, and precisely out of *free* competition, is the transition of the capitalist social order to a higher order.'

It may be pointed out in passing that this definition produces some difficulties for those who would explain the hesitations in foreign policy of the present British Government to a clash between their class and their imperial interests. Presumably this will be explained on the ground that the dialectical transition from national industrial capitalism to an international class based on finance capital is not complete. It will be noted that our fate is to live in this illogical middle period. After speaking with approval of those economists who define modern capitalism as export capitalism, and defining imperialism as the 'policy of conquest of finance

capital,' Bukharin proceeds to a criticism of what apparently he takes to be Norman Angell's position :

'The truth of the matter is that those who make such arguments ordinarily lose sight of all the complex functions of military power. Such power, as we have seen above, functions not only in time of war but also in times of peace to back up its finance capital in "peaceful competition." The pacifists forget that the war burdens, due to the incidence of taxation, etc., are borne mainly by the working-class, partly by the intermediary economic groupings which are being expropriated during the war (which means in the process of the greatest centralisation of production).'

Bukharin continues :

'This anarchic structure of world capitalism is expressed in two facts : world industrial crisis on the one hand, wars on the other. It is a profound error to think, as the *bourgeois* economists do, that the elimination of free competition and its replacement by capitalist monopolies would do away with industrial crises. Such economists forget one "trifle," namely, that the economic activities of a "national" economy are now conducted with a view towards world economy. . . . What has been said about crises is also true about wars. War in capitalist society is only one of the methods of capitalist competition, when the latter extends to the sphere of world economy. This is why war is an immanent law of a society producing goods under the pressure of the blind laws of a spontaneously developing world market, but it cannot be the law of a society that consciously regulates the process of production and distribution.'

He proceeds to quote Rudolf Hilferding (italics mine) :

'Violent methods,' says Hilferding, 'are *inseparably* bound up with the very essence of colonial policy, which without them would lose its capitalist meaning ; they are so much an integral element of the colonial policy as the existence of a proletariat divorced from all ownership is generally a *conditio sine qua non* of capitalism. To be in favour of a colonial policy and at the same time to talk

about eliminating its violent methods, is a dream which cannot be treated with more earnestness than the illusion that one can eliminate the proletariat while retaining capitalism.'

Herr Hilferding's argument is here sprinkled with various inevitabilities, not patent to the average man, which are reminiscent of the inevitable and 'iron' law of wages.

Bukharin, it is worth noting, by developing the above line of argument, fell into heresy. This particular book, indeed, received the approbation of Lenin, who spoke of the 'indisputable progressiveness' of capitalism—a new and militant imperialist variety beating out the old, 'peaceful' Cobdenite variety (which variety, nevertheless, it will be noted, did exist—'peaceable,' when its grosser speculators were restrained). Lenin, in this same passage, goes on to allude to the possibility—'in the abstract one can think of such a phase'—of an international system, not entirely Socialist and yet not imperialist. He points out, however, against Kautsky, that this is not the situation with which he, or anyone else, was confronted in 1915. Bukharin, however, was authoritatively held to tend to the false view that capitalism need not collapse because of its inherent contradictions domestically; but only because of a world situation in which, in backward areas, it made even more desperate and violent efforts to keep itself afloat. He is now 'a venal spy.' The second form of the argument, then, is that capitalism inevitably leads to war, but *not* only because of imperialist ventures.

H. N. Brailsford, in his *Property or Peace*, develops a thesis significantly different from the contention that profitable investment abroad can only end in the rivalry of war—'the policy of conquest.' It is not open to the objection how one of the most ruthless of modern 'economic imperialisms,' or dollar empires, the American, avoids political imperialism and territorial expansion. More seriously, it is not open to the objection of tying the criticism of capitalism to its colonial ventures, save as an incident. For Bukharin, the 'economic man,' in the shape of the capitalist, as no hypothesis of speculation but in fell fact, still walks abroad. Balked, he fights. And 'he' means 'his state.' How he gets the men of his State, mostly proletarians, to accept community of interest

—to be of a 'we-group' with him—and to do the fighting for him, remains tinged with obscurity.

Brailsford, having stated that 'the Genevan League, in its present [*bourgeois*] form, is not a conceivable instrument with which to achieve a creative peace . . . one would not propose to endow the League of Nations, as it exists to-day, with an international force,' proceeds to draw his conclusions.

> 'Property *must* rely on military power, partly to hold down its subject populations, partly to guard its fenced areas of privilege. It does not consciously desire war: it may even in its periods of repletion dread it; but alike by its competitive arming and its refusal to abate its claims to privilege and tribute, it is destined to defeat our hopes of a creative peace. Even when it is ready to consent to some scaling down of armaments, it maintains the relative power of the great empires, and against these no League of Nations dare enforce peace. Property, in short, is the principle of anarchy and the enemy of society. It *must* conspire against an ordered economic plan, nor can it tolerate an authoritative organization of an international life. It is the disease of which slumps and wars are symptoms.'

Mr. Brailsford goes on to rejoice that the Labour Party is abandoning 'its former faith in gradualism.' In a subsequent pamphlet, *Why Capitalism Means War*, he promises to develop the argument that inequality, *scil.* economic inequality, depends upon domestic force, and that, in a world of sovereign States, the habit of force means war.

I shall not enquire here whether in Russia there is equality of economic status between unskilled worker and bureaucrat; or whether the payment to each man, so far as feasible, of the whole value of the product of his labour, i.e. piece-rates and Stakhanovism, is consistent with economic equality (although the gross inequalities of power based on wealth have been removed). Nor shall I enquire whether, even granted equality of wealth, the most grave inequalities of power, between those 'in the party' and those not in it, may not persist (involving rule by force or superstition)—in brief, whether Mr. Brailsford does not prove too much for his own argument.

The issue is whether domestic force, sovereignty, private property, inequality, as well as imperialism, *tend* to war or whether they make war *inevitable*. It must, I suggest, be admitted that, theoretically, the sovereignty of separate nations, in so far as it is logically developed as a doctrine denying the possibility of any arbiter or obligation morally and actually superior to that sovereign State, is an immoral doctrine certainly tending (however historically excusable as a weapon against feudal fiefs) to war. From one angle the sovereign State is an instrument of peace *within* nations against feudal anarchy; from another angle it is the consolidation of a possible instrument of war *between* States. This argument, that absolute sovereignty is a main root of war, the writer has developed in *Challenge to Death*.[1] It does not, however, follow that sovereignty or even armaments *must* mean war any more than that poison on a druggist's shelf or revolvers in an armourer's case must mean a murdered man. What does follow is the need for drastic precautionary action.

What can be said about sovereignty (which is a kind of national consolidation of the unbridled Will to Domination) as a cause of war can be said—although, in my opinion, with less force—about property and inequality. Mr. Laski ridicules, as 'deceptively simple,' Sir Norman Angell's arguments; but I am unconvinced that his own arguments stand the strain of criticism better, although they are more consonant with our modern political theology. Sir Norman's conundrum about the North American States, beginning in tariff wars and ending at peace under federal sovereignty, and the impoverished South American States, at peace under Spain and proceeding to war under the control of several sovereign cliques, states an empirical issue which has never been unevasively answered. The cliques quarrel, of course, about property—and power and prestige. But why do the property interests, which should *inevitably* issue in war, not do so in the rich North but only in the poor South—and then under certain circumstances alone, and so much to the detriment of property that the capitalist United States has taken measures to refuse recognition to these *coups d'état*?

The substantial argument of Angell remains unshaken.

[1] *Challenge to Death*, with foreword by Viscount Cecil, 1934.

Differences of private property or even economic lusts are not the *sole* or the *necessary* causes of war. Nor is it even proven that Communism or economic equality—I mean real equality, not only to-day's Russian transition—dissociated from internationalism (which is not impossible) would necessarily remove war. It is not difficult to imagine that, were the level of living under equality set too low, equalitarian, propaganda-monopolistic, dictatorio-militaristic Communist State A might make war on its equally poor, equalitarian, propaganda-monopolistic, dictatorio-militaristic Communist State B [Trotskyite, of course], for reasons, possibly economic, possibly connected with keeping the regime in power. The Marxist explanation (as generally understood—there are passages where Engels admits, out of hand, other factors, although philosophically denying them decisiveness)—shall we say, for convenience, the 'Left-Wing-Book-Club'er' explanation—is deceptively simple.

As to the contention that the habit of force engenders war, it is, of course, true, as shown by Messrs. Durbin and Bowlby, although one would hesitate to say that the connection between boxing the ears of a naughty child and the next European War—or even between the force of Jones, P.C., 'keeping an eye' on the property of John Smith, socks salesman, while the latter is away with the wife and children at Brighton, and the deadly embraces of Hitler and Stalin—is patently intimate. The solid truth of it is that the appetite to punish; the belief that if you are not economically ruthless with the other fellow he will be with you; and the belief that wars always have been and always will be, and that the next war inevitably must be, alike spring from the mood, not merely un-Christian, but psychopathic, of mental armament. 'All for Hate or the World Well Lost,' as Aldous Huxley comments. It is precisely this mood that at all costs must be avoided like plague as utterly inimical to scientific advance, and practically reactionary even when held by admirable idealists.

The weakness of this line of argument, that economic inequality between men or nations inevitably issues in war, as indeed the weakness of Marxism in general, is its aggressive dogmatism, utterly anti-empiric. To the implication that economic inequality, that capitalism, that foreign investment

for property *must* lead to war, we can, of course, add, 'in the long run.' But, if so, quite a few wars, with which humanity and statesmen are more occupied (such as a new German war about the quite different issue of colonial prestige), may well have occurred—or, by good statesmanship, have been avoided—before this cosmic Marathon runner has completed more than a lap or two. Our interest is in the causes of the wars that threaten us now. The issue, however, between *must* and *may* is far more than some cheap academic trifling. If 'war *must* follow,' then it is folly not to prepare for it by the customary military means; folly not to attempt to locate the probable cancer spot from which the infection will spread; probably folly not to undertake a precautionary surgical operation, a 'preventive war' in the interest of treaty rights and general security. The best defence, *if* war is inevitable, may be attack. Certainly no possible advantages should be given to the opponent from false sentimentality. As has been pointed out plentifully in recent pamphlets, it is criminal negligence to think that one can come to terms with the blackguard aggressor unless one is prepared cravenly to concede his inevitable unjust demands. The mental atmosphere must and should remain that of the expectation of violence. The result is, for example, the Anti-Commintern Pact, cloaking national ambitions. It issues in a gospel of universal and persistent armed interventionism in the inevitable and ineluctable fight between Black and Red. It issues in a Great Power (or imperialist) dictation to other peoples about how they should live. It issues in statements, such as have been made, that if one could cause Britain to declare war on Germany, one should do so to-morrow. It is an attitude irresponsible and monstrous.

If, however, we adopt the alternative thesis, that 'war *may* follow,' that the risk of war is still alive, then very different political and diplomatic consequences ensue. For one thing, at a stroke, we are rid of the whole febrile miasma of 'inevitability.' Frankly, inevitability, of which too much has been heard, is not a concept congenial to the English tradition, whether in philosophy or politics. In international relations it is more than a philosophic lapse; it is a damnable menace. If war is inevitable, then alike all negotiations for an understanding, all talk of disarmament, is at an end. The best

hope is to sit on bayonets and to intimidate the probable aggressor for indeterminate decades by the superior armaments of his collective opponents: it is folly to suppose that such a state, at any time at all, can cease from the will to aggress. There is no compromise: enmity is eternal. An understanding is another name for futile compromise; and compromise another name for treason. We may continue to talk propaganda about campaigns against war and Fascism; but emphatically what is meant is that we must prepare to fight the inevitable war, abroad *and* at home, which may (or shall we say, 'inevitably *must?*') end war and Fascism —or us. Briefly, the crusade against war and Fascism may easily become a crusade against the Central European Powers through war, such as must wreck civilization. It is presumably this group that stimulated Lord Ponsonby's remark about those who appear anxious to engage in any war that is going.

Professor Laski has recently given striking enough expression to the customary Marxist view. In fairness it must be said that Mr. Laski has changed—not, indeed, his essential view that 'capitalism' not only may, but must issue in war, with its consequences in that mood of mental armament so ubiquitous on the Continent of Europe—but the guise of his views. In 1935, when still a member of the Fabian Executive, he was prepared to sponsor a resolution, generally 'Socialist League' in tenor, condemning all collaboration in war conducted by 'any capitalist Government.' This patently precluded support of that collaboration against Germany by the Soviet Government with *bourgeois* Governments, and of workers with both, which he subsequently advocated. I hold it no reproach to any man, in these years, to have changed his views on foreign policy. The case, however, for collaboration with League Powers in action would surely appear to be much stronger, because more realistic, before the Abyssinian collapse than to-day.

There is, however, no reason to suppose that the expression of Laski's views in *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War* (1933) are other than substantially authoritative. The argument is the customary economic one. Phrases about 'inevitability' are strewn about. In these years before Russia joined the League, Mr. Laski is a sceptic about what that League can do.

'Progress in these directions' (League of Nations organization and educational) 'is possible, without the certainty of the foundations of a system which makes war appear either necessary or desirable being attacked at the root. They would not destroy its *inevitability*.'

Although the diction is obscure, the conclusion to be drawn is plain. Unless capitalism is abolished, war is inevitable.

Let us then be quite clear on the issue under discussion. If the statement be that foreign investment or export, where motivated by an uncurbed greed of profit or by a desire to maintain a domestic standard of living for the general population at all costs against the workers of other countries, leads to a friction such that war becomes a grave risk, no reasonable exception can or should be taken to it. Exploitative capitalism notoriously has some of these tendencies: nor may the capitalist be prepared to relinquish his gains without stirring the maximum of trouble. Professor Laski, however, goes well beyond this. The contention appears to be that we must live and act upon the presupposition that war must come so long as capitalist systems, not only dictatorial but *bourgeois*, play any conspicuous part in the world.

This contention has no small practical consequences. Whether government under another Arthur Henderson, under any conditions at present probable in Britain, would count as 'capitalist system,' is not clear. But certainly the conclusion is invited that it is Utopian to act upon the supposition that war in our days is avoidable. The statesmanlike course, as in Russia, is to warn—even to alarm—the people about their danger from the foreign menace. In all countries, and especially in all countries moving towards Socialism, there is an 'inevitability' of capitalist military attack. To your tents then, and be prepared. Let us found our societies speedily for Aviation and Chemical Warfare. If this is not precisely the conclusion that Professor Laski chooses to draw, it must be the conclusion that less subtle followers will draw.

History is a study of the contingent. Sound statesmanship should allow for that fact. The Germans, unfortunately, Hegel, Marx, and their followers, have made it an exercise in the inevitable. I am prepared to accept that General Baden-Powell was a monster of imperialism, although the conse-

quences of this particular adventure in South Africa have, in the strictly logical theory, been somewhat unexpected, as are the joint endeavours of the British Government and Mr. de Valera to round up I.R.A. men. Mr. Laski rightly points out that the United States pushed on from 'dollar diplomacy' to territorial annexation. One does not forget Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt or Mr. Secretary Olney. These men were in the fashion of their times.

> 'That the push towards imperialism,' writes Laski (italics mine), 'is, on the assumptions of the system, an *irresistible* one, the history of the United States and, still more recently, of Japan, would appear to make manifest.'

Mr. Laski does not record the subsequent gradual withdrawal of the United States from territorial control in the Philippines. He presumes too much upon the inattention of his readers. If it be the case that this withdrawal is dictated by economic considerations, his argument is still further weakened. It is not clear that Japan's present campaign in China is in the economic interest of the Japanese capitalists and men of commerce. Indeed here the capitalists and the feudal-warrior Fascists are not quite the same.

Upon Laski's suppositions of inevitable conflict (and the implications of this conflict are always physical and uncompromising), the most recent history of India and the psychological technique of Mr. Gandhi would appear to be a closed book. Nor do his allusions to the 'grim history of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations since 1919,' which 'show clearly how little of its inherent habits economic imperialism has abandoned,' provide any scintilla of light upon the subsequent issue of their negotiations. All is gloom.

Mr. Laski has stated a perfectly sound sequence of economic likelihoods. He prefers to treat them as certainties immanent in history, rather than exploring how they may be obviated. Professor Staley, in one of the most exhaustive recent books on the matter, *War and the Private Investor*—an economist supported by Professor Quincey Wright and Sir Arthur Salter—comes to the exactly opposite conclusion. To perhaps an excessive degree he minimises the responsibility of the private investor for purely business advantage in producing serious political clashes. 'Foreign investments have been considerably

more useful as an aid and protection to navies than navies have been an aid and protection to foreign investments.'[1]

Increased consumption, Laski argues, ahead of food production involves exports and hence markets abroad to pay for the food imports. I am not clear how any government (granted the sovereign-state system, of which we have admitted the grave dangers) is to avoid this dilemma. We need not, however, accept the thesis that exports (e.g. under an international arrangement as touching backward areas) *must* mean war between imperialist powers. The hesitant attitude of the imperialist Western Powers in the present Sino-Japanese situation, although their markets are deeply affected, does not seem to bear this out so simply. Japan's own action appears to be rather dictated by the military clique, for their own glory, prestige, and domestic power, than by the Japanese traders and Foreign Office. And if we do accept this export thesis, the possibilities occur of increasing domestic food supplies or of accepting and keeping to—apparently not so difficult—an optimum of population. Investments abroad may, indeed, bring profits which are impossible when, thanks to scientific inventions, there is over-production at home. But there is still, surely (we shall revert to Laski's discussion of this), the possibility of exploring routes to increased consumption at home. Are all so well supplied?

There is, it may be said, an acute division between the rich and the poor, which the rich propose to perpetuate. The poor lose by war. The middle-class, from a Marxist point of view, may of course be dismissed as without a future or a decisive role. Sir Norman Angell may be right that wars are not economically profitable in the gross. But, argues Laski, if the many lose, the few who have the ear of government, profit. They prefer war to high wages. What, on this economic theory (unlike the psychological), remains totally unexplained is why, as Messrs. Durbin and Bowlby show, the many choose to fight to the death for the interest of these few whose economic interest is (by hypothesis) antagonistic to their own. Further, it is notorious that the gravest danger to-day with Mussolini

[1] Cf further H. J Laski in *Does Capitalism cause War?* (Brinton), with his argument that, wherever we find the [government of an] acquisitive society in operation, 'we find it [the society] using the sovereignty of the State for its purposes'—and the general discussion whether, as one contributor says, quoting Postgate, 'after another war Socialism will be more remote than ever.'

and Hitler is that they will put their power interests, as heads of a governing order, before the economic interest of either the capitalist class or the nation.

Professor Laski, however, proceeds to make an extraordinary and significant confession :

> 'A state is conceivable which is organized for the common welfare, in which the equal interests of men in its results is recognized as its essential principle. There is no *a priori* reason why such a state, if it were confronted by the prospect of a great addition to its common welfare, which it believed, for one reason or another, to be desirable or necessary, might not, if it thought the circumstances propitious, embark upon war in order to obtain that addition. It is even possible that such a state might embark upon war with a patriotism more extravagant, a loyalty more profound, than one in which its authority was exploited by a few. . . . The division of the world, that is to say, into a system of socialist states which retain the substance of sovereign authority would not, of itself, solve in a final way the problem of war.'

This is a remarkable statement in view of the remainder of the argument, a statement which eviscerates that argument and leaves us, as reality, precisely with the thesis we have ourselves stated about the dangers of sovereignty and the problem, behind that, of psychological causes, of which the acquisitive is only one.

Laski, however, safeguards himself by re-introducing the word 'economic.' He continues :

> 'Until we recognize that an interdependent economic world, whatever the internal organization of its constituent parts, is incompatible with a system of political units which bear no relation to that inescapable unity, we shall have left untouched the central causes of war.'

An equalitarian State may, then, go to war unless it recognizes 'economic' world interdependence. At least in this case, we do not have the problem of why the many should, as in a capitalist State, support the few, contrary to their economic interest. They all stand equally together. But, if so, what becomes of the contention that, although it is *not* to the economic interest of the many to make war, it will be made

'inevitably' because it *is* to the interest of the few? The original argument holds that it is not to the economic interest of *any* people to make war. They may make it, as a consequence of the clash of independent sovereigns, acknowledging no superior, and as a consequence of the appetite for prestige, or the appetite for power and prestige of governments, even contrary to (or from a mistake about) the economic interest of the generality. The words about 'an interdependent economic world' mean no more than that the societies and states of the world are interdependent, *among other things*, economically. The menace to the recognition of this interdependence is the appetite for power and, *among other things*, mistaken economic appetite—both of which we have throughout admitted, without any fatalistic metaphysic of the necessary logic of history or mumbo-jumbo about inevitability.

It is, of course, conceivable that an equalitarian country, in order to maintain its standard of living, might *really* derive economic advantage from a war for markets. If this is Laski's position, then we may agree; but the case, far from being inevitable, is highly hypothetical. Anyhow, such action must involve such grave damage to the economic and social structure of an interdependent world as not to constitute it a real, total advantage. Such a course, more likely, may be *mistakenly* supposed to constitute an advantage. I do not, however, see that economic mistakes can be loaded on to the back of legitimate economic causation. Rather it would be to the psychological field that we should have to turn for explanation. Why are mistakes believed? If capitalists *must* put a short-sighted private advantage before a long-sighted advantage even of their own system, why must they secure a popular following? In either event, the 'logical necessity' of capitalist inequality as the cause of war has, on Laski's own showing, receded into the background among other contingent economic and non-economic causes.

The whole of Laski's argument in this article (which is given in full as typical of many more written in the same vein) oscillates between these two positions: the striking one that economic inequality logically, inevitably, necessarily means war, and the sound (but different one) that political absolute sovereignty, as an instrun [illegible] the appetite for power reinforced by economic [illegible] n, class—consideration

reposes peace on utterly unsatisfactory and insecure foundations. A slight re-enforcement of this appetite for power; the need for prestige of a governing group; the tightening of economic considerations, may mean war. The weight of authoritative economic opinion is on the side of the second argument. Laski, himself, in some passages, admits this contingent element—in his allusions to the genuine pacifism of Bright's and Cobden's outlook and to the pre-capitalist, pre-imperialist theme of Hobbes that State stands to State in the position of gladiators. But Laski, developing the first argument, seeks irrelevantly to re-enforce it by the second, and to win on both the swings and the roundabouts.

Is there, on Laski's suppositions, a route out of the fated web which leads to war, short of physical revolution? For a moment he appears to indicate one: to develop the home market (that this is impossible to an adequate degree 'only appears to be true by reason of the character of our economic history since the Industrial Revolution') and to raise further the standard of wages. The suggestion obviously is important. But, Laski continues, it will hurt the dividend-drawer, the capitalist, the man who finds it easier to get profit abroad, the imperialist, the man who sucks sustenance from the necessary root of war. Mr. Laski rejoices in abstract phrases and in a pontifical language all his own. Let him, however, explain himself as he bolts the gates of rash hope. (It seems unnecessary any longer to italicize the key words: their incessant tune must strike the ear of any reader.) As touching faith in the League of Nations and like international organizations:

> 'peace itself, in this context, is no more than a troubled breathing space in which the men who protest their devotion to it, some of them, no doubt in all sincerity, are driven to make the preparations for inevitable war. . . . If the analysis here made is correct, it follows that the assumption is an impossible one. Capitalist peace is only, by its nature, a breathing-space between wars . . . the States involved, as a rule with their satellites also, move irresistibly upon the path to war. . . . To chose peace rather than war when the convergence threatens powerful vested interests is to abandon the right to employ exactly the weapons which

have been organized for their protection. . . . To abandon war is to cast doubt upon the whole evolution they have sponsored. . . . The vested interests will not make the necessary sacrifices. . . . A capitalism might be conceivable, of international scope, which surmounted the barriers of nationality; but, limited by history to alliance with the national State [*nota bene*] it is incapable of making the necessary adjustments in its assumptions. . . . If democracy means the end of imperialism, it is natural for the imperialist to contemplate the end of democracy.'

The above passages will at least make clear that Professor Laski possesses, to a singular degree, not the humanist, but the dogmatic, mind. Life, however, is not so.

Let us, then, reiterate—even at risk of tedium: No one in their senses will deny that economic avarice, when it is shared by powerful groups, is a potent irritant leading to war. When these groups are, or control, the government and can sway the emotions of the nation, the prospect of profits may be decisive of war. The expectation of profit by a nation is a dangerous—the expectation of profit by a group is a frequent—cause of international ill-will. Imperialism, in the sense of this search for maximum profit linked with determination to use State-power, is a cause of war. Capitalism, as the pursuit of profit by those in unequal possession of the means of production, is the concomitant, not necessary but usual, of imperialism.

This international ill-will is not checked, but emphasised, by the theory of State irresponsibility, i.e. absolute sovereignty, especially as expounded to-day in disregard of treaties. I agree with Professor Laski when he says, about the need for surrender of irresponsible State discretion:

> 'The international society requires this surrender; but it is a contradiction in terms of the postulates of the existing order.'

I share his suspicion of imperialism whether as the exercise of military power over subject peoples for the good of the conqueror or as the employment of wealth abroad for speculative profit, regardless of social well-being, or as the creation, by capitalist exploitation of a landless proletariat, of expropriated

peasants or natives in colonies or mandated areas. All tend to war. I sympathize with his suspicion of wealthy malefactors.

We differ in that I decline to agree to a fatalistic and dangerous doctrine which has immense contemporary practical consequences. That doctrine is that there is a necessary and inevitable cause of war in economic factors, which factors are present in the existing social system. That doctrine Mr. Laski states or implies, with a plethora of words that leave the impression of ineluctable destiny. He thereby, like some baneful foster-nurse, suffocates all alternative enquiries into causes of war, which enquiries may in fact be fruitful in making for peace.

It is not appropriate here to investigate whether psychological (or vital) causes are precedent to economic (or material) ones in the determination of life, including human life, or conversely. These metaphysical issues would be inappropriate in this context. It is, however, relevant to point out that Laski throughout assumes that, within the field of experience of present politics and a single generation, psychological factors are secondary to and derivative from economic. This dogma I hold vehemently suspect. Thus Professor Laski writes: 'If war is the real evil, the way to deal with war is not to deal with the occasions out of which it comes but the deeper causes of which those occasions are merely the expression. For he cannot otherwise successfully tackle at the source either the psychology or the institutions of imperialism.'

Although the greatest force of the 'economic argument' lies where, as the 'acquisitive argument,' it is itself a subspecies of the psychological, Professor Laski treats the 'psychology,' whether of 'imperialism' or of individuals, rather as what David Hume called 'humours,' and out-Humes Hume in making them dependent upon institutions. He does not, however, continue, with Hume: 'I would only persuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting *pro aris et focis*, and change a good constitution into a bad one, by the violence of their factions.' Assuredly 'habits' are moulded by institutions—although 'psychological habits' are not rashly to be classed, as appears to be the case with Professor Laski, along with 'ideology'—but institutions in turn are moulded by human psychology as well as by material environment. That human nature is older than any specific economic institutions.

That nature it is the task of science in the service of civilization to study. For the moment, the inculcation of the mood of peace may prove a practical stop-gap.

In a brief book, well meriting study, *War, Sadism and Pacifism*, Dr. Edward Glover writes: 'In the view of the medical psychologist, any attempt to fix attention on ethical and economic considerations to the neglect of deeper psychological factors is not only a misdirection of energy, but an obstacle to any real progress.' I agree here with Dr. Glover and, so far as I can gather, against Mr. Laski, who appears to me to be in error.

I should be happy if one result of this book were to persuade the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace to establish an adequate investigation, carrying further the enquiries of Messrs. Durbin and Bowlby, into what is or can be known about the psychology of the emotions making for war. Perhaps Messrs. Lansbury and Huxley and Professor Beard would form a suitable delegation to that body. A few—shall we say?—millions spent on this might really be sound economy.

Peace will not be assured, even on the grand scale, until the irresponsible sovereignty of particular States is discarded in favour of the organized confederation of the nations and the recognition of final allegiance to the comity of the world. That has already been said at length in *Challenge to Death.* It will not be assured so long as war may be invoked as an instrument, whether of national or group policy, to compass ends of particular economic advantage. The pursuit of private economic gain, in an unequal society, placed before social obligation, or the pursuit of social economic gain placed before the duty of each state by humanity and civilization, are incentives to ill-neighbourliness and are indirectly conducive of war. The core of the trouble is the romantic, but intelligible, belief that state comes before civilization. When these interests are able to bind themselves up with racial pride or national lust of power, they tend to become directly conducive to war.

These incentives must be put under restraint. Some of them, such as national pride and the supposed economic well-being of a local society may have their ideal side. Even so, the ideal must be subjected to limits imposed by a wider ideal.

Among ideals, neither interest of state nor individual might and profit is the noblest—although the former may be to the temporary advantage, even of the workers, in some particular country. How to effect this restriction, so that war may be checked, is primarily a problem of psychology and, secondarily, one of political and economic organization.

There are then many roots of war of varying degrees of importance. The egoistic lust of certain scandalous, speculative armament-makers—I do not hereby condemn all or most steel-masters—is one which adds its quota of mischief, sometimes decisive, but which Bukharin himself dismisses as a superficial explanation. However, by a restriction of profits, proposed by the Duponts themselves and for which the public conscience is now prepared, it is capable of ready remedy. Lawyers' doctrines of state sovereignty, which deny superior obligation to international morality, and economic imperialism, both of the private profiteering variety and of the totalitarian variety, are grave causes—not the primary ones, but intimately interlocked with those primary ones. Acquisitiveness, desire to retain group power, desire for domination by 'us,' as group, nation, empire—here we come nearer to the root causes. It is necessary to discover a new 'us'—to exclaim 'humans of the world unite.'

It is not true that 'the capitalist,' save as an abstraction, a lay figure, 'must' make war. But it is true that men brought up to put acquisition first will, at a pinch, tend to resort to it. So will statesmen who see profit for their country or their regime. (A far harder case these, because they can 'rationalize' their position into idealism.) And so will the man whose mind is possessed by sadistic hysteria, whether in the technical or popular sense. It is an infection that we catch from our enemies. That proclaimed pacifism may provide an anti-toxin is the best argument in its favour.

Of that hysteria it is especially necessary to rid our minds. It is a well-recognized route of war própaganda. It is unworthy as the basis of the policy of a great nation. It terminates the mood of accommodation which is the pledge of the return to reason and substitutes the eminently dangerous belief in war's 'inevitability.' It is, at source, and indubitably, reactionary.[1]

[1] *Vide International Policy and Defence* (National Council of Labour), p. 4.

IV

Let us draw the argument together. There are three movements which, claiming for themselves the high name of Peace, approach Democracy in order that she may espouse their cause. These three movements are the Pacifist, the League of Nations, and the Marxist crusades. Perhaps they may be combined, or two of them. Perhaps we have to choose between their divergent moods. Perhaps a policy that will satisfy none of them is still best for this country and for civilization. It will probably depend upon definition of terms and the limits of their respective demands upon the citizen.

(i) The pacifist is a man who feels an obligation—usually a religious obligation—to abstain entirely from all war. Whatever the Sixth Commandment archæologically-speaking meant, he takes it to apply to war. Or perhaps he doesn't trouble his mind about Jewish Commandments, and whether Jews could fitly slaughter Amalekites. He possesses a direct moral intuition that war is an abomination, in the same class as cannibalism, penal torture, and slavery, from which he will utterly abstain. Fine men, even saintly men or great philosophers—Thomas More, Torquemada, Calhoun, Aristotle himself—may have burned heretics or defended chattel slavery, but the pacifist will have nothing to do with compromise. Literally, he would die first.

Let us admit that, although it may *not* be true, as the Marxists tend to allege, that progress springs from the readiness to exercise violent resistance, it may yet be true that progress is made, thanks to men's willingness to do, perhaps non-violently, those heroic and uncompromising things which, in a better condition of society, we most certainly would not morally advocate all men doing. It is the ' hundred-per-center ' who gets things done. When the principle is established, then allowance may have to be made for common-sense modifications; but these exceptions do not warrant hesitation in maintaining the principle. Not all men are called upon to throw themselves into the arena with Telemachus or before the horse's hooves with Emily Davison; but the effect of a Telemachus or a John Brown or a Emily Davison on the abolition of the gladiatorial show or of slavery or on the

granting of women's suffrage is incalculable. And, among intransigences, one of peace is likely to be better for civilization than one of hate. As Lord Russell, in his *Practice of Bolshevism*, and Aldous Huxley, in his *End and Means* (one of the most important books in political philosophy for several years), have pointed out : *the means of reform condition the end.* Violence and distorted propaganda will speedily pollute any end—or (as Huxley writes with a pungency that will not please the exponents of unbridled moral indignation) 'the principal aim of the liars is the eradication of charitable feelings and behaviour in the sphere of international politics.'

We may, then, admit that, in an organized world, there might be a strong case for an international police force. That, however, is not the case which requires stress at the moment when the issue is to come to grips with the primitive leviathans and dinosaurs of sovereignty. We may, even, on principle admit the Christian doctrine of the just war. We do well, however, to recall that the just war was precisely defined. It presupposed an international *jus naturae et gentium* ; a papal arbiter exercising his sacred office ; and a real public advantage at stake. The comment of the German politicist, von Treitschke, upon this substitute for his favourite panacea of war as a cure for nations diseased, is interesting.

> 'The abstract conception of the State, if it is to be carried to its logical conclusion, requires the existence of some supreme power on earth, endowed with external authority. Thus we are inevitably led to St. Peter's Chair, for this supreme authority cannot be vested in any earthly body, but only the Representative of Christ, who claims to speak in the name of God. No such power, however, ought to exist here below, for our world of beauty ought to be a world of liberty as well.'

We must remember also Kant's gloss that there is no just war whatsoever where there is no such recognized arbiter. There is merely the jungle fight of victor and victim, in which the victor has fist-law : the victim is always guilty of the wrong of being the weaker. He will be a bold man, then, who builds too much on this 'just war' doctrine ; and a dishonest one who forgets the reservations. And the pacifist may feel entitled to enunciate a prime truth—that war is evil, whether

civil or foreign, the first curse of our contemporary civilization —without attending for the moment to the refinements.

The pacifist may, moreover, feel that the prime duty at the present time is to induce a certain *mood*, that of mental disarmament and of peaceful change. It may be that the first thing required is an emotional *détente*, if the climate of peace is to reappear. He may decline to accept the argument that certain countries will give no option of peace; 'will war,' not in certain, but in any contingencies; that the 'only thing they understand is force'; that it is 'blood either way'; and that they can only be fitly treated as 'mad dogs.' He may differ from those who are all in favour of peace—but 'a peace of justice'; and who regard with scorn the notion of paying the price of any peace that does not precisely square with their own private idea of justice for themselves.

He may insist that, e.g. the German *furor* arises from the conjunction of two factors; (*a*) a just case against the Versailles dictate, and (*b*) an immoral—but not new or unintelligible—belief that only force pays and is 'vital.' It is the conjunction of (*a*) with (*b*) that puts sober Germans behind these policies that we most deplore. The psychological and political task is, by a policy reasonable without timidity, to remove (*a*). The end of dictatorship will come when men are tired of its glamour and become sceptical of the advantages supposed to flow from its oppressive restrictions. Until point (*a*) is met, it is merely a detestable and nauseating hypocrisy, not lofty indignation, to talk about point (*b*). It is cant. Crooked events have had a crooked progeny. We are not quit with our own consciences. Let us sharply distinguish fear of Germany as Germany from hostility to Fascism.

The pacifist may feel that there is a yet greater issue at stake: a choice between two techniques upon which the future of civilization depends—that of the witch-doctor who works by passion, incantation, dogma, and force, and that of the scientist, infinite in his patient explorations, who holds no system absolutely right or absolutely wrong and holds most problems matters to be solved (if men will but keep calm) by the right psychological approach. It is Mr. Kingsley Martin who points out that there are more scientific methods of dealing with criminals and lunatics than by murdering their relatives. The importance, for the future of civilization, of this issue

between political scientists and political theologians I find it impossible to overstress.

Where the pacifist goes wrong is that he too often (for his own legitimate, intransigent purpose) forgets that the mental physician undertakes his task accompanied by the asylum warders. The right hand of peace, where there is a good conscience, is not inconsistent with the left hand on 'the hilt of justice.' What matters is, however, not *only* prudent defence, but *also* resolute, right, and good-neighbourly foreign policy. Man is an ill-tempered animal, most dangerous when talking loudest about just indignation. The pacifist is strongest when he is moving on the plane, not of 'defence forces' and army estimates, but of the right mood of a nation and its foreign affairs.

It may, of course, be felt that the pacifist case breaks down because economic inequality is a greater evil than war. To put it in other words, it may be felt that the difference between the present wage system and the periodic slumps, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Russian piece-rate system, not unaccompanied by pitiful street begging—or some intelligent Socialist system, far better than either, which the peaceful wit of man can devise—counts for more than the costs of another World War. We may, then, be tempted to dismiss as nonsense all attempts to consolidate this peace before the precedent economic issue has been fought through—or, again, feel that the only way to lasting peace is, specifically, to fight to a finish the Germans in an apocalyptic war to end war. I do not feel that the pacifist will have difficulty in rejecting this line of argument. The prior condition of Socialist advance in well-being for the common man is peace, if peace may be had. The palace of social justice and humanity is not best to be built on the blood-stained wreckage left behind after another Armageddon. Huxley, Russell, and Lansbury are effective in showing that. Nor is universal peace best ingerminated by universal crime.

On the contrary, if, as Professor Laski himself states, several of the terms of the Versailles Treaty were unjust, to the plain man the proper course would be to make a downright offer to the disaffected nations of the rediscussion of these clauses; to exercise that pressure for the dissociation of the 'Peace' and the Covenant, which, unfortunately, for over twenty years has

not been exercised and which is one proximate cause of the growth of Fascism; and to appeal, deliberately and not at all sentimentally, to the sense of fair play and love of peace of the human beings in Germany.

What, then, would be the practical pacifist programme? It may be pointed out that one first demand of Germany, in any such discussions, will be the return of some colonies, as a matter of prestige—perhaps a German West African Dominion, including something by purchase of Portuguese Angola and something of Leopold II's Congo 'Free' State (now Belgian). In reply, it may be said that Nazi Germany is no fit country to have native populations committed to her. To this the first answer must be that, according to the Marxists, neither, at the present time, are we. The second answer is to enquire whether the objectors are arguing for a plebiscite by the natives. The third answer is that, patently, any such restoration, or establishment of international charter companies, ought to involve the general recognition of international authority and guarantees. An offer on this basis was suggested by Mr. Herbert Morrison long ago. He was much criticized by Conservatives for these 'overtures to Germany.' Colonies must not be merely the trivial chattel possessions of some imperial nation to be handed over like salt or copra or coco-nuts. It does not follow that they must not, in equity and common sense, be conceded—so far as it lies as much in our power or that of France to concede them as of Japan to concede the Marshall Islands.[1] It would be pointless for Englishmen to fight about Togoland when the man in the street does not know where it is. The re-cession of German

[1] Lord Samuel, in his excellent *Belief and Action* (p 230, Cassell), quotes the following figures:

British Empire . .	14 million square miles
Soviet Russia . .	8¼ ,, ,,
French Empire . .	4⅓ ,, ,,
China . . .	4¼ ,, ,,
U.S.A.	3¾ ,, ,,
Belgium	930,000 square miles
Portugal . .	850,000 ,, ,,
Holland . .	800,000 ,, ,,
Total . . .	37¼ million square miles
Total land area of the earth .	55½ ,, ,,

The area of Manchuria is 363,000 square miles, and of Abyssinia, 350,000 square miles

It should, however, in fairness be recalled that colonial dependencies excessive for England or Britain, may not be excessive (if such dependencies are to be retained anywhere at all) for the British Commonwealth.

New Guinea would give Germany a colonial interest in the future of the control of the Western Pacific, which might well be beneficial.

What, however, Germany requires more than colonies to assuage her pride are access to raw materials (which may, of course, be munitions of war) and markets (which are not munitions)—especially markets.

Englishmen have many times wished that the Almighty would place Ireland, like a new Atlantis, under the water. But it has availed naught. The Irish remained their agreeable, truculent selves. The old technique of government by menace, by the strong hand, was not crowned by the one thing which might excuse it—success. Similarly, let us reflect that the German nation, however much a pity this may be, has come to stay and it will require, if it is to be peaceful, its appropriate position in the markets of Central Europe and on the Danube. It must, however, give signs of interpreting this demand in the spirit of the van Zeeland report.[1]

It may well be that this should be accompanied by diplomatic pressure to establish a Czecho-Jugo-Hungarian Federation in place of that Austro-Hungarian Empire which perhaps ought never to have been broken up. It may be that this would be a proper object of diplomatic pressure for the safeguarding of the Czechs and for imposing reasonable restraint on Berlin. Briand's old scheme of European union, revived by Mr. Ernest Bevin, demands patient consideration—but it must have beginning somewhere. Nor would I, for one, brush aside the recent suggestions, characterized by extraordinary vision, of Mr. Lionel Curtis.

The further German commercial interests become established in the Danube plain, among non-Nordics, the less relish Germany will have for the Islamic *jehad*, the holy war, of Wotan and the Nordic race. The genuine interest of Germany is in a Four-Power Pact—in a Franco-German arrangement—not in an alliance across the Alps at the expense of the Tyrol. Agreement between France and Germany (by the good offices of Britain; not, as with M. Caillaux' policy, at her

Attention is called to the exceedingly sagacious suggestions on foreign policy made by Lord Samuel in Chapter XIV of this book; and also to the proposals to Germany, and on Collective Security, outlined by Mr Richard Acland in his in many ways admirable little Popular Front book, *One Only Battle* (Gollancz).

[1] *Vide International Policy and Defence*, p. 5

expense) makes for the peace of Europe. Every indication of Russian policy is that she will increasingly choose detachment from Europe. What is necessary is that Britain shall impose upon Germany, as a condition of a Five-Power Pact, that the Russian frontiers shall not be interfered with in any fashion (not even as the tool of any factitious Ukrainian autonomism) and that hence no new European War shall be risked. The further guarantees required, which must be financially and economically as well as diplomatically secured, are the inviolability of the Rhine frontier; respect for the independent sovereignty of the Little Entente States; and respect for the right of free self-determination by free plebiscite of Austria, coupled with a scheme of general disarmament.

When an equitable arrangement of live-and-let-live has been made with Germany, it becomes again possible to deal with vigour with that flagrant militarist aggression by other Powers which scorns discussion in reshaping the map of the world, and utilizes the disagreement of the great Powers to flaunt, against even an honest internationalism, a new national imperialism that spits on peace. It will then be possible to battle for the international prestige of democracy and the rule of law. If, however, Germany chooses to refuse these overtures, then indeed we must look to the powder that we have kept dry and, having candidly explained our position to the world and, above all, to America, we must leave the German people to take the consequences of supporting insatiable rulers. I cannot suppose that these rulers, even bedazed by their new Roman Empire, will be guilty of such folly.

It is a policy well recognized in the history of diplomacy and not solely based upon the Gospels that, when one has discovered one's strongest enemy, if one course is to fight, the other intelligent course is to make peace with him. It is a policy that, in practice and principle, has much to be said for it if one can make *a stable peace with honour*, including within its guarantees the safety of one's smaller friends without exposing these weaker powers to devastation by war. It is not necessarily a weak policy. It may be beneficent. One thing can be said with assurance. The opposite policy is expensive and the crushing expense falls on the social services and lowers the standard of living and the hope of progress. The worker and his family pays.

A weak policy is neither to know what one wants nor to have the resolution to obtain it. Vigour of foreign policy does not involve interference in the domestic constitutional arrangements of dictatorial countries, whether or not endorsed by plebiscite or one-party elections. But it also does not involve ignoring the whole of the lessons of Richelieu's policy so far as it affects Spain—a policy acted upon alike by Canning and Palmerston a century ago.[1] Resolution in foreign policy is the opposite of timid retreat. 'Timidity, with regard to the well-being of our country,' wrote Burke, 'is heroic virtue.' But Burke, above all, believed that he knew at what point to make a stand. Resolution, then, involves prudence in choosing one's ground and courage in holding it.

International leadership involves the imagination to proceed beyond the confines, while recognizing them, of our own immediate interests. It involves vision for the future. Policy and inclination may demand the closer union of Anglo-Saxony —of Britain and America. Policy may require that increased strength of both countries, which Germany gives evidence of alone respecting ; but resolution is required to assure for both countries their safety, and their progress and power to support democracy. In Mr. Greenwood's words : 'War will not be averted by permitting one small country after another to become the happy hunting ground of dictators,' with an aggressive bluff in their diplomacy. It will be averted by a dispassionate, common-sense recognition of realities, and a willingness to shape policy upon this recognition, coupled with a passionate resolution to vindicate for ourselves the value of our own established ideals as a people.

However, what if the Cinderella powers are indeed wolves in Red Riding Hood clothes? What if no concessions, no reasonableness, no sane generosity will appease the countries of Goethe and Kant and Mazzini?—if their populations be bosch, dago, sub-human, or the hypnotic victims of inexplicably evil governments in this new dualism, this great duel of history? What if the Germans are not human?

Mr. Crossman, in his pungent article has shrewdly suggested that the German Führer, Herr Hitler, has the intransigent temperament of Mr. de Valera. It will, however, be recalled

[1] I find it [now, as in August 1936] difficult to exaggerate the importance of this.

that the methods of the 'Black and Tans' were not singularly successful against Sinn Fein, whereas later and opposite methods have been crowned with an almost incredible measure of success.

Mr. John Maynard Keynes speaks with great authority on these issues—with more authority than most writers. In a luminous article in the *New Statesman*, he writes:

> 'Defeat is complete disaster. Victory, as usual, would be useless, and probably pernicious. . . . Therefore, and furthermore, I maintain that the claims of peace are paramount; though this seems to be an out-of-date view in what used to be pacifist circles. It is our duty to prolong peace, hour by hour, day by day, for as long as we can.'

So far, every genuine pacifist will agree. But Mr. Keynes continues:

> 'I do not claim that war can always be avoided . . . our knowledge of human nature tells us that in practice there are circumstances when war on our part, whether defensible or not, is unavoidable.'

At this stage the pacifist becomes an 'impossibilist.' He declines to compromise. For him, unlike Mr. Keynes, it is of the essence of the matter whether war is morally defensible; and, if it is not defensible, he declines to have part or lot in it. When such a war comes, he will inevitably be accused of 'causing the righteous to fall,' of 'letting the just cause down.' I think that his reply is effective: that, if the righteous man is really such, he will not object to suffering in order that a supreme cause may be vindicated. The Christian Church survived, when the Roman Empire with its bloody soldier Emperors and their assassins fell, because it had the courage to suffer even after free discussion had been stamped out. It was Confucius who said: 'There has never been a good war, although some have been better than others.' China, basing her culture on the teaching of Confucius, may be destroyed by Japan in four weeks, but she has stood as one of the mightiest contributors to civilization for longer than any other State whatsoever—that is, for three thousand years. There is more practical, common-sense force to the pacifist

argument than is generally allowed. Perhaps, however, the righteous man will prove also human—concerned with the maintenance of his country and society as he finds it, not as, let us say, Buddha might have wished it. What is clear is that no politician representing mostly those who do *not* take the pacifist's view, can pursue an uncompromising pacifist principle at the expense of the rest.

The pacifist position is practical politics so long as it is constructive, advocating economic discussions and the like, or is concerned to instil the mood of embassies of peace, not excluding those of the British Legion. Beyond that it is only 'exemplary,' i.e. right as an attitude in specific circumstances—although exemplary on an issue of incomparable importance. History will greet these men—the Lansburys, the Sheppards—as pioneers. They belong to the company of those, led by Erasmus, who declared of war that it is 'so pestilent that it blights all morality, so impious that it has nothing in common with Christ'—but they will be cursed by their contemporaries as dangerous, shallow fools, or worse. Ideals, the preservatives of the race, may be the damnation of the nation.

(ii) Let us, then, grant that, under certain circumstances, there may be wars and preparation for war—or international police work—that may be just. What are these circumstances?

The enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations here replies: that war is just which is authorized as defensive sanctions in accordance with the provision of the Covenant, the decision of the League Council, and as a measure of collective security.

This argument had great cogency until 1936. All the Great Powers, except the United States, were or had recently been members of the League. The United States was co-operative. The Abyssinian War showed that the façade of the League and the realities were very different things. The realities emerged, under capitalist governments, as those of the Triple Entente versus the Triple Alliance, in which France, at Stresa and under M. Laval, was before all things preoccupied lest Italy became wedded to that Alliance. The resultant political alignment bears no striking spiritual resemblance to the League for which Wilson fought. But, if not his Covenant, then another, earlier slogan of Wilson's does seem singularly applicable as providing an aim: 'He kept them out of war.'

Lord Russell seems abundantly justified in his pungent scepticism whether an association of Powers, however organized or legally constituted, weaker in the aggregate than the Triple Entente group of 1914, can appropriately and without disingenuity be named 'collective security,' save as *une espérance de l'horizon.*

The criticism, in Mrs. H. M. Swanwick's *Collective Insecurity*, of Lord Cecil and the International Peace Campaign, with its policy of multiplying commitments and stressing the sanctity of very unholy treaties—certainly less holy than the British signed obligation to pay the American debt—deserves attention. This policy is not indeed uncoupled with words about treaty revision; but without indication of priority. That all nations should unite against the aggressor is splendid. It would be the basis of a real league; a new international order; and a mighty advance towards peace. It presupposes that policy of appeasement outlined in the last section.

That half the nations of the world should confederate without the other half is not so good as a basis for abiding peace, whatever may be said for it as a restatement of the balance of power. We have first to decide—as Mr. Crossman shows—before we begin the process of consolidating world-sovereignty and world-courts, whether we have the feasible basis of a world-league. There is not always shining evidence that this is being even *bona fide* attempted. There is grave danger of being deceived by fine words that have singularly little in common with the spirit of the League as even Wilson intended it. At least it can be safely said that Mr. Lansbury, as a strictly practical matter, has done more to produce that emotional *détente* necessary for the work of peace than all these campaigners.

Is this country, then, to maintain its neutrality at all costs—to share only in collective neutrality? And to pursue, so far as it may, the traditional American policy, to disentangle itself from Europe? The answer must be 'no.' At least we are pledged to the *defence* of France against unprovoked aggression—not of course against the vain egotism in policy of some Napoleon III or the sadistic obstinacy of some Poincaré. Beyond this the answer must be, in part, strategic. And here it must be remembered that, owing to the aeroplane, the old strategic boundaries of interest are largely obsolete—

we are all at the mercy of all, *if* we choose to get involved. As Mr. Crossman ably urges, we cannot and should not afford to undertake widespread prior commitments that weaken ourselves and ultimately damage our cause. Briefly, however, Britain has a western interest, bound up with the low tariff group, and an Anglo-Saxon interest. And these happen roughly to coincide with the frontiers of democracy.

This may involve sacrificing imperialist gains irrelevant to that democracy. Such abnegation, however, by concentrating power, may be a source of strength, not weakness, and enable us to deal, with a resolution hitherto conspicuous by its absence, and with hands less full, with aggression from beyond the Pyrenees or on the Red Sea. There is much to be said for the policy of Octavian of 'drawing the limits of empire.' Granted this concentrated strength and limited commitment, we should be able to guarantee effectively and definitely not only the frontiers of France, but also even of Poland (with adjustments) and of the Slav area of Czechoslovakia. The German minorities problem, indeed, where British blood is involved, ceases to be a domestic question for that country alone. We are not pledged to sympathy with Lithuania ; and the issue of the Polish Corridor has got to be settled. On the other hand, no general and lasting arrangement for peace can be satisfactory which ignores Russia, or endeavours to treat her as isolable in such a settlement.

For the rest, Mr. Keynes appears to be right. 'It is our duty to prolong peace, hour by hour. . . . It is silly and presumptuous to say that war is inevitable.' It is Briand's old policy : *la politique des dix ans.* I doubt if there is better political wisdom.

Are we to 'scrap' the League and terminate obligations under the Covenant ? Certainly not. The League, not only as an idea but as an organization, is one of the few concrete gains, more than mere negation of aggression, accruing from the last Great War. One can vehemently agree with the Armistice Day statement of General Smuts : 'Let us keep to the light we have seen.'

Nevertheless, patience is required—if we are to abolish the principle of unanimous vote so catastrophic in the history of Poland or even to introduce that direct taxative power fundamental in the history of the United States, let alone proceed

to a war of secession against Italy, Germany, Japan, and a few others. We cannot indeed stop until we have increased the functions of the Bank of International Settlement at Basle; and achieved an operative International Bank of issue and direct taxation of the citizen by the League, instead of the present national taxation for armaments. International government costs money. But the very League protagonists as yet give little evidence—so busy are they with using their League militarily—of admitting these necessities. The only consequence of obstinacy in this course will be to divide the world into two Leagues, one centred in Geneva and the other in Berlin; and the last state will be worse than the first. While this wrangling on paper goes on, the substance of peace is wounded mortally—and peace when wounded sheds human blood. . . . Often the trouble with the League has been its supporters, who were more concerned with treaty law than with equity.

These international advances, to new and unprecedented loyalties, take time. There is little in the contemporary condition of the world to warrant undue optimism. Exponents, such as Lord Cecil, of the League idea, very properly warn us that it took five hundred years to build up from feudalism the modern nation-state. It will be good work indeed if we get an effective League built in two generations. That it should be built is of urgent importance for humanity. The glory and vindication of this Commonwealth, as of Virginia under Washington, should be in leading, first the Anglo-Saxon peoples and then the world, towards this wider idea. But we must lead realistically. And it is the beginning of wisdom that we be not deceived into believing the present League to be that which it is not. Above all, we must not be gulled into co-operating, under the name of League ideals, in schemes which have a more ancient and a more sinister history. The League must not become a tool of intrigue and an excuse for yet another war to be christened 'just.' The danger is real. It is against it that the protest of what have been called 'the pessimistic pacifists,' Lords Russell, Ponsonby, and their like, have indubitable force.

To do nothing avoidable to frustrate the universalization of the League is the first duty of loyal supporters of it. Once universalized—or even approximately so—and the mood of

peace ingerminated, all these fruits of economic solidarity, to which Mr. Attlee has referred, may be expected in due season to follow. If, on the contrary, aggression is to be threatened (and it is the moral duty of men of good will not to presume this, even when 'keeping their powder dry,') then the issue resolves itself into one governed by the military and strategic considerations which we have already discussed. Should there be no alternative for this country save to strike, it is imperative to strike decisively. *In war, success must always be the only test.* Power decides. There must be rigid discipline of men and money. That absence, however, of an alternative, is far from the present situation. We cannot speak of alternatives being exhausted until we have publicly cleansed ourselves of the impurities of Versailles. Nor is it contrary to our national interest or that of peace to do this. An honest League must do this.

(iii) It may, however, in despite of Mr. Keynes, Mr. Attlee, and others, be held that any assumption that war is not inevitable—or, at the least, calculation of it the only fit basis of prudent conduct—is itself 'silly and presumptuous,' naïve if not deliberate treachery. I am aware that, for these reasons, much of what is written above must be a matter of scorn for what Attlee calls 'the class war enthusiasts,' and a spitting for the Marx-Stalinists. *Je m'en fiche.* One prefers peace to Stalin.

Let us begin by pointing out those principles in which the Marx-Stalinists are right—not only in the Tsarist Russia of the knout, but even in this country. As against the League of Nations' enthusiasts, they are right in asserting that a League Council, including 'capitalist' and even Fascist Powers, might, if too strong, easily set up a static Holy Alliance for the maintenance of the *status quo*, political and economic, which would be a dangerous instrument of reaction. In this sense it is true, that we *do not want* an international organization regarded as a cure-all and finally consolidated, until we are assured of the concomitant development with it of dynamic, vital movements for social justice and for the creation of a society not unchristianly divided into two mutually exclusive cities of rich and poor. There is danger of a lawyers' and diplomats' League—and reactionary lawyers, at that.

Further, the counter-truth to the statement that peace

matters more than equal wealth—no lords and ladies, and all the Soviet's children commissars—is the statement that bread matters more than an international machinery for safeguarding the frightened *bourgeois* in his comforts. Until—it may be said with an irritant particle of truth—there is a much larger measure of social security for the common man than at present exists, all monuments of peace are whited sepulchres. We need not finesse about who, in a democracy, controls the police. Order is maintained by the police repression of the resentful—resentful in their stomachs.

The remedy is resolute, radical, rapid reform. The Marxist pessimism precludes the view of any other remedy but physical revolution. We may debate who will start the revolution, but physical it will be. As Lenin said : 'To-day, both in England and in America, the precondition of any real people's revolution is the *smashing*, the *shattering* of the ready-made state-machinery.'[1] This is to defy, not merely some particular law, but the system of law itself, at least as touching this revolutionary transition. It should be noted, on the Russian analogy, that this revolution is most likely to take place in the case of war—a war of attrition in which Britain is beaten. Force is in the hands, not of the law, but of the litigants. To assert the rule of men above law is to enthrone force against peace. It is, however, important not to ignore the facts of the Marxists because one repudiates the dangerous Marxist theology built thereon.

It is not indeed quite obvious why, in a discussion of peace, one should include reference to a theory soaked, as much as the mind of any junker, with militarist symbolism. Marxism took its origin from the thought of an age which regarded the pursuit of self-interest as the highest wisdom and when it was regarded as the duty (if that be the word)—at least, the 'inevitable' practice—of each group to pursue that material, economic interest against all comers. The natural consequence was a doctrine of necessary conflict. The result is a philosophy and propaganda that visualizes civil war at home and predestined Armageddon abroad. Civil war is not enough. The *jehad* or holy war abroad cannot cease even when one or two countries have been gained. War is necessarily international —multi-national. Nay, it must inevitably grow more fierce as the chagrined ranks of the enemy puts up, thanks to its

[1] Italics Lenin's.

inherent logic, an ever more desperate and diabolic fight, until at last *solvet coelum in favilla*—the whole firmament is dissolved in ardent heat—and justice at last, like Jerusalem descending from Heaven, is socially achieved amid chaos, with or without piece-rates and, as in Russia, interest on State-bonds.

A pacifist may be permitted to remark that, in the process, a military dictatorship, in all its ways not entirely distinguishable from the Fascist, will by inherent logic be set up. At least it seems odd that all this Swedenborgian or Miltonic vision of Heaven and Hell and Last Things should be included under the caption of the Peace Movement. The Marxist objections, however, as to the temper of thought of the older Peace Movement are too insistent, and too valid, to be ignored.

Let us, instead of discussing whether Marx-Leninism is 'ultimately' a peace movement, as it were by the *détour* method, enquire its probable immediate consequences on local application. Using the analogy of Professor Laski's very sound statement that foreign investment begat imperialism and his less exact one that imperialism begat militarism, we may say, yet again, that there is the gravest danger, in the history of this country, lest we have to record that Professor Laski begat Mr. Pollitt (for whom as a person I entertain genuine respect but whose policy is ill-adapted to our needs) and that, by historical dialectic, Pollitt begat Sir Oswald Mosley. Whether a revolution beginning in this neo-Girondinism and ending in neo-Bonapartism would be worth while, each must judge for himself. Sir Oswald Mosley would doubtless maintain (Hitler does this) for domestic consumption, that his is a peace movement; but the franker statements of Il Duce are probably to be preferred. That such an historical course is possible and that, on the achievement of each stage, the next becomes more probable, I affirm. It is not otiose to add that the admirable Jewish community would be extraordinarily misguided were it to lend itself and its support to any such political course. The first steps on the slope of tendency may not be taken—must not be taken.

(iv) The ultimate goal, then, is entire pacifism: the mood that presumes the universal reign of peace, domestic and international. It is a goal comparable to the abolition of crime. That abolition we may never expect to see in our own

or our children's time, but we still do not cease, as a practical matter, to scan the criminal statistics and to demand a decrease. Nor are the most violent of penal methods the best for this result. And we may expect to see, as of particular crimes so of national wars, their entire extinction without any enervation of the race. Discipline and heroism are important; but no more dangerous moral doctrine can well be than that national or international wars must continue to provide them a field. It is like the older fallacy that poverty must exist to provide a field for generosity. There is also a heroism in a persistent pacifism in pursuit of a supreme ideal.

The intermediate objective is the organization, so speedily as may be possible in the process of history, of a world-wide society or confederation of states—perhaps prepared to apply force; perhaps providing, in an international police (like the old Military Orders of the Papacy) or civil air-service, field for one type of heroism; perhaps, as sovereign, prepared to treat aggressors or seceders as Lincoln treated Lee; but immediately prepared to provide facilities for the creative work of peace and for such international organization in markets—whether through a new Economic Conference, through the I.L.O. or by offering the aid of experts besides direct diplomacy—as may obviate the admitted causes of war.

Even these things cannot be attained over-night. The major virtues of history are energy and patience. Countries are in different stages of civilization and of good will, both internationally and between classes. It is our duty to carry on energetically with social change, peaceful but radical, at home and simultaneously to prevent ourselves from being entangled in schemes abroad of which our conscientious attachment to peace cannot approve. The premature crystallization of the League, *undetached from the Versailles 'settlement,'* is far from entirely desirable.

Immediately, our duty is to explore every avenue to the maintenance of actual peace and to scrutinize every doctrine that debouches in *actual* war, however much it may allege that, theoretically, it is the 'real doctrine' of peace, as being a preparation for war to end war. This does not mean a policy of concession to dictators no longer in their pink; or an attempt to reconstitute the fatuous Stresa Front, which

betrayed justice without assuring peace. We have come to a time when either we have to choose rigorously the mood and habits of peace, even at some cost to our own political predilections, or we have to turn our back on them and arm, not in mere prudence, but in faith and confidence of war to come, seizing for ourselves the decisive, if unscrupulous, advantage of the initiative. Like all great political decisions it is not a morally simple one. It is the tragedy of politics that this is so. The temptation to intervene in our neighbours' affairs, as we once did in Russia, and to prescribe for them dogmatically what we know alone to be good for them, is immense. It is the road of political theology. It has a species of religious appeal.

It is an appeal that must be resisted. Our task is to give to the world-society plan a sober and loyal support made active wherever we can do this without unjust sacrifice, not only of the material interests of our own people, but of the reasonable expectation of fulfilment for their peaceful and democratic ideals. Our task is to maintain, by all relevant means, democracy 'in at least one country' (Stalin)—perhaps in all Anglo-Saxony. Our task is that of the good neighbour, disentangled but not disinterested. And meanwhile, our task also is to work for economic justice at least in our own country, and there first—but also in international relations as between country and country. Passion for equity, mental sobriety, resolute self-discipline, organized military strength equal to the need—these are the requirements.

The assumption of this paper is that the roots of war are, not hard, fatal facts, but primarily psychological and changeable. To date, despite millions spent on armaments, no technical psychological study of the causes of war (so in earnest are we all) has even been begun. The major risk of world war is to-day German. (Or is it now Japanese?) Herr Hitler has shown genius in rising to power on grievances, some genuine, all carefully developed by an able propaganda, itself involving technical psychology. These grievances are largely due to a deplorable refusal for years, especially in France, to regard the German case as within the legitimate range of sympathy. The very virtuous social sense that attaches one to one's co-citizens is related to the vicious distrust of the alien. It is part of the savage humour of history that virtue

and vice are so linked. The other man's affairs, not 'of us,' are outside our purview, unless unpleasant events shake complacency.

If democracy is to be maintained, dictatorship must be understood as any disease must be understood. To the eye of political science it arises from a removable tension in the body politic. The scientific technique of social psychology is not consistent with theologico-political incantations. The immediate need is to remove this tension. The situation will not be bettered but aggravated by political fanatics, *coups d'état.* and civil wars. The disease is too deep for any surgery of individuals. The first requirement of therapeutics would appear to be an aggressive good will—which is neither the same thing as weak concession to every petulant demand nor as self-exposure to danger. That good will must, on all and every occasion, be accompanied by a strong will and a patent self-respect. That requirement is scarcely met by some Stresa Front backers who make no declaration about what of their own imperial interests they will concede, but who are only apparently willing to sacrifice international justice to sympathy with aggressive Fascism and lasting peace to their own financial interests. We need to make—not to the fire-eating German politicians, but to the German people—an offer that we consider just and generous such as we should expect ourselves if our history had been that of the Germany of 1918, of the Food Blockade, of Versailles, and of Weimar. We need to put our own fire-eating politicians in jail for a while—including those who think Mussolini and Franco 'always right'; but also some others. When that offer has been tried and failed, it will be time to take up, by methods authoritarian, efficient, if need be, dictatorial, the stout defence of our own liberties, along with those equally threatened, and the mass poisoning of German children.

This does not mean that we should not make adequate preparation against the worst: or that we should not clearly notify Germany of the nature of our guarantees and of our intention of abiding by them. It does not mean that we should not proclaim proudly and publicly, with grounded assurance of strength, our faith in our own free tradition or that we should not use every modern instrument of publicity for this purpose. But, for the present, we are entitled to

condemn an excited temper as a criminal activity against the spirit of peace and of humanity.

It is relevant here to quote a comment by Mr. Attlee :

> 'I do not believe that a war of ideologies is inevitable. I believe that the way to meet Fascism is not by force of arms, but by showing that with co-operation in the economic sphere far better conditions are obtainable than by pursuing a policy of aggression. The League should be used, not as the framework of an alliance of States united against those outside it, but as an organization within which there are the widest opportunities for all States, a League open to all States which will come in and accept its conditions.' (*The Labour Party in Perspective.*)

And, again, in the House of Commons :

> 'If we look broadly at this question we see the immense scope that there is for world development and world prosperity, and the real way to deal with the dictators is not to think that you can attack them by war ; the real way is to show that there is another and a better method.'

This opinion is a valuable guide to social democrats in this country in indicating their proper course. It rightly refuses to admit that it is for the good of this nation and Commonwealth to view Europe as, by some metaphysical necessity, divided into two hostile camps ; or even to adhere to that view of the balance of power according to which the balance is best maintained by kneeling, economically and militarily speaking, on the chest of a fallen foe—or by being knelt on. *It does maintain that this country, to uphold its own Western democratic social policy, must be strong*, just as Germany demands that she, too, must be strong . . . but strong as arbiter and strong as upholder of the international (as distinct from the Clemenceau) system.

It is useful to place beside this comment of Mr. Attlee's the judicious and sound statement of Sir Walter Citrine, at the Norwich Trade Union Congress, 1937. His assertion that Germany and Italy were on the road to commit themselves to a course in which 'nothing but force will restrain them,' was placed in the context of two other remarks :

'We have to envisage the possibility of taking distinct action of a military or naval character.'

'Our primary duty is not to take such action as will cause this country to go to war if any alternative is open to us.'

Mr. Herbert Morrison, speaking at Newcastle as recently as 5 March 1938, said:

'We should make it clear to the Fascist countries that, on the basis of a genuine peace settlement, we are open to discuss and agree on economic settlements, and that, provided other countries are willing to do the same, we are agreeable to hand over all appropriate colonial territory to international administration in which all countries shall be eligible to take a share. . . . That is the policy of constructive peace.'

This Essay will have fulfilled its purpose if it serves to place these conclusions of Attlee, as of Morrison, in a context that re-enforces their argument. The Labour Party of this country is traditionally a peace party. That is the source of its votes. Its argument historically has been that war is like cholera, of which the extinction demands, in the co-operative commonwealth of the world, the collaboration and heroism of all sane and civilized men. That tradition cannot be sacrificed. That collaboration is not yet impossible, and is willed by the people of this country. It is necessary—and it is possible without folly—to take a chance for peace.

The strength of Russia has got to be maintained. No other factor in recent history has given greater pause to an aggressive and exploitative capitalism. No trick must be lost to Fascism, least of all in Spain. But these principles are not inconsistent with a judicious, unhysterical policy that will, in fact, maintain peace for the common people of this country. That policy must rest upon the basis of frank reciprocity and of national respect, requiring accommodation as well as giving it. It is not the case that this country should not enter into negotiation with dictatorial countries. But it will not be dictated to by them. It is the case that it must enter into the *right* negotiations with them, without timidity and without self-apology, in the interest of those generations in every nation that are yet to

come and whose hopes repose upon morality, peace, rational progress, and on the rule *pactum serva*—' keep pact.'

We must settle the Peace terms, if possible, not after, but before the next war. That is the best guarantee that they will indeed be terms of peace. Such a settlement must be negotiated, not by those whose minds are obsessed by the inevitability of war (since such prophecy fulfils itself) and not without determination to admit such elements of justice as there are in the German case, but by allied, disciplined and armed countries determined upon peace, if possible, and respect for law anyhow. The terms of peace, before war, must be settled in a fashion that expresses respect for the orderly processes of law. To such a settlement we must, as a nation, be prepared to contribute, in the words of President Monroe, quoted by Mr. Secretary Cordell Hull, ' a frank, firm, and manly policy . . . submitting to injury from none,' but asking for more than our due, for ourselves or our friends, from none. Meanwhile we must occupy the time, not in shouting insults at others, but in organizing ourselves and in doing this, beyond peradventure, efficiently. That is a sufficient whole-time occupation for the present.

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